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Foreword
N THE frontiers of the social order we can expect
to find scholarship unusually prolific, and in recent
years no legal frontier has invoked more intensive
effort than has American administrative law. In law review
articles, reports, monographs, and treatises, legal literature
has teemed with discussion of every phase of the subject,
both general and particular. Able legal writers-Benjamin,
Dickinson, Freund, Gellhorn, Goodnow, Landis, and Sharfman, to name only a few from a very long list-have expounded the theory and embellished the practice in every
nook and corner. They have given administrative law an
important niche in American jurisprudence, so much so that
at long last even the digest-makers now give it recognition
in tables of contents and key number systems. Across the
Atlantic, writings of such leaders of legal thought as Sir
Cecil Carr, Lord Hewart, and Professors Robson and Wade
have opened the way to understanding of English theory and
practice. At the level of practical administrative operations,
the President's Committee on Administrative Management
and the United States Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure have made available comprehensive studies of administrative organization and procedure as
they are found among federal administrative agencies, studies
that have been ably paralleled for state agencies by the
Benjamin report, Administrative Adjudication in the State
of New York. In the legislative branch the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 and equivalent state enactments in Wisconsin, California, Missouri, and elsewhere
have instituted the practice of statutory codification of administrative procedure. These statutes are milestones in procedural law. They have evoked a wealth of periodical comment,

0

vii

Vlll

FOREWORD

both pro and con. In fact, administrative agencies, though
frequently the object of criticism and even distrust, are now
fully accepted as an essential part of the modern social,
economic, and political order. American administrative law,
born in its modern aspect not more than two generations
ago, has definitely come of age.
In the United States, in sharp contrast with practice in
Great Britain, and, indeed, with that in most continental
countries, we have committed ourselves to judicial control
of administration and administrative agencies. It is an accepted part of our constitutional theory of distribution of
powers. We look to the judiciary for protection of rights and
liberties-for protection against the hazards of uncontrolled
bureaucracy.
Judicial control is manifested in two principal ways. In the
first place, we command administrative agencies to follow
the usual judicial patterns of procedure in conducting their
quasi-judicial processes, and to a certain extent we impose
equivalent requirements in connection with quasi-legislation,
the promulgation of administrative rules. Notice to interested
parties, with opportunity to be heard orally and in writing,
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, rules of evidence in
quasi-judicial proceedings differing not too widely from
common-law standards, orders based upon written opinions
setting forth conclusions of fact and law-ali of these are
required as part of the administrative process. In short we
believe in the virtue of the "paraphernalia" of the judicial
process as a means of channeling the administrative process
and thereby assuring fair play. Then, in the second place, and
even more importantly, we are committed to a thoroughgoing doctrine and practice of judicial review of administrative rules and orders. Constitutional questions, questions of
interpretation, and all other legal questions the courts reserve
to themselves for final judicial decision. Even with respect to
fact questions, a certain measure of control is asserted and at
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least a limited judicial review is made available. It is a fact
that we are more trustful of courts than we are of administration, and we rely upon them and their processes to assure fair
treatment for the individual. Judicial controls are definitely a
part of our jurisprudence, in sharp contrast, it may be noted,
to the practice in Britain, where judicial procedure is ordinarily not expected of administration and judicial review is
virtually nonexistent. The British rely upon Parliamentary
control of the ministerial departments. We rely upon the
courts.
Notwithstanding the wealth of literature on administrative
law, there is ample room for Mr. Cooper's volume, Administrative Agencies and the Courts, a volume which, with
careful attention to practical detail, reflects our judicial attitude toward administrative agencies. The author, within
reasonable confines, gives us a careful exposition of the
judicial procedures that have been imposed upon administration as interpreted by judicial decision and the judicial
limitations that have been evolved through the case law of
judicial review, all to channel administrative agency powers
and assure justice in administrative law. Both quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative processes are treated. Decisions of the
agencies are used to capture the spirit of administrative law
in action and to expound in concise form the details of the
administrative processes themselves. The method and scope
of judicial review of administrative decisions-our system
of checking administrative error-are thoroughly covered.
Court decisions, both federal and state, handed down in the
various substantive fields in which administrative agencies
play a part, are correlated. The principles generally applicable to the functioning of this new departure in American
jurisprudence are presented. In this volume we have something a little different in the literature on. administrative
law-a systematic treatment, not too detailed for the student
and the novitiate, yet sufficiently detailed to provide the
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general background essential to a practical understanding of
the relationship between the courts and administrative agencies in this country.
American administrative law, although a comparative
newcomer in our jurisprudence, today rests on a firm juristic foundation, stemming from the prevailing statutes expounded and interpreted by some unusually high-grade,
judge-made law, enlarging upon the statutes and correlating
administrative practices to constitutional principles. The leading decisions are well known to all who work in the field. To
name only a few, consider, for example, Morgan v. United
States, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, Ohio Valley Water
Company v. Ben Avon Borough, Crowell v. Benson, Rowan
and Nichols Oil Company v. State Railroad Commission of
Texas, Hearst v. National Labor Relations Board, and only
recently the important interpretation of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act expounded in Universal Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board. All decided by
the United States Supreme Court, these opinions are landmarks in the administrative law of the land. State Supreme
Court decisions add to the wealth of material. For example,
observe the series of great opinions of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, Borgnis v. Falk Company, State ex rel. Wisconsin
Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v. Wrabetz, Tesch v. Industrial Commission, and
others. These are only illustrative of the very considerable
body of valuable case law reflecting the judicial attitude
toward administration-the foundation on which American
administrative law rests.
Mr. Cooper's book serves to correlate these and many
other judicial pronouncements in a volume which portrays
well the relationship in American jurisprudence between the
courts and administrative agencies. Statutes enacted by legislative bodies reveal occasional glimpses of statesmanship;
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administrative pronouncements, made by men "appointed
by law and informed by experience," sometimes reach a high
level; but by and large in American administrative law we
encounter most of our finest contributions to jurisprudence
in the opinions of our courts. Mr. Cooper's volume is devoted
primarily to those contributions.

E.
Ann Arbor, Michigan
April r4, I95I
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HE limits which courts place on the powers of administrative tribunals have particular significance to
practicing attorneys and law students. It is largely to
the extent that such limits are imposed, that our government
remains a government of laws and not a government of men.
The following pages have been written to describe the
standards which the courts impose upon administrative
agencies, thereby controlling and limiting their powers. More
particularly, the writer has sought: (I) to bring together
the leading cases in which the courts have laid down the
principles that govern frequently litigated questions in contests between the agencies and the parties with whom
they deal; ( 2) to describe the criteria and techniques of
administrative adjudication-what may be termed the jurisprudence of administrative tribunals-within these courtimposed standards.
No attempt has been made to discuss the problems of
administrative organization and agency management, which
are of particular interest to the political scientist and specialist in government. The purpose of this volume is more
modest. It is an examination of the relationship between
administrative agencies and the courts, with particular reference to judicial doctrines concerning: (I) constitutional
limitations on the delegation of powers to administrative
agencies; ( 2) procedural requirements in cases where agencies exercise judicial powers; (3) procedural and substantive
requirements imposed in connection with rule-making activities; (4) methods and scope of judicial review.
It is a pleasurable duty to acknowledge my indebtedness
to E. Blythe Stason, Dean of the University of Michigan
Law School, whose kindly encouragement led to the writing
Xlll
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of this study, and whose scholarly case book has been relied
on repeatedly throughout the following pages. The views
expressed, however, are those of the writer.
FRANK

Detroit, Michigan
February, 1951

E.
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PART ONE
THE PLACE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM

CHAPTER

I

Development of Administrative Agencies

F

OR many years, both federal and state courts tacitly
refused to admit the existence of administrative law as
a distinctive part of our legal system. It was considered
a Continental concept, alien to our common law, and something to be shunned. 1 While the development of administrative law is now recognized as an outstanding characteristic
of twentieth-century jurisprudence, the effects of this longcontinued and persistent disregard are still felt. It has
affected judicial doctrine, and the attitudes of the administrative agencies themselves. It has increased the difficulties
of the lawyer's task. The law digests and encyclopedias, for
example, until very recently failed to recognize the subject
as one worthy of its own index heading. It has increased the
difficulties of any systematic study of this branch of the law.
Indeed, there is not even to be found any generally accepted
definition of the term "administrative law." Defining the
term thus becomes the first element of any discussion of the
subject.

1 Cf. A. V. Dicey, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1886) for an English
statement of this view. It is interesting to note that thirty years later, viewing
with alarm the decisions in Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A. C. 179,
and Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A. C. uo, Mr. Dicey
recognized the existence of this new system of jurisprudence (which he still
considered to be in derogation of the Rule of Law) by entitling a review
of these decisions, "The Development of Administrative Law in England,"
31 L. Q. R. 148 (1915). In this article, he acknowledges with misgivings
that "a considerable step" had been taken toward the introduction of "something like the droit administratif in France"; and cf. Mr. Dicey's introduction
to the 8th edition of LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1915) xxxviii.
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Definitions of Administrative Law

I.

In the broadest sense, administrative law may be defined
as including all those branches of public law which relate to
the organization of governmental administration.2 In this
sense, it covers many of the principles and doctrines comprising the fields usually described as constitutional law, legislation, public corporations, public officers, civil service, and
taxation, and includes, in fact, all branches of the law affecting the executive activities of the government.
At the opposite extreme, the subject is sometimes viewed
as involving little more than the doctrine of separation of
powers and its application to the creation and operation of
administrative agencies.
In most discussions of the subject, however, it is deemed
to involve somewhat more than the doctrine of separation
of powers, but somewhat less than would be included in the
definition first suggested. The subject is generally thought
to embrace the activities of those administrative agencies
which, either by adjudicating judicial questions or by prescribing general rules and standards of conduct, act as little
courts or little legislatures in regulating individual activities.
It includes those aspects of constitutional law which pertain
to limitations on the powers of such agencies, and embraces
as well questions of-practice and procedure before such agencies, and also questions relating to judicial review of the
determinations and orders of such agencies.
It is these three questions-constitutional power, practice
and procedure, and judicial review-which are at the nub
of all discussions of the subject. It is these three questions, in
variant applications, which beset the lawyer in the conduct of
every case tried before an administrative agency. To an exam2
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ination of these three topics, therefore, the following pages
will be devoted.
2.

Administrative Agencies and the Administration of Law

There is a constantly accelerating trend toward the adoption of administrative techniques for disposition of legal
matters that have been traditionally handled by the courts.
In every field of practice, this tendency may be observed. In
the tax field, for example, it is a rare case that justifies an
appeal to the courts; and the recent indication by the United
States Supreme Court that it will not always concern itself
even with asserted errors of law committed by the administrative agencies,3 only emphasizes the importance of the
agencies' role in this field. In corporation law, those issues
which are most vital in the conduct of corporate affairs are
ordinarily committed to such administrative agencies as the
state corporation commissions, the Federal Securities and
Exchange Commission, and state and federal utility commissions. The field of labor law, which in recent years has assumed unique social importance, is almost completely a
creature of administrative tribunals. Even in the private law
realm of contracts, administrative agencies are important.
They effectively prescribe, by imposition of conditions and
provisos which must be included or excluded, the general
form and content of the most significant clauses of many
types of private contracts, including agreements of employment, some contracts of sale, and various types of obligation
relating to trade and finance. Furthermore, such agencies
frequently are concerned with reviewing the performance of
such contracts, and imposing sanctions for breach of the re3 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 64 S. Ct.
239 ( 1943). Despite apparent Congressional disapproval of the Dobson rule,
so-called (I.R.C. 1141(a), 1948), the general trend of the courts is still to
reverse only for gross error.

6

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

quired conditions. A substantial segment of the law of torts
is now a matter of administrative adjudication: workmen's
compensation, many forms of unfair competition cases, and
the granting of reparations for various statutory offenses are
all matters of administrative competence. Suggestions are
frequently made that automobile accident cases should be
taken from the courts and entrusted to the assertedly more
expert handling of a commission or agency. Even in the field
of criminal law, much is now being left to the psychiatrist
and the parole board, and it is often suggested that there
should be still more of this. In the field of domestic relations
there has been a similar movement. Issues of alimony and
custody in divorce cases are quite likely to be decided by a
Friend of the Court or some similar agency. Likewise there
should be mentioned the insurance commissions, the banking
commissions, the trade commissions, and all the other like
agencies that police their designated fields.
Perhaps more significant than the infiltration of administrative elements into the traditional fields of judicial activity
is the gravitation of law practice into matters of purely administrative concern. A great part of the practice of law today
does not take the lawyer or his client into the courts, but
involves matters handled and concluded solely by administrative agencies.
Almost all of the social legislation of recent years has
been implemented by the creation of new administrative
agencies, some of them passing on many thousands of justiciable cases annually. It is in his dealings with these agencies
that the citizen most frequently requires the aid of counsel.
Many men can avoid "court trouble" but few indeed can
avoid the administrative agencies. Like death and taxes (both
of which, incidentally, are now the concern of administrative
agencies) the agencies reach everyone.
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All this is not to deprecate the position of the courts and
legislatures. With them remains the power of superintending
control. While tendencies toward s.elf-abnegation by the
judicial and legislative organs may sometimes be noted, it
is with the courts and the legislatures that there rests the
sole power to correct widely noted defects of administrative
action.
It must be conceded, nonetheless, that with the developments in administrative law, the center of balance has been
shifting. The implications of these developments are portentous both to those professionally concerned and to the general
public.
3· Historical Development of Administrative Agencies
(a) In general. Administrative law is no modern phenomenon. It is, on the contrary, much older than the common
law-older even than judicial systems or democratic legislation. In the earlier periods of history, when the law was
little more than custom, it was administered only through
despotically controlled administrative processes. The development of the philosophy that government should be by law,
and not by men (which originated at least as early as the
time of Aristotle)/ represented a trend away from administrative law.
At various periods of legal history, trends toward and
away from administrative law have produced governmental
upheavals. Many revolutions have been premised on dissatisfaction with administrative processes. The barons at Runnymede were protesting King John's administrative law.
4 The classic phrase found in Part I, Section XXX of the Massachusetts
Constitution, 178o, was borrowed from Harrington (OcEANA (1656) 2-2.9),
who acknowledged his indebtedness to Aristotle. See Aristotle's PoLITICS, III,
xvi, 4, 5, "He who bids the law rule, bids God and reason rule, but he who
bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a beast, and passion
perverts rulers, even though they be the best of men."
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The American Declaration of Independence charged many
abuses against the administrative agencies comprising the
British Government's colonial establishment. It declared,
among other charges, that the King had created a multitude
of new offices and had sent hither swarms of officers to harass
the American people; that the King had invested his agencies
with power to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatsoever, superseding the colonial legislatures; that the King had
altered fundamentally American forms of government and
deprived Americans, in many cases, of the benefits of trial
by jury. The revolution that led to the downfall of the
Russian monarchy was in large measure a protest against the
czarist system of administrative law.
While no close parallel can be drawn between the droit
administratif of France or the administrative law systems of
other Continental countries and our American legal system,
yet a most intriguing comparison does exist between the developments in the United States during the fourth and fifth
decades of the twentieth century, and the experience of
England some four hundred years earlier. In the middle of
the sixteenth century, English lawyers were heard complaining that the common law was being set aside and that scarcely
any business of importance came to the King's law courts.
Legal matters were being handled instead by administrative
tribunals-the Star Chamber, the Court of Requests, Chancery, and the Great Councils. Each of these agencies was
staffed with a permanent clerical establishment, which (the
bar complained) undertook the duties performed by attorneys
in the law courts, so that the members of the bar had but
little place in these new agencies. There remained only, as
Professor Plucknett says, "numerous duties of a quasi-legal
character which had to be done, and litigants soon found it
convenient to have a sort of law agent who would set the
complicated machinery in motion by engaging and conferring
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with the various branches of the profession as occasion required, and doing other duties, sometimes of a legal and
sometimes of a business character." It was thought for a time
that the professional courts, with their judges and trained
lawyers, would be discarded and that the Crown would place
all judicial powers in laymen as exponents of a new technique
of law and government. But in the end a compromise was
worked out. The common-law courts survived and ultimately
regained their former importance. 5
While the underlying causes and conditions are of course
different now than in sixteenth-century England, yet the
striking similarity between that ancient development and the
current situation compels attention. A host of new agencies
are set up. They take over the conduct of many of the most
significant aspects of the legal matters that had formerly
been handled in the courts. These matters are handled on
a nonlegal basis. The agencies in charge are staffed with large
clerical establishments who perform many of the functions
which in the judicial courts are assigned to attorneys. The
function of lawyers, in some of the agencies at least, is pretty
well limited to setting the wheels in motion and to conferring informally with the administrative staff, as the occasion
reqUlres.
The final outcome of the English crisis of four hundred
years ago was characterized principally by the assimilation
of the equity courts as a special branch of the judicial
system. Does this bit of history carry any hint as to the
future course in the United States? The possibility is worthy
of conjecture. In emphasizing the importance of granting
respect and deference to the determinations of administrative
agencies, the Supreme Court not long ago remarked that
the twentieth-century judicial system should not "repeat in
5 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( 1942.) 36; Simmons, "Law and Administrative Government," 2.8 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 133 (1945); Plucknett, CoNCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, zd ed. (1936).
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this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity
was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of
justice." 6
(b) In the United States. The development of administrative agencies in the United States reflects the social history
of the country, and can be roughly divided into three general periods. As above noted, the birth of this country was
prompted by the abuses of the administrative agencies of the
Tudors and Stuarts, who (at least so far as the American
colonies were concerned) had waged unremitting war against
the supremacy of law. The long-standing and bitter conflict
between the colonists and the Crown agencies set up to govern the colonies had served to establish a firm conviction in
American minds that broad grants of discretionary power to
governmental agencies must be avoided; governmental powers must be strictly limited and effectively separated between
the different branches of government; the government must
be one of law. This philosophy of course left little room for
the development of administrative tribunals. In addition to
this hatred for the things that English administrative government had stood for in the colonies, other factors also militated
against the development of administrative government in
early America. These were the economic condition and the
social philosophy of the country. The relatively simple course
of trade and commerce in a sparsely settled, agricultural
country created no need for close governmental supervision,
and the highly individualistic spirit of the times rebelled
against bureaucratic control.
For these reasons, very few administrative agencies were
created during the first century of this nation's existence,
except those which were clearly necessary to carry on the
6 United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 191, 59 S. Ct. 795 (1939).
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public business, such as the collection of customs and taxes, 7
the disposition of public lands,8 the distribution of veterans'
pensions,9 and the conduct of Indian affairs. 10
A reaction occurred, however, in the years following the
Civil War. As Dean Pound expresses it,11 the country had
become "law ridden," and a counterswing was inevitable
because the lines had been drawn so rigidly. The longstanding opposition to administrative control was replaced
by a willingness to experiment with what was looked on as
a new device. This new spirit inaugurated a second periodthe beginning of modern administrative agencies. The demands of an expanding law of public utilities, and the birth
of so-called social legislation, imposing stricter and more
thoroughgoing public supervision over the conduct of certain
types of business, united to produce a need for a greater
measure of administrative control. The rapid increase in
population, the expansion of industrial organization, and the
growing complexity of national affairs, all contributed to this
new desire for a more detailed and adaptable method of
governmental regulation than could be afforded by legislatures and the courts alone.
The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
I 887 signaled the change. This was the first federal agency
7 Among the laws enacted at the first session of Congress were two granting
administrative powers in connection with customs collections: Act of July 3 I,
I789, I Stat. 29; Act of Sept. I, I789, I Stat. 55· Similarly, local assessors
operated under state statutes since an early date; but it is interesting that while
federal tax laws had been more or less continuous from I789, the office of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not created until 1862.
8 The General Land Office was established in I 8 I 2.
9 But the Act of Sept. 29, I789, 1 Stat. 95, granting certain administrative
powers in connection with the payment of pensions to soldiers of the Revolutionary War, bore little resemblance to the statutes of more recent years vesting
broad powers in the Veteran's Administration.
10 The Act of April I 8, I 796, I Stat. 452, authorized the President to prescribe rules in connection with the establishment of trading houses dealing with
the Indians.
11 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (I942) 27.
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with broad regulatory powers over private affairs. 12 Some
ten other agencies with significant regulatory powers were
created between the turn of the century and the New Deal
of I9J2. These included the Food and Drug Administration
(I 906), Federal Reserve System (I 9 I 3), Federal Trade
Commission ( I9I4), National Advisory Commission for Aeronautics (I9I5), United States Tariff Commission (I9I6),
the Shipping Board (I 9 I 6), Federal Power Commission
(1920), Board of Tax Appeals (I924), Railroad Adjustment Board (I 926), and Federal Radio Commission (I 926).
The flood-tide, of course, came in the decade following
1932, with the adoption of the policy of revamping the social
and economic structure of the country through administrative
action. During this third period, not only did the number
of federal agencies exercising important regulatory functions
increase tremendous} y, but there was a growing tendency to
vest in such agencies an even greater measure of uncontrolled
discretionary power. This decade, further, saw a vast expansion of administrative agencies among the state governments.
It was during this period that administrative law in America
became of age. Characteristic of the development were such
agencies as the Securities and Ex;change Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Social Security Board,
the Bituminous Coal Division, as well as numerous state
price-fixing agencies, labor boards, unemployment commissions, and the like.
While not precisely paralleling these three periods in the
development of the administrative agency as a new governmental technique in this country, a roughly similar evolution
12 A somewhat detailed history of the origin of the various agencies, compiled by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, discloses that some comparatively minor regulatory powers were granted to
administrative agencies somewhat earlier. "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 8, 9·
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has been exhibited in the attitude of the bench and bar of
the country toward these agencies. The earliest attitude
viewed with alarm the introduction of this alien concept. The
principal questions examined and discussed were those concerning the validity of the statutes creating the agencies, and
the extent of the powers that could be delegated to them.
Then (starting shortly after World War I and continuing
for some twenty years-indeed, the problem is still far from
solved) attention was turned to the availability and utility of
judicial review as a method of checking or controlling the
activities of the agencies.
But as experience has demonstrated the limited effectiveness of judicial review in cases where broad discretion is
conferred on the agency and its findings of fact are ordinarily
unassailable, legal thought has turned to matters of procedure
within the agencies themselves. Recognizing administrative
tribunals as co-ordinate agencies in the disposition of significant segments of judicial and legislative business, the more
recent point of view is concerned chiefly with improving the
level of performance attained by the agencies.

CHAPTER

2

Functions and Character of
Administrative Agencies

J\ DMINISTRATIVE

agencies serve certain governpurposes more efficiently than do the traditional judicial and legislative organs. Where the
government's purpose is that of policing the minutiae of
conduct in some designated field, with a view to forestalling
any deviations from the prescribed course of conduct rather
than merely enforcing penalties for noncompliance, such an
objective can be best achieved by an administrative agency.
As legislative programs have tended more and more to adopt
such a purpose, resort to the administrative agency as an enforcement device has become correspondingly more common.

£"l_ mental

1.

Execution of Preventive Legislation

The traditional technique of legislation, depending largely
on court action to compel enforcement of the law, has not
been effective to prevent anticipated evils from arising. It has
been limited, primarily, to correcting evils after they have
occurred. Criminal proceedings, of course, are instituted only
after the crime has been committed. Most civil actions similarly operate after the event, embracing a claim for damages
for violation of one's rights. Injunctive remedies, it is true,
are essentially preventive in nature, and thus operate to some
extent to eliminate the occurrence of a threatened wrong, but
even here there are certain obvious limitations. It is patent
that if the enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Act,
for example, were premised upon the bringing of judicial
actions to enjoin the issuance of any securities suspected to
be fraudulent, the investment banking business would be less
14
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effectively policed than can be done under the various administrative processes which have been developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Many administrative agencies serve primarily the function
of accomplishing what ordinary legal remedies cannot normally achieve-avoiding the occurrence of an injury, which,
of course, is usually far more satisfactory to the party concerned than to suffer the injury and subsequently obtain a
judgment for money damages as at least partial compensation for the injury. Thus, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in determining in advance what freight rates are reasonable, saves the shipper the trouble and expense of shipping
his goods and paying an unreasonably excessive tariff, and
of suing later for reparations. Similarly, the Securities and
Exchange Commission aims to prevent the occurrence of a
situation wherein a defrauded purchaser of securities must
bring a suit for damages. The state public utilities commissions, and the state and federal trade commissions, and of
course the various agencies and boards which license those
who engage in various types of activities (from the practice
of chiropractic to the operation of radio stations) all serve a
similar preventive purpose. In any field where the execution
of a preventive program necessitates constant supervision and
inspection, administrative devices are much better adapted to
the successful operation of the program than are the traditional judicial remedies.
Since most preventive legislation has broad social purposes,
reliance on the administrative agency as an enforcement device is prompted not only because administrative devices are
more effective to assure compliance than are ordinary legal
remedies, but also because more effective enforcement can be
attained through this device than where dependence is placed
on private initiative in instituting action. Administrative
agencies will take action in many cases where the individuals
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directly affected, for one reason or another, would be unwilling to appeal to the courts to seek protection of their rights.
Where the legislative purpose is to achieve what are commonly called social ends, it is desirable not only that effective
preventive remedies be made available, but also that such
remedies be availed of in every case. It is deemed desirable,
for example, not only that a method be provided for preventing the commission of unfair trade practices, but also to
make sure that appropriate action be taken in every case
where any unfair trade practice may be committed. Accordingly, administrative agencies have been created to protect
both private parties and the public interest by assuming direct
control over business management and social relations, in a
wide variety of fields. 1
2.

Conducting Social Experiments

As the assertion of social control over private affairs extends into new fields of governmental activity, many situations are encountered where it is uncertain just what type or
degree of control is desirable. It is clear that something
should be done, but nobody knows exactly what. There ought
to be a law, it is agreed; but just what the law should be is
uncertain. In situations of this type, the administrative agency
is conveniently available as a means of coping with problems
of recognized public concern on an experimental basis. This
is obviously not a function of the courts, and the legislatures
cannot achieve this method of control except through the
awkward and impractical expedient of repeated repeals,
amendments, and re-enactments. Legislative procedures do
not ordinarily permit this to be done, at least not on anything
like the scale that is feasible in administrative agencies. When
1 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JVDIC!AL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) ix.
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Congress adopted the wage stabilization law/ for example,
it appreciated that there would exist a practical necessity for
permitting certain normal, minor wage adjustments to be
made freely despite the general prohibition against voluntary
wage increases during World War II. But it was impracticable for Congress to define the standards or tests to be employed in determining what types of wage increases were to
be permissible as voluntary adjustments that could be put
into effect without seeking prior governmental approval. The
National War Labor Board, to which was delegated the task
of administration, very shortly after its creation issued a
"general order" which specified the types of cases in which
wage increases could be made without prior approval. But as
experience was· obtained, the need for revisions in this "general order" became apparent; and during the ensuing two
years numerous amendments were issued. Some of the
amendments were quite plainly experimental in naturean idea would be tried to see how well it would work out,
and if early results were not encouraging, a change would
promptly be made. Similarly, much of the work of the
Federal Communications Commission has been experimental
in character. Many similar examples could be named.
As an agency gains experience, the need for continued experimentation diminishes, but almost every important agency
at the time of its creation faces a necessity of picking out a
path on an uncharted sea, and it must, on some of its excursions at least, adopt a trial and error method.
Where the necessity of experimentation thus exists, the
obvious need of flexibility and discretion dictates the desirability of reposing powers in an administrative agency. In
this type of case the aqministrative agency can perform val2 Act of October z, 1942, as amended; 56 Stat. 765; 50 U.S.C. App. § 901
at 198.
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uable functions for which the traditional judicial and legislative organizations are unsuited.
3· Other Reasons for Utilization of Administrative Agencies
It is sometimes said that the traditional legislative and
judicial systems broke down in the face of modern necessities;
that they were not effective to cope with important problems
of recognized public concern; and that accordingly, resort to
some more modern device was necessitated. But this unfairly
belittles the importance of the legislatures and the courts. It
is fairer to say that administrative tribunals have been availed
of as a valuable assistance to hard-pressed and overburdened
legislatures and judiciaries. Supervising control has been retained-the effectiveness and extent of which remains subject
to the desires of the legislatures and courts themselves-and
there have been delegated only subsidiary functions which
are adaptable to administrative handling.
The ever-broadening delegation of legislative power has
come about not only because the legislature may lack time
and technique to prescribe detailed rules, but equally because
the delegation of certain rule-making powers to administrative agencies is desirable to relieve the legislature of a burden
of detail so that its essential policy-making work may go
forward more effectively. It is not only the fact that courts
may be inexpert in making factual determinations in certain
highly technical and complex fields, which has led to the
delegation of judicial powers to administrative agencies, but
it is equally a purpose of such delegation to avoid burdening
the judiciary with a myriad of small cases, the consideration
of which would interfere with the most effective disposition
of the courts' more important duties in laying down fundamental principles.
In certain types of cases, however, some definite advantages are inherent in the administrative process. It makes
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available a continuity of attention which, particularly in fields
where expert knowledge of changing conditions is an aid to
effective social control, enables regulation to keep pace with
new events. This would appear to be true in the case of the
regulation of the television industry. Again, reliance on administrative agencies makes possible the application of uniform national policies in fields where reliance on ordinary
judicial procedure would lead to a conflict of decision on
many points. If, for example, it were left exclusively to the
courts to determine what were unfair trade practices, or unfair labor practices, it seems clear that it would be much less
certain what was permitted, and what forbidden. Further,
utilization of the administrative process satisfies the need of
an organization equipped to dispose of a great volume of
business. For example, the courts would obviously be flooded
if called upon to decide the hundreds of thousands of cases
arising yearly under workmen's compensation and social
security and unemployment insurance legislation. Similarly,
creation of administrative agencies avoids dangers of unfairness which might be present in some fields if reliance were
placed on purely executive action. For example, while the
distribution of public improvement funds for the use of
municipalities may safely be left to ordinary executive action,
yet when it comes to the allowance of benefit claims of the
sort handled by the Veterans' Administration, it is plain that
some orderly procedure and provision for assuring equal
treatment is highly desirable. Finally, administrative procedure achieves a speed which cannot be attained through
the ordinary processes of legislation and adjudication.
Thus, there is a plain need for the administrative tribunal.
It serves its own particular functions; and it is capable of
serving them well. The administrative process is needed as
a supplement to the legislative and judicial processes. It is
needed as a directing process in an industrialized, urban
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soctety which requires that social controls be administered
with a greater degree of adjustment to unique situations and
with a greater degree of preventive control than ordinary
judicial processes, looking at controversies after the event,
can afford. 3
4· Administrative and Judicial Procedures Contrasted
But despite the plain need for administrative agencies, and
their inherent ability to serve certain functions more effectively than can either courts or legislatures acting alone, yet
there have developed in many administrative agencies, within
both the state and the federal governments, certain characteristics of attitude and procedure which are detrimental to their
most effective fulfillment of their particular functions. These
characteristics often color every step of administrative procedure, and affect the task of the attorney who conducts cases
before such agencies. They underly the mistrust harbored by
large segments both of the bar and of the public as to the
fairness and justice of many administrative agencies.
(a) Interest in result. Perhaps the outstanding trait of
administrative tribunals is their interest in the result of the
cases pending before them. As later pointed out, this interest
may affect all the processes of pleading, hearing, and decision.
It is, of course, inevitable that administrative agencies should
have such an interest in the result of pending administrative
proceedings. Most agencies are created for the purpose of
administering certain broad policies of social or economic reform. They are naturally interested in attaining such reforms.
So long as this interest in the general course of decision does
not affect the fairness and impartiality with which each contested case is decided, there are but scant grounds for objection to its existence. It is inherent in the purpose for which
such agencies are created, and the absence of such interest
3

Cf. Pound,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 26.
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would interfere with their most effective functioning. But
overconcern with the desirability of achieving appointed ends
leads sometimes to an excess of zeal. For example, it has
produced in some agencies an antipathy toward participation
by counsel in agency proceedings. The diligent efforts of
counsel on behalf of the party respondent are sometimes
resented, as tending undesirably to hamper the expeditious
execution of the agency's work. There is a feeling on the
part of the agency that its expertness as to both the law and
the facts renders the assistance of counsel superfluous. Similarly, a pronounced antagonism toward judicial review has
sometimes developed. Some agencies put every obstacle in
the path of a party who seeks to obtain a court decision as
to the validity of an administrative determination. These,
of course, are extreme examples, but they indicate the fundamental differences between administrative and judicial procedures which are a necessary concomitant of the fact that
administrative agencies are normally parties in interest to
the proceedings they conduct.
(b) Role of discretion. A second outstanding characteristic
of the administrative process is the broad scope and effectiveness of administrative discretion. Authorized in increasingly
frequent instances to make decision on the basis of what is
"fair" or "reasonable" (and being ordinarily the sole judges
of the reasonableness or fairness of the measure involved)
administrative agencies tend to substitute a rule of discretion
for the rule of law. This is what is sometimes·called administrative absolutism. Indeed, it may well be that delegation
of power to administrative agencies is often resorted to because the matter in hand cannot be regulated by general rules
but only by the exercise of discretion in the decision of
particular cases. 4
4

Cf. Hayek,
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There can be no argument but that the vesting of discretionary powers in administrative agencies is necessary to the
most effective performance of their appointed tasks. At the
same time, there can be little question but that these discretionary powers have had an important effect on all the
processes of administrative adjudication. The possession of
discretionary power has engendered in many agencies an
impatience to proceed along the tiresome, detailed, plodding
path of deciding each case on the basis of careful and painstaking consideration of all the evidence produced in the slowmoving process of a contested hearing. Discretion can be
more freely exercised when cases are decided without a hearing, or without hearing both parties. 5 This tendency of many
agencies to minimize the importance of hearings, as may be
noted in the common practice of basing the decision not on
the record of the hearing itself but rather on abstracts or
reports prepared by staff assistants, has had far-reaching
effects on the course of administrative decision.
The same tendency to rely on discretion is largely responsible for the willingness evidenced by many agencies to
set up policies going beyond or even at variance with the
standards of the statutes which the agencies administer. The
tendency is to decide cases, not on the basis of interpreting
the governing statutes-as courts would-to discover the
apparent legislative intent, but rather to decide on the basis
of broader policies which it is thought may be, within the
broad discretionary powers of the agency, superimposed on
the stated legislative purpose.
Again, reliance on the role of discretion has disinclined
many agencies to make available for the use of interested
parties any clear statements either of the exact practice and
procedure of the agency or the criteria relied on by the
5 Cf. Reports of American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 331, 346 (1938); 64 A.B.A. REP. 575 (1939);
Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( 1942) 68-73.
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agency in deciding cases. 6 Discretion can be more freely
exercised if procedural matters can be settled in accordance
with the agency's convenience in each case. Similarly, discretion has a broader range if the agency has not committed
itself to any stated bases or principles of decision comparable
to common-law rules of decision, but has reserved the privilege of deciding each case on its "merits," permitting such
departures from prior criteria of decision as may seem expedient in any particular case. Hence, the party appearing
before the agency may be in the position of not having the
assurance, commonly available in court proceedings, that
established procedures and rules of decision will govern the
disposition of his particular case.
5· The Lawyer and Administrative Agencies
The task of the lawyer in conducting cases before administrative agencies is a difficult one. 7
Even the preliminary step of discovering the court-made
case law on the particular issues with which he may be concerned is no easy one. The historic reluctance of the courts
to recognize administrative law as a distinct topic is reflected
by the absence of any such heading, until very recently, in
most law digests and encyclopedias. The search for the law
applicable to questions of administrative procedure, or governing the validity of administrative action in certain types
of cases, leads the researcher through almost every topic in
the digests. Decisions involving a single point of law, uniformly applicable to any agency, may be scattered through
such diverse headings as Aliens, Agriculture, Carriers, Commerce, Constitutional Law, Gas, Electricity, Mandamus,
6 Sec. 3 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Ch. 3 z4,
6o Stat. z37; 5 U.S.C. § 1001, imposes certain requirements for the publication
of such information. See Davis, "Separation of Functions in Administrative
Agencies," 61 HARV. L. REV. 389 ( 1948).
7 See Dulles, "Administrative Law: A Practical Attitude for Lawyers,"
zs A.B.A. J. Z75 (1939).
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Internal Revenue, Licenses, Master and Servant, Mines
and Minerals, Post Office, Public Lands, Public Service
Commissions, Radio, Railroads, Rate Regulation, War, and
Workmen's Compensation. In the following pages, an attempt is made to correlate the decisions, handed down in
various substantive fields and involving various federal and
state agencies, which lay down principles generally applicable to the functioning of all administrative agencies.
But the problems of administrative law cannot be properly
understood without going beyond the decisions of the courts
to the decisions of the agencies themselves and to the processes of administration. 8 Accordingly, the following discussion will attempt to capture the spirit of administrative law
in action. An appreciation of the philosophy of administrative adjudication is essential to the most effective participation of the bar in the administrative processes. The lawyer
appearing at an administrative agency must accommodate
himself to the difference between administrative and judicial
proceedings. In many respects, greater skill in advocacy is
required in the administrative than in the judicial hearing.
In court proceedings, the attorney need not be concerned
with convincing his opponent of the merits of his case; but
in an administrative proceeding, it is the opponent's reaction
which is paramount, for the agency which decides the case
often appears as the opponent of the respondent. Effective
presentation of the respondent's case requires not only knowledge of the applicable rules of law, but an adaptation to
principles of procedure and decision which are based on
somewhat different considerations than those which control
judicial proceedings.
8

Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE
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Delegation and Combination of Powers
A. EFFECT OF SEPARATION oF PowERS DocTRINE oN
DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PowERS

T

HE vitality of the nineteenth-century belief in the
principle of separation of powers accounts for much of
the bitterness with which the development of administrative tribunals has been assailed. An offshoot of the theory
that governmental powers must be separated is the rule
against delegation of powers. Since the creation of each new
administrative tribunal vested with regulatory powers involves a delegation of some measure of legislative power or
judicial power (or both) and with it a further encroachment
on the principle that the powers of government must be
separated and channeled in the three constitutionally created
departments of government, it was inevitable that the law of
administrative tribunals should involve at the outset a collision with these time-honored shibboleths.1
Much of the difficulty is today of little more than historical interest. But since the doctrine still retains some
vitality, in modified form, and for the further reason that
the ghosts of many old decisions (long overruled sub silen1 There is no fixed or unvarying constitutional requirement prescribing the
separation of the powers of government or proscribing delegations of power.
The Federal Constitution does not require the several states to observe in their
internal organization the limitations imposed by the separation of powers
doctrine. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 552, 28
S. Ct. 178 (x9o8). Neither the provision of Article IV, Section 4, of the
Constitution, providing that the United States shall guarantee to every state
a republican form of government, nor the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, have been held to necessitate a rigid separation of powers. Ohio ex rel.
Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 28 I U. S. 74, 79-80, so S. Ct.
228 (1930); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507, 23 S. Ct. 390 (1903).
As to agencies created by state law, the question is primarily whether a delega-
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tio) still haunt the books, a brief examination of the problem
is essential.
I.

Validity of Delegations

If judicial power be conceived of as the sort of power
which a court exercises (for example, applying the general
rule of a statute to particular factual situations), and similarly if legislative power be conceived as the sort of power
which a legislature exercises (for example, determining what
types of conduct shall be prohibited), then it must be conceded that both judicial and legislative powers may be
delegated to administrative tribunals. There is no generical
distinction between the function of a workmen's compensation commission in adjudicating a claim of an injured employee and that of a court in adjudicating a claim under
some other statute imposing liability without fault. There
was no change of function when the Board of Tax Appeals
became the Tax Court. 2 Similarly, the policy-framing functions of the legislature in determining, for example, that
switchboard operators employed in a public telephone exchange which has less than five hundred stations 3 should
be exempted from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act 4 are not of a different genre than the policyframing responsibility of the administrator who determined
tion of power is improper under the terms of the state constitution; and this
is a question of state law. Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297, 59 S. Ct. 170
(1938); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 186, 56
S. Ct. 159 (1935). The federal courts will, however, sometimes inquire as to
whether a delegation of power under a state statute is so vague and general
as to permit the agency to exercise an untrammeled discretion in a manner that
might be discriminatory or oppressive. See Yick VVo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). And see Jaffe, "An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 1," 47 CoL. L. REv. 359 (1947); Jefferson, The Supreme
Court and State Separation and Delegation of Powers," 44 CoL. L. REV. r
(1944).
2 56 Stat. 957, 26 U.S.C. § r 100.
3 Act of June 25, 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
4 This specific exemption in Section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
was added by the amendment of August 9, 1939, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (53 Stat.
1266).
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that professional workers who earned over $325 monthly 5
should be exempted from the same statute.
Yet many courts have avoided candid recognition of the
nature of such delegated powers. This has been accomplished
by the convenient formula of describing such delegated powers as being only "quasi-judicial," or "quasi-legislative"the "quasi" meaning, apparently, "not quite." These distinctions between "judicial" and "quasi-judicial," between
"legislative" and "quasi-legislative" should be considered
convenient fictions.
Refusal to recognize the fiction and insistence on the
making of some logical distinction based on the nature of
the delegable powers leads to inextricable difficulties. For
example, the Wisconsin Court in an early case 6 held that
the function of a workmen's compensation commission was
only quasi-judicial, since the commission merely "found the
facts" on which the law operated; but when a few years
later the state legislature bestowed upon another administrative agency the responsibility for finding as a fact whether
or not illegal stock sales were made in bad faith, the court
found that here the proposed function was purely judicial,
and that the statute was hence void. 7 Again, the New York
Court in I 908 8 said that the power to fix utility rates was
only quasi-legislative, and for the reason that such powers
had historically been delegated by the legislatures in various
instances. But the next year it was argued before the same
court that since a commission fixing rates was exercising only
quasi-legislative powers, the courts could not on writ of
5 Sec. 13 of the act created an exemption for such individuals as might be
defined as "professional" employees by the Administrator, and thus empowered
the Administrator to decide what the exemption should be. Earlier, the regulations had fixed $200 as the monthly salary requirement.
6 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911).
7 Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457 (1923).
8 Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light &
Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908).
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certiorari review the commission's determination. And then
the court, refusing to follow the logical implications of its
earlier decision, decided that the power of the commission
was not quasi-legislative but rather quasi-judicial, and hence
reviewable. 9 In some types of cases, the courts disagreed as
to whether certain types of function were "purely" judicial
or only "quasi" judicial. For example, the grant of a power
to remove a public officer was held by some courts to be
purely judicial 10 and by others to be only quasi-judicial.11
In other instances, powers which were originally held to be
purely judicial and hence nondelegable were later held to
be only quasi-judicial, and a proper subject for delegation
to administrative tribunals. 12 Logic has retreated in the face
of practical necessities. Not infrequently, the members of
a court have been in disagreement as to whether a given
power was "purely" or only "quasi" legislative or judicial.13
Demonstration that the distinction cannot be predicated on
logical grounds can be found in the many cases discussing
delegation of the power to punish for contempt.14
But the fact that the appellative "quasi" affords no logical
distinction between those governmental powers which may
be delegated to administrative tribunals and those which
9 People ex rel. Central Park, North & East River R. Co. v. Willcox, 194
N.Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (r9o9).
10 Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112 (r884).
11 State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228
(r886).
1 2 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( 1942) 32, discussing the statutes which
empowered administrative boards to apportion the use of the water rights in
a stream between conflicting claimants. In r 8 70, a pioneer statute of this
character was declared unconstitutional as a delegation of purely judicial
powers customarily exercised by courts of equity in suits to "adjudicate a
stream." Two or three decades later, when such statutes became more common,
the courts agreed that such power was only quasi-judicial.
13 For example, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495 (r892). See also J. W. Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928).
14 See 35 CoL. L. REV. 578 (1935).
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must be reserved to the legislatures and the courts, does not
of course mean that any or all of such legislative and judicial
powers may be delegated. Rather, it points out merely the
simple truth that "The line has not been exactly drawn which
separates those important subjects, which must be entirely
regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest,
in which a general provision may be made, and power given
to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill
up the details." 15 The principles against delegability of essential powers still retain vitality at least to the extent of
invalidating delegations which would render one department
of government subject to the control of another department
or which would confer uncontrolled discretion on administrative agencies in matters affecting substantial property
rights or rights of personal liberty.
2.

Preserving Essential Independence of the Departments
of Government

Essentially, the doctrine of separation of powers concerns
little more than the "fundamental necessity of maintaining
each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or
indirect, of either of the others." 16 The exercise of powers
by one agency or department of government which logically
should be exercised by another is accordingly countenanced
as a matter of practical necessity; 17 and administrative agencies are permitted to exercise powers which logically belong
to the courts, or to the legislature, so long as the independence of the courts or of the legislature is not impaired. But
15 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 5o6, 517, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1911).
16 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 6o2, 629, 55 S. Ct. 869
(1935).
17 c;:f. Dean Henry M. Bates, "Trends in American Government," Proceedings Annual Meeting, 5 CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, 58, 67-68 ( 1932).
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when an attempt is made to vest in an administrative agency,
or when an administrative agency or executive officer claims,
powers which could be exercised in such a way as to deprive
the legislature or the courts of their constitutional prerogatives, then there has been a violation of the essential consti-·
tutional precept. The rule is well illustrated by the decisions
in Myers v. United States 17a and in Humphrey's Executor
v. United States.17b In the former case, an attempt by Congress to deprive the President of his power of summary
removal of a local postmaster was held unconstitutional. In
the latter case, it was held that Congress could properly
restrict the powers of the President in removing members
of the Federal Trade Commission. Is not the reason for this
distinction based upon the test suggested above? The local
postmaster is a ministerial employee of the executive department of government. He performs few, if any, functions of
a legislative or judicial character. Hence the purpose of
Congress in seeking to limit the exclusive power of the chief
executive officer to remove an executive assistant amounted
to an attempt by the legislature to control the independence
of the executive branch of the government; and this could
not be sustained. The converse was true in the Humphrey's
case. There, the Federal Trade Commission was charged
with important responsibilities in formulating legislative
policy in the field of unfair trade practices, and was charged
with important responsibilities in adjudicating asserted violations of the law. As the court pointed out, in order to
perform its duties properly, the commission was required
to be free of executive control. In that case, therefore, an
assertion by the chief executive of a power of arbitrary
removal of a member of the commission, if sustained, would
have vested in the executive department control over a creaMyers v. United States, 272 U.S. sz, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926).
l7b Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 6oz, 55 S. Ct. 869
(1935).
17a
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ture of the legislative department, which was at the same
time, and for certain purposes, a judicial agency.
The same type of situation exists in other cases where the
separation-of-powers philosophy has been relied upon in
invalidating legislation. In Springer v. Government of the
Philippine Islands/ 7c for example, the statute which was
held invalid was designed so as to give the legislature control over a government corporation which had been chartered
to perform purely executive functions.
To the extent suggested by such decisions, the doctrine
of separation of powers retains vitality in the field of administrative law. An administrative agency, it seems safe to
say, may not validly be granted powers which would permit
it to displace the courts, or the legislature, or the executive,
in matters constitutionally committed to these departments.
Nor may an agency controlled by one department be given
powers which would permit that department to control the
others. 18
3· Precluding the Vesting of Administrative Duties in the
Courts
The doctrine of separation of powers still retains vitality,
in at least a negative aspect, in connection with the rule that
courts (at least, the federal constitutional courts) will not
undertake the discharge of any nonjudicial duties. This rule
has been applied not only in cases where courts have refused
to revise determinations of administrative tribunals on the
grounds that such revisory duties, though sanctioned or imSpringer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 2.77 U. S. 189, 48
Ct. 480 (19Z8).
18 An interesting application of this principle is found in Kreutz v. Durning
(C.C.A. zd 1934), 69 F. (zd) 8oz. There, the court reviewed a statute which
vested in a legislative court the power to make a final and nonreviewable decision on certain questions of law concerning the imposition of import duties.
In sustaining the statute, the court relied upon the fact that the legislative court
was independent of the executive.
17c

s.
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posed by statute, would impose nonjudicial powers on the
courts, 19 but also in cases where the court's refusal to review
an agency's determination is based on the principle that the
agency is exercising essentially administrative functions. 20
In cases involving technical competence, where the courts
may feel that an administrative agency possesses superior
qualifications to pass upon questions of interpretation and
implementation of policies expressed generally in statutory
law, the courts display some readiness to characterize as
administrative, and hence beyond judicial review, functions
which might on purely logical tests be deemed judicial. The
doctrine of separation of powers can thus be relied upon
occasionally as strengthening rather than weakening the
powers of an administrative agency to dispose with finality
of the problem at hand.
4· Preventing Uncontrolled Administrative Discretion

If it be conceded that legislative powers and judicial powers may be delegated to administrative tribunals-subject in
some jurisdictions at least to the condition of attaching the
pious appellative "quasi"-the problem of formulating a
guide for determining the limits to be placed on the extent
of permissible delegation is at once apparent. There can be
no doubt that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for
example, could not be vested with power to rewrite the
federal tax laws, imposing such types of levies and at such
rates as appeared to him best. But what distinction is to be
drawn between this and the valid delegation of the power
to determine whether or not an applicant shall be given
l9 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445
(1923). This problem is discussed more fully infra, Ch. 16, ns. 12. and 13,
in connection with the discussion of review of administrative determinations,
where it is noted that the state courts have been more willing to extend their
powers in this direction than have the federal courts.
20 United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct.
413 (1927).
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relief from the harshness, as applied to his situation, of the
provisions of a statute imposing taxes on excess profits? 21
Similarly, it is inconceivable that the Tax Court could be
given power to determine with finality the validity of a tax
statute, but the Supreme Court has made it clear that it will
not concern itself with the correctness of the decision of the
Tax Court on certain "minor" issues of law said to have
been improperly determined by that tribunaJ.22 Here again
the question is presented of finding a basis for predicting
the outer periphery of the delegable powers. It is of course
quite possible to say, as many courts have observed during
the last half century, that the one involves "pure" legislative or judicial power, which may not be entrusted to an
administrative agency, while the other involves only "quasi"
legislative or judicial power, which may be freely delegated.
But resort to this convenient fiction does not simplify the
problem. The twin consiaerations of sound logic and mental
honesty recommend saying, rather, that the kind of power
which the Interstate Commerce Commission (to cite another
example) exercised when it decided whether or not it should
regulate the hours and working conditions of drivers employed by private carriers 23 was the same kind of legislative
power that Congress exercised when it decided whether or
not there should be regulation of the hours and working
conditions of drivers employed by common or contract carriers.24 Similarly, the function of a workmen's compensation
21 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 55 I, 48 S. Ct.
587 (1928).
22 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 32I U. S. 23I, 64 S. Ct.
495 (I944). See Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law
and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REv. 753 (I944).
23 Sec. 204 (a) (3) of the Motor Carrier Act of I935> 49 Stat. 543; 49
U.S.C. § 304 placed upon the Commission the duty "To establish for private
carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found [italics inserted],
reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation." In a proceeding entitled "Ex Parte No. MC-4," I I.C.C. Motor Carrier Cases I (I936), the
Commission determined that such need existed.
24 Motor Carrier Act of I935, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. § 304.
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commission in determining whether an applicant for benefits
was injured as a result of his wanton and willful negligence,
is indistinguishable on logical grounds from the function
exercised by a court in determining whether a guest passenger in an automobile was injured as a result of the wanton
and willful negligence of the driver.
The true situation would appear to be that legislative
and judicial powers may be delegated in certain instances,
but not in others. Determination of the category into which
a particular situation falls depends, apparently, in part on
the subject matter involved and in part on the degree of
control delegated. In some fields, administrative agencies
may be vested with absolute and unreviewable legislative
and judicial powers. In such cases, the agency is free to
exercise uncontrolled discretion. In other fields, where rights
of personal liberty or private property are more significantly
involved, delegation is permitted ·only if reasonable limits
and controls are imposed on the agency's discretion. Such
control is ordinarily exercised by the creation of statutory
standards to which the activities of the agency must conform. Thus, the question of determining the extent to which
legislative and judicial powers may be delegated to administrative bodies resolves itself into a question as to what sort
of standard the legislature must set up to limit administrative discretion. If not appropriately limited, the statute is
invalid.25
(a) Various "tests" suggested by courts for determining
sufficiency of standards devised to limit administrative discretion. Implicitly recognizing that the principle against delegation of judicial or legislative powers to administrative
agencies is nothing more than a proscription of the grant of
2 5 Except of course in cases where constitutional limitations are nonexistent,
and where legislative and judicial powers may be delegated to the uncontrolled
discretion of the agency. These are separately discussed, infra.
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unlimited discretionary powers to administrative agencies
whose determinations affect substantial rights of person or
property, the courts at various times have suggested a number of "tests" by which to determine whether the delegated
discretionary powers have been sufficiently limited.
Thus, it is sometimes said that an administrative tribunal
may not be given power to make the law, but may be given
discretion as to the execution of the law. This criterion has
in certain case situations the advantage of glib plausibility.
Apparently originating in Justice Ranney's opinion in Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Clinton Co. Commissioners,25 a
this phrase has been repeated in a very large number of
cases. 26 But it cannot be accepted as an actual basis for decision. Thus, when Congress "made the law" by prohibiting
interstate transportation of "hot" oil, but gave to an administrative officer discretion as to executing the law, the grant
of unlimited discretion was invalidated, although it could
well have been supported on the basis of this "test." 27
An alternative "true test" suggested in many decisions
is that an administrative agency may not be vested with
discretionary power to determine policies, but may be em25a

Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Clinton Co. Commissioners,

1

Ohio St.

88 (18p),
26 It was frequently relied upon in decisions invalidating the delegation to
an insurance commission of the power to prescribe a standard form of policy.
E.g., King v. Concordia Fire-Insurance Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N. W. 616
(1905); Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896).
The latter case was in effect overruled in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection
Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928), in an excellent
opinion by Justice Rosenberry. A comment on administrative control of insurance policy forms by Professor Edwin W. Patterson appears in 25 CoL. L. REV.
253 (1925). The cases on this particular point present an interesting history.
Many early decisions invalidating delegation of administrative discretion to
insurance commissioners cast a long shadow, both in the direction of legislative
hesitancy to grant such powers and in the direction of judicial tendency to
invalidate the delegation of discretionary powers in this particular field, by
strong reliance on stare decisis, even though in other fields comparable grants
of delegated discretion had been upheld.
27Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).

38

UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

powered only to determine the facts to which the legislative
policy will apply. 28 But this test is obviously fallacious. Thus,
to say that a public utility commission is merely finding a
fact in determining what rate is reasonable, is to overlook
entirely the fact that in such a field the commission has the
same breadth of discretion as does the legislature. Where a
statute 29 in terms provides that no employees engaged on
certain contracts shall be employed more than eight hours
a day, and an administrative agency can determine by regulation that such employees may legally be employed more
than eight hours a day, providing they are compensated for
overtime at rates to be prescribed by the head of the administrative agency,S0 it is absurd to say that the agency is performing only fact-finding functions, without policy-making
responsibility.
In safer, less precise language, it is sometimes declared
that the true general test is that administrative tribunals may
validly be empowered only to fill in the details by making
subordinate rules within prescribed limits. This suggestion
has the security of vague ambiguity. To what must the
administrative rule be subordinate? By what standards must
the limits of its discretion be prescribed? Seemingly, the rule
is little more than a restatement of the problem. It has been
relied upon to sustain a grant of power to exempt certain
shipments of food from the labeling and branding requirements of the Food and Drug Act/1 where the legislative
principle to which the rule was subordinate was a mandatory
requirement of labeling (and the rule was subordinate only
28 This is mentioned in many cases sustaining the delegation to public utility
commissions of power to fix rates. The "test" is referred to in some federal
court decisions. See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495 (1892);
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349 (1904).
29 The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 49 Stat. 2036, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 35-46.
30 Article 103 of Regulations 504, prescribed by the Secretary of Labor under
the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act.
31 34 Stat. 768, 21 U.S.C. § 2.
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in that it eliminated the statutory requirement) and where
the prescribed limit was "reasonable variations . . . tolerances and also exemptions as to small packages." 32 It is
elastic enough to permit the delegation of power to fix
prices, subject to a "standard" empowering the administrative agency to fix such prices as are deemed by it to be
"generally fair and equitable," in any situation where there
"threatens" a rise in prices "inconsistent with the purposes
of the Act," those purposes being stated in terms of broadest
generality. 33 Administrative rules setting up a system whereby permits to graze sheep within government forest preserves
might be obtained on certain conditions, including the payment of various fees, was deemed properly subordinate to
a legislative purpose to "improve and protect" the forest
preserves, and within the limits prescribed by a statutory
grant of power to make regulations to insure the effectuation
of "the objects of such reservation [the forest reserves],
namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve
the forests thereon from destruction." 34
Applying this last-mentioned rule to specific case situations,
then, it appears that the "detail" which may be left to the
agency may include such broad questions of legislative policy
as whether there shall or shall not be regulation; that the
"subordination" to the statute means only that the administrative law must not be directly contradictory to the statute;
that the "limits" need be no tighter than those of "fairness"
or "equity," which as is well know-9- varies with the length
of the chancellor's foot.
This is but another way of saying that there has been
devised no general rule by which it is possible to determine
32 United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 78, 53
S. Ct. 42 (1932).
33 Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 66o (1944); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641 (1944).
34 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6, 507, 509, 31 S. Ct. 48o ( 1911).
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the validity of any given proposed delegation of power. Any
of the suggested rules aptly describe the results in certain
cases; but none of them can be applied in all cases.85 In no
case do any of the rules account for the result; at best they
are a description of results reached in certain cases. The
considerations which actually motivate decision are less precise, and less legalistic.
(b) Factors that motivate decision. But what are the innominate, imponderable factors which do, in fact, motivate
decision? They perhaps cannot be catalogued. Their nature
and relative importance vary from one case to another. The
basic reasoning of a decision vesting broad discretion in an
agency to revoke, say, the charter of a bank, will be rejected
by the court (even though it might logically be applied)
where the charter to be revoked is a professional license to
practice law or medicine. In the case of a revocation of a
license to operate a saloon, still other factors will be involved.
These subtle distinctions between logically analogous case
situations must be kept in mind.
It must likewise be recognized that in this field judgment
is somewhat temporal, reflecting to a degr~e contemporaneous economic and political thinking. 36 Then, too, courts must
necessarily be concerned with matters of practical necessity.
Likewise, the attitude of the particular court must be taken
into consideration. The admonitions found in some opinions,
that these statutory tribunals must be recognized as coordinate agencies in the administration of law and justice,
are not accorded universal acquiescence. Courts are not
35 In cases involving the delegation of judicial power, the various general
rules are all quite inappropriate.
36 Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936),
invalidating the delegation of power to a majority of producers and mine
workers to fix prices; and Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379
(1939), and United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533,
59 S. Ct. 993 (1939)-upholding a delegation of power to milk producers to
decide whether an order should be put into effect.
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equally receptive to this philosophy. By and large, state
courts probably remain less willing to permit delegation of
comparatively free discretionary powers than the federal
courts.
Despite all these difficulties, it seems possible to describe
the most important factors that influence the decision by
the courts as to the adequacy of standards employed to limit
administrative discretion, in fields where such a limit is constitutionally necessary.
I. In cases where delegation of broad discretionary powers
is traditional, almost any standard will be accepted as sufficient. It is enough if the legislature, either expressly or by
implication-and silence is sufficient implication-sets up a
general standard of reasonableness. This, of course, is the
same standard by which the legislature itself is controlled.
Thus, the delegation of power to fix utility rates requires
no standard more specific than the implied common-law
requirement that the rates fixed must be reasonable. 37 Similarly, in the field of censorship, delegations are customarily
sustained which place no definable limits on the discretion
of the censors. 38 Again, in a recent case sustaining the delegation to an agency controlling certain lending activities of
banks, the court pointed out that a less rigid standard was
permissible in a field which is "one of the longest regulated
and most closely supervised of public callings." 39
2. A standard which is seemingly vague may always be
shown to be, in fact, quite well defined when related to an
established legal concept. Thus, the Federal Trade Commission may be granted considerable powers in determining
37 Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light &
Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (19o8); cf. Rohrer v. Milk Control
Board, 322 Pa. 257, 186 Atl. 336 (1936).
38 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230,
35 S. Ct. 387 (1915).
S9Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S. Ct. 1552 (1947).
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what are unfair trade practices within a statutory prohibition; 40 but the granting of a similar power to identify fair
trade practices is invalid. 41 The meaning of the former phrase
is fairly deducible from a long line of cases, and the standard
is therefore more restrictive than might appear. But in the
latter case, the agency was in fact left at large to exercise a
rovmg comm1sswn.
3. The degree of definiteness required in the standard
varies with the extent to which the agency's determinations
impinge importantly on rights of personal liberty, or substantial property rights. This general principle has many
facets. In cases where the agency is the dispenser of favors
which the government is free to grant or refuse, a very broad
standard is sufficient; if, indeed, any is required. 42 Where
violations of an agency's rules may invqlve the imposition
of criminal sanctions, per contra, an explicit standard is usually required. 43 In license cases, much less discretion may be
delegated as to revocation of licenses to engage in a profession (where the revocation would presumably carry intensely disastrous personal consequences 44 ), or to carry on
a substantial business/5 than in cases where the license revoked permits one to engage in activity of a type which
the legislature might entirely prohibit (such as running a
40 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 1919),
258 Fed. 307.
41 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct.
837 (1935).
42 Cf. Cases involving traffic regulations: Smallwood v. District of Columbia (App. D. C. 1927), 17 F. (zd) 210; Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S.
32, 19 S. Ct. 317 (1899); tolls for the use of roads: Rogge v. United States
(C.C.A. 9th 1942), 128 F. (2d) 8oo.
43 People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. S. 74 (1934); United
States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764 (1892), where the statute was
sustained by decision that violation of the administrative regulations was not
subject to the criminal penalties that attended other violations of the statute;
cf.In re Kollock, 165 u.s. 526, 17 s. Ct. 444 (1897).
44
See 5 A. L. R. 94·
45 State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court for Pierce County, 113 Wash. 296,
193 Pac. 845 (1920); see 12 A. L. R. 1435·
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poolroom 46 or a business which so immediately affects the
general public welfare that close and continuous supervision
is generally deemed desirable). 47
4· The extent to which the court conceives that there is a
genuine need for expertise is probably a factor. In the case
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, the
courts quite readily concede their incapacities to handle in
a satisfactory manner the highly technical problems involved/8 and in sustaining a broad grant of power to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to order divestiture of
holding companies, the court pointed out that its approval
constituted "a reflection of the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems." 49
But where the agency regulates the traffic on city streets 50
or determines the "area of production" of agricultural processing/1 the court may feel there is much less need for technical competence, and therefore less need of sustaining broad
standards. The court may accordingly well insist on a fairly
explicit standard, and in the absence thereof either invalidate
the statute or disregard the agency's rulings.
5. Where there is ample provision for notice, hearing, and
argument, and where it is thought these sufficiently guarantee
a fair and intelligent disposition of the case by informed and
impartial administrative action, broad standards are likely to
be upheld. 52
46 State of Kansas v. Sherow, 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866 (1912); Mehlos
v. City of Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882 ( 1914).
47 Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 3 I S. Ct. 190 ( 1911); People of
State of New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 26 S. Ct.
144 (1905).
48 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177,59 S. Ct. 16o (1938).
49 American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329
U.S. go, 105, 67 S. Ct. 133 (1946).
50 City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 ( 1925).
51 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 32-2 U. S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct.
1215 (1944).
52 Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division of
Department of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941).
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6. Where provisions for judicial review permit the court
to exercise a large measure of superintending control over
the agency, this reasoning is even more effective in persuading the courts to sustain statutes setting up a very vague
standard. 53
7. In cases involving the exercise of judicial power by
administrative agencies, the courts on the whole insist on a
stricter standard than in cases where the agency's powers
are principally legislative in nature. Since the judicial process
is primarily one of applying a standard, it is natural that this
requirement exists. Just as a court refuses to treat as a justiciable matter a controversy which cannot be determined by
application of the so-called rules of law, so it insists that
some rule or standard must be set up to guide the adjudicatory functions of an agency exercising judicial powers. 54
Then, too, the delegation of judicial powers to administrative
agencies is always subject to attack on the grounds that the
due process guaranties of the Constitution have been violated. In past years, courts have been by no means reluctant
to discover a violation of due process, where judicial powers
were delegated.
It is these considerations that form the basis of decision,
and rightly so. The law of administrative tribunals could not
live and grow upon a logical extension of philosophical doctrine. Its growth must be empiric, based on experience.
Judicial recognition of practical necessities, indeed, is the
most typical characteristic of this branch of the law.
Courts will therefore be little persuaded by an argument
that a statute must be invalidated because it grants an administrative tribunal power to make law, rather than merely to
53Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911).
54 Many of the cases holding the statutory standard to be unconstitutionally
broad are cases involving the issuance and revocation of licenses, where the
agency's powers are in many respects judicial in nature. Seemingly, a much
more explicit standard is insisted on in such cases than in those where the
agency promulgates legislative rules.
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exercise discretion in its enforcement, or because there are no
definitely specified limits to which administrative discretion
is subordinate. Nor will the language employed by a court
in striking down a statute giving a board unbridled discretion
in deciding whether or not to issue a building permit be accepted as persuasive when it is sought to be applied to a
statute giving a similar measure of discretion to another board
which issues or revokes saloon and dance-hall licenses.
Not only is the decision in each case to be limited to the
facts of the case, but the reasoning employed in one case will
not be extended to another· case where considerations of
statesmanship recommended a different judgment.
(c) Cases where constitutional limitations are nonexistent.
In some types of cases, the considerations above discussed
recommend that delegation of virtually unlimited discretionary powers be sustained. Typically these are cases where the
activities of the tribunal will not directly impinge on constitutionally recognized rights of property. Thus, where the administrative discretion is directed to such matters as granting
licenses to dredge for rocks in state-owned waters,55 or prohibiting fishing in certain areas,56 or regulating the nontra:ffic
uses of city streets,57 there is no difficulty in sustaining unlimited grants of power. In such cases the result can easily
be described by saying that there can be no invasion of private
rights of person or property as a result of the rulings of
the agencies.
But it would seem that the true principle of such cases
goes further. In some types of cases, unlimited discretionary
powers may be delegated even though the activities of the
agency may impinge directly on private rights. In such cases,
a broader explanation is required. The true reason is sug55

State ex rel. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood,

30

S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686

(t88g).
56 McMillan v. Sims, 132. Wash. 2.65, 2.31 Pac. 943 (192.5).
57Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32., 19 S. Ct. 317 (t8gg).
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gested in the opinion of the Supreme Court in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 57a In that case the Court
sustained the delegation to the President of unfettered discretion to prohibit shipment of munitions to certain foreign
countries, conditioned upon his judgment as to whether such
prohibition would contribute to the re-establishment of peace.
The Court assigned as the reason for its decision, not that
such prohibitions would not affect private rights-for of
course they would-but rather that to avoid "perhaps serious
embarrassment," such legislation "must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic
affairs alone involved." The Court pointed out that such
delegations of power were traditional in matters pertaining
to foreign relations, that the President possessed more expert
knowledge than did Congress, and that practical necessities
could not be met by a more restricted delegation.
Similarly, virtually unlimited discretion is frequently bestowed upon municipal corporations to adopt local ordinances.
This cannot be explained on the theory that such ordinances
will not substantially affect important private rights. It must
be explained, if at all, on the basis that such delegations have
been traditional and have proved expedient. 58

(d) Problems of draftsmanship in formulating standards.
Obviously, effective administrative action may be expedited
or hampered by the language adopted in the controlling
statute as the standard by which its actions must be guided.
Sometimes, as Dean Landis points out,59 legislative draftsmen formulate too elaborate standards, under a misappre57 a United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct.
216 (1936).
58 See Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 9 S. Ct. 256 (1889); Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 6o7 (1903); cf. I
McQuillin on MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (I 940) 422; Willis on CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 137-138.
59 Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 55 et seq.

DELEGATION AND COMBINATION OF POWERS

47

hension as to the clarity of the outlines of the problem at
hand, and condition administrative action in such detail as
to make it difficult to dispose effectively of pressing problems.
On the other hand, the legislature may sometimes be tempted
to evade responsibility by an ill-defined transfer to an administrative agency of the duty to provide, by such regulations
"as the public interest may require," a determination of
fundamental policy in a highly controversial fi.eld. 60
A standard which attempts to anticipate every possible
situation is likely to defeat the whole purpose of delegation.
On the other hand, one which reflects the empty generalities
of "reasonableness" or "public interest"-criteria which
would be supplied by implication in any event-tends to
substitute a government by men for one of laws.
The tendency of the courts to sustain the delegation, however the standard be phrased, emphasizes the importance of
wisely drafting the statutory standards. Relief from unsatisfactory administrative action must often come through the
legislature, rather than the courts. It may be necessary, upon
venturing into a new field of governmental regulation, to
grant the agency wide powers. It must, perhaps, have some
authority to experiment. But as experience defines the contours of the problem involved, opportunities may be afforded
to redefine the standards which guide administrative action,
terminating the agency's authority to perpetuate unsuccessful
experiments.61 To the extent that it proves practicable or
desirable for the legislature to specify standards that are
60 E.g., at one stage the House of Representatives' version of the bill which
later became the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, after requiring
the Securities and Exchange Commission to take action to confine each holding
company to a single integrated system, at the same time authorized the Commission to exempt any holding company from this requirement if such exemption was found to be consistent with the public interest.
61 E.g., the discretion vested in the National Labor Relations Board by the
Wagner Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151) to include any combination of employees in a single collective bargaining unit was drastically curtailed
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.
Supp. § 141).
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definite and capable of objective proof, the courts are enabled
to assert a greater power of review over administrative action than they possess where the standards are cast in vague,
subjective terminology.
5. Delegation of Powers by an Agency to Its Employees
The statute usually bestows authority upon a commission
or the head of an agency, but these individuals cannot often
perform personally the multifarious duties delegated to
them. The Secretary of Agriculture, for example, is charged
with the administration of more than seventy statutes. In
this task, he is aided by a staff of several hundred assistants.
There arises by clear necessity, in all the larger agencies,
delegation of discretionary power within the personnel of
the agency.
The governing statutes often recognize this situation, and
make appropriate provision therefor. Failure to do so has
sometimes produced untoward results. The courts have been
quite ready to invalidate unauthorized attempts of agency
heads to delegate to their subordinates powers vested by
statute in the heads of the agency. 62 Sometimes, to be sure,
the problem is avoided by reliance on the presumption of
regularity that attends official action, which as here applied
means merely that it is hard to prove that the responsible
official did not personally perform his duty. 6a And in many
cases, the courts, appreciating the necessity of a limited degree
6 2 This problem is discussed more fully infra, in connection particularly
with the use of assistants in formulating decisions in judicial determinations.
Examples in other fields include: Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 3 I 5
U. S. 357, 62 S. Ct. 651 (1942)-denying the power of the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division to delegate power to issue subpoenas;
State v. The Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 662
( 1 855) -commissioners appointed to assess cost of improvement could not
delegate this duty to the city surveyor; Dunn v. United States (C.C.A. 5th
1917), 238 Fed. 508-denying the power of a court clerk to delegate the
duty of selecting names for grand jury service; School Dist. No. 4, Town of
Sigel, Wood County v. Industrial Commission, 194 Wis. 342, 216 N. W. 844
( 1927 )-school district could not delegate power to employ part-time janitor.
63 Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Cooley, 173 Wis. u8, 179 N. W. 590
(1921). United States ex rel. Petach v. Phelps (C.C.A. zd 1930), 40 F. (2d)
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of such delegation, find authority therefor implicit in the
statutory language.64 Decision in each case depends on the
court's judgment as to whether the nature of the particular
power exercised is so important, requiring the exercise of
judgment on matters of policy, as to preclude the likelihood
that the legislature would have been willing to have the
particular power exercised by any one other than the ultimate
authority within the agency.
Regardless of the limits on delegation to agency employees
to pass finally upon matters of importance, the fact remains
that power to recommend the decision in any matter can
be and ordinarily is so delegated. The distinction is more
technical than practical. The higher officers are so little inclined to reverse the determination of their subordinates that
the latter's recommendation often carries the weight to sway
and determine final agency action in any close case, especially
where the determination relates not to a general policy but
to the decision of a particular individual case.65
A great danger resulting from this necessary practice of
delegating within the agency the powers of the agency heads
is that decision is often made by an employee whose compelling personal interest is to make such a determination as
he thinks will please his employer, in the hope of obtaining
promotion .. If the employee is impressed with a belief that
the agency likes decisions which find an employer guilty of
unfair labor practices, or a commercial concern guilty of
unfair trade practices, or an employee entitled to receive
workmen's compensation, then great strength of mind and
5oo. Sometimes, particularly where questions of jurisdiction are involved, the
presumption will not be extended to administrative agencies: see e.g., Blount
v. Forbes, 250 App. Div. 15, 293 N. Y. S. 319 ( 1937).
64 United States ex ret. French v. Weeks, 259 U. S. p6, 42 S. Ct. sos
(1922); Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 31 S. Ct.
603 (19u); Plapao Laboratories, Inc. v. Farley (App. D. C. 1937) 92 F.
(2d) 228. For an analysis of the general problem, see Grundstein, "Subdelegation of Administrative Authority," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 144 (1945).
65 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 recognizes this situation by setting up provisions whereby the decision of the hearing officer may
stand (in the absence of an appeal) as the decision of the agency.
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character is required to avoid the making of decisions which
it is thought will please the officials who will pass upon the
employee's personal advancement. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, creating an independent status for many
hearing officers, goes far toward alleviating this problem in
many of the federal agencies.
Agency heads have the difficult problem of making free
delegation as to matters where there is little need for close
supervision by the agency heads-such as matters of internal
management, disposition of routine matters, initiation of proceedings, disposition of matters by consent, executing binding
stipulations of fact, etcetera-in order that they may devote
more time and attention to reviewing the work of subordinates in matters affecting the rights of parties appearing before the agency. In the latter connection, while it is admittedly infeasible to attempt a review of every case, much
might be accomplished by ( r) careful formulation, for the
guidance of agency employees, of instructions for the application of those policies which have been crystallized; ( 2)
consideration by the agency heads of cases where the application of established policies is difficult or where policies have
not been definitely formulated (with encouragement for the
referral by agency employees of cases thought to fall within
this category); and (3) the requirement of periodic and
informative reports by those employees entrusted with power
to make decisions.

B.

EFFECT oF SEPARATION OF PowERS DocTRINE ON
CoMBINATION OF LEGISLATIVE, JunrcrAL, AND
ExECUTIVE FuNCTIONS WITHIN A
SINGLE AGENCY

To the extent that the Constitution permits the delegation
of judicial and legislative powers, there appears to be little ·
impediment to the granting of both such powers to a single
agency. Thus it occurs that frequently a single agency will
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exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It becomes
lawmaker, prosecutor, and judge. The same agency legislates
the rules that implement a general statute, then looks for
violations of such rules, and (if it discovers a suspected violation) prosecutes a hearing at which it sits as judge to determine whether it has proved its allegations to its own satisfaction. Contrary though this may be to the ancient maxim that
no man should be judge in his own cause, there seems to be
(in the federal courts, at least) no constitutional impediment
to such combination of powers within a single agency.
Yet it is this delegation of combinations of power, rather
than the delegation of either legislative or judicial power
alone to a single agency, which is at the bottom of much of
the criticism to which the administrative agencies are subject.
Many of the agencies, and exponents of administrative
absolutism, argue that such combination of functions is desirable, if not essential to the attainment of the best results.
They argue that if the prosecuting functions were divorced
from the judicial, those charged with instituting prosecutions
could be expected to inaugurate formal proceedings in every
case where there might be the slightest suspicion of some
infraction of rules. To this it can properly be replied that
while theoretically such a possibility cannot be eliminated,
yet no untoward results have been observed in cases where
the prosecuting body is without adjudicatory functions, as.
in the case of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, or in the Internal Revenue Department.
The argument has also been made that any separation of
powers would interfere with informal settlement of cases
and make it more difficult to achieve voluntary settlements.
But experience has not indicated this to be the case. In many
instances, the Department of Justice must appear before the
courts to press its charges of violations of laws or regula-
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tions, but it has experienced no great difficulty in reaching
settlements.
The same advocates further point out-and it cannot be
denied-that an agency is not a single person, and that the
staff member who prosecutes a case is not usually the same
staff member who decides whether a case has been proved.
But this overlooks the friendly luncheon contacts between
prosecutor and judge, whose offices may be in adjacent rooms,
and likewise the esprit de corps which is so markedly a factor among employees of an administrative agency of this
type. This argument also overlooks the fact that the administrative judge who adjudicates an issue must sometimes depend for promotion upon the agency heads who have decided
that a prosecution should be instituted, and who may have
supervised the prosecution of the case.
It is undoubtedly true that in some types of proceedings,
administrative efficiency would be grossly impaired, without
compensating advantages, by insistence on a rigid separation
of functions. In some types of cases, adjudicatory functions
are so closely related to other phases of the tribunal's work
that separation of functions is not practical, nor indeed desirable. An example may be found in the field of rate making. A
rate-making investigation ordinarily culminates in a hearing
which has many of the characteristics of a judicial proceeding.
Yet the prime purpose of such a hearing is not to determine
justiciable questions of fact or law, but rather to gather information which will furnish a basis for the exercise of an
informed judgment on matters which are fundamentally
those of legislative policy. 66 Other types of agencies act
through the exercise of a number of interrelated powers, and
66 This is recognized in § 5 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946, excepting from the general requirements for separation of functions various rate-fixing proceedings. Cf. R. M. Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE oF NEw YoRK (1942) 67, 68.
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complete isolation of all adjudicatory functions would not
present compensatory advantages. 67
The problem is not one which can be solved by any general
formula. Distinctions must be made between agencies, and
between different functions of the same agency. Where the
element of administrative discretion is properly dominantas in many cases of passing on license applications, or applications for benefits-fairness can ordinarily be achieved by
an internal separation of functions within the agency. In
license cases, for example, so long as the staff employees
charged with discovering and presenting objections to the
allowance of the application have nothing to do with the making of the ultimate decision, little harm is done. But on the
other hand, in cases where the prime function of an agency
is to police an important segment of business activity-as in
the case of the Federal Trade Commission or the National
Labor Relations Board, where the agency devotes all its
energies to preventing a certain type of activity and where the
judicial question to be determined by agency employees is
whether the agency is justified in its suspicions that a particular person has engaged in such activity-then it is doubtful
whether any internal separation of functions can be sufficient
to assure the fairness and, equally important, the manifestations of fairness, which the public can properly demand. In
such cases, the adjudicatory authority should not be subject
to the direct or indirect control of the heads of the agency
which initiates prosecutions.
Agencies are ordinarily created to meet an emergency
situation, one presenting new problems which may at the
outset require an experimental approach-where, perhaps,
rules must be formulated only on the basis of experience
67 See "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies"-Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure ( 1941) 58 et seq.
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gained as a result of deciding cases for a while on an ad hoc
basis. But in many cases where agencies were originally
created to meet such emergency situations, and accordingly
granted not only executive and legislative but judicial power
as well, later experience has suggested a refinement of the
early approach to the problem. On the basis of further
studies, and in the light of experience, it has proved wise to
create a special tribunal to exercise adjudicatory powers.
Thus, adjudicatory functions of the Customs Bureau came
after a time to be vested in a Customs Court. Similarly, the
responsibilities of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in passing
administratively on claims for refunds or objections to tax
assessments were in later years vested in a separate Board of
Tax Appeals which in due course became a Tax Court. The
Court of Claims had similar origins.
These lessons of history teach that, in fields where administrative tribunals engage contentiously with the private
parties appearing before them, it is in the interest of good
government to eliminate combinations of prosecuting and
judicial powers. The process is gradual. Change does not
come overnight. But the highway of past experience points
the way into the uncharted future. 68
68 See statement of "Additional Views and Recommendations of Messrs.
McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt" in "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies"-Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure (r94r) 203 et seq.
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Notice and Hearing in
Administrative Proceedings
A.

NEcESSITY OF GIVING NoTICE TO INTERESTED PARTIES

r. Historical Development

T

HE question as to the necessity of affording interested
parties some advance notice of contemplated administrative action, and an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety thereof, is one which has been considered frequently both by the courts and the legislatures. Much of the
difficulty revolves around the fact that administrative agencies often treat cases individually, as do courts, but dispose
of them on the basis of considerations of policy, acting as
legislative agents. The affected party, looking at the ruling
as an individual disposition of his particular case, demands a
right to be heard fully; he feels he should have his "day in
court." The agency, treating the ruling as only an incidental
step in the development of a general policy, which it must
determine on the basis of broad considerations that would be
but little affected by the testimony of the individual as to the
facts of his own case, often prefers to act legislatively on
the basis of its own information and judgment, without granting a hearing.
In cases where an agency acts judicially, deciding the
asserted rights of claimants on the basis of an ascertainable
rule, there is usually but little difficulty, since legislative
requirements or established practices usually provide for
ample notice and opportunity to be heard. The problem
55

s6

UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

becomes more acute in cases where the agency exercises a
1
greater measure of executive or legislative discretion.
The fundamental legal problem involved in each case is
one as to the requirements of due process of law: and the
historical development of this broad constitutional requirement has been reflected in changing theories as to the requirements to be imposed on administrative agencies. In the
eighteenth century, English courts were strongly inclined to
insist on notice and hearing in all administrative proceedings.2
But as experience showed this requirement to be too strict
for general application, various theories were evolved to
permit such modification of the underlying rule as practical
necessities required.
In part, this evolution took the form of devising substitutes effective to accomplish the underlying purpose. Thus,
for example, the rule was early evolved in tax cases that
constitutional requirements were satisfied if a hearing was
given at any stage of the proceedings prior to the final nonreviewable determination and collection of the tax. Similarly,
in certain types of rate cases, the courts took it upon themselves to give hearings subsequent to the administrative determination, on the basis of determining whether the administrative determination had been reasonable. In other types
of cases, where it seemed desirable to permit summary action
on the part of administrative officers, it was deemed sufficient
if the offended party were given an opportunity to bring
a subsequent damage action against the officer.
1 But other factors may incline agencies to a denial of hearings. Sometimes
an agency considers the suppression of individual hearings an effective procedural short cut, enabling an agency to dispose of a heavy case load of pending matters. The problem of giving hearings is often acute in cases where a
particular administrative determination affects parties not immediately before
it. The same problem arises in cases where the agency is concerned fundamentally with formulating new rules, to be applied either generally or to a
specific case.
2 Mott, DuE PROCESS OF LAw (1926) 216-240.
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But by and large, the courts until the last few years have
overlooked the development of efficient substitutes for formal
notice and hearing, and have on the whole been inclined to
hold either that notice and hearing could be entirely dispensed with, or that a formal courtlike procedure would be
required. Instead of treating administrative proceedings as
a distinctive genre, the courts have been inclined to view
each agency as either a little court or a little legislature, and
to determine on such basis the necessity of notice and hearing
in each particular case.
That the courts departed from the original path (which
led toward the goal of devising in each type of case such
procedure as fairly suited the problems of the particular
agency) for a more arbitrary approach, is probably accounted
for in large measure by the preoccupation of nineteenth-century American courts with the problem of separation of
powers. In reviewing administrative action, the courts would
seek to catalogue the agency's activities as being either quasilegislative or quasi-judicial. This feat accomplished, certain
results thought to stem from such classification were applied
more or less automatically (except where the result seemed
plainly undesirable, in which case the path of logic would
be forsaken).
2.

Necessity of Notice as Depending on Legislative or
Judicial Nature of Agency's Activity

A natural consequence of this formalistic approach was
the development of the frequently suggested rule that a hearing is required where the agency is exercising judicial functions, and is not required where the agency is exercising
legislative functions.
But these labels play a much smaller part in judicial
motivation than in opinion writing.8 In fact, hearings have
3 Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative
Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942).
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been quite uniformly required in some types of cases where
the agency's function is essentially rule making, or legislative, and conversely, hearings have been held unnecessary
in some types of cases where the agency's role is essentially
judicial. The difficulties encountered in attempting to apply
this test are illustrated by the case where the determination
to be made is that of identifying the boundaries of an "improvement district" over which there is to be prorated the
cost of a public improvement. If such determination is made
by certain types of agencies, it is said to be a legislative act
that does not require advance notice to the affected parties; 4
but if the same determination is made by different agencies, it
is described as "judicial" in character, and notice is required. 5
Determination of whether a hearing will be required cannot be made by deciding whether the agency's function is
primarily legislative or primarily judicial. In the first place,
the functions of many agencies defy attempts at any such
neat classification. In the second place, even where the classification can fairly be made, the postulated result does not
uniformly follow.
Rather, decision depends primarily upon (I) the accepted
traditions in the particular field; 6 and ( 2) certain ':lnderlying
considerations of policy. The latter can be discussed most
4 This seems to be the case where the determination is made by the legislature or the governing board of a municipality or other established governmental agency. See Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 306
U.S. 459, 59 S. Ct. 622 (1939); St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U.
S. 157, 48 S. Ct. 438 (1928); Myles Salt Co. Ltd. v. Board of Com'rs Iberia
& St. Mary Drain. Dist., 239 U.S. 478, 36 S. Ct. 204 (1916).
5 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 u.s. II2, 17 s. Ct. 56 (1896) j
Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road Dist., 240 U. S. 242, 36
S. Ct. 317 (1916); cf., Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S. 396, 46 S. Ct. 141

(1926).
6 While the courts have been quite willing to permit the continuance of
administrative practices which eliminate notice and hearing in cases wher~
such procedure has become time-honored, they have been reluctant to dispense
with the requirement in analogous but less familiar cases.
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readily in terms of typical case situations. Such a discussion
follows.
3· Ta~ Cases
There is obviously an opportunity for a direct and substantial deprivation of property rights if the administrative process for assessing and collecting taxes is permitted to proceed
without notice and hearing. At the same time, there is an
equally obvious need that the collection of public revenues
be permitted to proceed expeditiously, without the interruptions and delays that might be caused by elaborate procedure
of individual notice and lengthy hearings on questions of
valuation. For these reasons, and as well the reason that it
is one of the most ancient spheres of administrative action,
the tax field is an interesting one in which to observe the interplay of competing policies.
In favor of requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard
are the factors: (I) the private property of an individual is
sing] ed out for specific action; ( 2) the pecuniary interest of
the taxpayer is ordinarily substantial; and (3) the administrative authorities have but little occasion to exercise .expert
discretion in fixing policies, for it is rather their duty to apply reasonably objective standards which are on the whole
adaptable to judicial review. On the other hand, even more
potent factors require that the assessors and tax collecting
authorities be relieved of the burdens that would attend the
giving of individual notice and a full hearing in each case:
(I) there is the overpowering necessity for prompt collection
of the necessary public revenues; ( 2) the large number of
cases to be disposed of requires the use of summary procedures; (3) many of the issues involved, such as the question of valuation of property, can better be determined by
inspection, investigation, and the exercise of the assessor's
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informed judgment, than by a judicial hearing at which the
contradictory estimates of opposing expert witnesses on the
question of valuation would be of little practical help; and
(4) the fact that judicial review is usually available for issues
affecting jurisdiction, construction of the statute, uniformity
of the levy, and claims of fraud-that there may thus be a
hearing after the event-is often thought to excuse a failure
to give notice and hearing at the administrative stage.
The result has been that requirements of notice and hearing in the tax field are rather attenuated. While many decisions declare that an owner is entitled to notice of a proceeding against his property, and has a right to be heard/ yet it
has become well settled that the requirements of due process
are satisfied if there is an opportunity for the owner to present
his objections before a competent tribunal at any stage of the
proceedings before the command to pay becomes final and
irrevocable. 8
"In general, . . . the protection accorded the taxpayer
against arbitrary assessment is sporadic and uncertain." 9 The
tendency of the courts is to sustain whatever form of procedure has been adopted. 10
In cases where there seems to be but little practical need
for notice and hearing, where the measure of the tax is fixed
by mechanical standards, as in the case of a poll tax, or an
7 See collection of cases, L. R. A. I9I6 E, p. 5, and see 33 ILL. L. REV. 575
( I939) Comment.
8 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 54 S. Ct. 743 ( I934). See 3 Cooley
on TAXATION, 4th ed. (I924) 2269, § II20,
9 Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW
(I927) 272.
10 See Dows v. City of Chicago, II Wall. (78 U.S.) Io8, no (I87o): "it
is of the utmost importance . . , that the modes adopted to enforce the
taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible." Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. Io8, III U.S. 70I, at 708,4 S. Ct. 663 (I884), holding that
"where the taking of property is in the enforcement of a tax, the proceeding
is necessarily less formal" than where life, liberty, or the title or possession of
property are involved.
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assessment measured by the size of the property, notice and
hearing can apparently be dispensed with. 11
Notice need not be formal. It is enough if a statute gives
general notice that taxes will be levied, 12 or if there is published a general notice of a meeting of the tax board. 13
The taxpayer need not be heard by the administrative
officials who make the assessment; he may be compelled to
wait. Nor need he be granted hearings at all of the successive
stages of administrative activity which precede the final levy
of the tax. One hearing is sufficient to constitute due process. 14
It is sufficient if there is a right to a hearing before the assessing officers, or in connection with administrative appeals, or
before a court (either in a suit by the government to collect
the tax or a suit by the taxpayer to enjoin collection thereof
or to recover sums paid over to the collector). The right to
a hearing does not involve the right to be heard before a
court. 15
The extent to which the courts will go in finding compliance with the requirements of procedural due process in tax
cases is indicated by the decision in Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado. 15a In that
case, a state board of equalization had raised all the assessments in the city of Denver by 40 per cent, to equalize the
assessments in that city with those made elsewhere in the
state. It was asserted that the property owners had no oppor11 Murray's Lessee et al. v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How.
(59 U.S.) 272 (1855); Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. po,
29 S. Ct. 671 (1909); 3 Cooley on TAXATION, 4th ed. (1924), 2259, § 1114;
5 6 A. L. R. 95 o.
12 Merchants' & Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461 1
17 S. Ct. 829 (1897).
13Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 21 S. Ct. 616 (1901).
14 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245,26 S. Ct. 459 (1906);
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421, 14 S. Ct. III4
(1894).
15 3 Cooley on TAXATION, 4th ed. (1924), 2263, § 1u8.
15a Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado,
239 U.S. 441 1 36 S. Ct. 141 (1915).
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tunity to be heard on the question as to whether such increase
was truly necessary to equalize the assessments. The court
said hearing would not be required. While suggesting that
the situation was no different than it would have been had
the state doubled the rate of taxation, in which event there
would plainly be no hearing required/ 6 the court quite
plainly put its decision on the ground that where the administrative determination "applies to more than a few people
it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice
in its adoption. . . . There must be a limit to individual
argument in such matters if government is to go on." The
court's opinion distinguished Londoner v. Denver 16a on the
ground that in the cited case "A relatively small number
of persons was concerned" in the question as to the correctness of the assessment.
Of course, the court would not accept in other fields the
suggestion that notice and hearing could be dispensed with
because the large number of persons concerned made it inconvenient. But in the tax field, the courts have been accustomed
for centuries to summary procedures-which no doubt were
in existence when the concept of notice as an element of due
process first developed-and the customary procedures are
sustained, even though they would not be recognized as valid
in newer fields of administrative activity. In the tax field,
too, administrative activity is in many cases largely executive
or ministerial, involving little judicial or legislative responsibility. This circumstance likewise has contributed to the
attenuated requirements as to notice and hearing which exist
in the tax field.
l6 This suggestion is unsound. An increase in tax rate would be borne by all
taxpayers in the state on the basis of the assessments as fixed locally; there
would be a state-wide increase, shared equally. But the result of changing the
assessments in one city alone was that taxpayers there bore a bigger proportion
of the total tax than they would have if the assessments had not been changed.
16a Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708 ( 1907).
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4· Other Cases Involving Conduct of Public Business
In other fields where, as in the case of tax collections,
the expeditious conduct of the public business requires speedy
decision, with a minimum of time for individual argument,
the normal requirements of notice in advance of hearing have
been widely relaxed.
Alien cases-exclusion and deportation. While holding
that some semblance of notice and hearing must be afforded
the immigrant whose entry into this country is challenged
by immigration authorities, the courts (particularly in exclusion cases) have not insisted upon any formal notice or
judicial-type hearings. 17 All that is insisted upon is that there
be observance of the rudimentary requirements of fair play.18
It is not necessary that the opportunity to be heard should be
"according to the forms of judicial procedure"; the sufficiency of the hearing is judged rather according to its aptness
to "secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress." 19
These cases may depend in part on doubts as to whether
the due process clause can be invoked on behalf of a person
who is seeking entrance to the country. In cases where the
question arises in connection with proceedings to deport an
individual who had originally been admitted, hearings more
17 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 12 S. Ct. 336 (1892)permitting the immigration officer to decide the question as to the right of
the immigrant to land on the basis of his own inspection and examination,
without taking testimony. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86, 23 S. Ct. 6ll
(I 90 3) -where the fact that the petitioner was ignorant of the English language, and at the time of the investigation did not know that it had reference
to her deportation, was considered to be simply "her misfortune."
18 Relief has been granted where it was alleged that the immigration officials had prevented the offering of relevant testimony of named witnesses:
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 S. Ct. 201 (1908). Similarly,
where it was asserted that important testimony was arbitrarily excluded from
the formal record on the basis of which the determination was made, it was
held that such action was improper. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U, S. 454,
40 s. Ct. s66 (1 9 2o).
19Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, IOI, 23 S. Ct. 6II (1903).
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closely in accordance with the standards of a judicial trial
are insisted upon. 20
Removal of public officers. Despite the substantial nature
of the personal rights involved, and the fact that the issue
presented often calls for a judicial-type determination, the
overwhelming authority supports the power of the state to
remove officers from office without notice or hearing.:J1 These
decisions are sometimes explained by saying that the right
to hold office is not a property right but a mere public trust. 22
But this cliche is misleading. It cannot be reconciled with the
results obtained in the cases where courts of equity protect
the property rights of an officeholder in his office. The true
explanation lies in frank recognition that where the public
interest in summary action-here, the interest in prompt
elimination of suspected corruption in government-clearly
outbalances the individual property interest involved, then,
at least in cases where the accepted traditions in the particular
field permit it, notice may be dispensed with.
Eminent domain proceedings. On the question as to the
existence of a public necessity for taking land (under statutory
provisions authorizing condemnation only where there exists
a public necessity therefor), it is held quite uniformly that
no notice or opportunity to be heard need precede the making
of a final, nonreviewable administrative determination that
such necessity exists. 23 Many factors relied upon in other types
of cases as requiring a hearing are here present: a particular
individual's property is singled out for specific action; substantial property interests are involved; the number of persons affected is comparatively small; a public hearing might
well be better calculated to ascertain the truth; and there is
20 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492 (1922).
21 See 99 A. L. R. 336.

22

This is suggested in many opinions; e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Rich

v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 6u (1894).
23 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 45 S. Ct. 491
(1925); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 43 S. Ct. 689
(1923),
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but seldom any crying public need for summary action. The
type of action is well suited for judicial determination; indeed, in many states, the question is reserved for the condemnation court, by state constitution or statutory provision.
Nevertheless, it seems plain that notice and hearing may be
dispensed with. The result must apparently be explained on
the basis of judicial recognition that in conducting those
matters of public business which are primarily of executive
concern, a degree of summary action should be permitted.
Undoubtedly the result in the eminent domain cases is
accounted for in part by the fact that "just compensation"
must be paid for the taking. There has not been an absolute
deprival of property where that of which one has been deprived is paid for. Where this guaranty of prompt and full
restitution is lacking, notice is more likely to be required.
In cases, for example, where the issue is not the taking of
land for public improvement but rather the allocation among
affected property owners of the cost of a public improvement
(and where a property owner would have no relief if an
administrative determination compelled him to pay for an
improvement that did not benefit him), notice is often required.24
Postal system. Generally, in dealing with administrative
determinations made in connection with the execution of the
postal laws, the courts have emphasized not the private rights
affected but rather the necessities and convenience of carrying on the public business.25
It has been suggested that the use of the postal system
is a mere privilege or public beneficence which the government is free to grant or withhold on its own terms. 26 Grant
or denial of second-class mailing privileges is commonly
24Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U, S. 112, 17 S. Ct. 56
(1896); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 46 S. Ct. 141 (1926).
25Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789 (1904);
Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53, 33 S. Ct. 6 (1912).
26 See dissent of Justice Holmes in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 42 S. Ct.
227 (1922).
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made as a result of ex parte determination on the basis of a
written application, rather than on the basis of a hearing. 27
It has been held that the denial of mailing privileges by the
issuance of a fraud order is not "judicial" in character and is
therefore not reviewable by certiorari proceedings.28
All of these decisions suggested that hearings would not
be required in connection with administrative revocation of
mailing privileges (and this conclusion was stoutly defended
by the postal authorities). However, when this particular
issue was finally raised in the courts, it was held that a hearing
was required. The severity of the penalty that follows deprival of the right to free use of the mails 29 persuaded the
courts that considerations of the expeditious conduct of the
public postal business were less important than the desiderata
of assuring that any denial of such privileges has been based
on a fair hearing. Accordingly, in Pike v. Walker 29 a it was
determined that fraud order proceedings must be conducted
upon notice and hearing. The logic of past decisions was
abandoned because the court, relying on the dissents voiced
in earlier cases, was impressed with the arguments that otherwise substantial property interests might be imperiled, there
was no need for free administrative discretion, and there was
no assurance that private investigation was better calculated
to determine the truth than was an open hearing.
Similarly, in Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley,29b a
determination of the Postmaster General, annulling air mail
27 Monograph of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940).
28 Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 33 S. Ct. 639 (1913).
29 Most periodicals could not survive if denied second-class mailing privilege. See Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman (C. C. Mo. 1907), 152 Fed. 787 1
793; Kadin, "Administrative Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures and Radio Broadcasting," 19 B. U. L. REV. 533, 538 (1939).
29 aPike v. Walker (App. D. C. 1941), 121 F. (2d) 37·
29 b Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley (App. D. C. 1935), 75 F. (zd)
!761:.
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contracts previously awarded, was held invalid where made
without notice and hearing. While the determination could
logically have been described as purely administrative or
executive, and thus of a type where no notice need be given,
yet the court was persuaded by the fact that a hearing was
necessary to a fully informed determination, and the fact
that clear deprivation of substantial property rights was involved, and the fact that no governmental need for summary
action could be shown.
5· Necessity of Notice Where the Agency Exercises RuleMaking Powers
Legislative character of determination not controlling. In
connection with cases where an agency exercises rule-making
powers, the suggestion is frequently encountered that since
such procedure is essentially legislative in character, rather
than judicial, no notice need be given. As a rule of general
application, this suggestion is too broad, and is shown by the
cases to be unsound. The idea behind it is similarly unsound.
The rule-making activities of an administrative agency
should not be put on a parity with the law-making activities
of a legislature. An agency does not represent a heterogeneous constituency, as does a legislature, but rather represents
ordinarily a special interest group. An agency does not, as
a legislature is generally thought to do, represent a cross
section of prevailing public opinion. None of the safeguards
which legislative procedure interpose against hasty, ill-considered action are present where an administrative agency
formulates rules of general application and substantive content without giving affected parties an opportunity to be
he~rd. The fact that an agency is usually formulating more
detailed rules than those adopted by the legislature-rules
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designed to control minutiae of conduct-only emphasizes
the importance of this distinction. 30
General recognition of the fact that the best guaranty of
wise and informed administrative action lies in making ample
provision for notice, hearing, and full discussion of proposed
rules prior to their promulgation, as well as a general realization that in this field there is no pressing public need for
speedy action, has led to frequent statutory enactments requiring that notice and hearing should precede the issuance
of many types of rules. The legislature frequently inserts an
express requirement of hearings in the controlling statute. 31
30 No case is known where a legislature has so far overlooked controlling
factual situations in formulating a rule of conduct as did the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in publishing regulations governing oil-tankers.
There, after the regulations had been promulgated, it was discovered that no
provisions had been made for certain small oil-tankers, constructed partly of
wood, that had been in operation for years in Southern bays and inlets. See
report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure ( 1941)
p. 114. The agency did not know of the existence of this fleet; and the operators of the fleet did not know of the forthcoming issuance of rules. Perhaps
part of the responsibility for this contretemps lies with a committee of representatives of certain oil companies which is said to have assisted in the preparation of the regulations.
31 Legislative provision may be of varied types. The simplest is a general
requirement that a hearing be held. Going beyond this, provision may be made
for investigation, publication of proposed rules, giving of such notice as to
assure that the affected parties will be made generally aware of the content of
the proposed rule, et cetera. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act ( § 4)
requires general notice (by publication) as to the time and place of hearing,
and requires that the notice either state the terms of the proposed rule or at
least describe the subjects and issues involved. In some instances, such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act (52 Stat. w6o, 29 U.S.C. §§ zo8, 210), the Bituminous Coal Act (so Stat. 73, 15 U.S.C. § 829) and the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1055, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e)), Congress has gone still
further and required that the administrative regulations be supported by findings of fact which in turn must rest on evidence duly taken in a formal
hearing before the agency. Such requirement is perhaps too rigorous. It has the
advantage of imposing a healthy discipline on the mental processes of the
administrators, who must in operating under such a statute reason closely and
clearly in formulating their rules. But it fails perhaps sufficiently to take into
account the fact that the issues in a rule-making proceeding are complex and
numerous, and the fact that the parties are diverse and not always alignable
into classes, and the fact that the final product represents not so much a determination based on existing facts as a judgment as to the future consequences
of proposed rules. For a general discussion of the problem of notice and hearing in rule-making proceedings, see Fuchs, "Procedure in Administrative
Rule-Making," 52 HARV. L. REV. 259 (1938). The particular problems that
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In cases where the statute is silent, it is common practice for
the agencies to give some notice and an opportunity at least
for discussion and informal exchange of views, before adopting any far-reaching rule of substantive effect.
It is only in cases where the statute is silent and the agency
prefers not to hold a hearing that the constitutional question
arises. In such cases, decision depends essentially on the nature of the rule. Some courts have camouflaged the distinction
by calling the rule-making procedure judicial in nature in
those cases where fairness seems to require a hearing, and
thus squaring the result with the formula that a hearing is
required in the case of quasi-judicial proceedings, but not in
the case of quasi-legislative proceedings.32
arise under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act are discussed in Ginnane,
"'Rule Making,' 'Adjudication' and Exemptions Under the Administrative
Procedure Act," 95 U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1947).
32 An illustration of the difficulties encountered by a court enmeshed in the
quagmire of distinctions between the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial is
afforded by a series of early decisions in Massachusetts. In Ela v. Smith, 5
Gray ( 71 Mass.) 12 r ( r8 55), the court had said that the action of a mayor
in calling out the militia to prevent a riot was quasi-judicial. Apparently, the
reason for this rather startling description of an executive act was the fear
that unless so described, there might be a personal liability on the part of the
mayor if it could be established that he had committed an error of judgment
in calling out the militia. A little later, in City of Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98
Mass. 431 (1868), the court upheld the action of a board of health which
(pursuant to a statute) had without notice or hearing ordered a person who had
blocked a pond, to provide proper drainage. In so holding, the court incidentally referred to the act of the board as a "quasi-judicial" act. The opinion
suggested-in a neat reversal of the usual cliche--that notice was necessary
in case of quasi-legislative proceedings; but not in case of quasi-judicial proceedings. However, when a litigant sought to take advantage of this theory
in Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693 (1904), the
court changed its terminology. In holding that notice and hearing need not
precede the adoption of a health regulation forbidding swimming in a small
lake which was the source of a city's water supply, the court said that notice
was necessary in case of quasi-judicial proceedings involving the determination
as to the existence of a nuisance in a particular case, but was not necessary in
case of quasi-legislative proceedings involving the issuance of general regulations. The suggestion of the prior decision was thus nicely reversed. But the
court soon encountered further difficulties. In Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189
Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (1905), it appeared that the board of health, without
a hearing, had found that certain activities did constitute a nuisance in a
particular case, and had ordered an individual to take certain steps to abate
it. This was, apparently, within the rule of the Nelson case, a quasi-judicial
act, and one which required notice. But since (for various reasons discussed in
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Procedural rules. In cases where the rule adopted by the
agency is primarily procedural in nature, setting up rules of
practice in proceedings before the agency, prescribing forms,
setting a schedule of fees, et cetera, it would seem that no
notice is required. The same result follows in cases where
the agency's "rules" are in effect no more than legal opinions
as to the proper interpretation of the governing statute, announcing the construction which, on the advice of its counsel,
the agency will follow unless and until the courts should
construe the statute otherwise. In neither of these types of
cases is there any substantial need for a hearing.
Substantive rules. Where the agency rule in effect comprises a substantive rule of law, the situation is less clear cut.
Where the class to be affected is large, and the question to be
resolved rests primarily on broad considerations of policy as
to which a wide discretion has been committed to the rulemaking agency, there is no necessity of giving advance individual notice to those affected. Nor is there necessity, in such
cases, of giving an opportunity for a formal judicial-type
hearing. Whatever degree of investigation and consultation
the agency may have engaged in prior to the issuance of the
rule will ordinarily be deemed to have satisfied the requirements of due process.33
Where, however, the rule or order is directed specifically
to a party or a compact group, and where the agency exercises only a limited degree of discretion, actual notice and
opportunity for hearing are ordinarily required. 34
the opinion) it seemed clearly undesirable to upset the order there involved
because of the denial of a hearing, the court was constrained to further differentiate between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative proceedings, and did so
in a most confusing way, with an apparent result of excusing notice in many
types of cases where under previous decisions, notice would be necessary. See
discussion in 20 HARV. L. REV. II6 (1906).
33 Guiseppi v. Walling (C.C.A. 2d 1944), 144 F. (2d) 6o8; cf., Gemsco
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S. Ct. 6os (1945).
34 Western U. Tel. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Minnesota (D. C. Minn.
1938), 24 F. Supp. 370, where a three-judge court was of the opinion that a
minimum-wage order would be invalid if made without notice and an adequate
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Character of hearing. Even in those cases where notice
and hearing are required as conditions precedent to the exercise by an agency of its rule-making powers, the requirements as to the form of notice and scope of the hearing are
far less rigorous than in cases where the agency exercises
judicial powers. The agency, in exercising its rule-making
powers, is not required "to conduct a quasi-judicial proceeding." 35 It is enough if the hearing is "of the same order as
had been given by congressional committees when the legislative process was in the hands of Congress." 36 It need not
be shown, in the absence of a specific statutory requirement,
that the rule or order is supported by evidence taken at the
hearing. 37
6. Necessity of Notice m Fixing Rates and Commodity
Prices
The fixing of utility rates is one of the most common forms
of the exercise of rule-making powers by administrative
agencies. Such activity has in comparatively recent years been
broadened to include the fixing of prices in case of certain
commodity sales. In considering the necessity of notice and
hearing in such cases, however, the courts have not considered
them simply as instances to be governed by a general rule
applicable to all rule-making activities. Nor have the courts
applied, in this instance, the suggestion that rule-making
activities are legislative in character and that therefore notice
is not required. Rather, the courts have required or excused
opportunity to be heard. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Board of Railroad
Commissioners, 76 Mont. 305, 247 Pac. 16z (19z6), holding unconstitutional
a statute empowering an agency to order a railroad to erect a spur track, without notice or hearing.
35 Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of. Wage and Hour Division of
Department of Labor, JIZ U.S. 1z6, u8, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941),
36 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, z88 U. S. 294, 305, 53
S. Ct. 350 (1933).
37 The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 47 S. Ct. 71.7 (191.7).
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notice and hearing on the basis of far more practical considerations.
It seems fairly clear that in a case of fixing utility rates,
there exists a right to a hearing, at least before the enforcement of the rates. 38 On the other hand, the Office of Price
Administration in fixing rents and commodity price ceilings
under war emergency powers was not required to give a
hearing before fixing prices, and it was held that there was
no denial of due process in the circumstance that the order
became effective without the parties affected having an opportunity to be heard. 39 State courts have reached similar results.40
Here again, it is futile to explain the difference in result
on the basis that one type of hearing is legislative and the
other judicial in nature. 41 A better explanation of the result
is that afforded by the Supreme Court, which (in the rentfixing case above cited) quoted the language of Justice
Holmes in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization of Colorado 41a that "Where a rule of conduct
applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that
every one should have a direct voice in its adoption." Not
only is it impracticable to give every landlord in a large area
an opportunity to be heard, but there is grave doubt as to
38 United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 29 I U. S. 457, 54 S. Ct. 47 I
( I934); Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302
U.S. 388, 58 S. Ct. 334 (I938); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota,
I34 U.S. 4I8, IO S. Ct. 462, 702 (I89o).
39 Bowles v. Willingham, 32I U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 64I (I944). For a
general discussion, see Bandy, "Notice and Opportunity to be Heard in Price
Control Proceedings," 20 TEX. L. REV. 577 (I942).
40 Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, II3 Wash. 359, I94 Pac. 595 (I92o)fixing wages; State ex rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co.,
II8 N.J. Eq. 504, I79 Atl. II6 (I935)-milk prices.
41 The Supreme Court has called rate making both judicial and legislative,
and the federal courts now characterize it as a legislative function. See 34 CoL.
L. REV. 332 (I934) and discussion in Freund, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER
PERSONS AND PROPERTY (I928) IS·
41 a Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado,
239 U.S. 44I at 445, 36 S. Ct. I4I (I9I5).
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the utility of such a hearing. In fixing utility rates, on the
other hand, the principal facts to be considered relate to the
valuation of one company's property and its cost of operation. The best source of information on this question is found
in the reports of the company and analyses of its accountants.
The nature of the issue is such as to make the judicial-type
hearing the most efficient way of discovering the truth. Per
contra, in the rent-fixing case, the order depends not upon
disputed facts which particularly concern individual parties
but rather upon broad economic postulates best susceptible
to investigation by the methods of skilled economists and
statisticians. A judicial-type hearing would not be the
best available method of assuring informed administrative
action. 42
Type of hearing. In the price-fixing field, statutes frequently require that a hearing be held even in cases where
it would not be constitutionally necessary. In such instances,
it would seem that a hearing which did no more than give
interested parties an opportunity to present their general
views (as in the typical case of a hearing before a legislative
committee) should be sufficient. Some courts have so held. 43
But other courts, believing that the legislative purpose in
providing for a hearing contemplated that the order must
be based on evidence taken at the hearing, have reached a
contrary result, requiring that the hearing must follow
generally the course of a judicial trial. 44
In utility rate-fixing cases, where a hearing is required
as a matter of constitutional right, the rule of the federal
courts is that the determination must be based on evidence
42 Cj., DAVIS, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942).
43 Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d) 665 (1940); Highland
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew (D. C. Va. 1936), 16 F. Supp. 575·
44 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania,
332 Pa. 15, 1 A. (2d) 775 (1938); McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96
Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 6o8 (1938).
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taken at the hearing; the tribunal is prohibited from relying
on its own asserted knowledge of facts not proved at the
hearing. 45 It would follow that in such cases, the hearing
must be of a type conforming generally to basic requirements
of a judicial hearing, involving opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
7· Necessity of Notice and Hearing in Public Safety Cases
In many types of cases, administrative or executive authorities, acting under statutes passed in the exercise of the
legislature's police power, proceed summarily to seize or
confiscate property, order nuisances abated, order the installation of safety appliances, and sometimes require the hospitalization or incarceration of persons, all without notice or
opportunity to be heard. In these "public safety" cases, the
underlying policy factors that motivate decisions come clearly
to light.
Immediacy of public danger. In such cases as the destruction of putrid food 46 or the quarantining of persons suffering
from vile and contagious diseases/7 most courts agree that
the administrative agency may proceed summarily, finding
satisfaction of due process in the opportunity to bring a
subsequent damage suit against the offending official. Where,
on the other hand, it can be plainly shown that no overwhelming public interest justifies such an arbitrary course,
and where pursuit thereof would affect substantial property
rights, advance notice and opportunity to be heard before
the administrative action becomes final is usually required. 48
45
46

This question is discussed more fully, infra, pp. 207, 208.
North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29
S. Ct. 101 (1908).
47 Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S. W. (2d) 21 (1931); cf., Rock v.
Carney, 216 Mich. 28o, 185 N. W. 798 (1921), citing many cases.
48 Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933), invalidating an authorization to an agency to order a railroad, without notice or
hearing, to construct an overhead crossing; cf., Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M.
54, 159 Pac. 949 (1916). See comments, 43 YALE L. J. 840 (1934); 82 U.
PA. L. REV. 400 (19J4).
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Substantiality of property interest involved. Summary
action is more often permitted where the dollar value of
the seized property is small. The distinction made possesses
advantages of empiricism rather than logic. This has been
frankly recognized by the courts. In Lawton v. Steele/8 a for
example, the court in upholding summary destruction of fish
nets maintained in alleged violation of a state statute, remarked that it would be "belittling the dignity of the judiciary" to require the destruction of "property . . . of
trifling value" to be "preceded by a solemn condemnation in
a court of justice." Where the fisherman's boats rather than
his nets were the subject of the statute, it was held that
notice and a formal hearing were required before a seizure
could be made, the court pointing out that the property
involved might reach in value many thousands of dollars. 49
On the closely related theory that property-such as slot
machines-which is incapable of being put to any lawful use
does not deserve protection, the courts have similarly sustained summary seizure of gambling equipment. 50 As a result
of a conceptualistic application of this theory, courts have
often sustained summary proceedings as to property legislatively declared to be a nuisance, even though there might
be doubt as to whether the particular property seized under
the statute was in fact being so used as to constitute a nuisance.51 The result in such cases seems unfortunate. Summary
proceedings should be justified only in cases of an overruling
necessity. 52 Several cases have been decided on this basis. 53
48 a Lawton v. Steele, I 52 U. S. I 3 3, I4 S. Ct. 499 (I 894).
Colon v. Lisk, I53 N.Y. I88, 47 N. E. 302 (1897).
50 Police Commissioners for City of Baltimore v. Wagner, 93 Md. I 82, 48
Atl. 455 (I901); and see Powell, "Administrative Exercise of the Police
Power," 24 HARV. L. REv. 333 (I9I1).
51 People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, I40 N. Y.
1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893); King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305 (188I).
5 2 See Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE }USTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW
(1927) 261.
53 City of Paducah v. Hook Amusement Co., Inc., 257 Ky. 19, 77 S. W.
(2d) 383 (1934); McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505
(1904).
49
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In some types of cases to be sure, where the facts can
be ascertained by an objective standard, inspection by an
expert offers a more reliable method than does a trial to
determine the truth; and in such cases summary seizure is
quite properly sustained, where there is any substantial public
interest to justify it. 54
8. Necessity of Notice and Hearing in Granting and Revoking Licenses
(a) Granting licenses. When application is made to an
administrative agency for the issuance of a license, there is
of course no problem of notice, and ordinarily no question
is presented as to the necessity of affording a hearing. The
informal procedural technique of the administrative agencies
is well adapted to the investigation of applications for licenses. The judicial technique of a hearing is displaced by
the administrative mechanics of the questionnaire and written
statement. Frequently, the license is allowed on the basis of
the application as filed. If the application is deemed insufficient to present all the desired information, or if the agency
wishes to demand additional assurances from the applicant,
he may be informally advised of what must be added to his
application to obtain favorable action. This is the common
practice, for example, with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Usually, the only purpose of a hearing is to
assure that the agency obtains the information and assurances
that it insists upon as a prerequisite to the issuance of a
license; and ordinarily the license seeker, approaching the
agency in propitiatory mood, willingly suits his convenience
to the agency's desires. 55
54 E.g., the conformity of food to certain standards; the conformity of a
structure to building-code requirements, et cetera.
55 These psychological factors, making for an attitude of deferential obeisance to the agency's will, account no doubt in large part for the great favor
with which the agencies view licensing systems as a modus operandi.
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Often, where the issuance of a license depends upon
compliance with certain standards or passing certain tests, a
hearing would indeed be less suitable than an inspection as
a means of ascertaining the truth. In such cases as the
inspection of grain by the Department of Agriculture, the
approval of radio equipment by the Federal Communications
Commission, or the determination by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority of the skill of an aviator or of the safety of an
airplane, it is clear that a hearing technique would be inappropriate.
In cases where the statute sets up an objective standard
that controls the granting of licenses, such as a license to
keep a dog, the administrative activity in granting licenses
is merely ministerial. Nonaction can ordinarily be remedied
by mandamus, or similar procedural devices.
\Vhere the statute vests a measure of discretion in the
agency as to the granting or denial of a license, the question
as to the necessity of a hearing arises only where an agency
has denied an applicant's request for a license and denied
his request for a hearing. The situation is substantially the
same as that where a license is revoked, and although decisions are few, it is believed that the determination would
be governed by the same considerations as those discussed
in the next section with respect to the revocation of licenses.
Of course, if the agency's discretion is untrammeled, there
is little reason for seeking a hearing, and probably no constitutional right to one. But where the agency's discretion is
limited by fairly ascertainable standards, there is apparently
a right to a hearing. 56
56 Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 46
S. Ct. 215 (1926); Gage v. Censors of New Hampshire Eclectic Medical
Society, 63 N. H. 92 ( 18 84). For a general discussion, see Stratton, "The
Necessity of Notice, Hearing, and Judicial Review of Licensing by Administrative Bodies," 14 MISS. L. J. 510 (1942); Black, "Does Due Process of Law
Require an Advance Notice and Hearing Before a License Is Issued Under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act1" 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 270 (1935).
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(b) Revocation of licenses. Since the revocation of a license is ordinarily upon the ground that the licensee has
failed to conform to prescribed standards of conduct, and
hence involves a judicial inquiry, it could logically be argued
that revocation must be preceded by notice and hearing. But
in this field the principle that judicial determinations must
be based upon a hearing (a principle that has been ignored
as often as it has been stated) has been abandoned in favor
of a terminology borrowed from the field of property law.
The conveyancer's distinction between the grant of a mere
terminable license, conveying no rights but only a revocable
privilege to make temporary use of another's lands (as
contrasted with the grant of a more substantial interest,
capable of judicial protection as a property right) has deviously affected the law of administrative tribunals. Courts
have suggested that some licenses grant mere privileges,
which may be revoked at the whim of the licensor, without
notice or hearing, and that in other cases the grantee has a
property right, of which he cannot be deprived except in
accordance with the course of judicial proceedings. Obviously, there is no connection between a license to walk across
another's lands and a license to conduct a business, but failure
to emphasize this clear distinction has led to much confusion
of language and perhaps some confusion of thinking.
Licenses as conferring privilege. The doctrine that some
licenses to engage in business or professional activity grant
to the licensee only a revocable privilege, short of the status
of a right, is unsound. While this suggestion is found in
many cases, few can be found where this is the real basis of
decision. It appears usually as a dictum, and close examination ordinarily shows the dictum to be a poor description
of the result in the particular case. 57 In principle and policy,
57

E.g., People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health of City of New York,

189 N.Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907), where it appeared there had been a full
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the suggestion is unsound, as has been pointed out repeatedly.58 It has not motivated judicial decision and cannot be
adopted as a test.
Rather, the factors that determine whether a license may
be revoked without hearing are the same as those that control
in other fields where the question is presented as to the
necessity of a hearing in advance of definitive administrative
action.
Hearing normally required. Normally, notice and an opportunity to be heard is required as a condition precedent
to the revocation of a license. Inasmuch as the basis for the
revocation is ordinarily asserted misconduct on the part of
the licensee, the situation is one where a hearing is normally
the most appropriate method for ascertaining the truth.
Recognizing this, the courts have been inclined to insist that
opportunity for a hearing be afforded. This predilection in
favor of a requirement that there be a hearing is further
supported by the fact that in revoking licenses, an agency
usually is vested with but little discretion; normally, revocation must be supported by a determination of misconduct .
.i\tlore important still is the fact that a revocation of a license
involves specific action directed toward a particular individual, and the effect upon that individual is often catastrophic.
Recognition of these factors can be found in many of the
decisions which require a hearing in case of license revocations. In cases where the licensee has invested a substantial
sum of money in the licensed activity, reluctance to permit
revocation of the license without a hearing is particularly
hearing, de novo, on an application to compel reinstatement of the license;
State ex rel. Nowotnv v. City of Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N. W. 658
( 1909) ; other cases discussed in Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to
be Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942); and
Hale, "Hearings: The Right to a Trial, with Special Reference to Administrative Powers," 42 ILL. L. REV. 749 ( r 948).
58 See Gellhorn, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940) 378.
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marked. 59 To some extent, the right to a hearing seems to
depend upon the amount of investment in the undertaking
which has been licensed. The courts have quite uniformly
(but not unanimously) insisted upon a hearing in connection
with revocation of a license to practice a profession. In these
cases, revocation is normally a major personal catastrophe. 60
The fact that fear of precipitate and ill-advised administrative action is a factor sometimes affecting the decision is
indicated by the great reluctance of courts to permit revocation without a hearing in case of activities which have but
recently come into the sphere of licensed activities. The
legislatures often share this fear, and require the revocation
to be based upon findings of fact supported by substantial
evidence taken at a public hearing. Section 9 (b) of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 goes somewhat further, providing that the licensee shall be accorded
an opportunity "to demonstrate or achieve" compliance with
all lawful requirements, prior to the revocation of a license.
Sometimes statutes are construed as implying a requirement
of hearing, and decision sometimes rests upon an interpretation of legislative intent. If the statute is ambiguous, it is
usually construed in favor of a notice and hearing. 61
Revocation permitted without hearing. But in some types
of cases, revocation of a license without a hearing is per59 Compare City of Grand Rapids v. Brandy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29
( 1895), indicating that hearing prior to revocation of a license as a junk
dealer would be required in the absence at least of the express reservation of a
power to revoke; and Vernakes v. City of South Haven, I86 Mich. 595, I52
N. W. 9I9 (19I5), where hearing was not required in connection with the
revocation of a license to run a popcorn stand.
60 E.g., disbarment of an attorney (or disciplinary suspension of the right
to practice): In re Noell (C.C.A. 8th I937), 93 F. (zd) 5; Garfield v. United
States ex rel. Spalding, 32 App. D. C. 153 (1908); revocation of a doctor's
license: People v. McCoy, I25 Ill. 289, I7 N. E. 786 (I888); State v. Schultz,
II Mont. 429, 28 Pac. 643 (I892); dentist's license: Kalman v. Walsh, 355
Ill. 34I, I89 N. E. 3I5 (I934); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532> 207 Pac. 724
(I922). See also Tuttrup, "Necessity of Notice and Hearing in the Revocation
of Occupational Licenses," 4 Wis. L. REV. I8o (I927).
6l Tanguay v. State Board of Public Roads, 46 R. I. 134, 125 Atl. 293
(I924).
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mitted. To a large degree, these cases simply reflect judicial
deference to accepted traditions in a particular field. Where
the carrying on of particular types of enterprises was historically permitted only by the special indulgence of the
sovereign, the exercise of free executive discretion in granting or revoking a license to conduct such enterprise long
ago became an accustomed part of our mores, and no deprival
of due process is perceived in permitting the revocation of
such licenses without a hearing. The result is often explained
by saying that the conduct of such enterprises involves a
high degree of risk to public morality, and that because of
the general undesirability of such activities as the conduct
of saloons, poolrooms, public dance halls, and the like, it is
proper to give administrative officials a free executive power
to control the conduct of licensees engaged in such activities,
embracing even the power to put them speedily out of
business.62 But the lack of respectability of the business is
not the controlling test, for similar results obtain in other
fields where there is no such moral question involved but
where there is an accepted tradition of discretionary revocation of licenses. 63
In cases where a clear need of speedy action to protect
the public health is shown, summary revocation of licenses
is sometimes permitted on the same grounds as in other
cases involving action to preserve the public safety. Typical
of this sort of case is a license to peddle milk. 64 This principle
has been pressed far, even to permitting the revocation of
62 Commonwealth v. Kinsley, I33 Mass. 578 (I882); Mehlos v. City of
Milwaukee, I56 Wis. 59I, I46 N. W. 882 (I9I4); People ex rel. Ritter v.
Wallace, I6o App. Div. 787, I45 N.Y. S. 104I (I9I4); Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of Seattle, I48 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. I043 (I928).
63 Child v. Bemus, 17 R.I. 230, 21 Atl. 539 (I89I)-hackney license.
64 State ex rel. Nowotny v. City of Milwaukee, I40 Wis. 38, I2 I N. W. 658
(I 909) ; People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health of City of New York,
I89 N.Y. 187, 82 N. E. I87 (I9o7)-both these cases containing dicta, as
above noted, going beyond the actual decision and suggesting improperly that
the right conferred upon the licensee was not a property right but a mere
revocable license.
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a license to operate a motion picture theater where inspectors
found the structure to be in dangerous condition.65
The courts are more ready to permit deprival of a hearing
in license revocation cases where the amount invested by the
licensee is small, because little harm will be caused even if
administrative action is based on mistake.
In some types of cases, of course, a license is issued on
an express or clearly implied condition that it is subject to
revocation at the whim of the licensing sovereign-for example, a license to fish commercially in state-owned waters,
or a license to conduct a business on city-owned property.
And in these cases there is no difficulty in revoking a license
in accordance with the reserved power. Such cases fall beyond
the ambit of the problem.
Likewise there must be distinguished cases where there
is a wholesale revocation of licenses as a method of effectuating a proper legislative determination that henceforward
a certain type of business shall be prohibited-for example,
if a state validly prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquor,
saloonkeepers are not entitled to a hearing on the question
as to the revocation of their licenses.66
Suspension of licenses. Revocation of a license to carry on
any type of business, without giving the licensee an opportunity to be heard as to his innocence of the charge on which
the revocation proceedings are based, is unfortunate. The
public interest could be adequately preserved, and a much
wider assurance of individual justice obtained, by adopting
a device of permitting temporary suspension of a license
without a hearing, at the same time prohibiting actual revocation except after a trial of the licensee on the charges
which have been preferred. This device is sometimes pro65 Genesee Recreation Co. of Rochester v. Edgerton, 172 App. Div. 464, 158
N.Y. S. 421 (1916).
·
66 Burgess v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Brockton, 235 Mass. 9.S> 126
N. E. 456 (1920), where an ordinance was adopted putting an end to the
jitney business as a means of public transportation in that city.
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vided for in recent statutes. 67 Some agencies are developing
this technique, independently of statutory provisions, as a
means of meeting the difficult license revocation problem.
It offers wide opportunities.
9· Effect of Statutes

Statutory requirement frequent. Frequently, statutes require notice and hearing in cases where such requirement
would not be implied from the due process clause.68 In
many cases, such statutory requirement appears to reflect
legislative disapprobation of the result of judicial decision
that, independent of statute, no hearing was required. 69 In
other cases, the statutes are apparently aimed chiefly at assuring the adequacy of notice and an opportunity for full
hearing. There is frequently a requirement (which in the
absence of statute would not in all cases be implied) that
.the agency's action must be based on and fully supported
by the evidence taken at the hearing.
67 Civil Aeronautics Act of I938, 52 Stat. 973, Ch. 6oi, § 6o9; 49 U.S.C.
§ 40 I; Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. I 64 (I 92 I) Ch. 64, § 306; 7
U.S.C. § I 8 I; Cotton Standards Act, 42 Stat. I 517 (I 92 3) Ch. 2 8 8, § 3;
7 U.S.C. § 5 I; Grain Standards Act, 3 9 Stat. 484 (I 9 I 6) Ch. 3 I 3, § 7; 7
U.S.C. § 7I; United States Warehouse Act, 46 Stat. I464 (I931) Ch. 366, §§ 7
and 8; 7 U.S.C. § 24I. Cf., § 9 (b) of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act of I946.
68 E.g., the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, requires "reasonable notice" and an "opportunity for hearing" in "any contested case."
69 Thus, in many states the landowner is given a right to a hearing on the
question as to the necessity of taking his property for a public use, although it
seems well settled that otherwise no hearing is required. The effect of the decision in Commonwealth v. Sisson, I89 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 6I9 (I905) (note
32, supra), was obliterated the following year by an amendment to the statute
there involved, the amendment requiring that the health commissioners give
notice and an opportunity to be heard before making an order forbidding the
discharge of sawdust into streams-exactly what the court had held was not
necessary, in the absence of statutory requirement. Ch. 3 56, Mass. Acts, I 906.
Many states by statute impose requirements as to hearings in connection with
executive proceedings to remove public officers. As above noted, a hearing is
not required in such case, in the absence of statute. See 99 A. L. R. 336.
Amendments to the federal immigration laws have broadened the immigrant's
right to a hearing. See Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JusTICE AND THE SuPREMACY OF LAW ( I927) 295; and Act of I907, 34 Stat. 906, Ch. I 134, § 25.
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The multiplicity of these legislative admonitions suggests
clearly a general realization that as a matter of sound administrative practice, there should be afforded, wherever practicable and regardless of constitutional requirements, adequate
notice to all interested parties and an opportunity to be
heard fully as to contemplated administrative actions. Many
agencies, sharing this view, regularly consult with interested
parties on problems of general concern, and make it almost
a rule never to take final action directly affecting any particular party or group without first inviting the party or
parties to discuss the matter. 70
Failure of statute to require notice. Sometimes a statute,
authorizing administrative activities in a particular field,
fails to impose any affirmative requirement as to notice and
hearing, even in a type of case where these are constitutionally required. May the statute be declared void because of
such omission? As the result of a dictum in Stuart v.
Palmer/0 a declaring that the validity of a statute must depend not on what is in fact done as to giving notice, but
on what may be done under the statute, a number of courts
have held that even though an administrative agency has
"by chance" given notice and a hearing to a respondent,
nevertheless its action may be set aside because the statute
under which it was operating did not in terms require the
giving of such notice. 71 The much sounder ruling, supported
by the clear weight of authority, holds that there is no deprivation of due process if notice and hearing were in fact
afforded by the administrative authorities, even though the
statutes do not specifically require such procedure. This result
70 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provides a general
broadening of the legislative requirements for hearings in cases involving the
exercise of rule-making powers.
70a Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183 ( 1878).
71 E.g., Lacy v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 Pac. 949 (1916); Central of
Georgia Ry. v. Georgia R.R. Commission (D. C. Ga. 1914), 215 Fed. 421;
People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N. E. 757 (1920); Northern Cedar Co.
v. French, 131 Wash. 394,230 Pac. 837 (1924).
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is achieved frequently by construing statutes as "implying"
a requirement of notice and hearing where the constitution
so requires; sometimes, the result is explained on the presumption that official action has been taken legally. But the
soundest basis appears to be that one who has in fact received
notice and has been heard has not been deprived of notice
and hearing. Nor is there any good reason for enjoining
administrative action under a statute which is silent as to
the requirement of notice, upon a party's speculative or
conjectural fear that the agency might take some action
against him without giving prior notice. 72
1 o.

Hearing by Judicial Review

In some cases, where an agency acts without giving notice
and an opportunity to be heard, in situations where a hearing
is required, it is possible to obtain a subsequent hearing by
appealing the administrative determination to the courts. Is
it sufficient if relief is forthcoming via this circuitous route?
In cases where personal liberty is involved, the answer would
seem plainly to be no. But where only property rights are
at stake, it is quite generally held that "mere postponement
of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the
opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of
the liability is adequate." 73 Where, however, the court is
72 People v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N. E. 786 (r888); Armory Realty
Co. v. Olsen, 210 Wis. 281, 246 N. W. 513 (1933); Toombs v. Citizens' Bank
of Waynesboro, 281 U. S. 643, 50 S. Ct. 434 (1930); State ex rel. Powell v.
State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238 (r884); Railroad Commissioners v. Columbia, N. & L. R. Co., 82 S. C. 418, 64 S. E. 240
(1909); Abrams v. Daugherty, 6o Cal. App. 297, 212 Pac. 942 (r922); City
of San Jose v. Railroad Commission of State of California, r 75 Cal. 2 84, r 6 5
Pac. 967 (1917); Corcoran v. Board of Aldermen of Cambridge, 199 Mass.
5, 85 N. E. 155 (r9o8); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179
U.S. 405, 21 S. Ct. 206 (r9oo). Other cases are collected in Stason, THE LAW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, 2d ed. (1947) 187.
73 Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597,
51 S. Ct. 6o8 (1931); and see Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct.
641 (1944); Springer v. United States, ro2 U.S. 586 (r88o); Scottish Union
& National Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 6rr, 25 S. Ct. 345 (1905).
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not satisfied that the remedies available in the courts are
adequate, the opposite result is reached. 74
In many of the cases where an opportunity to obtain an
ex post facto hearing, through judicial review, has been held
sufficient, there has been no showing of particular harm to
the respondent as a result of being compelled to go into the
courts to obtain relief. In a tax case involving disputed
liability for a sum of money, for example, it can fairly be
expected that a determination on the question would ultimately be a matter for the courts in any event; and, further,
in such cases the courts are swayed by imponderable considerations as to the public desirability of assuring speedy
and efficient operation of the tax-collection procedure. But
if the rule established in such decisions were to be applied
in case situations (like workmen's compensation) where the
party affected could not normally afford to carry his case
into court, or in situations where the private injury (e. g.,
deprival of a license to do business) that would result from
the immediate effectiveness of the administrative order outweighs the public necessity for prompt administrative action,
this doctrine could produce most untoward results. The doctrine has not been applied in such cases; and the doctrine
should not be so extended. The constantly increasing sphere
of administrative actability, and the continuing withdrawal
of the courts from detailed examination of administrative
rulings, are further reasons for the conclusiori. that in many
types of cases the theoretical availability of judicial review
should not be deemed a ground for permitting agencies to
deny private parties the privilege of notice and hearing at
the early stages of the proceeding.
74 Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 54 S. Ct. 148 (1933);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59
S. Ct. 206 (1938).
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Effect of Failure to Demand Notice and Hearing

Where notice is required, by constitution or statute, to
precede administrative action, and no notice is given, the
proceedings are of course defective, unless the error is waived
by the party's appearance before the agency. 75 Similarly, the
respondent may waive his right of a hearing, and waiver is
readily inferred from failure to make a prompt and insistent
demand therefor. Especially is this true in such fields as
taxation. 76
I 2.

Conclusions

No general formula can be relied upon to determine
whether or not, in a given situation, notice and hearing must
precede administrative action. The line has not been drawn
according to a distinction between judicial and legislative
activities. Although there is some tendency to require notice
in the former type of case and not in the latter, yet this
tendency has frequently been overcome by extraneous considerations deemed to be controlling in a particular case.
Nor can statements of principle made in a case involving
one administrative function safely be applied in predicting
what result will be reached in a case involving a different
agency performing its work in a different field. The courts
tend not only to follow the accepted tradition in a particular
field, they tend also to restrict their rulings to the particular
field in which the ruling was made. Factual distinctions
assume great importance. The doctrine permitting summary
75 Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C. 1932), 59 F. (2d) 879;
Harris v. Hoage (App. D. C. 1933), 66 F. (2d) 801. But there is some disagreement as to this. See Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 229 Mass. 208,
II8 N. E. 347 (1918). There is no waiver where the objection is based on
failure to give notice to other interested parties. City of Los Angeles v. Glassell,
203 Cal. 44, 262 Pac. 1084 (1928); cf., Romeo v. Campbell (C.C.A. 2d
1929), 35 F. (2d) 704.
76 McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.S. 234, 44 S. Ct. 50 (1923); cf., Central of
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 28 S. Ct. 47 (1907).
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confiscation of a net used illegally by a fisherman does not
permit similar seizure of a fleet of ships which he uses to
conduct his illegal fishing operations, for example. More
important, the fact that the requirements of notice and hearing may have become attenuated in a particular field, by a
gradual process of judicial erosion, does not mean that the
same flexibility of procedure will be tolerated in an analogous
field where administrative supervision is an unaccustomed
innovation.
But the divergent traditions obtaining in various fields of
administrative activities can be rationalized, and the warp
and woof of seemingly conflicting decisions spun into whole
cloth, by reference to the underlying policy factors which
motivate decisions more frequently than judicial opinions
indicate. The essential problem in every case is that of weighing the relative merits of a public interest in prompt action
against the respondent's private interest that the hand of
the law be stayed until he has fully argued the equities of
his particular position. Sometimes the balance is plain-for
example, the public necessity of expeditious collection of the
public revenues obviously outweighs the individual taxpayer's desire to avoid payment of a contested tax until the
validity thereof has been finally determined by a court of
last resort. Conversely, the right of a doctor to continue the
practice of his profession, pending determination of charges
that he improperly advertised, clearly outweighs the public
interest in curtailing such instances of asserted unethical
conduct.
But in other cases the scales are more evenly balanced.
Then other considerations of policy must be taken into
account.
First among these, perhaps, is the extent to which the
administrative agency has been vested with discretion to premise its determinations upon ad hoc considerations of what
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is generally desirable in a particular case. If an agency has
free discretion, notice and hearing could serve no controlling
purpose, and may be dispensed with if the agency so desires.
But the extent of administrative freedom of action is
ordinarily the result of, rather than the basis of, judicial
determination. The courts ordinarily decide what degree of
discretion is to be accorded the agency. In reaching this
decision, the courts probe into considerations lying far beneath the surface of the readily seen.
One such consideration is the importance to the private
party involved of the repercussions of a particular administrative activity, and the immediacy of the effect. Where
private property of a particular person is singled out for
specific action, notice and hearing are ordinarily deemed
appropriate. More particularly is this the case where the
property interest involved is of substantial value. Where the
number of persons affected by the administrative determination is large, on the other hand, requirement of notice and
hearing is less persuasively indicated. This result is prompted
in part by the practical difficulties involved in hearing large
numbers of parties before taking action; further, the courts
sense the difficulty of aligning the interests of thousands of
parties and resolving many individual complaints into clearcut issues.
Closely related to this factor is another. As a result of
judicial experience, courts know that in some inquiries, a
formal hearing is less well calculated to reveal the truth
than is private investigation and inspection. In such cases,
notice and hearing will not ordinarily be required.
Decision is influenced somewhat by the court's confidence
in the agency. A court that views with doubts and misgivings
the functioning of a given agency is naturally inclined to
repress that agency's freedom of discretionary action. It can
often be most efficiently repressed by insistence that the
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agency must proceed only on the basis of a record which is
shown to contain substantial evidence to support the agency's
conclusions. Coupled with this is a countertendency (particularly in cases where it is believed administrative action is not
likely to be ill-advised or, even if in error, not likely to be
a cause of irreparable injury) to waive insistence upon a
hearing in advance of administrative action, where there is
adequate opportunity for correcting administrative mistakes
upon judicial review.

B.
I.

REQUIREMENTS AS TO SERVICE oF NoTICE

Constitutional and Statutory Questions Involved

In cases where notice is required to precede administrative
action, questions arise as to who is entitled to receive notice,
and what formalities must be complied with in serving
notice. The problems thus presented may have both a constitutional and statutory background.
From the viewpoint of meeting constitutional requirements, there is little difficulty. The due process clause is
not concerned with procedural niceties. Generally, notice
need be given only those parties who will be directly and
substantially affected by the administrative determination.
The form of notice is immaterial, so long as it is calculated
to acquaint the respondent with the necessary information
as to the date and place of hearing in time to give him a
reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his case, and
so long as it apprises him of the nature of the claim with
sufficient particularity to enable him to know what evidence
he must prepare to meet it. 71
Statutes often require more of the agencies as to these
matters than the Constitution demands. Frequently, notice
must be given to collaterally interested parties. Sometimes,
77 The question as to the adequacy of notice, from the viewpoint of the degree of definiteness and particularity required, is treated infra.
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the statute specifies with particularity to whom notice must
be given; 78 and sometimes, the statute requires the agency
to seek out all interested parties and give them appropriate
notice. 79 The latter requirement theoretically imposes a heavy
burden on administrative intuition, but in practice the mere
giving of a general notice of proposed administrative action
is sufficient to bring the matter to the attention of interested
parties, since those subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of
the various agencies are generally watchful of the agencies'
activities.
Similarly, the statutes frequently prescribe in some detail
the contents of the required notice and the mode in which
service of notice is to be perfected.
2.

Who Is Entitled to Notice

Generally, except as statutes may impose broader requirements, those parties whose legal rights will be affected by
the administrative determination, and who would be deemed
"indispensable parties" in equitable proceedings in the courts,
are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard thereon
(assuming, of course, that the determination is of such a nature that notice and an opportunity to be heard are required).
The problem becomes troublesome as it involves the rights
of those whose interests will be collaterally affected by a
determination. For example, the granting to a radio station
of the right to change its assigned frequency and power, or
the grant of a license to erect and operate a new station,
may substantially affect the value of a franchise previously
granted to another station. Or an order directing an employer to discontinue an unfair labor practice which has
78 In federal legislation regulating public utilities, it is sometimes required
that notice of certain proceedings be given to the states in which the property
of the utilities is located; e.g., § 214 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 151; § 203 (a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791.
79 E.g., § 14 (a) of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 8oq §19 (c) of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901.
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injured a particular union may adversely affect the rights
of a competing union.
To what extent must the agency seek out and discover
those whose interest may be collaterally affected? No clearcut answer is afforded by the cases. Decision is affected in
part by the language of applicable statutes and by the background of accepted practices in particular fields. 80 Generally,
however, there is little duty cast upon the agency to trace
down those who may be able to show that the order has some
substantial but collateral effect on their legal rights. It is
enough if the agency serves notice on those whose direct
concern should be reasonably anticipated by one who is an
expert in the particular field of activity.
No duty exists, it is believed, of notifying all those who
might have a right to appeal. 81 Nor should it be said that
such advance notice must be served on every party who may
have sufficient interest to be entitled to intervene in the
administrative proceedings as an "interested party"; it may
be quite impossible to determine in advance the identity of
every potential intervenor.
Seeming inconsistencies in the decision of particular cases
largely disappear when attention is given to the significance
80 Compare Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App. D. C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 517, with Clarksburg-Columbus Short
Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring (App. D. C. 1937), 89 F. (2d) 788.
8l Thus, it seems that a rival radio station, even though not entitled to advance notice, can appeal from an order of the Federal Communications Commission. See Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting
Co., 319 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 1035 (1943), noted in 42 MICH. L. REV. 329
( 1943) ; Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 6oS. Ct. 693 (1940), noted in 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 121 (1940);
Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc. v. Federal Communications Commission
(App. D. C. 1939), 105 F. (2d) 75; Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C. 1931), 48 F. (2d) 461. Cf. Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co. (App.
D. C. 1935), 78 F. (2d) 729. In some of these cases, it appears that the
Commission had not given advance notice to the appellant of its intention to
consider the application filed by another radio station. Nor does it appear that
in these cases any claim was made that such advance notice was required. The
present statute contains some requirements as to holding public hearings where
conflicting claims appear. See 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 516 (1946).
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of attendant factual circumstances. Thus, in certain proceedings of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, notice
must be given to the individual employee whose contract of
employment may be affected by the outcome of the case,82
while in proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Board, notice need not be given those employees whose individual contracts of employment are attacked as having
been consummated by the employer in violation of law.83 But
in the former case the administrative order might necessarily
deprive the employee of his job, whereas in the latter case
the Board's order could be shaped so as to preserve the
rights of the individuals not before the Board-by providing
that the Board's order would not preclude the employees
from asserting valid individual rights conferred upon them
under the contracts. In the former case, it was only reasonable to assume that the Board should have anticipated and
protected the interest of the employees in danger of losing
their jobs.
Similarly, a state public utilities commission presumably
need not, precedent to a rate hearing, give notice to all
holders of power contracts whose rates might be affected by
its order; 84 this would impose too onerous a burden. But
where it is obvious that proceedings to fix the tolls of one
of two competing bridges will directly and substantially
affect the business of the other bridge, it is not unreasonable
to require that advance notice must be given both bridge
companies. 85 Again, the National Labor Relations Board is
required to give notice to a bona fide labor union before
8 2 Nord v.
Terminal Co.
83 National
6o S. Ct. 569

Griffin (C.C.A. 7th 1936), 86 F. (zd) 481; Estes v. Union
(C.C.A. 5th 1937), 89 F. (zd) 768.
Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350,
( 1940).
84 RePublic Service Elec. Co., P.U.R. 1918 E, p. 898-New Jersey Board of
Public Utility Commissioners (r9r8).
85 Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring (App. D. C.
1937), 89 F. (zd) 788.
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entering an order setting aside a collective contract in which
the union asserts rights, 86 but need not give such notice to
a union which is incapable of acting as the bargaining representative of the employees.87
3· Class Suits
In cases where the number of interested parties is unduly
large, agencies can sometimes solve the problem of giving
adequate notice by bringing what is in effect a class suit,
which may be used under approximately the same conditions
as in equity proceedings in the courts.88
4· Form of Notice and Mechanics of Service
In many types of cases, notice may be served by general
publication. In tax cases, indeed, it is deemed sufficient notice
if the statutes provide that the assessing agencies are to meet
at designated times and places to take certain actions that
may affect every taxpayer on the roll. 89 In cases where publication of notice is all that is required, any form that is
reasonably adopted to inform the public generally will be
deemed sufficient. 90 The courts have quite generally sustained the sufficiency of notice even where the medium of
publication and format of the notice was not calculated to
attract the attention of numerous parties who might be
interested. 91
Where the statute does not authorize service by publication, and the proceedings are not in rem, it is doubtful
86 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197, 59 S. Ct. w6 (1938).
87 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U.S. 261,58 S. Ct. 571 (1938).
88 Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission
(C.C.A. 8th 1926), 13 F. (2d) 673. See 89 U. PA. L. REV. 8o8 (1941).
89Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421, 14 S. Ct.
111.4- (1894).
9°0ttinger v. Arena! Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 371,178 N. E. 665 (1931).
91 See Carusi v. Hazen (App. D. C. 1935), 76 F. (zd) 444; but compare
In rePetition of Auditor General, 275 Mich. 462, z66 N. W. 464 (1936).
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whether notice by publication would be deemed sufficient,
in cases where a constitutional right to notice exists. But it
would seem that any form of personal notice is sufficient.
Service by mail is probably acceptable.92
92 Unity School of Christianity v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C.
1933), 64 F. (2d) 550.

PART THREE
PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION
OF CASES

CHAPTER

5

Parties and Pleading
A.
I.

PARTIES

The Agency as a Party

VERY phase of the administrative adjudication of
cases-whether by informal conference or formal
hearing 1-is affected by the circumstance that the
agency itself is a principal party. Unlike judges, administrative officers are almost always concerned with the outcome of
the case as parties in interest.
The agency's direct interest in the outcome is obvious in
cases where the proceeding is entitled in the name of the
agency (or the Government) against a respondent, such as
proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission or the National Labor Relations Board. Moreover, the same tendency
is present in many types of cases where the agency is not

E

1 As pointed out in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (I 94 I),
most of the activity of administrative agencies in disposing of cases judicially
is concerned with informal disposition of matters, by conference and consultation, without formal hearing and often without any regularized proceedings of
any kind. While this circumstance is of fundamental importance, and is the
primary point to be considered in connection with legislative imposition of
standards of administrative procedure; yet the very flexibility of these informal
methods of disposing of cases precludes any extended discussion thereof. Since
the informal cases are almost always those closed by consent, as a result of
a mutual agreement between the parties, their disposition is governed by no set
rules or standards but rather by the inclination of the negotiators in each particular case. It is in such cases, if any, that justification can be found for the
cynical observation that practice before administrative tribunals does not involve knowing the law, but rather knowing the administrators. While no
separate treatment of the informal methods of administrative procedure is here
undertaken, yet frequent references thereto will be made in the following chapters. The opportunity of resorting to the informal procedure at any stage of
a formally conducted case-which is simply the option of terminating the
proceedings by negotiating an agreed settlement-somewhat conditions the
conduct of the agencies, and their practices, in handling matters which are
formally adjudicated.
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formally a party. Quite generally, for example, workmen's
compensation commissions feel that it is a part of their function to aid the claimant in obtaining compensation. Similarly,
unemployment compensation commissions are conscious of
a desire to stretch statutory interpretation to the furthest
possible point, in favor of allowing claims. Many other
examples could be cited. 2
The simple fact that the agency is usually directly interested in the final disposition of the case is probably the chief
factor differentiating administrative from judicial procedure.
An agency's rules as to intervention, its rules of pleading,
and its method of conducting hearings, are all likely to be
affected by the desire to achieve a procedure that will most
effectively aid the agency in reaching what it deems desirable results.
2.

Indispensable and Permissive Parties

Traditional rules of joinder and of necessary or indis-·
pensable parties play but little part in administrative proceedings.3 Ordinarily, the only indispensable parties are those
who, as a matter of due process or because of specific statutory
requirements, must be given notice of contemplated action
and an opportunity to be heard thereon. 4 Parties with dissimilar or even conflicting and competing interests may be
joined in a single proceeding, or the proceeding may continue without joinder of parties who might appropriately be
brought into the proceeding, and parties may be dropped
or new parties added, as administrative convenience suggests,
2 There are some instances where probably no such tendency is present. For
example, the Interstate Commerce Commission probably has no partisan interest in the disposition of the reparations cases which it decides-and incidentally,
it has expressed its desire of being relieved of the duty of deciding such cases.
3 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350,
6o S. Ct. 569 (1940); cf., Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)-holding that the Board
could not void a contract, when one of the parties thereto had not been joined
in the administrative proceedings.
4 See Chapter 4, supra, p. 91.
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ordinarily subject to no restriction except occasional statutory
provision or particular agency rules.
3· Intervention
Provision is frequently made, either in statutes or in the
agency's rules of procedure, for intervention of interested
parties. Intervention is usually permissive and is granted or
denied at the discretion of the agency.5 Many agencies, motivated by a desire for expeditious handling of cases or sometimes perhaps by a desire to exclude potential troublemakers,
exhibit a tendency to deny such petitions, thus narrowing the
issues and excluding competing interests from an opportunity
to play their part in shaping the course of administrative
determination. 6
Ordinarily, denial of a petition to intervene is not appealable. 7 In cases where administrative discretion has clearly
been abused, or where a clear statutory right exists, denial
of a petition to intervene may sometimes be remedied in
subsequent judicial proceedings. 8 But on the whole, the
courts show little disposition to interfere.
Not infrequently, administrative agencies permit limited
participation in a case by one who is not allowed to intervene.
Sometimes the status of such a party is substantially like that
of an amicus curiae in judicial proceedings; sometimes he is
permitted to introduce testimony, cross-examine witnesses,
and even (under some statutory provisions creating a right
of appeal in any aggrieved party) to seek judicial review
of the order. Between these two extremes, many intermediate
5 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 434, 35 S. Ct. 337 (I9I5);
Sunshine Broadcasting Co. v. Fly (D. C. D. C. I94o), 33 F. Supp. 56o.
6 E.g., In the Matter of Matheson Radio Co., Inc., 8 F. C. C. 397 (I94I);
In the Matter of Vail-Ballous Press, Inc., IS N. L. R. B. 378 ( I939); Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al., 6 C. A. B. 2 I 7 ( I944).
7 Alston Coal Co. v. Federal Power Commission (C.C.A. Ioth I943), 137
F. (zd) 740.
8 Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 3 I9
U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. I035 (I943); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United
States (D. C. Pa. I944), 56 F. Supp. I.
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solutions may be worked out as a means of enabling the
agency to have the benefit of the views of collaterally interested parties. 9
These devices offer wide opportunities in the way of
permitting effective participation in administrative proceedings by collaterally interested parties, thus securing valuable
contributions making for better informed administrative action, without involving difficulties that sometimes attend
formal intervention, such as the prolonging of hearings, and
the undue enlargement of the record, or the introduction
of extraneous issues.

B.
I.

PLEADING

General Requirements

The mode of pleading to be adopted by an administrative
agency is a matter to be settled by the agency. Save as
occasional statutory provisions or agency rules may impose
some requirements,10 the tribunals are permitted to conduct
their proceedings in such manner as they may deem will be
most conducive to the effective disposition of business. 11 Apparently, if an agency so desired, it could proceed to hearing
without filing a complaint, relying on informal conferences
to advise the other parties to the case as to the claims and
contemplated action of the agency; indeed, this is substantially the practice of several agencies, which employ conplaints that recite little more than the names of the parties
and the language of the statute involved. 12 It has not been
required, in any event, that the pleadings conform to any of
the accepted common-law standards by which the sufficiency
9 See In the Matter of United Light & Power Co., S.E.C. Holding Company
Act Release No. 2531 (1941).
10 E.g., the very detailed rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
11 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. (C.C.A. 5th
1923), 295 Fed. 53, aff'd 269 U.S. 217, 46 S. Ct. 73 (1925).
12 For criticism of the practice, see "Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 63.
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of pleadings in judicial proceedings are judged/3 although
Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 may
be construed as imposing some requirements as to definiteness in pleadings. Section 5 provides that where some other
statute requires the agency to act only after holding a
hearing, there must be notice not only of the time and place
of hearing, but also as to "the matters of fact and law
asserted."
The pervasive tendency of administrative tribunals to
adopt rules that are primarily defensive in character, designed to protect the agency's procedure from attack rather
than to define the practice before the agency,14 has militated
against the voluntary adoption of any strict requirements
with reference to pleadings. If an agency adopted a rule
providing for the furnishing of bills of particulars, upon
cause shown, for example, it might lay itself open to attack
on the ground that in denying such a motion in a particular
case, it had violated its own rule. It is much the easier
course for the agency to provide by rule that bills of particulars may not be required. Then the agency is free to
furnish statements of particulars as often as it serves its
purposes to do so; and at the same time it may with impunity deny a request for particulars whenever this appears
the more convenient course.
But it is a shortsighted policy which prompts some agencies
to adopt modes of pleading which neither apprise the respondent of the factual issues in dispute nor put him on
notice of the real nature of the claim. Not only does this
13 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States (D. C. Pa. 1923), 288 Fed. 88;
Farmers' Livestock Commission Co. v. United States (D. C. Ill. 1931), 54
F. (2d) 375· The decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S.
421, 40 S. Ct. 572 (192o), to the extent that it indicated that an administrative complaint must state a cause of action, has had but little effect. See Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 57 S. Ct. 65 (1936), and Honeyman v. Hanan,
302 U.S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 273 (1937).
14 See Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK (1942) 38.

104

PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES

practice make it difficult for the respondent to prepare his
case, but it often results in wasting the time of the agency.
The generality of a complaint, or notice of hearing, may
serve to put formally in issue a host of matters on which
there is really no question. On an application for issuance of
a license, for example, the applicant must sometimes put in
lengthy proofs on such broad issues as public convenience,
interest, and necessity, although there may be but one narrow
issue with which the agency is concerned.
There can be no question but that a complaint which sets
out allegations of alleged wrongdoing in general form, substantially in the language of the statute, puts the respondent
to unnecessary difficulty in ascertaining the gist of the actual
complaint and thus renders it difficult for him adequately
to prepare his defense.
Not only would the rights of the respondents be better
protected, but the agencies themselves could act more efficiently, if they voluntarily adopted the suggestions as to
particularity in pleading made by the Attorney General's
Committee.15
Much of the difficulty could be solved by agency insistence
on careful investigation and consideration prior to the institution of formal proceedings. This would have many collateral
advantages. It would tend to eliminate the inauguration of
proceedings in cases where the challenged party was in fact
not guilty of wrong. It would facilitate the satisfactory adjustment, without contest, of cases where the respondent
would, upon learning precisely what charge was made and
what action was proposed, admit the facts and agree to the
entry of a consent order disposing of the case. Finally, by
making possible a better statement of the case in the initial
pleadings, it would facilitate the trial of contested matters.
l5 Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 234.
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The initial notice should be the crucial one. While the requirements of due process can be satisfied in many cases by
a specification of the charges during prehearing conferences
or even by the device of posthearing notice of contentions
and issues (coupled with an opportunity for further hearings
if requested by the respondent), yet these are at best time
consuming and inefficient. The entire course of administrative
adjudication can proceed most efficiently, most fairly, and
with greatest assurance of doing justice, if at the outset of
the case the parties are advised fully and with particularity
of the nature of the claims to be made and the issues to be
argued.
2.

Sufficiency of Complaint: Apprisal of What Is to Be
Heard

Procedural due process requires that the respondent in
administrative proceedings shall be duly informed of the
nature of the charge made against him, in order that he
shall have ample opportunity to present an appropriate defense to the case that may be made against him.
However, the courts have not generally required that such
information be contained in the complaint or other moving
papers which institute the administrative proceedings. In
many types of cases it is enough if the respondent is apprised
of the agency's claims, and the issues involved, at any stage
of the proceedings, provided always that after such information becomes available an opportunity remains to the
respondent to present his defense to such claims before the
issuance of the final order. It has been suggested that four
means, at least, may be appropriate in various types of proceedings as a means of apprising the parties of the issues:
( 1) a specific complaint; ( 2) an examiner's tentative findings, to which exceptions may be taken; (3) an issue-defining
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oral argument; and (4) the filing of briefs in which definite
points are stated. 16
The absence of all four of these devices would invalidate
the administrative procedure (in cases where its function is
fundamentally judicial in nature). But it is not required
that all four be utilized in every case. The absence of a
specific complaint may often be remedied by the subsequent
employment of alternative devices as a means of advising
the respondent of the agency's claims and the issues. Whether
or not an insufficiently definite complaint has been satisfactorily remedied by the subsequent proceedings is an inquiry
that rests largely upon the facts of the individual case. If in
fact the parties are fully acquainted with the basis of the
agency's claims, for example, a formal objection to the inadequacy of the agency's complaint will be unsuccessful. 17
If the hearings are held at intermittent intervals and the
respondent has sufficient time, after learning the basis of the
agency's claims when it is putting in its evidence, to prepare
and present his defenses, then the lack of particularity in
the complaint is immaterial.18 If the respondent elects to
proceed with the defense, without objecting to the insufficiency of the complaint, he may be held to have waived
the point.19
In cases where decision is not affected by the course of
developments subsequent to the issuance of the complaint,
and where the court must pass upon the sufficiency of the
complaint, standing alone, the court must undertake to determine whether the respondent is in fact likely to be
prejudiced by the vagueness of the complaint. To some
16 Morgan v. United States, 304 u.s. I, 58 s. Ct. 773> 999 (1938).
17 National Labor Relations Board v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co.
(C.C.A. 6th 194o), 109 F. (2d) ssz, 557·
18 National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc. (C.C.A. zd
1938), 94 F. (zd) 862.
19Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission (App. D. C. 1932), 59 F. (2d) 879.
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extent, this determination is affected by the character of
the administrative proceeding.
Where the scope and nature of the administrative decision
which may be made at the hearing is ascertainable in advance-where it will be an order granting or denying a
license, or ordering a respondent to cease and desist from
particular practices-it is more frequently required, and
properly so, that the initial pleadings must indicate the issues
which are to be considered at the hearing. If the agency
contemplates revocation of a license on particular grounds,
the respondent is in fairness entitled to know in advance of
the hearing what those grounds are. On the other hand,
where the character of the administrative decision which may
follow the hearing is not fixed and certain, it is often not
practical to define the issues with great particularity in the
initial pleadings, and a very general notice of the subject
matter to be considered will be deemed sufficient.20
20 Thus, in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50
S. Ct. 220 ( 1930), where market agencies had filed proposed tariff schedules
increasing their rates, and the administrative authorities, after suspending the
proposed rate schedules, gave notice that at statutory hearings they would consider whether a further order should be made as to the rates, it was held that
this sufficiently apprised the parties of the possibility that the administrative
authorities might prescribe a new schedule of rates even lower than those under
which the agencies had been operating before an increase was proposed. The
court relied in part upon the circumstance that the statute was deemed to put
the parties on notice as to the type of order which might ensue; and the court
was impressed by the fact that there was no showing that the market agencies
had been misled or that they had failed to put in evidence anything which
would have been adduced had the notice stated more particularly the nature
of the contemplated order. The difficulty of knowing in advance what type of
order might be deemed proper was also adverted to. Similar considerations are
reflected by the decision in Pearson v. Walling (C.C.A. 8th 1943), r38 F.
(2d) 655. In that case, the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of
the U. S. Department of Labor had published general notice as to the meetings
to be held by a statutory "Industry Committee," which would be charged in
part with the duty of defining the "Lumber and Timber Products" industry,
and establishing a minimum wage to be paid to certain employees in that
industry. A definition was promulgated broad enough to include manufacturers
of bows and arrows, and it was held that there was no deprival of due process
because a manufacturer engaged in that particular business had not been apprised in advance that the definition might be made broad enough to include
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Despite the difficulty of giving in advance an accurate
description of the issues which may arise in the course of
the administrative proceeding, if the failure sufficiently to
describe the issues has in fact caused actual prejudice to the
respondent, relief may be afforded. The same result is sometimes reached where it seems entirely probable that such
prejudice would follow. 21
Unless it can be shown that actual prejudice has been
suffered, or that it can be fairly presumed that it will inevitably result, the courts are little inclined to insist that
the administrative agencies use their pleadings as a means
of apprising the respondent of what is to be heard. 22
3. Bills of Particulars
One reason why administrative agencies prefer to restrict
their complaints and charges to vague generalities is that at
the time of the issuance of such documents, the particulars
his enterprise. There was no showing that the particular manufacturer was
injured because of the very general character of the notice as to the convening
of the committee. Further, it would obviously be extremely difficult to specify
what particular types of enterprise might be deemed to fall within the lumber
and timber products industry. The precise scope and character of the administrative order could not be foreseen.
21 In Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States (C.C.P.A. I935), 76 F. (2d) 4I2, the
Tariff Commission gave notice that it intended to investigate difference in cost
of production of "optical instruments 'of a class or type used by Army, Navy
or Air Forces for fire control.'" The Zeiss Company was not interested in the
particular types of optical instruments then in use, but was vitally interested in
related types of optical instruments which were suitable for such use. It did not
participate in the hearings. At the conclusion thereof, a determination was made
that applied to all types of optical instruments suitable for such use by the
Army and Navy. The notice was held insufficient, the court saying that information as to an investigation of optical instruments of a class or type used by the
Army and Navy did not suggest to interested parties the holding of an investigation relative to optical instruments suitable to be used by such armed forces.
Many of the state courts are more inclined to insist on definiteness and particularity in administrative pleadings (from the viewpoint of accurately apprising the parties of what is to be heard) than are the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Abrams v. Daugherty, 6o Cal. App. 297, 2I2 Pac. 942 (I922); Kalman v.
Walsh, 355 Ill. HI, I89 N. E. 3I5 (I934).
22 Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 6th
I94o), 113 F. (2d) 38; Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 107 F. (2d) 472; Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th I94o), III F. (2d) 869.
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of the case may not yet be known. But before the hearing
is reached, or at least before it is completed, the attorney
handling the case for the agency must learn such particulars;
and accordingly some agencies have adopted fairly liberal
practices as to the furnishing on request of further statements
of details and particulars. Other agencies, unfortunately, appear to have a fixed rule against it. 23
Much would be gained by a further development of the
practice of furnishing bills of particulars, wherever practicaP4
Such a practice would eliminate most of the vice inherent
in the vagueness and incompleteness so often found in
the original complaint. Needless litigation might often be
avoided by providing in rule or statute for the issuance of
bills of particulars on the same basis as that on which they
are available in judicial proceedings.
But the granting of such relief rests largely within the
discretion of the agency. Denial of a request for particulars
cannot be attacked successfully unless it is clear that actual
prejudice has resulted. The courts will not presume prejudice.25
23 Beer, FEDERAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE
CoMMISSION (1942) 194.
24 The degree of particularity which can be achieved varies, of course, in
accordance with the nature of the proceeding. Where the hearing is directed
to the determination of justiciable questions (as in most license revocation cases
and many unfair labor practice or trade practice cases) detailed specification is
ordinarily feasible. But in other types of cases, particularly where the hearing
is directed primarily to the establishment of a mass of factual data which will
guide the agency in reaching a decision that is largely a matter of policy-as in
some cases before utility commissions-it is frequently impractical to do more
at the outset than to indicate the general subject to be investigated. In this type
of case, where the specification of particular issues of fact and law may be left
to be developed at the hearing itself, opportunity should be given for supplementary presentation of evidence and further argument. See Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942) 78.
25 On the contrary, it is assumed that no actual prejudice would result from
a denial of particulars, where the administrative hearing was conducted at
intervals. National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc. (C.C.A.
2d 1938), 94 F. (2d) 862. See also Locomotive Finished Material Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. roth 1944), 142 F. (2d) 8o2; and
Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A.
7th 1940), I l l F. (2d) 869.
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Even in cases where it is conceded that simple fairness
would have required the furnishing of the requested particulars, it has been held that the respondent can have no
relief other than to apply for leave to adduce additional
testimony. 26
4· Amendments of Pleadings; Variances
No problem is presented by amendments of a formal
or technical character, correcting mistaken averments as to
names, dates, places, figures, or other minutiae of pleading.
Such amendments can be made with little if any formality,
and no prejudice results.
Nor is much difficulty encountered from the allowance
of amendments, which enlarge or otherwise alter the substance of the charge, if they are made on due notice prior
to the hearing. Even though such amendments may incorporate matters arising subsequent to the institution of the
administrative proceedings,27 yet no harm comes from the
allowance thereof so long as adequate time is given the
parties to prepare and meet the additional charges.
Not infrequently, amendments raising new issues are proposed at the hearing itself. Then the question is whether
or not a continuance will be granted to enable the respondent
26E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th I944),
142 F. (zd) 5"· Such holdings, it might be said, overlook the fact that the
whole course of a hearing and the entire complexion of the case is quite different where the respondent must feel his way along in the dark than where he
knows in advance exactly what claims and issues he must meet. Putting in
additional evidence, after the hearing has been completed, does not correct the
harm that has been done. Where this harm can be clearly demonstrated-as
where the refusal of particulars has in effect deprived the respondent of a right
of cross-examination-relief is sometimes granted, and the administrative proceedings set aside. Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes ( C.C.A. 6th I 94 I), I I 8
F. (2d) 105.
2 7 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350,
6o S. Ct. 5 69 ( 1940) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Piqua Munising
Wood Products Co. (C.C.A. 6th I94o), I09 F. (2d) 552; Lehigh Valley R.
Co. v. American Hay Co. (C.C.A. 2d I9I4), 2I9 Fed. 539·
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to prepare his proofs on the new issue. Continuances should
be freely granted, on a claim that a party requires additional
time to prepare his case. 28 But there seems to be no clear
right to such a continuance; a large measure of discretion is
vested in the administrative agency. 29
Where a variance between the complaint and the proof
is not corrected at the hearing, a question arises as to whether
an order may nevertheless be entered appropriate to the
factual situation disclosed at the hearing. The modern trend
toward the allowance of amendments to the pleadings to
conform to the proofs, even in court proceedings, is quite
properly reflected in the decisions which permit at least an
equal degree of flexibility in the procedure of administrative
agencies. 30 But this liberality should not be relied upon to
permit an administrative order to stand where it appears that
the departure at the hearing from the issues raised in the
pleadings probably prevented the parties from having a full
and fair hearing. 31 In this type of case, no clear demonstration
of prejudice should be required. Because of difficulties of
proof, a convincing showing of probable prejudice should
2 8 It is incumbent upon the party seeking a continuance to demand it
promptly. Harris v. Hoage (App. D. C. I933), 66 F. (2d) 8or.
29 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
I97> 59 S. Ct. 206 (I938); Jefferson Elec. Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board (C.C.A. 7th I939), I02 F. (2d) 949· If it is clear that the denial of
a continuance is an abuse of discretion, the courts may grant relief. Wallace
v. Allen, II5 Pa. Super. Ct. 347, I75 At!. 878 (I934), where the complaint
in a workmen's compensation case alleged physical injuries, and the claimant
at the hearing sought to establish that he was suffering from traumatic hysteria.
30 Armand Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 2d I936), 84
F. (2d) 973; National Labor Relations Board v. Swift & Co. (C.C.A. 7th
I94o), Io8 F. (2d) 988; M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board (C.C.A. 7th I94o), II4 F. (2d) 432; Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Maples,
ISS Okla. Io5, 8 P. (2d) 46 (I9J2); Sears v. Peytral, 15I La. 971, 92 So.
56I (I922); Felix Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 Ky. I9o, 71 S. W. (2d) 430
(I934).
31 Alton & Southern Railroad v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 3 I 6 Ill.
625, I47 N. E. 417 (I925); Deadwyler v. Consolidated Paper Co., 260 Mich.
IJO, 244 N. W. 484 (I9J2); Vaughn v. Solvay Process Co. (La. Ct. of App.),
176 So. 241 (I937).
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be sufficient. As noted from the decisions cited, the cases on
this point exhibit considerable contrariety of result, reflecting
in part different factual situations and, in part, differences of
judicial philosophy.

5. Respondent's Answer; Subsequent Pleadings
The generality of the initial pleadings, so typical of administrative procedure, begets a like generality in the answer,
in cases where an answer is filed. Often, the answer amounts
to little more than a plea of the general issue, with notice of
special defenses frequently appended. The transmutation
from the common-law art of issue pleading to the code pleading of facts and thence to so-called notice pleading (inappropriately named, since the theory proceeds largely on the
assumption that the respondent has actual knowledge or
notice of the claims and accordingly need not be particularly
notified thereof in the pleadings), which has largely affected
the pleading practices of the administrative agencies, is thus
seen to be far from an unmixed blessing. While it eliminates
technicalities, it sometimes produces a situation where the
pleadings serve no useful purpose-where, for example, the
respondent does not know the exact claim of the agency and
the agency is not aware of the respondent's defense, until a
prehearing conference is held or until the matter comes on
for hearing.
Administrative agencies frequently pay but little attention
to the respondent's pleadings. Replications and rejoinders, or
their equivalents, are uncommon in administrative procedure.
A vague complaint and a general denial are typical.
Where, however, a respondent presents, by way of defense
in his answer, allegations of matters which he seeks to prove
but which in the opinion of the agency are irrelevant to the
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issues tendered by the complaint, the agency may strike such
allegations from the answer. 32 This is done where the agency
believes that the hearing of the proposed proofs might unnecessarily delay the case, or if it appears that the prime
motive of the pleader is to confuse the issues.
32 International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 35 v.
National Labor Relations Board (App. D. C. 1939), 110 F. (2d) 29, aff'd
311 u.s. 72, 61 s. Ct. 83 (1940),

CHAPTER

6

Prehearing Conferences and
Informal Procedures

T

HE essential difference in character between court
proceedings and the administrative process is epitomized by the contrast in the nature of the activities
which follow the filing of pleadings. In a court case, after the
pleadings have been filed and the case brought to issue, it is
placed on the docket of cases ready for trial, and there it rests
until trial day. The court has little if any concern with the
case prior to the opening of the triaP In the case of proceedings before an administrative agency, on the other hand, the
crucial point of official action is typically reached in the interim between the filing of pleadings and the hearing. The
trial procedure is, in many cases, reserved as a method of
last resort for disposing of cases which cannot be otherwise
terminated.
I .

Purposes of Prehearing Procedure

From the viewpoint of the administrative agency, informal
negotiations concerning pending cases offer many advantages.
First and foremost, it is only by use of such informal procedures that the agencies can keep abreast of their heavy case
loads. Many agencies dispose of nine tenths or more of all
matters instituted before them without trial. In some cases,
1 Sometimes, of course, preliminary motions must be disposed of; but these
ordinarily involve only a ruling on subsidiary legal issues-they are, so to
speak, "little trials." In many jurisdictions, too, pre-trial hearings are becoming common. But even in such cases, the court's concern is principally with
such formal points as the settlement of the pleadings, the fixing of a trial date,
and related matters designed to facilitate the holding of the trial, which remains the important focal point.
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the percentage is even higher. 2 The agencies would be compelled to neglect many cases requiring attention if it were
necessary to adopt the hearing-and-adjudication technique
in each case. Imbued as they are by a desire to fulfill what
they deem to be their broad social missions, the agencies find
other reasons for preferring the informal procedure. They
can sometimes persuade a party to adopt a course of action
which he perhaps could not be compelled to adopt if he resisted formal proceedings directed to such end, or they can
obtain agreements that something be done which it would be
beyond their powers to compel. An effective means is thus
afforded for reforming marketing practices, financial practices, or labor relations practices along the general lines
deemed desirable by the agencies concerned. In working
toward these broad ends, the agencies, so long as they restrict
their activities to the informal procedures, can operate in
an atmosphere of uncontrolled discretion, bound by no substantive or procedural rules.
From the viewpoint of the private parties concerned, these
informal proceedings are important for other reasons. The
respondent faces a practical necessity of discussing his case
informally with the agency in order that he may learn exactly what is involved. It is often the only practical means of
learning, in advance of the hearing, the actual claims of the
agency and the true issues involved. Similarly, consultation
2 In a recent ten-year period, the Interstate Commerce Commission arranged
settlements in all but five of some 3,5oo demurrage complaints filed with it.
The National Labor Relations Board, over a period of several years, settled
more than 90 per cent of all unfair labor practice complaints without issuance
of formal proceedings; and of cases where formal proceedings were instituted
only about so per cent proceeded to a final formal determination. The various
bureaus and divisions of the United States Department of Labor accomplish
most of their business informally. In one recent year, the Department of
Agriculture, which administers twenty-odd regulatory statutes, involving thousands of cases annually, found that only some 250 went to formal hearing, and
of these only about one seventh proceeded beyond the state of exceptions to
the examiner's intermediate report.
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and conference are frequently the only methods of ascertaining the existence and content of various unpublished rulings
and general counsel opinions which may be determinative of
the administrative ruling: instead of briefing judicial decisions in his library, the attorney must learn of the agency's
precedents by interviews with the agency's representatives.
Despite the fact that the informal procedures are primarily
designed to permit the agency to avoid the trial of cases, the
respondent can thus advantageously utilize such procedures
as an effective means of trial preparation.
Other advantages are offered the respondent. Consultation
and conference with agency representatives offer him an
opportunity to convince the agency of the fairness of his
position; and if this can be done his worries are very nearly
at an end. Furthermore, negotiation with agency attorneys
often serves to disclose alternative bases of settlement; counsel for respondent can learn of various formulas, stipulations,
or agreements which the agency will sometimes consent to
as a means of disposing of the case. Such alternative solutions
often afford, so far as the respondent is concerned, an easy
way out. Sometimes the agency will be satisfied with a concession which the respondent is entirely willing to make.
These possibilities can be explored only by intelligent use
of the informal procedure, for the agency rules do not ordinarily disclose these alternative possibilities, and agency representatives are likely at the outset to suggest only such
modes of settlement as are most favorable to the agency,
rather than those which are most favorable to the respondent.
2.

Need for Rules Regulating Prehearing Procedures

The advantages inherent in the informal procedures of
administrative tribunals are so important as t.o discourage any
suggestion that they should be eliminated. They are, in fact,
the very lifeblood of the administrative process, and the
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problem is to discover means of minimizing certain inherent
difficulties without losing the great advantages that the practice offers.
The central difficulty is that the situation offers opportunities for abuse of power. Citizens who are accustomed to consult attorneys only in connection with court matters often
undertake to deal with representatives of administrative
agencies without first obtaining advice as to their legal rights.
They often rely on the representatives of the agency to learn
what the law requires of them. This of course heightens the
importance of scrupulous fairness on the part of the administrators and their assistants. Granting the existence of this,
it still remains inevitable that in negotiations looking toward
a possible settlement, the government agency has many
advantages. 3 A private party has no desire to be in the bad
graces of the agency which administers a law affecting his
business. There is a tendency on the part of the respondent
to make the best bargain he can with the agency rather than
carry the matter to a formal hearing. This tendency may be
almost impelling in cases where time is of the essence-as
where the applicant seeks a license to issue an offering of
securities or to continue the operation of a radio station, or
where the respondent's challenged course of action constitutes, if illegal, a continuing offense entailing daily increasing
penalties. Then, too, the expense of conducting an action and
carrying an appeal through the courts is a factor which weighs
heavily with the private party and which sometimes prompts
him to sacrifice his legal rights in favor of accepting a settlement offered by the government.
If an agency is so inclined, it can make use of these innominate sanctions which attend the informal administrative
procedures in such a way as to nullify largely the formal
3 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 12.
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safeguards which the principles of procedural due process
have erected as a shield against arbitrary administrative action.4
While it is impossible to eliminate this possibility of abuse,
much could be done to ameliorate the situation through the
adoption of definite rules that would crystallize administrative procedure. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act of I 946 goes a great distance in this direction, so far as
the federal agencies are concerned. While the flexibilities of
the informal procedures should not be sacrificed, yet they
could be regularized without serious injury to any valid administrative purpose. Adoption of adequate rules of procedure, not conceived in any narrow sense but covering the
important steps to be taken, would make available to the
parties affected by quasi-judicial action a guide to practice
and assistance in adequate preparation for the hearing. Such
rules would enable the parties to know what alternative solutions were available. They would enable the parties to know
in advance the general policies which would control administrative action. They would enable the parties to know
exactly what procedures were open to them, and with whom
the case could be discussed. More important, they would
tend to accomplish uniformity of procedure in like proceedings within an agency, so that the manner in which a proceeding was conducted, and the determination reached, would not
depend on the particular administrative officer who happened
to conduct it. 5
Quite apart from the tendency to reduce the possibilities
for unfairness, adoption of procedural rules would otherwise
aid in developing the efficiency of the informal procedures
of administrative agencies.
4

5

Idem., 86.
Benjamin,

( 194Z) J6.
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3. Prehearing Narrowing of Issues
Adoption of procedural rules setting up a regular method
of prehearing conferences designed to narrow the issues and
explore possibilities of settlement would be of great practical
aid to the agencies and the parties appearing before them.
Under conditions that prevail in most agencies, it is difficult for the parties even to ascertain with whom such possibilities may be discussed. Not infrequently, no one save the
head of the agency has power to make any binding stipulations as to the facts or as to the issues; and the agency heads
ordinarily are unable to take any part in informal prehearing
conferences, because their whole time and attention is consumed with matters of intra-agency administration, with considering general policies, and with the decision of cases that
have been fully heard. Even if no formal stipulation is
sought, and the desire is only for informal discussion, this
frequently necessitates a trip to the central offices of. the
agency, which may be hundreds of miles away from the respondent's place of business. If such a trip be undertaken,
the agency representative, as likely as not, will be required
to take the position that he has no authority to make any
bargain and that he cannot, on behalf of the agency, agree
to forego any of the formal demands which have been made,
in favor of reaching a compromise agreement. Further, any
such conferences must be undertaken as a matter of private
negotiations, without the aid that could be given if a hearing
officer presided over the conference, just as a judge presides
over the pre-trial hearing of a lawsuit, at which counsel for
the parties discuss just such issues-the possibility of settlement, simplification of issues, amendments to the pleadings,
stipulations as to facts and documents, limitations of the
number of expert witnesses, and such other matters as may
aid in the efficient disposition of the case. Ordinarily, the
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private parties are unable to have any contact with the hearing officer before the hearing opens. In some agencies, there
is consultation in advance of the hearing between the hearing
officer and the representative of the agency who is to present
the agency's case at the hearing. Whether or not this results
in actual prejudice to the respondent, it creates at least an
appearance of unfairness which is sufficient to condemn the
practice.6
All these difficulties could be avoided by adoption of procedural rules designed to set up a regular system of pre-trial
hearings. This has been recommended by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. 7 Such a device would not rob the prehearing procedures of their flexibility or informality. It would simply improve their effectiveness. Provision could be made by rule for a prehearing
conference to be conducted well in advance of the hearing,
at a ·place convenient to the parties, and before a hearing
officer, who would consult with representatives of the agency
and representatives of the private parties in order to ascertain
exactly what issues were in dispute, and what stipulations
could be made as to the facts, and what compromise agreements might be feasible. Power could be given to authorized
representatives of the agency to make binding stipulations
and firm commitments as to settlement.
Such procedure would go far to remove many of the justified criticisms directed toward the present unsystematized
practice by parties who are caught in its meshes. It would,
further, facilitate rather than hinder the effective disposition
of the agency's business, as has been demonstrated by the
6

Cf., Benjamin,
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7 Sen. Doc. No. 8, nth Cong., ISt Sess. ( 1941) 67·
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success with which such innovation has been met in the cases
where it has been tried. 8
4· Use of Informal Procedure in Disposing of Case by Consent
The difficulty that is inherently present in the situation
where an automobile driver undertakes to bargain with a
traffic policeman on the question as to whether or not a
ticket will be issued is also present, in greater or less degree,
in most cases where negotiations are undertaken between
representatives of an administrative agency and a respondent
with the hope of discovering a means of disposing of the case
by consent. But, as above indicated, in many types of cases
there is room for bargaining, without any sacrifice to the
public interest which the agency must uphold and enforce.
The central problem in practice is whether or not, in cases
where a mutually satisfactory means of disposing of the case
can be found, the agency will insist on an admission of guilt
before the issuance of a consent order. Some agencies do so
insist. For example, the Federal Trade Commission long
followed the rule that, after a formal complaint was issued,
the respondent must formally admit at least one of the
8 Stipulation procedures are used quite widely by the Interstate Commerce
Commission in reparations cases, by the Civil Aeronal)tics Board, and in proceedings under federal workmen's compensation laws. A few agencies provide
for stipulations by rule-e. g., the Bituminous Coal Division, the Federal Power
Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the United States
Maritime Commission. While obvious factors make it more difficult to reach
settlements or compromise agreements in cases before administrative agencies
than in private civil actions, yet there is often considerable basis for bargaining. For example, in case of proceedings under the Wage Stabilization Law,
56 Stat. 765, Ch. 578, the matter of agreeing on the amount of penalty to be
imposed for unauthorized wage or salary adjustments was different only in
emphasis from the matter of agreeing on the amount of damages to be allowed
in a personal injury case. In other types of cases, it can sometimes be agreed
that asserted past violations may be disregarded if the respondent adopts and
agrees to adhere in the future to a course of conduct meeting the requirements
and standards imposed by the agency.
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charges before any consent order could be entered. Frequently, the respondent, although willing to comply with the
course of action of which the Commission is desirous, feels
he cannot make an insincere admission of guilt because of
the prospect that it might afford a basis for a subsequent
civil damage action. Other agencies have not imposed this
requirement. For example, the National Labor Relations
Board requires only that the respondent admit that his
business substantially affects interstate commerce. Then, on
a finding that the respondent is engaged in commerce, that
a complaint has been issued, and that a stipulation has been
made, the Board issues the order agreed on in the stipulation.9
There appears to be no compelling reason to require an
admission of guilt as a condition precedent to the issuance of
a consent order. Often, the respondent in good faith asserts
his complete innocence of the charge, but is willing to submit
to the entry of an order enjoining a specified course of future
conduct. The latter is, often, all that the agency or the
public interest requires. The rules of the agencies should permit the entry of consent orders, on stipulation, without ad: nission of guilt.
This device of a consent order has even greater usefulness
.• 1 cases where the parties informally consult with the agency
before any actual formal complaint is issued. Some agencies
nevertheless require the respondent to make certain admissions of fact as a condition of the entry of a consent order,
even in these cases where no formal complaint has been filed.
9 The National War Labor Board developed an interesting practice, in connection with its duty of penalizing violations of the Wage Stabilization Law.
Thereunder, the alleged offender could submit a proposed statement of factsthe truth of which he was not compelled to admit; on the contrary, he could
expressly deny that the facts were such-and stipulate that if the Board fixed
the penalty in a named amount, he would waive his rights to a hearing and
consent to the entry of findings in accordance with the statement as submitted.
If the proposed settlement was satisfactory to the Board, it would so find the
facts, and issue an order imposing the agreed penalty. If it was unsatisfactory,
the stipulation was rejected and could not thereafter be used for any purpose.
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Surely, the better practice is that of the National Labor Relations Board, under which the agreement is reduced to
writing, and the charges withdrawn.
Another important utility of the informal procedure, when
availed of as a means of settling a case without resorting
to formal proceedings, is the possibility of avoiding concomitant hardships that follow from the issuance of a formal complaint or order. For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission issues deficiency letters, indicating what amendments will be required in registration statements as a condition of avoiding a stop order which would formally put in
contest the right of an issuer to market a security offering.
Issuance of a stop order, in view of the sensitivity of market
conditions, would normally (whatever the outcome of formal
proceedings as to the propriety or sufficiency of the prospectus) render it impossible to market the securities-the offering would be for practical purposes an impossible venture.
Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board consults with
the parties while it is considering the issuance of a complaint
charging unfair labor practices; and if a satisfactory adjustment is reached, the employer avoids the stigma that in some
measure attaches to the issuance of a complaint. It is well
known that the issuance of a complaint by many federal
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, to cite a
typical example, is frequently a cause of substantial hardship
to the accused (particularly in view of the wide publicity
given the issuance of the complaint), even if the Commission
subsequently finds that no illegal practices had been committed.
Statutory recognition and regulation of the practice of
"informal disposition," and development of procedural rules
to facilitate the usefulness of the informal prehearing procedures (achieving the desirable end of avoiding unnecessary
hardship in cases that do not involve any intentional viola-
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tion), would go far toward meeting criticism of administrative absolutism. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
moves in this direction. Section 5(b) requires the giving of
an opportunity to present such proposals, in cases where a
hearing is required by statute. Section 4 operates to promote
informal dispositions in cases of rule making. In other cases,
Section 6 (a) and Section 6 (d), supplemented by the application of Section 9 and Section IO, indicate the general scope
of informal procedures.

5. Inspections and Tests
In cases where the administrative adjudication is based on
inspections or tests, informal methods afford private interests
perhaps even greater protection than would formal hearing
procedures. For example, when the issue involved is the
fitness of food, the seaworthiness of a ship, or the ability of
an individual to fly an airplane, no form of hearing would
be as well calculated to reveal the truth as an actual inspection or test.
But even here a problem is involved, for ordinarily in
such a proceeding no record can be made on which a party can
appeal to the courts for relief from what he deems to be a
clearly erroneous administrative determination. In cases
where an administrative agency denies a license on the basis
of an informal inspection or test, great good could be achieved
by the adoption of rules providing that after such denial,
the applicant could obtain an administrative redetermination
of the same issue, on the basis of a formal hearing. This
would render it possible for the applicant to obtain a judicial
review of any claims that the administrative determination
exceeded the permissible bounds of discretion and was capricious and arbitrary.

CHAPTER

7

Powers to Compel Furnishing
of Information
A. AGENCY PowERS TO CoMPEL FuRNISHING oF
INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATIVE agencies normally possess many
methods of obtaining evidence which are not available
to private litigants. Indeed, they possess powers in
this connection not exercised by any other government officers. The fact that the agencies are often able to learn, in
advance of hearing, the facts on which the respondent may
rely in his defense (and as well many facts and circumstances
which he might never be forced to reveal were it not for the
agencies' extraordinary powers of discovery) is one of the
principal reasons why the whole tone and character of judicial
proceedings before administrative agencies are entirely different than in the case of proceedings in the courts.
Thus, the agencies, if they utilize the facilities commonly
afforded them by statute, frequently can be better prepaJ;"ed
on the facts of the case than are the parties appearing before
them. In addition to the information which the agency has
obtained from the respondent, it may have obtained a great
quantity of factual data from sources not available to the
respondent. While it can often compel the respondent to
reveal his case in advance, it is not under any requirement
to afford a reciprocal privilege to the respondent. The advantages thus inherent in the agency's position, if unfairly
used, could be utilized to deprive the opposite party of much
of what is intended to be assured him by the general guarantee of a fair trial. Aside from this possibility of abuse of

fi
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power, there remains an inequality of position which affects
the character of the entire proceedings.
One result is that, in the case of many agencies, the hearing
officer normally looks primarily to counsel for the agency
for the information which he needs to decide the case. This of
course is beneficial to the extent that it leads to an assumption
of responsibility by the agency to make sure that all the important facts of each case are presented at the hearing. But
to the extent that it may produce a predisposition on the part
of the hearing officer to rely on the evidence presented by
the agency more heavily than on that presented by the opposite party, the tendency may lead unfortunately to an erroneous decision.
Another result is a temptation to decide the case on the
basis of the agency's private information rather than on the
basis of the evidence produced at the hearing. An agency
obtains information for many general purposes not specifically related to any particular case, and there is a natural
tendency on the part of agency representatives to rely on
the contents of secret investigational files in reaching the determination in any particular case, if the contents of such
secret files may seem relevant. There is a possibility that
information which the administrator has gathered for the
purpose of recommending legislation may subconsciously influence him in deciding what weight should be given, or what
interpretation should be placed on, evidence appearing in
the record of a particular contested case.
The responsibility which the agencies assume to determine
independently the true facts of the case, rather than following the traditional judicial approach which shifts that responsibility to parties independent of the tribunal that decides
the case, is thus far-reaching in its implications. It colors
the proceedings as well in cases where an agency is more or
less a disinterested judge in a contest between opposed pri-
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vate parties, as in cases where the agency is an active party
in interest.
In obtaining information, the agencies normally have
available at least four methods of discovery: (I) investigation and examination of books and records; ( 2) requiring the
appearance of witnesses and the production of documents by
subpoena; (3) requiring the furnishing of reports; and (4)
physical inspections.
I. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS

Many statutes creating administrative agencies bestow
upon them broad powers to examine the books, papers,
records, and other documents of the parties subject to the
regulatory activities of the agency (but the agencies have
no independent investigatory powers except such as may be
delegated to them by statute-cj., Section 6(b) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1 946). Such investigations may be either for the purpose of gathering general information or for the purpose of ascertaining whether or. not
there exist infractions of legislative or administrative rules.
While important as establishing broad patterns of public
policy, these provisions have but little mandatory effect in
compelling disclosure of information, for except as power is
given to compel the production of papers (by enforcement of
a subpoena or proceedings in the nature of mandamus) the
power to inspect is one which can be exercised only with the
consent of the party whose papers are to be inspected.1 If a
party refuses to grant representatives of the agency access
to the desired information, the agency must ask the court
for aid in enforcing its demand.
When such application is made to the courts, the issues
presented are substantially the same as in case of an appli1 Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 62. S. Ct. 651
(1942.).
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cation to enforce a subpoena issued during the course of an
administrative proceeding. The question as to judicial enforcement of requests by administrative agencies to compel
disclosure of books and records for examination by the
agency, therefore, will be discussed below in connection with
the question as to enforcement of administrative subpoenas.
There is wide variation in respect to the breadth of powers
of inspection granted the various agencies, ranging from the
almost unlimited visitorial rights of some state agencies to
examine into the affairs of corporations franchised by the
state 2 to the somewhat closely circumscribed grants of investigatory powers found in some of the earlier federal statutes. The general validity of a grant of such power is established beyond question; and decisions, as to whether or not
the furnishing of the requested information will be compelled
in a particular case, are based generally on the construction
of particular statutes, rather than on broad constitutional
grounds. But in construing statutes, the courts have been
influenced by considerations as to the reasonableness of the
agency's demands, as will be discussed more fully below in
connection with cases involving applications to enforce subpoenas.
II. ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUBPOENAS

I.

Right to Issue Dependent on Statute

An agency's powers as to the issuance of subpoenas are
regulated by statute. In the absence of statutory authorization, an agency has no such power. Statutes granting the
power are rather strictly construed. For example, it has been
held that if the power is granted to the head of an agency,
it may not be delegated by him to his subordinates, unless
the statute also provides for delegation of such power.3
2 See, for example, State ex ret. Public Utilities Commission v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., II5 Kan. 3, 221 Pac. 259 (1923).
3 Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 62 S. Ct. 651
( 1942), holding that delegation was not permitted under the Wage Hour
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Granting the existence of the power, the conditions upon
which subpoenas will be issued are within the control of the
respective agencies, and widely variant practices have been
adopted as to the showing required in an application for the
·issuance of a subpoena, as to the identity of the officials passing upon such applications, as to service of the papers, and
as to the general availability of the device. This is another
of the many situations in which the heterogeneity of agency
rules causes needless confusion. 4
'2.

Methods of Enforcement

The traditional and most effective method for enforcing
obedience to the command of a subpoena, imprisonment for
contempt, is one which the courts have been unwilling to
permit administrative agencies to exercise. Occasionally, a
legislature has undertaken to grant such a power to an administrative agency, but the view of most courts is that such
grant of power is invalid. 5 The reason ordinarily assigned in
support of this conclusion is that the power to punish for
contempt is exclusively judicial. But clearly such is not the
true character of the power, for it is conceded that Congress
and state legislatures, exercising no judicial powers, may
punish for contempt,6 and in several cases it has been h~ld
Law. Cj., Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 3 31 U. S. III, 67
S. Ct. 1129 (1947), finding authority for such delegation in the Emergency
Price Control Act. For general discussion, see note 19 TENN. L. REV. 544
(1946); 42 ILL. L. REV. 672 (1947).
4 See "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen, Doc. No, 8,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 414 et seq.
5Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471 1 31 N. E. 190 {1892), which cites
several cases. See Sherwood, "The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas,"
44 CoL. L. REV. 531 (1944). See also 54 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1940); 35
CoL, L. REv. 578 (1935). A few courts have reached a contrary result, and
have upheld the constitutionality of such provisions. E.g., In re Hayes, 200
N.c. 133, 156 s. E. 791 (1931).
6 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 {1927); Jurney v.
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S. Ct. 375 (1935).
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that such power may be conferred upon notaries public.7 The
real reasons for the unwillingness of the courts, in the absence
of express constitutional provision, to permit administrative
agencies to exercise the power to punish for contempt are
deeper reaching. They lie in the traditional distrust of any
proposal to vest in any agency other than the legislature
itself or the courts, the power to interfere with personal
liberty. It is felt that the hazards of reposing such powers
in the partisan hands of the agencies would exceed the advantages that might be gained thereby. Such being the underlying reasons, there is a possibility that with the further
acceptance of agencies as co-ordinate judicial agencies with
the courts there may in future years be a relaxation of the
doctrines now generally prevailing.
Aside from occasional statutory provisions attaching penal
sanctions to refusal to obey an administrative subpoena,8 the
usual method provided for enforcement is by application to
a court for an order directing obedience to the command
of the subpoena.9 The statutes ordinarily make it discretionary with the court whether or not the requested order shall be
entered. Occasionally, the statute seems to make it mandatory
upon the court to issue the requested order, but such provisions are construed as granting a wide measure of discretion
in the court to refuse to enforce the subpoena if it appears
unreasonable.10 While somewhat cumbersome, and theoreti7 Noell v. Bender, 317 Mo. 392,295 S. W. 532 (1927). The courts divide
on this particular question. See 35 CoL. L. REV. 578, 582 (1935).
8 E.g., Federal Alcohol Administration; Department of Agriculture (Packers
and Stockyards Act).
9 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct.
115 ( 1908). The typical provision is along the lines which seemingly originated with the Interstate Commerce Commission. See 49 U.S.C. § u.
10 Matter of Davies, 168 N.Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118 (1901). But there are
limits to the Court's discretion. In Penfield Co. of California v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947), it was held that
the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a witness, convicted of
contempt for failure to obey a subpoena, to purge himself of contempt by paying a $50 fine. Under such circumstances, it was held, an answer should have
been compelled.
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cally subject to the objection that it imposes a heavy burden
on the agencies to satisfy the court as to reasonableness and
propriety of the subpoena, still, in view of the judicial tendency to grant the agencies the benefit of any doubts on this
score, the method has worked very well. Indeed, there are
very few cases where administrative subpoenas are contested.
Partly because of the disinclination of the party subpoenaed
to suggest, by contumacious behavior, that he may have
something to hide, and partly because of the readiness of
the courts to enforce obedience, a subpoena issued by an administrative agency is usually as effective as a judicial subpoena. It is essentially the power to punish for contempt that
is reserved to the courts.
3· Objections to Enforcement of Subpoena, or Other Demand for Revelation of Information

General requirements as to validity. The general restrictions developed in the common-law courts as to the use of
subpoenas in connection with the trial of cases are ordinarily
applicable to subpoenas issued by administrative agencies,
subject to such modifications as are suggested by the analogy
between administrative subpoenas and those of a grand jury.
The relevancy of the information sought to the matter
under investigation must be shown, if a question is raised as
to this,11 but the rigor of this requirement is attenuated by
the readiness of the courts to assume that sufficient relevancy
exists, unless it can be clearly shown that it does not.
Similarly, the general requirement that the documents
sought must be appropriately described, while recognized as
a limitation, has not been construed in such a way as to
interfere with the effective exercise by agencies of their sub11 Sinclair v. United States, 1.79 U.S. 263, 49 S. Ct. z68 (191.9); McGrain
v. Daugherty, 1.73 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 (191.7); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U. S. 168 (188o); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S. Ct. 448
(1917).
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poena powers. 12 Subpoenas requiring the production of all
documents relative to a specified inquiry have been often
sustained by the courts. 13
Privilege. The same rules as to privilege applicable to
judicial proceedings ordinarily apply to efforts by administrative agencies to enforce the production of information. 14 Objections based on the privilege against self-incrimination are
thus recognized, although the practical effect of this is minimized in two ways: (I) by the frequency of statutory provisions eliminating this privilege upon a grant of immunity
from prosecution based upon the information adduced; and
( 2) by the unavailability of this objection where the subpoena
is directed to a corporation.15
Jurisdiction of agency. Not infrequently, an administrative agency desires to compel the furnishing of information
upon the basis of which it can be determined whether or not
the agency has jurisdiction to proceed further. The respondent, contending that he is not engaged in activities which
the agency is authorized to supervise, may contest the subpoena on the grounds that the agency has no jurisdiction.
In such cases,- obviously, the agency would find itself in a
dilemma if it were required to prove its jurisdiction over the
case before it could get the information which would enable
it to determine whether jurisdiction existed. Influenced by
these practical considerations, and in part by the suggestion
that decision on the jurisdictional issue is primarily for the
agency, the courts have generally held that the subpoena
will be enforced, despite the denial of jurisdiction, if the
agency asserts that it has reasonable ground to believe that
12Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134,48 S. Ct. 288 (1928).
Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178
(1908); Consolidated Mines of California v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 97 F. (2d) 704; cf., Shotkin v. Nelson (C.C.A. 1oth
1944), 146 F. (2d) 402.
14 United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 236 U. S. p8, 35 S. Ct. 363
(1915).
15 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644 (1896).
13
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the necessary jurisdictional facts are present.16 But respondent
should be, and seemingly is, entitled to a hearing on the
narrower issue as to whether such reasonable belief exists.17
The statutes empowering agencies to issue subpoenas or
otherwise require disclosure of information are not ordinarily
limited by any requirement that the agency can proceed
only where it has probable cause to believe that a violation of
law exists; and objections based on this ground have been
unsuccessful.18
Invasion of privacy. The principal objection raised to the
enforcement of agency subpoenas is that based on the ground
that the particular demand is unreasonable in scope, interfering unjustifiably with the respondent's privilege of privacy, and constituting a mere fishing expedition.
At this point, a clear distinction is apparent between demands for the production of documents and demands addressed to oral testimony.
In the case of a subpoena duces tecum, or a demand for
the production of records for examination, the guarantee of
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures presents difficulties which can often be avoided where
16 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. sor, 63 S. Ct. 339 ( 1943),
discussed in 41 MICH. L. REv. 959 ( 1943); 43 CoL. L. REV. 254 ( 1943); 52
YALE L. J. 175 (1942); National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Trust
Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1945), 148 F. (zd) 24; Walling v. Benson (C.C.A. 8th
1943), 137 F. (2d) sor. Somewhat stricter requirements were imposed in
General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming (C.C.A. 6th 1942), 125 F. (zd)
596; but see the later decision of the same court in Walling v. La Belle S.S. Co.
(C.C.A. 6th, 1945), 148 F. (2d) 198.
17 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tung Corporation of America (D.
C. Ill. 1940), 32 F. Supp. 371; and see dictum in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 49, 58 S. Ct. 459 (r938). But the point is not
entirely clear; in Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 7th
1940), 114 F. (2d) 384, respondent was denied the privilege of introducing
evidence that the agency had no reasonable cause to believe that the respondent
was subject to the act.
1 8Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 7th 1940), II4 F.
(zd) 384; National Labor Relations Board v. Barrett Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1941),
r 20 F. ( zd) 58 3; Consolidated Mines of California v. Securities & Exchange
Commission (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 97 F. (zd) 704. See 40 MICH. L. REV. 78
(1941); 29 GEO. L. ]. 328 (1940),
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the demand is merely that a witness answer a particular
question or furnish specified information. Further, in the
case of a subpoena duces tecum, the courts cannot be insensitive to the practical difficulties involved in complying with
a demand that a large mass of records be collected and transported to the place of the hearing, where they may remain
for quite a period of time, inaccessible to individuals having
occasion to use them in the normal conduct of their daily
business. 19 For these reasons, the considerations that sometimes persuade the courts to deny enforcement of administrative subpoenas when challenged on this ground, are
given greater weight in cases involving demands for the
production of voluminous records than in cases of subpoenas
ad testificandum.
The difference, however, is essentially one of degree. The
same broad considerations of public policy are relied on,
whether the demand is that a party produce a certain paper
or that he answer a certain question. In either case, the court
in determining whether the subpoena should be enforced
will take into account: (a) the nature of the proceeding;
(b) the form of the particular request; and (c) the balance
of interests, in terms of the particular case, between the
public interest in disclosure and the private interest in suppressing public knowledge of the facts.
(a) The nature of the proceeding. The demand of the
agency for information may be made in the course of a
judicial-type proceeding, or as part of a legislative inquiry,
or in connection with a general inquisitorial investigation.
Where the information is desired for use in a proceeding
where the agency must pass on a judicial question affecting
the party upon whom the demand is made, the courts are
19 Federal Trade Commission v. Smith (D. C. N. Y. 1929), 34 F. (2d)
323; Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Douglas (App. D. C.
1939), 105 F. (2d) too.
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inclined to grant enforcement of the demand. In such casestypically, where a hearing is to be had on a complaint-the
issues are ordinarily defined at least in general terms, and
there is but little reason why any information pertinent to
such issues should be withheld.
For somewhat different reasons, the courts quite readily
enforce demands for information desired in the course of
a legislative inquiry, undertaken to obtain information on the
basis of which a statute is to be written or amended. Where
such inquiry is undertaken by a legislative committee, or by
an agency pursuant to a specific request from the legislature,
the courts are inclined to presume (at least in the absence of
a clear contrary showing) that the inquiry is properly related
to the legislative purpose. A somewhat different situation is
presented, however, where an administrative agency on its
own initiative undertakes a general investigation on the basis
of which it contemplates making recommendations to the
legislature as to possible statutory amendments. It is hard
to distinguish this from the broad inquisitorial investigations
which have received but little favor from the courts.
In the latter type of case, where an administrative agency
is conducting a general investigation better to advise itself
of conditions existing in the field wherein its regulatory
activities are exercised, enforcement of the demand for information exhibits more clearly a tendency to violate the assumed right of the law-abiding citizen or corporation to be
free of "officious intermeddling"; and accordingly it is in
these cases that the courts have sometimes been more reluctant to enforce the administrative subpoena. Until recent
years, at least, the demand for information, when made under
such circumstances, has often been denied on the theory that
there exists a right of privacy which cannot be invaded unless
there clearly appears a compelling public interest in disclosure.
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(b) Form of demand. The particular form of the demand-the way a question is put or the manner in which
the desired documents are described-is also a factor. If
the inquiry is grossly impertinent, as if the question is directed
more to the personal affairs of the witness than to his business
practices, the courts are somewhat reluctant to compel disclosure. Such considerations (at least equally with the argument based on a somewhat minor change in the language of
the controlling statute), led the Supreme Court to deny the
right of the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel the
president of the Union Pacific Railroad to answer questions
as to his personal investments in railroad stocks,20 but to
enforce the Commission's demand that the president of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad testify as to the amounts
expended by his company in political activities. 21
(c) Public and private interest. The courts try to prick
out a line between mere scandalmongering inquiries, and
cases where the requested information is necessary for the
enlightened discharge of the agency's functions. For a long
time, the courts felt that the rights of privacy were to be
respected unless the competing public interest in disclosure
was clearly the more compelling.22 Many decisions appeared
to create a privilege, linked with the protective rights
against compulsory self-accusation and unlawful searches
and seizures, against unreasonable inquisitorial investigations.
However, more recent decisions, while not denying such a
privilege, indicate that it is now much more difficult than
it had been in former years to convince the courts as to the
20 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 2 I 1 U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct.
II5 (I908).
21 Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U. S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30
(I9I7).
22 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 2 I I U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct.
II5 (I9o8); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298, 44 S. Ct. 336 (I924); Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 298
u.s. I, 5 6 s. Ct. 6 54 (I936).
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unreasonableness of the demand. Recently, the Supreme
Court indicated that if (a) the agency is authorized by law
to make the inquiry it proposes, and if (b) the information
sought is relevant to that inquiry, then the subpoena should
be enforced unless it is so broad and indefinite as to be plainly
a case of "officious intermeddling." Only then is it to be
called unreasonable, because the private interests to be protected "are not identical with those protected against invasion
by actual search and seizure." 23
The real problem always is balancing the public interest
against private security. The question is whether the demand
for information "is out of proportion to the end sought." 24
Since the question is thus one of axiology, of balancing competing values, it is not surprising that the factual elements
of each particular case may sway the balance in one direction
or the other. A demand by an agency to examine a broker's
records may be either "a violation of the natural law of
privacy in one's own affairs," or "unobjectionable," depending on the court's appraisal of the general morals of the
particular situation.25
In drawing the dividing line between the permissible and
the illicit, the courts are influenced by the apparent reasonableness of the request, its apparent relevancy to a clearly
proper and important administrative purpose,26 the degree to
23 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213, 66 S. Ct. 494
(1946), commented on in 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6oz (1946); cf., Fleming
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (C.C.A. 7th 1940), 114 F. (zd) 384;
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Vacuum Can Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1946),
157 F. (zd) 530. The current trend of the federal courts to grant enforcement
of administrative subpoenas in almost every case is discussed in Davis, "The
Administrative Power of Investigation," 56 YALE L. J. 1II1 (1947).
2 4 McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. zd 1937), 87 F.
(zd) 377,379•
2 5 Zimmerman v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1936), 81 F. (zd) 847, 849. Later,
after the agency alleged that it wished to examine the records to uncover suspected fraud, the examination which had at first been denied was subsequently
permitted. Zimmerman v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 105 F. (zd) 583.
26 McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. zd 1937 ), 87 F.
(zd) 377·
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which the business in question is affected by a public interest,
and the apparent intent of the legislature as to the breadth of
the inquiry authorized. 27
4· Compelling Production of Documents m Possession of
Disinterested Parties
Not infrequently, the records of a bank or a stockbroker
revealing the financial dealings of a customer, or a telegraph
company's copies of messages sent over its wires, may be a
productive source of information for an administrative agency. May an agency, by subpoena or other demand directed
to the company, require it to permit an examination of all
its records which may throw some light on the activities of
the company's customers?
If the company itself objects, the question of course is
determinable on the same basis as in any other case where
the owner of records objects that a broad demand for disclosure thereof is unreasonable. But frequently the company
has no objection to producing the records in question save
for a general desire to protect the customer's good will by
respecting his wishes for privacy; and this is not often a
sufficient incentive to compel the company to contest vigorously the demand of the agency.
In such cases, has the company's customer, whose affairs
are the ultimate object of the investigation, any grounds to
complain? Since the search is not directed to the customer's
own records, he apparently cannot invoke the protection of
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches; 28 nor
27 In addition to the cases above cited, see Smith v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 245 U.S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30 (1917); Federal Trade Commission
v. Baltimore Grain Co. (D. C. Md. 1922), 284 Fed. 886, aff'd 267 U.S. 586,
45 S. Ct. 461 (1924); Federal Trade Commission v. National Biscuit Co.
(D. C. N.Y. 1937), 18 F. Supp. 667; Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States
(C.C.A. 7th 1926), 15 F. (2d) 133.
28 Newfield v. Ryan (C.C.A. 5th 1937), 91 F. (2d) 7oo; Zimmerman v.
Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 105 F. (2d) 583-this decision citing many cases;
McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 2d 1937), 87 F. (2d)
377·
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can he ordinarily show that any privilege prohibits the disclosure of the information (as would be true in the case of
communications to counsel).29
He does, however, seem to be accorded a derivative right
to insist that the company assert, and to assert on the company's behalf, any objection to the disclosure that could
properly be urged by the company.30 But this amounts to
little, for ordinarily the company has no grounds for complaining that the search is unreasonable. 31
Despite the fact that the person whose activities are the
subject of the search is not immediately involved, he is nevertheless the real party in interest. Should he not have a
standing to object to a procedure that would compel disclosure by a disinterested third party of its duplicate records,
in cases where he could resist a similar demand directed to
him personally? If his private copies of telegrams which he
has sent, or his own record of his banking transactions or
deposits in a stockbroker's accounts, are protected as against
a general inquisitorial search, should not the protection be
extended to counterparts of such records in the hands of
the banker, broker, or telegraph company? Decisions in some
cases, and dicta in others, recognize that the person being investigated should be regarded as the real party in interest,
and should have a right to injunctive relief to prevent the
opening of the records of his agent to an unreasonably broad
search.32 The fact that such records are not strictly private
doubtless inclines the courts to view with greater complaisance a rather broad demand. Again, the question is fundamentally one calling for the court's judgment as to the
29 McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 2d 1937), 87 F.
(2d) 377·
30 This is conceded by dicta in the McMann case, supra.
31 United States v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile (D. C. Ala. 1924), 295 Fed.
142, aif'd sub nom. First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. United States, 267 U. S.
576, 45 S. Ct. 231 (1925).
82 Hearst v. Black (App. D. C. 1936), 87 F. (2d) 68; Newfield v. Ryan
(C.C.A. 5th 1937), 91 F. (2d) 7oo.
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reasonableness of the demand, under all the circumstances
of the case. 33
5. Remedy Against Improper Demand for Production of
Information
Where a subpoena, or other demand for production of
information, is improper (on the basis of any of the objections above discussed) ordinarily the only course open to the
party objecting to the demand is to refuse to obey it, and
challenge its validity in the course of proceedings brought
by the administrative agency to enforce it. Ordinarily, motions to quash the subpoena or to enjoin the enforcement
thereof are not available as a means of obtaining in advance a
judicial determination of the propriety of the demand. 34 If
violation of the subpoena entails criminal penalties, equitable
remedies may be available.35 Similarly, injunctive relief is
available in situations where the objection is not only to the
enforcement of the subpoena, but to the public disclosure of
the information demanded; 36 and also in situations of the
sort discussed in the preceding section, where the objection
is addressed to compliance on the part of a disinterested third
party with unreasonable requirements for disclosure of confidential information.
A judicial order directing obedience to a subpoena is
'-'J:lpealable. 37
3 3 Cf., Zimmerman v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 1936), 81 F. (:z.d) 847; and
the Court's later decisiqn in a subsequent phase of the same case in Zimmerman
v. Wilson (C.C.A. 3d 11939), 105 F. (:z.d) 583.
34 Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 3 7 5,
58 S. Ct. 963 (1938); Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' National Federation (App. D. C. 1931), 47 F. (:z.d) 42.8; Fleming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp.
(D. C. N.Y. 194o), 38 F. Supp. 675.
35 Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' Nat. Federation (App. D. C.
1927), 23 F. (zd) 968.
36 Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Douglas (App. D. C.
1939), 105 F. (2d) 1oo.
3 7 Brownson v. United States (C.C.A. 8th 1929), 32. F. (:z.d) 844.
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III. REQUIRING REPORTS

Administrative agencies are frequently granted power to
require the filing of reports by those whose activities are
subject to the agency's jurisdiction. In the absence of statutory authorization, it is very doubtful whether the filing of
reports could be compelled; but even in the absence of such
authorization, a suggestion that a report be filed in lieu of
submitting to a demand, backed by a subpoena, for production of books and records, is to say the least highly persuasive.
While the preparation of such reports involves practical
difficulties in connection with attempting accurately to compress voluminous information into tailor-made forms that
sometimes do not well fit the situation, yet there are few
legal difficulties involved. The Fourth Amendment is inapplicable.38 Any invasion of asserted rights of privacy which
may be involved is not likely to be embarrassing. Because
of the opportunity to reconcile figures and report legal conclusions, the filing of reports does not lay open one's affairs
to such soul-searching scrutiny as does the revelation of
private records and correspondence.
The desire of the agencies for a wealth of information as
to topics connected only collaterally with matters within the
agencies' jurisdiction is sometimes met by refusal to furnish
information called for in the report form. In such cases, the
furnishing of the information is generally required if it has a
substantial bearing on matters falling within the agency's
jurisdiction.39
Closely related to the power to require the filing of reports is the power to prescribe accounting systems, which by
38 Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., Inc. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 57 S. Ct. 407
(1937).
89 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., Z24 U. S. 194,
32 S. Ct. 436 (1912); Terminal Taxi Cab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252., 36
S. Ct. 583 (1916); United States v. Clyde S.S. Co. (C.C.A. 2d 1929), 36 F.
(2d) 691; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co. (App. D. C.
1923), 285 Fed. 936, rev'd 274 U.S. r6o, 47 S. Ct. 553 (1927).
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statute is vested in some agencies. Compliance with requirements as to the form of accounting prescribed has been quite
consistently enforced. 40 Objections as to the soundness of
the accounting system preferred by the agency will be considered only if the system adopted by the agency is so entirely
at odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting as
to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of
judgment. 41
IV. PHYSICAL INSPECTIONS

Whether or not the controlling statute gives such power,
representatives of administrative agencies (exhibiting the
layman's preference, which is in many types of cases entirely
justifiable, for getting facts by firsthand investigation rather
than on the basis of testimony) frequently rely on personal
inspections as a means of obtaining information.
Of course, if an inspection of the premises affords an
opportunity to obtain accurate firsthand knowledge of physical facts affecting the determination of a case, there is no
sound reason why an administrative tribunal should not rely
on information thus gained. But the question in each case is
whether or not the inspection does afford such opportunity.
The agency's investigators may not see all that there is to be
seen. They may report inaccurately to the officers in whom
resides the ultimate power of decision. The physical situation
may not be the same at the time of the inspection as at the
time to which the determination relates.
Reliance by an agency on such inspection of course narrows
the sphere of effective judicial review, and in cases where
40 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194,
32 S. Ct. 436 (1912); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134,
53 S. Ct. 52 ( 1932).
41 American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232,
57 S. Ct. 170 (1936). For discussion of the general problem, see Kripke, "A

Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform Accounts
100.5 and 107,'' 57 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1944-); Morehouse, "Innovations in
Public Utility Accounting Regulation," 46 YALE L. J. 955 (1937).
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an agency must decide on the basis of a hearing and support
its conclusion by a record containing substantial evidence
tending to prove the facts found, reliance by the agency on
such a physical inspection may be invalid as depriving the
respondent of a hearing. He may be deprived of his right of
cross-examination and of the means of showing that there
is no substantial evidence to support the agency's findings. 42
On the other hand, in cases where the agency is not compelled to grant a hearing, or where there is no provision for
direct judicial review of the case on the basis of the record
made by the agency, the agency is free to decide a case on
the basis of its own inspection.43

B.
I.

RIGHT oF DEFENDANT TO CoMPULSORY PRocEss

Where Agency Has No Power to Issue Subpoena

Many agencies have no powers to issue subpoenas. In proceedings conducted before such tribunals, counsel for both
parties, the agency as well as the respondent, must rely on
informal arrangments to induce witnesses to appear and testify. While the burden thus imposed may weigh more heavily
on counsel for the private party than on counsel for the
agency, yet the mere fact that compulsory process is not
available to the respondent does not, at least in the absence
of a clear showing of actual prejudice and deprival of an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing, invalidate the administrative proceedings. 44 Significantly, almost all the cases
42 Farmers' Elevator Co. of Yorkville v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., z66
Ill. 567, 107 N. E. 841 (1915).
43 People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y.
I,

35 N. E. po (1893).

·

Low Wah Suey v. Backus, zzs U. S. 460, 3z S. Ct. 734 ( 19u); Missouri
ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, Z7I U.S. 40, 46 S. Ct. 384 (19z6); Brinkley v.
Hassig, 130 Kan. 874, 289 Pac. 64 (1930), appeal dismissed z8z U.S. 8oo,
51 S. Ct. 39 (1930): In Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191, 116 N. E. 4Z
(I 9 I 7), which apparently holds the contrary, the decision was placed on the
somewhat broader grounds that the statute vested in the agency none of the
powers essential to the conduct of a hearing.
44
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so holding pomt out that the respondent in the administrative
proceedings, who was objecting to the unavailability of compulsory process, did not show that this lack actually prejudiced the presentation of his case. It would be a rare case
where such a showing could be made, for ordinarily a hostile
witness who refuses to testify voluntarily cannot be depended
upon to give any helpful testimony, except as to matters of
a formal nature which most often can be otherwise proved.
But circumstances can be conceived where the inability to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of
documents would actually operate to deprive a party of an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing. In such cases it is
probable that appropriate relief could be obtained.
2.

Conditions on Issuance of Subpoena

In cases where the agency does have power to issue a
subpoena, a different question is presented. To what extent
may the agency attach conditions to the issuance of subpoenas
requested by a private party appearing as respondent in proceedings before the agency?
The sounder administrative practice is to place the issuance
of subpoenas on a ministerial basis, making them readily
available to all parties, and (this particularly) making them
as easily obtainable by counsel for private parties as by counsel for the agency. This conforms with established judicial
traditions, under which subpoenas are ordinarily issued in
blank by the clerk of the court, to be used by counsel as occasion requires. It is, if anything, more important in administrative proceedings than in judicial proceedings that subpoenas be readily available to the private parties, for the
practice of entrusting the agency-one of the parties in
interest-with the responsibility to decide whether the adverse party should be aided in preparing his case for trial,
creates at least a suspicion if not an appearance of unfairness.
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It has been suggested that to avoid any possibility of abuse
of this power, it should be transferred from the litigant
agency to some independent o:ffi.ce.45 This may be unnecessary,
but at least the agencies should take pains to avoid making
their subpoenas more easily obtainable by agency counsel than
by private parties.46
However, many agencies (with laudable motives but
unfortunate shortsightedness) do impose various conditions
upon the issuance of subpoenas to respondents, which are not
imposed where the staff of the agency seeks a subpoena.
While such requirement has been criticized as "unreasonable
and unfair," 47 the federal courts have generally held that
in the absence of clear showing of actual prejudice, imposition
of such requirements will be sustained.48 Since actual prejudice may be suffered in cases where its existence is not susceptible to precise demonstration, there is much to be said
for the view that the burden should be on the agency to
prove lack of prejudice, and at least one state court has taken
this position. 49 Section 6 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 requires federal agencies to issue subpoenas to any party upon a statement showing the general
relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence, and further
45 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JuDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (194z) 2.5.
46 See comments of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) u4; and further statement of concurring members,
idem., ZZI.
47 Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1940),
109 F. (zd) 9, zo, where the court held that in view of this and other matters
respondent had been denied a fair trial.
48 North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. National Labor Relations :Board
(C.C.A. 9th 1940), 109 F. (zd) 76; National Labor Relations Board v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. (C.C.A. zd 194o), 112. F. (:~.d) 756; National Labor
Relations Board v. Blackstone Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. zd 1941), u3 F. (:~.d) 633.
49 Coney Island Dairy Products Corp. v. Baldwin, 2.43 App. Div. 178, z76
N. Y. S. 6 8 2. ( 19 3 5), setting aside an order revoking a milk dealer's license
because of the refusal of the commissioner to furnish subpoenas to a respondent
who refused to state whom he wished to subpoena. As to the general problem
of the respondent's statutory right to subpoena, see 53 HARV. L. REV. 842.
(1940).
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requires that a denial of such an application must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor.
The reluctance of many agencies to make subpoenas readily available to respondents is based upon a fear that attempts
would be made to impede the expeditious progress of hearings by calling too many witnesses, or by calling witnesses
to testify to irrelevant or immaterial matters, in the hope
of possibly confusing the issue or at least delaying the issuance of the order. Such abuses are well known, but there are
many devices to meet them which serve the purpose more
aptly than does a conditional refusal to issue the subpoena.
Hearing officers, generally, are not without power to exclude
immaterial testimony. Where it becomes obvious that the
purpose of the respondent is to waste time, administrative
agencies can employ the same devices as do the courts to cut
the hearing short. The danger that an unlimited right to subpoena witnesses might operate unfairly to the witnesses (as
where competitors are subpoenaed to testify on an issue that
is clearly irrelevant) can be met by making provision for
quashing subpoenas at the instance of the witness. 50
While there may be sounder grounds for limiting the
issuance of subpoenas duces tecum than subpoenas ad testificandum, in view of the substantially greater burden of producing documentary evidence, yet the admonition of Chief
Justice Marshall in the Burr case,51 that "the opposite party
can . . . take no more interest in the awarding of a subpoena duces tecum than in the awarding of an ordinary
subpoena," applies as aptly to administrative agencies as to
courts.
A useful purpose would be served by a requirement, equally applicable to agency representatives and to private parties,
50

Benjamin,

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(1942) 162-164.
5l 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 35 (Case No. 14,692d).
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that the application for a subpoena need state only the general
reason for the request (and this could be shown without identifying the witness or outlining his testimony). No more
should be required.
3· Subpoena to Agency Representatives
The files of an agency may contain matters which, if made
a part of the record at the hearing, would be helpful to the
respondent's case, but which the agency for tactical reasons
does not care to introduce in evidence. Similarly, members
of the agency's staff occasionally are potentially valuable
witnesses as to occurrences which the agency has no wish to
make a matter of record. Since the respondent in such a case
must in effect ask the agency to compel itself to testify, he is
ordinarily without a remedy to compel the production of any
information which the agency does not wish to produce voluntarily, and the agencies quite properly are reluctant to open
their files in all cases to the parties appearing before them.
Agency staffs welcome fishing expeditions no more than do
private parties. Further, the agency's files often contain
matters which are privileged from compulsory disclosure.
But where the proceedings are being conducted before a
tribunal other than that of the agency to which the request
is directed, a subpoena may properly issue to require disclosure of specified, relevant factual data 52 (unless the agency
has by rule prohibited the production of official records in
court proceedings on the ground that to do so would be prejudicial to the public interest) 53 and, in some cases, of certain
information as to agency practices and procedures. 54 Inquiry
directed to the mental processes of members of the adminis52
53

Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220,48 S. Ct. 87 (1927).
Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States (C.C.A. zd 1947), 163 F. (2d) 133·
54 National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C.C.A. sth
1938), 98 F. (zd) 444·

148

PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES

trative staff, however, is ordinarily forbidden on the same
grounds which preclude cross-examination of a judge or
jury as to the basis on which a certain decision was reached.1111
55 United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 ( 1941); National
Labor Relations Board v. Botany Worsted Mills, Inc. (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 106
F. (zd) z63; National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co.
(C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (zd) 16. For a general discussion, see Pike and
Fischer, "Discovery Against Federal Administrative Agencies," s6 HARV. L.
REV. IUS (1943).

CHAPTER

8

Right to a Fair Trial
I.

General Tests of Fairness of Trial

T

HE granting of a fair trial is the one sine qua non of
administrative procedure. It is the one fixed criterion
of judicial review. Although the courts may decline to
review an agency's findings of fact and in some cases at least
its conclusions of law, there is always the opportunity for judicial review of the issue as to whether an administrative
determination was made without giving an opportunity for
full presentation of a party's case or without fair consideration
of the just rights of the party.1
But provisions for judicial review are not an appropriate
means for achieving and guaranteeing fairness in administration. Even if an agency were stripped of every vestige of
judicial power, and its determinations thus removed from
the ambit of judicial review, the problem of administrative
fair play would remain substantially undiminished.2
The achievement of the goal is fundamentally a task committed to the agencies themselves. As the agencies attain the
stability and poise of maturity, their attention is increasingly
devoted to refining the procedural devices which they have
worked out in their specific fields, adding safeguards whereever the need appears, to the end of assuring not only the
effective enforcement of the social or economic policies whose
implementation is entrusted to their care, but assuring also
that fair consideration be given the individual rights of the
1 Final Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 78; Hale, "Administrative Hearings under the Federal
Constitution," 30 KY. L. J. 137 (1942.).
2 Chester Lane, Address before the Association of American Law Schools,
Handbook of Proceedings, 36th annual meeting (1938) 184, 199.
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parties involved, to the end that adjudication be not only
prompt but just.
The requirement of a fair trial is commonly associated
with the hearing procedure itself. This association probably
springs from the identification of hearing and trial in the
common-law courts, where they constitute the essence of the
adjudicatory process; and from the fact that the formal
hearing constitutes the most dramatic step in administrative
procedure. But because of deep-seated differences between
judicial and administrative techniques, many of the requirements encompassed in the constitutional guaranty of a fair
trial are to be applied, in administrative proceedings, to activities that either precede or follow the actual hearing. The
question as to whether a fair trial has been granted cannot
be answered by looking to the hearing procedure alone.
Thus, one of the three fundamental requisites of a fair
trial-an opportunity to be fully informed of the nature of
the charge in time to prepare to meet it-has only a collateral
connection with the hearing procedure proper. The notice
may, as above discussed, either precede or follow the hearing. Sometimes the hearing procedure itself is utilized as
the means of giving this information to the respondent. But
whatever device may be appropriate in the operations of a
particular agency, as a means of informing the respondent of
the nature of the agency's claim, this requirement has no
direct connection with the hearing procedure itself. It is
rather a part of the general problem of the adequacy of
notice, discussed above.
A second basic requirement of a fair trial-that the one
who decides must hear, i.e., that the actual decision must
be that of the officer or board to whom the responsibility
has been delegated by the legislature and who must reach
that decision on the basis of a personal knowledge of the
evidence-is likewise disassociated from the hearing proce-
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dure proper. Contrary to normal judicial practice, where the
initial decision is ordinarily that of the officer before whom
the testimony is taken, the actual process of determination in
administrative agencies is normally a posthearing procedure.
The requirement is spoken of as part of the general guaranty
of a fair trial because of the intimate association between
hearing and decision in the courts, where indeed (as in jury
trials) the decision is often the final step of the trial or
hearing procedure. But in administrative proceedings, the
process of determination is to a large extent divorced from
the hearing procedure proper. This second requirement is
therefore treated separately, infra.
The third general requirement of a fair trial-that the
party on trial be granted an opportunity fully to present his
contentions, by adducing testimony and arguing thereon before an unbiased tribunal-is the only aspect of this general
guaranty which, in administrative procedure, is directly connected with the hearing itself. It is this particular portion
of the general problem that is here discussed.
In addressing the problem as to what is and should be
required of administrative tribunals as a means of safeguarding individual rights at the formal hearing, there is one
fundamental to be borne in mind. The basic characteristics
of trial procedure in the courts (which are largely a reflection
of a particular Anglo-American historical development, influenced by many diverse factors, prominent among which
has been the rather narrowly defined range of judicial activity) are not imposed on administrative tribunals, 3 which
represent an outgrowth of conditions far different from those
which influenced the course of the judicial procedures of
the courts. 4 While the requirements imposed with respect
3 Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309

U.S. 134, 6oS. Ct. 437 (1940).
4 See Maitland, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1908) 415418; Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, passim.
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to hearings conducted by administrative agencies have been
worked out with reference to judicial standards, yet the analogy is not to be taken in any technical sense. The fundamental
principle is only that the rudimentary requirements of fair
play be observed. 5 Lawyers who have objected long and
bitterly to many aspects of customary court procedure, so far
as its application in the courts is concerned, have had a tendency to enshrine this procedure as sacrosanct when administrative tribunals set out boldly on new and unfamiliar courses.
But the courts see no immutable perfections in court-type
procedure which administrative agencies must, at their peril,
follow. Rather, the agencies are free to work out any type of
hearing procedure which appears reasonably apt to the requirements of their particular task, subject only to the one
requirement that the technique adopted must not violate the
fundamental requirements of fair play and common decency.
Little more is required than that the one who decides shall
be bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, and to
be guided essentially by what the evidence discloses, rather
than by extraneous considerations which in other fields might
control purely executive action.6
The reason for allowing wide departures from normal
hearing procedures is said to be that such departures may
make for brevity and speed. These ideals, however, are seldom realized. Records comprising several thousand pages
are not unusual. Hearings before such bodies as the Federal
Trade Commission are protracted not infrequently over a
period of months if not years. Indeed, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has found it desirable in one branch
of its work to resort to the federal courts for the trial of
5 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938). Among
the many law review articles discussing the Morgan cases, the following are
noteworthy: 27 GEO. L. J. 351 (1939); 47 YALE L. J. 647 (1938); 10 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 43 (1941); 30 KY. L. J. 408 (1942).
6 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936).
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its cases, utilization of the administrative hearing having been
found to be slower and more expensive.7
In cases where the reason for the rule is lacking, the rule
should have but little application. In lengthy hearings on
closely contested technical issues of fact and law, where the
contentions of the opposing parties are presented by skilled
attorneys, the cause of good administration is furthered by
the adoption of customary judicial techniques in conducting
the trial of cases. In other instances, as where a ·wounded
veteran seeks disability benefits, or an aged applicant seeks
an old-age allowance under the Social Security Act, or an
unemployed worker seeks unemployment benefits, an atmosphere of sympathetic conversation is perhaps best conducive
to proper administration. There, the rule that informal hearing procedures are proper, so long as the rudimentary requirements of fair play are observed, has just and fitting
application. But the rule does not so well fit the case of
proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, state or
federal utility commissions, the National Labor Relations
Board, and other bodies before which experienced attorneys
present evidence in heated controversies involving highly
complex issues of law and fact. In such cases, formality is
desirable, not only as a means of assuring dignity and decorum, but as the most effective means of assuring that the
administrative officers presiding at the hearing shall not be
misled by extraneous distractions.
Even in such cases, however, undesirable though it is,
unrestrained informality does not void the administrative
proceedings. The niceties of judicial procedure cannot be
insisted upon. It is the responsibility of the agencies so to
shape hearing techniques in these cases as to utilize the
merits of the procedures that have developed in the courts.
7 Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 81 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941) 61.
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The Requirement of Impartiality

(a) The general problem. It is frequently said that the
complete impartiality of the tribunal which hears and decides
the case is one of the prerequisites of a fair trial. Indeed,
it has been suggested that the requirement of an impartial
tribunal, unconcerned with the result, applies with even
greater rigidity to administrative officers than to judges; 8
and it has been said that an administrative body exercising
quasi-judicial powers "must, from the very nature of its
duties, act with entire impartiality"; 9 because "Judgment
ceases to be judicial if there is condemnation in advance of
trial." 10
But this requirement of impartiality should not be taken
as meaning that the administrative agency must be indifferent
to the result. So far as constitutional requirements are concerned, an agency may approach a hearing with a strong hope
that a record may be built up which will permit the agency
to enter and enforce an order, the desirability of which is to
the agency a matter of predetermined conviction.
This is the very core of the problem as to the practical
connotations of the requirement of impartiality. In view of
the frequent tendency of the agencies to make decisions on
the basis of preformed opinions and prejudices, and the related tendency of many administrative officials to feel they
are appointed to perform a mission and intentionally to direct
their determinations accordingly,11 the parties whose interests
are adverse to those of the agency assail as prejudice an
attitude of mind which on closer examination proves to be no
8 National Labor Relations Board v. Phelps (C.C.A. 5th 1943), 136 F.
(2d) 562.
9 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 624, 55 S. Ct. 869
(1935).
10 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 494, 55 S. Ct. 8r8 (1935) l see also,
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927); Jordan v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 225 U.S. r67, 32 S. Ct. 651 (1912).
11 See instances cited in r 9 38 report of American Bar Association Committee
on Administrative Tribunals, 63 A. B. A. REP. 331, 349·
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more than a permissible interest in enforcing a legislatively
declared policy.
This problem is inherent in the very nature of administrative tribunals. Charged as they are with responsibility for the
advancement of a particular public policy, their desire to
enforce that policy renders it difficult for them to appraise
with impassive objectivity the evidence adduced at the hearing. Their special experience and conviction may lead them
to find claims clearly established on a record which would
leave a disinterested judge in doubt.12 Ideally, the administrator should concern himself with his public duty to further
broad statutory policies only when formulating regulations
and general interpretative rulings, and should drop this
attitude in favor of a strictly impartial, disinterested judicial
approach in weighing the evidence presented at the hearing
of a particular case. 13 But this idealism is rarely found. Administrative officers may strive for it/4 but in practice it is
not easy to lay aside the role of the legislator for that of
the judge when walking from the committee room to the
hearing room. The administrator is only a man. Often, he
is a man without legal training, and the distinction between
creating rules and applying them may not be so clear to
him as to the counsel who argues before him. Or, for
example, if the administrator sees that a cease and desist
order would further the policy in which he is interested, he
cannot easily perceive why, if a respondent's protestations of
intent to comply with the law are sincere, the respondent
should object to the entry of such an order. He sees but little
point in respondent's protestations that the evidence pre12 Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L.
REV. 1201 (1939).
13 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORit
( 1942) 22. Cf., Davis, "Bias of Administrative Officers," 32 MINN. L. REV.
199 (1948).
H See opinions in In Matter of Segal & Smith, 5 F. C. C. 3 (1937); In
Matter of Express Pub. Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 16:z. (1938).
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sented does not justify a finding of facts which the statute
makes a condition precedent to the entry of the order.
Erroneous and unjust determinations too often result from
this predilection of administrative agencies to determine cases
and appraise facts in the light of predetermined policy motives. But the remedy lies rather with the agencies and the
legislatures than with the courts. A significant step toward
the amelioration of this condition would be a separation of
the policy-making and fact-finding functions within the agencies. The individuals who make the rules and enforce them
should not ordinarily be permitted to determine whether a
violation of the rules has been proved. The decision on this
question, preferably, should be left to individuals quite independent of the policy-making officials, so that the latter
could not overrule the expert conclusions of the fact-finding
officer in order to further executive policies or curry favor
with the appropriating agencies at whose mercies the agency
heads are often placed. 15
In some cases, of course, although the hearing is judicial
in form the decision is largely legislative in nature. This is
often true where the agency instead of laying down broad
rules in advance prefers to work out rules of policy a step
at a time, by exercising its administrative or legislative discretion in deciding the result that should be reached in the
various factual situations presented in a large number of
cases. Here, the ideal of a disinterested appraisal of the evidence is even more difficult of achievement. In such cases,
accepted concepts of administrative discretion permit decisions to be rooted in the agency's bias in favor of postulated
ends. This must be accepted as part of the price to be paid
for the advantages of administrative enforcement of the laws.
15 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 79· Cf., provisions of Federal Administrative Procedure Act for appointment of trial examiners.
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The fact that an agency's interest in implementing predetermined policies may dictate the result in particular casesand dictate, in such cases, a different result than would be
reached on the same facts by a judge who was completely
disinterested in the result--does not constitute the type of
bias and prejudice which invalidates an administrative determination. This exists, generally, only where the agency or
a responsible official thereof has a personal or pecuniary
interest in a particular case, or where there exists a personal
prejudice against a particular respondent, or where the intemperate conduct of the hearing officer has made it impossible for a respondent fairly to present his case.
(b) Personal or pecuniary interest. Where a representative
of an agency has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome
of a case pending before the agency, he is of course disqualified to participate in the decision of the case. Where his
interest is indirect, the same principle applies, but considerations of de minimis may be invoked where a collateral interest
is so unsubstantial that it is unlikely it would affect the
decision. The situation is similar to that where a judge is a
stockholder of a corporation involved in a lawsuit. 16 An
interesting and typical situation was presented to the Supreme
Court of Michigan/7 in a case involving the fixing of milk
prices by a board, four fifths of whose members were engaged
in the business of producing or distributing milk. The order
was protested by a distributor whose business methods differed from those of the distributors and producers represented on the board, and the court held that the statute
creating the agency was fatally defective in failing to provide
for a fair and impartial board. The facts of the case disclosing
16 See I CYC. OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (Perm. ed.) § I 8.
17 Milk Marketing Board v. Johnson, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N. W. 346
(I94o), commented on in 89 U. PA. L. REV. 977 (I94I),
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a somewhat direct interest on the part of the board members,
some of whom at least were in a sense business competitors
of the petitioner, the result seems eminently fair and well
calculated to preserve public respect for the work of administrative agencies. But it would not seem that the same result
should follow necessarily in every case where the members
of an agency are engaged in the same line of business as that
falling within the jurisdiction of the agency. A manufacturer
engaged in the aviation industry, for example, should not
be deemed disqualified to act as a member of an agency
charged with the responsibility for prescribing regulations
governing the use of safety devices on airships.
(c) Personal prejudice. If an officer participating in the
decision has a personal prejudice against a party appearing
as a petitioner or respondent before the agency, the agency's
action is void or at least voidable on proper petition by the
party affected. 18 While the principle is clear, its application
involves the same difficulties which plague the courts in cases
involving recused judges.19 In the first place, the existence
of such personal prejudice is more easily asserted than
proved. There is not ordinarily any statutory provision of
the sort commonly found in judicature acts giving automatic
effect to an affidavit alleging, in proper form, the existence
of such personal prejudice (e. g., Section 7 (a) of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provides that upon
the filing of such an affidavit, the agency shall determine the
claim of disqualification as a part of the decision in the case).
Claims of unfair trial based on the asserted prejudice of the
18 Narragansett Racing Ass'n v. Kiernan, 59 R.I. 90, I94 At!. 692. (I937);
Clark v. Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 54 R. I. 12.6, I 70 Atl. 79 ( I934).
See Scott, "Administrative Law: Bias of Trial Examiner and Due Process of
Law," 30 GEo. L. J. 54 (I94I); also, "The Disqualification of Administrative Officials," 4 I CoL. L. REV. I 3 84 (I 94 I).
19 See 4 I HARV. L. REv. 7 8 (I 92.7) ; Kramer "Judges--Appointment of
Substitute for Recused Judges-Disqualification of Judges," 36 MICH. L. REV.
985 (I938); Godman, "Disqualification for Bias of Judicial and Administrative Officers," 23 N.Y. U. L. Q. REv. I09 (I948).
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administrative officers frequently fail for lack of proo£.20
Secondly, and more important, there is involved here the
difficulty above referred to of distinguishing between, on the
one hand, those strong convictions of probable guilt, based
on prior experience in situations involving a particular party
or particular situations, which do not disqualify an administrator any more than they disqualify a trial judge; 21 and,
on the other hand, a predisposition against a particular party
founded on purely personal dislike or mistrust, which constitutes improper prejudice.
(d) Interference with presentation of evidence. The process of presenting evidence in hearings before administrative
tribunals must be kept free from forces generating bias or
intimidation.22 At times an administrative officer, who though
appointed by law is misguided by inexperience, so conducts
himself at a hearing as to violate this wise precept. In some
cases, which fortunately are comparatively few, a hearing
officer adopts so partisan a manner and exhibits so obvious
an attitude of bias as to interfere unfairly with the presentation of evidence, to the end that the record does not fairly
reflect the true factual situation. Such interference may take
the form of iri.terrogating witnesses in a manner so hostile
as to intimidate them, or interrupting the examination of a
witness so frequently as to interfere with the orderly presentation of his testimony, or interfering unfairly with the crossexamination of witnesses, or exhibiting an abusive attitude
toward witnesses or counsel or both, or sometimes, indeed,
ordering the exclusion from the record of colloquies which
show the general tone and character of the proceeding.
20 Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission of Montana (D. C.
Mont. 1935), 12 F. Supp. 946; Georgia Continental Tel. Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission (D. C. Ga. 1934), 8 F. Supp. 434·
21 See Craven v. United States (C.C.A. 1st 1927), 22 F. (2d) 6oss Parker
v. New England Oil Corp. (D. C. Mass. 1926), 13 F. (zd) 4971 Johnson v.
United States (D. C. Wash. 1929), 35 F. (zd) 355·
22 National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & M. Elec. Co., 3 18 U. S. 9,
6 3 s. Ct. 394 ( I 94 3) .
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Of course, if such conduct can be shown to have affected
the result, the objection of bias and prejudice is well taken.
But ordinarily, the effect cannot be precisely measured, nor
can it be demonstrated that actual harm resulted. At best,
there is an inference, tenuous or persuasive in the particular
case, that the result might have been otherwise if the trial
had been properly conducted. How far must the respondent
go in establishing that he has been harmed? The prevailing
view is that unless the inference of probable injury to the
respondent is so strained as to be completely unimpressive,
the burden is on the agency to show that posthearing procedures were effective to obliterate the effect of the injudicious conduct of the hearing officer.
In the court decisions reviewing such cases, the opinions
reveal a variety of judicial utterances which may be misleading unless considered in view of all the facts of the
case as presented to the court. Thus, it may be said that so
long as the result reached was right, it is no grounds for
voiding the administrative order that the hearing was improperly conducted, where the evidence amply supports the
conclusion of the agency; 23 or on the other hand, it may be
said that the existence of evidence in support of the agency's
conclusions is immaterial, since, once partiality appears, it
taints and vitiates all the proceedings.24 The conflict between
the decisions, however, is more seeming than real. Decisions
supported by statements to the effect that once partiality
appears, prejudice will be presumed,25 are not really inconsistent with the decisions wherein statements are made that
23 National Labor Relations Board v. Western Cartridge Co., Winchester
Repeating Arms Co. Division (C.C.A. zd 1943), 138 F. (zd) 551.
24 National Labor Relations Board v. Phelps (C.C.A. sth 1943), 136 F.
(zd) s6z.
25 Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1940),
109 F. (zd) 9·
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material prejudice to the complaining litigant must clearly
appear, before the court will set aside an administrative order
because of the misconduct of the hearing officer.26 Each decision is based on the peculiar facts of the case involved, and
the kind and degree of the impropriety.27 If the case against
the respondent is a close one, and it appears that the agency
made no effective effort to correct the hearing officer's misbehavior, justice may require the granting of a new hearing. 28
On the other hand, if it fairly appears that the respondent
was able to get into the record enough evidence to establish
fairly the defenses on which he relied, and if the agency was
apparently able to decide the case uninfluenced by the behavior of the hearing officer, and if it quite clearly appears
that the granting of a new trial would not affect the final
result, the administrative order is allowed to stand, regardless
of the harm done to the cause of good administration.
(e) Where the only officers with power to act are prejudiced; doctrine of necessity. Where an administrative agency,
or a majority of the members thereof, is disqualified by
reason of prejudice from proceeding to hear and determine
a pending case, a situation sometimes ensues where an alleged
lawbreaker must be permitted to escape standing trial unless
the agency is allowed to proceed notwithstanding its bias. The
great majority of decisions sustain the proposition that in
such cases what has been called "the stern rule of necessity"
26 National Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co. (C.C.A. 6th 1940),
II4 F. (:~.d) 905.
27 Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board
(Mutual Relations Ass'n) (C.C.A. 8th 1939), 106 F. (:~.d) roo; National
Labor Relations Board v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co. (C.C.A. 9th
1941), II8 F. (:~.d) 980.
28 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (Union of
Ward Employees) (C.C.A. 8th 1939), 103 F. (:r.d) 147; and see National
Labor Relations Board v. Western Cartridge Co., Winchester Repeating Arms
Co. Division (C.C.A. 2.d 1943), 138 F. (zd) 551.
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requires the agency to act. 29 Inasmuch as the doctrine disqualifying a tribunal for prejudice is based on the mere
likelihood of an erroneous determination, the result seems
clearly proper. It does not necessarily follow that a biased
tribunal will decide a case incorrectly. The officers will be
presumed to make an honest effort to carry out their sworn
obligation to decide the case fairly; and the reviewing court
will be diligent to examine the record with particular care.
Of course, if there is anyone else who can act in the place
of the disqualified persons, such substitution of personnel
will be required. In such cases, the doctrine of necessity has
no application. 30
Since furtherance of the cause of good administration
requires the avoidance of all appearances of unfairness, many
agencies very properly strive to avoid reliance on this doctrine of necessity. While legislative authorization for substitution of pro hac board members temporarily to fill the places
of the recused members would be required to eliminate the
problem, much can be done even in the absence of statute by
the appointing of a special panel or hearing officer to receive
the evidence and make recommendations to the board members as to the proper disposition of the case. By utilizing such
procedure in cases where the members of the board are
prejudiced, it is possible to afford the respondent the opportunity of presenting his evidence and arguing his case before
officers who do not share this prejudice. Their recommenda29 Brinkley v. Hassig (C.C.A. 1oth 1936), 83 F. (2d) 351; Loughran v.
Federal Trade Commission ( C.C.A. 8th 1944), 143 F. (2d) 431; Marquette
Cement Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 1945), 147 F.
(2d) 589, aff'd sub nom. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, et
al., 333 U.S. 683, 68 S. Ct. 793 (1948); and see many cases collected in 39
A. L. R. 1476. A few cases reach a contrary result. Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho
532,207 Pac. 724 (1922); State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 66o, 103
So. 835 (1925). The problem is discussed in Fischer, "Should Prejudgment
Before Hearing in a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding Disqualify an Administrative
Agency?" 33 GEo. L. J. 311 (1945).
30 Cases collected in 39 A. L. R. 1476.
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tions to the board members who must decide would be
unaffected by any improper interest, and by relying on such
recommendations the members of the board can more easily
overcome the effect of their personal prejudices in the matter.
3· Time, Place, and Manner of Holding the Hearing
(a) Time. Requirements as to the time of holding a hearing are ordinarily a subject for the rules of a particular
agency. It is required, to be sure, that the respondent be
given sufficient advance notice of the time of hearing in order
to enable him properly to prepare his case. In practice, however, little difficulty arises on this score because of the general
tendency of administrative agencies to hold hearings at intervals. If the respondent is not fully prepared to present his
case when the hearing is called, the representatives of the
agency will put in their proofs, and an adjournment will
ordinarily be granted to enable the respondent to prepare
his evidence. Refusal to grant a respondent a reasonable
amount of time to prepare and present his case would undoubtedly constitute a deprival of a fair trial, vitiating the
administrative proceedings. Section 5 of the Federal Administrative Act provides (as to cases where federal agencies are
required by statute to hold hearings) that in fixing the time
and place of hearing "due regard shall be had" for the
convenience and necessity of the parties or their representati-ves.
(b) Place of hearin~. Administrative tribunals are frequently ambulatory, holding the hearing at such place as
will be most convenient for the majority of the witnesses
and will afford most convenient access to the records which
the agency desires to examine. Frequently, successive hearings are held in a single case at widely separated localities.
Selection of the place of hearing and the removal of the
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hearing from one place to another is within the prerogative
of the agency, subject to the requirement that ample notice
be given the parties affected as to the removal of the hearing
from one place to another. 31
While agencies have asserted an uncontrolled discretion
as to the selection of the place where the hearing will be
held, it would seem that they must be able to show at least
a sound reason of administrative convenience to justify the
holding of the hearing in a locality other than that where it
would normally be held. If it appears that the selection of
the place of the hearing was motivated by a desire to handicap
the respondent, or to escape the process of a particular court,
it may be held that deprival of a fair trial has resulted. 32 The
power to hold hearings any place within the country is conferred not alone for the benefit of the agency but also for
the convenience of those subject to the provisions of the
statute which the agency administers; and in the case last
cited it was held that fair play requires an agency to hold
hearings at a place convenient to each of the parties.
(c) Public v. private hearing. It is difficult to conceive of
a case where an agency's refusal to disclose to the public
information obtained by an agency (either at a hearing or
in the course of ex parte investigations) could be made the
basis of a claim of deprival of the right to a fair trial. The
only adverse effect of such a policy of making hearings private would be to deprive a collaterally interested party of
an opportunity to learn the details of another party's case
in which he might be interested; and this opportunity does
not fall within the scope of the constitutional guaranty. If an
agency wishes to conduct the hearing in private, it has the
31 Wright v. Securities and Exchange Commission (C.C.A. zd 1940), II2

F. (zd) 89.
32National Labor Relations Board v. Prettyman (C.C.A. 6th 1941), 117 F.

(zd) 786.
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privilege of so ordering, so long as the parties directly affected are afforded adequate opportunity to participate.
Normally, administrative hearings are public; and this is
often required by statute. May insistence by the agency upon
a public hearing deprive a respondent of a fair trial? In
occasional cases, this result may obtain, as where the fair
presentation of the respondent's case requires the disclosure
of trade secrets or closely guarded secrets of business practices, and where the respondent could not afford to make
public disclosure of such properly confidential matters. In
such cases, it would seem to be the duty of the agency to
protect the respondent's privilege of privacy by some method
appropriate to the particular case.88
(d) Representation by counsel. The zealousness with
which the courts in criminal cases have insisted upon protecting the right of defendants to be aided by counsel 84 is
based upon a philosophy that by logical implication also
requires administrative agencies to permit any party to be
represented by counsel in a proceeding in which the agency
passes upon judicial questions. Such proceedings have many
of the qualities of criminal prosecutions, in that they typically
involve a determination as to the truth of an allegation by
the government that the respondent has violated the law of
the land. While the Sixth Amendment is not applicable, its
spirit is. As declared in broad language in Powell v. Alabama,S5 the right to a hearing "has always included the right
to the aid of counsel. . . . If in any case, civil or criminal,
88 Cf., American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission (App. D. C. 1937), 93 F. (zd) 2.36; E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (App. D. C. 1933), 63 F. (zd) 362..
8 4 E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938); Williams
v. Kaiser, 32.3 U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct. 363 (1945).
3 5 2.87 U.S. 45 at 68, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932.). The quoted phrase is dictum.
See Green, "The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment, and The Supreme Court," 46 MICH. L. REV. 869 ( 1948) for a discussion of this general
problem.

166

PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES

a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be
a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the
constitutional sense."
The right to be heard by counsel has been recognized by
the Department of Justice 36 as a necessary ingredient of a
fair hearing in administrative proceedings, and is specifically
provided for in Section 6 (a) of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946. Numerous decisions in state courts
are to the same effect.37
But the right is no broader than the need requires.
Where, for example, it fairly appears that the party's
failure to be represented by counsel was attributable to the
party himself, or his attorney, rather than to the administrative tribunal, the agency may continue its hearings in the
absence of counsel, even over the protest of respondent. 38
Further, the right to representation by counsel does not
apply to cases where the agency is not engaged in the determination of a judicial question, but is merely conducting an
investigation or taking testimony to aid it in reaching a
purely executive decision. 89
In proceedings where elements of wide administrative or
executive discretion are inextricably intertwined with the
adjudication of justiciable rights, doubts should be resolved
in favor of allowing representation by counsel. This, generally, is the result in the alienage cases, where the rule
36 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 17, 19 (1921).
37 People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582 (t88o); People ex rel.
Rea v. Nokomis Coal Co., 308 Ill. 45, 139 N. E. 41 (1923); Christy v. City
of Kingfisher, 13 Okla. 585, 76 Pac. 135 (1904).
38 National Labor Relations Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp.
(C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (2d) 488; Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co. v. Ott
(D. C. W.Va. 1914), 215 Fed. 940.
39Bowles v. Baer (C.C.A. 7th 1944), 142 F. (2d) 787; Avery v. Studley,
74 Conn. zp, 50 Atl. 752 (1901).
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allowing counsel in deportation cases seems fairly well established, 40 although the decisions in this particular field exhibit
a great contrariety of result, reflecting in large part the doubt
as to the applicability of the constitutional guaranties to aliens
"knocking at the door." 41
(e) Fallowing agency rules. Administrative agencies have
no greater rights than do courts to depart from their accustomed procedural rules and practices, in order to facilitate
the achievement of a desired result in a particular case. If
such departure is shown to have prejudiced, or seems likely
to have prejudiced, the rights of a party appearing before
the agency, it will be held that such departure deprived the
party of a fair trial and vitiated the administrative proceeding.
This general principle has many ramifications.
At one extreme, there are occasional cases where there is
at least a suggestion or colorable inference that a change in
an agency's rule was of a temporal nature, and adopted for
the purpose of affecting the outcome of a particular case.
The reprehensibility of such conduct needs no arguing and
has been made a basis for setting aside administrative action. 42
40Whitfield v. Ranges (C.C.A. 8th 1915), 2.22. Fed. 745; Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 2.25 U.S. 46o, 32 S. Ct. 734 (1912).
41 Brownlow v. Miers (C.C.A. 5th 1928), 28 F. (2d) 653. Among decisions
insisting strongly on the right to counsel in this type of case are: Chew Hoy
Quong v. White (C.C.A. 9th 1918), 2.49 Fed. 869; Ex parte Lam Pui (D. C.
N.C. 1914), 217 Fed. 456; Ex parte Plastina (D. C. Wash. 1916), 236 Fed.
295; E." parte Radivoeff (D. C. Mont. 192.2), 278 Fed. 227. Other cases, permitting some restrictions on the right to representation by counsel in the preliminary stages of the administrative proceeding, include Chin Shee v. White
(C.C.A. 9th 1921), 273 Fed. Sot; Plane v. Carr (C.C.A. 9th 1927), 19 F.
(2d) 470; United States ex rei. Buccino v. Williams (C. C. N.Y. 1911), 190
Fed. 897; United States ex rei. Ivanow v. Greenawalt (D. C. Pa. 1914), 2.13
Fed. 901; Ex parte Cahan aff'd sub nom. Cahan v. Carr (C.C.A. 9th 1931),
47 F. (2d) 604.
42 Sibray v. United States (C.C.A. 3d 1922), 28z Fed. 795; Colyer v. Skeffington (D. C. Mass. 1920), 265 Fed. 17; Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays,
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 15.
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At the opposite extreme, if it can be shown that the failure
to observe the departmental regulation had no effect on the
result, the administrative proceeding will not be invalidated.43
Between these two extremes lie the vast bulk of cases,
where it is plain that the failure to follow the usual procedural devices caused a more or less substantial degree of inconvenience to the party appearing before the agency, but
it is uncertain whether or not the irregularity affected the
final result. The courts have been strongly inclined to resolve
the doubt in favor of the party protesting the failure to follow the rules. Where the rules which were disregarded had
been promulgated for the purpose of safeguarding the rights
of the persons affected by administrative action, this result
is of course to be expected.44 In such cases, the departmental
or agency rules may properly be considered as setting minimum standards of fair procedure, and any departure therefrom is not to be tolerated.
But the same result has been reached in other cases where
the rule in question was apparently designed rather for the
convenience of the agency than for the protection of the parties appearing before it. 45 In such cases, there is doubt whether
the administrative proceedings should be invalidated unless
prejudice is fairly indicated. But even where the nonobservance of administrative regulations is not, standing alone, of
any seeming great significance, it may nevertheless be an important element giving color to a claim that other irregularities of procedure, when considered together with the
43

United States ex rel. Minuto v. Reimer (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F. (2d)

166.
44 Mah Shee v. White ( C.C.A. 9th 1917), 242 Fed. 8 6 8 ; Ex parte Radivoeff
(D. C. Mont. 1922), 278 Fed. 227; United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins
(C.C.A. 2d 1935), 79 F. (2d) 533; United States ex rel. Chin Fook Wah v.
Dunton (D. C. N.Y. 1923), 288 Fed. 959·
45 Erie R. Co. v. City of Paterson, 79 N.J. L. 512 76 Atl. 1065 (1910).
1
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departure from the agency's customary rules, had a combined
or cumulative effect of depriving a party of a fair trial.(~~
4· Right to Meet the Agency's Case
One of the indispensable requisites of a fair hearing is that
the course of the proceedings shall be such that the party
appearing before the agency "shall have an opportunity to
be heard and cross-examine the witnesses against him and
shall have time and opportunity at a convenient place, after
the evidence against him is produced and known to him, to
produce evidence and witnesses to refute the charges." 47 The
principle is plain; and in cases where the administrative determination rests fundamentally upon the testimony of witnesses
taken at an open hearing, there is no difficulty in its application. But because administrative agencies so often base their
findings and conclusions upon data otherwise obtained, the
exact requirements of this rule are a source of perennial
difficulty. Administrative bodies typically carry out many
other functions in addition to their purely judicial duties; and
in conducting their normal business they come into the possession of vast compilations of data which have some general
bearing on a great number of cases and which they cannot
intelligently disregard in the decision of any particular individual case. Sometimes the data represents the results of
general fact-gathering activities; the agency has perhaps
received reports from a group of persons or companies over
a period of years, or it may have itself compiled official records which are a valuable source of information in specific
cases. In other instances, and especially where the agency's
function is that of enforcing a general legislative policy, or
46E.g., People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo, 194 App. Div. 9z1, 184 N.Y. S. 943
(192.0).
47 National Labor Relations Board v. Prettyman (C.C.A. 6th 1941), 117

F. (zd) 786, 790.
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policing a particular industry or particular type of activity,
the agency may employ a corps of investigators to gather
facts concerning a particular case. Insofar as the agency's case
against a respondent rests in part upon information derived
from such sources, to what extent must the respondent be
permitted to delve into the files of the agency, or seek to
discredit the information therein contained? In general terms,
it can be said that he must be granted an opportunity to learn
what the agency relies on, to investigate and rebut (by oral
cross-examination of witnesses or otherwise) the accuracy of
the information so relied on, and to present all the evidentiary data in his possession which may call for a different
conclusion or different inference from that suggested by the
agency's information.
(a) Right to examine opposing evidence. The party appearing before an agency may insist that the agency advise
him, by specific reference, of those parts of its general files
and records on which it intends to rely in reaching a decision
in the particular adversary proceeding with which he is concerned.48 He does not have a right to delve and pry into all
the records of the agency, or to examine secret reports of the
agency's investigators, but all material upon which an agency
proposes to rely as establishing a fact should be open for
inspection. 49
In enforcing this requirement, reliance must necessarily
be placed on the integrity of the agencies. It is quite possible
for an agency, should it so desire, to rely sub silentio on secret
information, accurate or otherwise, which it does not disclose
to the respondent. But to the extent that the agency's findings
must be supported by the record of the proceedings before it,
the agency is bound to introduce into the record at least
48 United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Abilene & S. Ry.
Co., 265 u.s. 274,44 s. Ct. 565 (1924).
49 United States ex rel. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 264 U. S. 64, 44 S. Ct. 294 ( 1924).

RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL

I]I

enough of its information to afford substantial support for
its findings. More than this, the courts cannot require. In
appraising the facts appearing in the record, an agency may
be subconsciously influenced by a general background of information or belief which the respondent might be able to
show to be inaccurate, but there is no practical way of giving
the respondent an opportunity to essay this task. It must be
hoped that the agency will desire the grounds of its tentative
conclusions to be subjected to searching tests, and will thus
make available for respondent's information all pertinent information.
(b) Right to cross-examine opposing witnesses. The right
to cross-examine an opposing witness is a substantial part of
the guaranty of a fair trial. There can be no doubt that where
a witness is called to testify vive voce, the respondent must
have an opportunity to cross-examine that witness. Nor can
this right be defeated merely by permitting a witness to put
his testimony in writing in advance of trial, and introducing
his affidavit or report in lieu of calling him to the stand.
But on the other hand, the respondent has no right to insist
that every bit of information on which the agency relies must
be proved by oral testimony of a witness subject to cross-examination. Were the rule pushed so far, it would obviously
collide with the principle that enables agencies to receive
hearsay proof, and would in fact make it practically impossible for most agencies to conduct their business.
It is at this point that the difference between courts and
administrative agencies in respect to fact-finding techniques
produces a real difficulty in setting standards to determine
when a party's right to a fair trial has been infringed. 50 The
general theory is clear-the agency is not to be permitted to
accept as evidence anything which is devoid of evidential
50 Cj., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK (I942) I96, I98; and Gellhorn, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (I 94 I) I oo, I I I,

172

PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES

value, and the party concerned must be given a fair opportunity to demonstrate the unreliability of the proffered proof. 51
In some cases, the only adequate way to undertake such a
demonstration is by oral cross-examination of the party who is
the author of the statement, but in others, an opportunity to
rebut the accuracy of the statement, or demonstrate that it
does not rest on reliable sources of information, is sufficient.
The general test is well phrased in Section 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, providing (in
case of certain proceedings before federal agencies) a right
"to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosure of the facts." A great deal depends
on the court's judgment as to what constitutes, in the circumstances of a particular case, a reasonable substitute or equivalent for the typical judicial cross-examination procedure; and
it is not unnatural that courts exhibit some differences of
opinion in specific case situations.
But several general propositions may reasonably and safely
be accepted. If a letter, affidavit, or other written report is
offered as a substitute for the oral testimony of an individual
witness as to what he has seen, or believes, or concludes, the
other party (at least if the contents of the writing are of any
importance) must be given an opportunity to cross-examine
the author. 52
Similarly, where the only means of attacking the accuracy
of the proffered evidence is by cross-examination of the author, that opportunity must be afforded. 53
Again, where the credibility of the author is in issue, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be afforded.
51 Pacific Livestock Co. v. State Water Board of Oregon, 241 U. S. 440, 36
S. Ct. 637 (1916).
52 Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 27 5 Ill. 514, 114 N. E.

275 (1916).
53 United States v. Baltimore & 0. Southwestern R. Co., 226 U. S. 14, 33 S.
Ct. 5 (1912).
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Where the testimony relates to a specific factual dispute
at issue in a particular case, cross-examination is more generally insisted upon than in cases where the testimony relates
to matters of general information.
But on the other hand, where an agency desires to rely on
information gathered in the course of a general investigation,
or on data revealed by hundreds of reports filed by disinterested parties, the rights intended to be guaranteed by the
privilege of cross-examination can ordinarily be safeguarded
so long as the affected party is given full opportunity to rebut
the prima-facie showing made by the reports. The impracticability of calling a large number of witnesses for cross-examination as to a variety of issues related only collaterally to the
specific question before the agency, coupled with the apparent
unlikelihood that such cross-examination would affect the
statements or reports in question, make it unwise to insist
upon a literal application of the general right of cross-examination.
The apparent reliability of the hearsay received without
privilege of cross-examination and the weight attached to it
by the agency, are both important factors. Sometimes, there
is little real controversy as to the factual question involved;
in such cases, deprival of the right of cross-examination is
likely to be deemed unimportant. And if the administrative
decision can be supported by reliance on other evidence, as to
which there was afforded an opportunity for cross-examination, the denial of cross-examination is harmless.
Generally, the respondent must be accorded an opportunity to cross-examine the authors of the information on which
the agency relies, except in cases where the nature of the
statement is such that its asserted unreliability can be just as
well demonstrated by rebutting proofs as by actual cross-examination.
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In cases where the agency's function is legislative or executive rather than judicial, of course, the right to cross-examination does not exist. 54
The question as to how far the right of cross-examination
may be abridged without denying a fair trial is intimately related to the question as to the extent to which agencies may
rely on official notice of facts not proved, a question which is
discussed more fully, infra.
(c) The right to introduce evidence. The right to a full
hearing implies the privilege of introducing all evidence
which is competent, material, and relevant to the issues. 55
Exclusion of evidence which should have been received and
considered may be a fatal error. 56 However, a party complaining of the exclusion of proffered evidence must exhaust
every remedy to get the matter before the tribunal, if he is
to rely on this ground as an attack upon an administrative
determination. If, for example, the governing statute makes
available the device of petitioning the appellate court for an
order granting leave to adduce the additional evidence before
the agency, he must resort to this device; and his failure to
make such an effort estops him from raising the point. 57

5. Timeliness of Hearing; Rehearing
Administrative adjudication ordinarily differs from the
typical court decision in that it is not directed principally to
a determination of rights and liabilities arising out of a closed
54 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 53 S.
Ct. 350 (1933).
55 Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct. 816 (1937); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S.
Ct. 185 (1913); State of Washington ex rel. Oregon Railroad and Navigation
Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 32 S. Ct. 535 (1912); West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 55 S. Ct. 316 (1935); and
see § 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
56 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of State of
Idaho, 274 U. S. 344, 47 S. Ct. 604 ( 1927); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63,55 S. Ct. 316 (1935).
57 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
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situation, but rather is chiefly significant as a mandate to govern a continuing course of action. Any material changes in the
factual situation that may occur between the time of the hearing and the time when the order is drafted should be made
known to the agency, so that it may fashion its remedy to fit
the current situation.
The problem arises frequently because of the lapse of time
which occurs between the date of the hearing and the date
when the order is prepared. After the testimony has been
completed, the trial examiner writes his report, copies of this
document are sent to the parties, they file exceptions thereto,
and there is an argument on these exceptions before the
agency. Such, at least, is the typical course of procedure in
many tribunals. But this process, especially in cases where
the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and the consideration of the case deliberate and careful, often consumes a
half year or more; and (such being the nature of human activities in many of the fields committed to the supervision of
administrative agencies) during these six months there often
occur significant changes in the factual situation.
If the case is set down for a new hearing before a trial
examiner, the whole process is put into operation a second
time; and by the time the case again reaches the agency heads,
there ma:y have been further changes in the factual situation.
In order to permit the eventual completion of the administrative process, it is necessary for the agency heads either to
hear the new evidence personally, or to cut the matter short
by deciding the case without reference to the recent changes
in the factual situation.
The choice between these two alternatives is that of the
agency. Its discretion in the matter will not ordinarily be reviewed by the courts.5 8 In making the choice, the agency must
consider: the apparent importance of the new facts (there
58 Interstate Commerce Commission v. City of Jersey City, 3u. U. S. 503, 64
S. Ct. 112 9 ( 1 944) •
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may be but little indication that they would affect the result) ;
the need for speedy action; and the likelihood that the plea
for a rehearing is premised principally on the hope of stalling
enforcement of the administrative order. In some cases, arehearing before a trial examiner or before the agency heads
themselves may appear to be justified, but in other cases,
justification does not appear. Denial of a rehearing cannot,
except in an extraordinary case of clear abuse of discretion, be
considered a deprival of a fair triaP 9
In some cases, however, abuse of discretion has been established, as where the petition for a rehearing showed persuasively that economic conditions had so altered since the close
of the prior hearing (two and a half years before) that the
administrative record was irresponsive to present conditions
and so could not be made a proper basis for administrative
application of the statutory mandate.60
6. The Hearing Officer
The right to a fair trial does not include the privilege of
insisting that the hearing be conducted before the members of
the agency who are to make the decision in the case. The obvious practical necessity of delegating to hearing officers the
duty of taking the evidence has long been recognized and
uniformly upheld. 61 Employment of examiners to preside
over the hearing at which will be made the record for subsequent decision by administrative officials and review by the
courts, is almost the universal practice, although Section 5 of
59 Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. z8z, 54 S.
Ct. 692 (1934); United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co., z88 U. S. 490, 53
S. Ct. 406 (1933); Acker v. United States, 2.98 U. S. 426, 56 S. Ct. 82.4
(1936).
60 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 2.84 U. S. 248, 52 S. Ct. 146
(1932).
61 E.g., Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936);
Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 346 ( 1927); Anniston
Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct. 816 (1937); California Lumbermen's Council v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 9th 1940), us F. (zd)
178.

RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL

I77

the Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 provides that,
where federal agencies are required by statute to hold hearings, the hearing officer shall make the initial or recommended decision.
The actual conduct of the hearing-its fairness and adequacy-is thus committed to the hands of the hearing officer.
It is important that this official shall command public confidence both by his capacity to grasp the matter at issue and by
his impartiality in dealing with it.62 He should have the
status, responsibility, and powers of a trial judge. But normally his position is far different. Frequently, the hearing
officer is no more than a monitor, without effective power
even to keep order at the hearing or to supervise the recording of the evidence, his position in some instances being shockingly similar to that of a notary public before whom a deposition is taken. In most agencies, he does have some powers to
rule on questions arising in connection with the hearing and
has the responsibility of preparing tentative findings (the
weight of which varies in different agencies) or of recommending the decision in the case. Octasionally, wide powers
are vested in the hearing officer-and the trend of development is increasingly in this direction (see Section 7 of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946)-but on the
whole his position has been ministerial in nature.
The insignificant position of the hearing officer has resulted in the paradox that the conduct of the official who
should be primarily responsible for the fairness of the hearing is ordinarily held to have but little effect in determining
whether a fair trial has been accorded. Unless his conduct
is such as to intimidate witnesses or to make it impossible for
one of the parties to get his evidence into the record, the assumption of an unfair attitude on his part, it is reasoned, does
62 Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1941) 43·
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not result in the deprival of a fair trial, because his attitude
will not contaminate the review of the record and the making
of the decision by the responsible officers of the agency. But
as the reason for the rule disappears, the rule itself will undoubtedly be modified. As greater powers and more substantial responsibilities are vested in the hearing officers, unjudicial conduct on their part will come more and more to be
regarded as a deprival of the right of a fair trial.
The responsibility of the agencies to further the cause of
good administration, furthermore, requires insistence that the
hearing officer approach the hearing with an open mind, without bias and without prejudgment of the issues, and without
any fear that his chances for promotion in the agency may be
affected by his recommendations (see Section 5 (c) of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946). His chief
purpose should be to afford to each party an adequate opportunity to present his case and to meet the case against him.
This is required not only in the interests of fairness but in
the interests of assuring a proper basis for informed and correct administrative action. 63
The hearing officer, like a trial judge, should participate
sparingly in the examination of witnesses, except where such
participation is necessary to a full development of the significant facts.
He should see to it that the record of the hearing is clear
and meaningful. The informality of administrative hearings,
and unskillful employment of the device of going "off the
record," 64 frequently results in the production of transcripts
that are almost unreadable and of limited helpfulness either·
to the responsible heads of the agencies or to reviewing courts.
63

Benjamin,

(194z) 108.
64 Benjamin,
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op. cit.,

140.
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In order that he properly execute these responsibilities, it is
obviously necessary that the hearing officer be an individual
who is trained in the law and who has had an ample background of instructive experience. The fact that this is not in
practice required 65 has much to do with the current need for
general improvement in this aspect of administrative practice.
If the initial decision of the hearing officer can carry the
hallmark of fairness and ability, a great part of the criticism
directed against the hearing procedures of administrative
agencies will have been met. The recommendations of the
Attorney General's Committee 66 indicate the direction which
future development will take. To assure the fairness and
efficiency of the hearing procedure, the hearing officer must be
an official who is fully trained in law, in administration, and
in the particular field in which the agency operates. The position must carry substantial compensation-sufficient to attract
very able men. It must carry also full power to direct the
conduct of the hearing, and to make decisions which will be
accorded, within the agency, the status which in the judicial
system is possessed by the decision of the trial judge. Finally,
the position should carry the security of tenure and freedom
from political pressure which is necessary to guarantee the
impartiality and dignity of any judicial officer. Great progress
toward this end is made by Section 11 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of r 946.
65 As to the training and experience of the hearing officers of many federal
agencies, see report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 375·
66 Idem. 45·
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HE power of administrative tribunals to disregard the
common-law exclusionary rules of evidence has not
resulted, as is often erroneously assumed, in their being
utterly ignored in administrative proceedings involving the
adjudication of judicial questions. In cases involving the discharge of legislative or executive functions, to be sure, the
common-law rules of evidence have no more application than
they do to proceedings before a legislature or in a conference
with an executive officer. But in cases where agencies exercise
judicial functions, the nature of the proof-taking procedure
is often almost indistinguishable from the taking of proofs in
nonjury cases in the courts.
While often freed by statutory provision from the necessity of following the common-law rules of evidence-or,
as it is not infrequently expressed, the technical rules of evidence-most agencies in practice, and often by specific agency
rule, apply the fundamental principles of relevancy, materiality, and probative force in a manner not unlike that of
equity courts. Partly, this results from their constant consciousness of the necessity of supporting all findings by
"substantial evidence," in order to avoid the possibilities of
judicial reversals of their determinations, and partly, the
tendency is a reflection of their appreciation of the innate
wisdom of the general rules as worked out in the courts. 1
1 Wigmore found a "general and instructive use" of the common-law rules of
evidence in contested cases deemed important. 1 Wigmore on EviDENCE, 3d ed.
( 1940) 44· See also, Wigmore, "Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are
the Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries?" 17 ILL. L.
REv. 2.63 ( 192.2.); Stephan, "The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should
be Bound by Rules of Evidence," 2.4 A. B. A. J. 630 (1938).
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Although disregarding many of the subtleties of jury-trial
evidentiary requirements which are coming to be regarded
as archaic even in the courts, the agencies as they develop
and mature are trending significantly in the direction of the
general rule recommended by the concurring members of
the Attorney General's Committee,2 which would require
that immaterial, irrelevant, and unduly repetitious evidence
be excluded from the record of any hearing and that the
basic principles of relevancy, materiality, and probative force,
as recognized in federal judicial proceedings of an equitable
nature, govern the proof of all questions of fact, except that
such principles be (I) broadly interpreted in such manner
as to make effective the adjudicative powers of administrative
agencies; ( 2) adapted to the legislative policy under which
adjudications are made; and (3) administered in such a way
as to assure that testimony of reasonably probative value will
not be excluded, as to any pertinent fact.
As expressed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
practice of the hearing officer "in taking evidence and ruling
upon objections thereto should be that which applies to
special masters in equity proceedings." 3
He should know the exclusionary rules and when he refrains from applying them he should have a cogent reason
for refraining. Conversely, he should have the courage to
refrain from applying them where the nature of a particular
issue or proceeding requires such departure. 4
In thus following the basic rules of evidence, the agencies
have power to exclude immaterial or incompetent evidence.'1
2 Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 241.
3 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 8th
1940), 113 F. (zd) 698, 702.
4 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(1942) 179. Sec. 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
requires federal agencies "as a matter of policy" to exclude irrelevant and immaterial evidence.
li Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission (C.C.A.
8th 1944), 143 F. (zd) 488.
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Logically, it would seem that this principle would authorize
the exclusion of any testimony affecting issues which it was
not within the power of the agency to determine, and it has
been so held. 6 But it would seem that in many cases the better
administrative practice is to receive all evidence which is
pertinent to the case, even though consideration of some
phases of the proofs must be deferred until the case comes
before the courts. Where, for example, the constitutionality
of the statute under which the agency is operating depends
in part upon questions of fact, the agency should permit the
respondent in proceedings before it to introduce evidence
bearing on such factual issues. Even though the agency
may not determine the constitutional issues, nevertheless
consideration of such factual matters may influence the determination of the agency as to matters within its competence.
Furthermore, when the issue of constitutionality subsequently
reaches the courts, it is much more convenient if all the facts
which the court must consider are found in a single record.
1.

Legally Incompetent Evidence: Types Admissible

The practice of general adherence to the underlying rules
of evidence is ordinarily a matter of administrative choice,
rather than of legal requirement. 7 It was early recognized
by the Supreme Court that administrative agencies should
not be "narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the
6 Engineers Public Service Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission (App.
D. C. 1943), 138 F. (2d) 936.
7 But there is a recent trend to require by statute that the agencies follow, in
the main, the fundamental rules of evidence. Thus, § 7 (c) of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act provides that, in hearings held pursuant to a
statutory requirement, the agencies shall "as a matter of policy provide for the
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.'' The Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 141, goes
further in requiring the National Labor Relations Board to follow court rules
of evidence "so far as practicable." For law review comment, see Hoyt, "Some
Practical Problems Met in the Trial of Cases Before Administrative Tribunals,"
:1.5 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1941); Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence
in the Administrative Process," 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942); Norwood, "Administrative Evidence in Practice," 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 15 (1941).
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admissibility of proof." 8 The mere admission by an administrative tribunal of matter which under the rules of evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings would be deemed incompetent does not invalidate its order.9 So long as the evidence
is "of the kind that usually affects fair-minded men in the
conduct of their daily and more important affairs," 10 it may
be received and considered by the agency, even though it is
technically incompetent.
Hearsay is often received, if the attendant circumstances
persuasively indicate its reliability, but this is the trend of
the courts.11
Opinion evidence, and statements by expert witnesses
whose qualifications have been but sketchily established, is
sometimes received.
Likewise, if the agency chooses to disregard the best evidence rule, it is not error for it to do so. 12
But this does not mean that it is typical of administrative
procedure to receive, carelessly, whatever statements of hear8 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. zs, 44, 2.4 S. Ct. 563
( 1904). This remark was dictum, the actual decision in the case being that the

commission was entitled to require the production of certain evidence, the relevancy of which was challenged but which was held to be proper and relevant
evidence. The remark, however, has been widely quoted and followed not only
as to questions involving the relevancy of evidence, but also as to cases involving
the competency of evidence. The cited case is the first in a series of five Supreme
Court decisions involving the admissibility of evidence in proceedings before the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which are significant as marking the origin
of the rules which have since been generally applied to other agencies. The
other cases, all of which are carefully analyzed in Stephens, ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1933) 2.1, et seq., include: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 22.7 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct.
185 (1913); Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 2.53 U.S. 117,40 S. Ct.
4 66 (192.0); United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Abilene &
Southern Ry. Co., z65 U.S. 2.74, 44 S. Ct. 565 (192.4); Western Paper Makers'
Chemical Co. v. United States, z71 U.S. z68, 46 S. Ct. soo (192.6).
9 United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Abilene & Southern
Ry. Co., z65 u.s. Z74> 44 s. Ct. s6s (19Z4).
10 John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. zd 192.4),
2.99 Fed. 468, 471.
11 E.g., Rules 503-530, American Law Institute, MoDEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
(1942.).
12

Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 2.53 U.S.

(192.0).

II7, 133, 40

S. Ct. 466
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say or opinion a witness may offer, or to disregard the principle of the best evidence doctrine (which even in court cases
is coming with great frequency to be stated as requiring only
the best evidence which the nature of the case permits). Nor
does it mean that the other exclusionary rules are quite forgotten. On the contrary, it is quite as common to hear objections to testimonial offers made and argued in administrative
proceedings as in the courtroom. The point is that the mere
reception of legally incompetent evidence, whether or not
objected to (of course, if received without objection, objectionable evidence may be and is considered even in court
cases), is not normally a ground for attacking the administrative determination, unless prejudice can be shown.
2.

Legally Incompetent Evidence: Restrictions on Admission

While the exclusion of incompetent and immaterial evidence matter ordinarily depends upon the exercise of selfrestraint by the administrative agency, there are some types
of cases where such a mandate is judicially imposed.
Thus, agencies are required to recognize the privileges
which the law attaches to communications to priests, attorneys, physicians, and other confidential disclosures. 13
The admission of hearsay under such circumstances as to
infringe substantially the right of cross-examination may
amount to a denial of a fair hearing. 14
Reception of evidence which is not only without probative
force but is prejudicial in effect is similarly sometimes made
a basis for invalidating an administrative determination.15
13 Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( C.C.A. 9th 1942), u 5
F. (2d) 812; Matter of City Council of City of New York v. Goldwater, 284
N.Y. 296, 31 N. E. (2d) 31 (1940).
14 Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes (C.C.A. 6th 1941), II8 F. (2d) 105;
Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D.
C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 564; United States v. Baltimore & 0. Southwestern R.
Co., 226 U.S. 14, 33 S. Ct. 5 (t912).
15 People ex rel. Shiels v. Greene, 179 N. Y. 195, 71 N. E. 777 (1904);
People ex rel. Moynihan v. Greene, 179 N. Y. 253, 72 N. E. 99 (1904);
Bridgesv. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,65 S. Ct. 1443 (1945).

PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

185

The power given the agencies to receive incompetent evidence is conditioned on the premise that it must be done
fairly. 16
3. Exclusion of Proper Evidence
The exclusion of proper evidence may VItiate a quasijudicial determination of an administrative agency. Refusal
to receive competent and material evidence is a denial of
due process.17 The requirement that evidence be received is
a necessary counterpart of the rule that the agency must also
give due weight to all the evidence before it; refusal to
consider evidence properly introduced or proffered falls
within the condemnation that voids arbitrary administrative
action. 18
The wisdom of this rule is not controverted by the agencies. On the contrary, there are instances wherein an agency
has dismissed charges because of the hearing officer's violation
of this cardinal principle.19
If it appears that the excluded evidence could not materially have affected the outcome of the case-if a remand
to receive and consider the evidence improperly excluded
would amount to nothing more than "a postponement of the
inevitable" 20 the error committed is not prejudicial. But
normally it is impossible for a reviewing court to be assured
that the outcome could not have been affected by the consideration of the excluded testimony, and in the usual case
the necessary result of the exclusion of proper testimony is
to void the administrative order.
16 John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. zd 192.4),
2.99 Fed. 468, 47 I,
17 The authorities are reviewed in Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board (C.C.A. 8th 1941), 12.3 F. (zd) 2.15.
1s Chicago Junction Case, z64 U.S. zs8, 44 S. Ct. 317 (19:t4).
19 E.g., In the Matter of Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N. L. R. B.

912. ( 1 944).
20 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S.
146,61 S. Ct. 908 (1941); idem., (C.C.A. 8th 1940) II3 F. (zd) 698, 702..
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4· Practices of the Agencies
Perhaps the best recommendation of the wisdom of applying rules of evidence to proceedings before administrative
agencies is that the agencies a!e coming more and more to
turn to these rules voluntarily, and often develop elaborate
codes of their own to govern questions relating to the proof
of specific types of questions. Even in the case of the agencies
whose function is primarily the distribution of governmental
largess, such as pensions and old age benefits (where ordinarily there is encountered the greatest relaxation of the
rules of evidence in order to permit claimants ignorant of
the law and unaided by counsel to present their cases), the
regulations contain extensive rules governing the modes of
proving such crucial issues as birth, death, years of service,
and the like.
Some agencies provide in considerable detail what rules
of evidence shall be followed. The Interstate Commerce
Commission is perhaps an outstanding example, its rules of
practice 21 covering such topics as the admissibility of evidence, restrictions as to cumulative evidence, reading prepared statements into the record, introduction of official
records, introduction of business entries, rules regarding
immaterial portions of documents, reference to documents
in Commission's files, records in other Commission proceedings, abstracts of documents, exhibits, making objections to
evidence, submission of further evidence subsequent to the
hearing, et cetera.
The Federal Communications Commission provides that,
saving exceptional cases where the ends of justice will be
better served by relaxing the rules, the rules of evidence
governing civil proceedings in matters not involving trial by
jury in the federal courts shall be followed in formal pro21

I.C.C. Rules 75-87.
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ceedings before the Commission.22 A similar provision is
found in the Maritime Commission's Rules of Procedure,23
and the general practice of the Civil Service Commission is
the same.24 While the rules of the Federal Trade Commission
are indefinite as to the standards to be followed in the reception of evidence,25 that Commission informally announced
some time ago that in practice it has "intended to receive only
legally competent evidence." 26
While there is much disagreement between the various
agencies and commissions as to just what rules of evidence
should be made to apply to their proceedings, it is very
common to find some general provisions made in agency
rules setting up certain standards to be followed in receiving
evidence,27 and on the whole there is no general pattern of
departure from the basic principles of evidence.28
A great deal depends, of course, on the training and native
abilities of the hearing officer. These officials are often lawyers
by training and, being accustomed to the application of the
rules of evidence in court proceedings, find it natural to follow them during the administrative hearing. 29 In some cases,
the choice of hearing officers is less fortunate, and there are
of course instances wherein poorly trained or incompetent
22F.C.C. Regulations,§§ I.2l2.-I.2I7•
23 U.S.M.C. Rules, § 8.10.
24 In re J. M. Procter, et al., Docket No. 115, Jan. 22, 1944.
25 F.T.C. Rule XVII.
26 Stephens, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
(1933) 82.
27 Blachly and Oatman, "A New Approach to the Reform of Regulatory
Procedure," 32 GEo. L. J. 325 (1944), reviewing the rules of many agencies;
I Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. (1940) § 4C.
28 Report of Attorney General's Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., xst
Sess. ( 1941) 70. Some authors believe that an exception has been, or should be,
made in workmen's compensation proceedings. Aniong law review articles or
notes as to this, see 21 IND. L. J. 473 ( 1946); 10 Wis. L. REV. 340, 431
(1935); 36 HARV. L. REV. 263 (1923); 68 u. PA. L. REV. 203 (1920); 24
lA. L. REV. 576 (1939).
29 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 22,
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hearing officers admit much irrelevant and unreliable evidence, largely because of their inability to distinguish the
good from the bad. But adherence to higher standards in the
selection of hearing officers has in recent years done much
to improve this situation. The trend is away from the loose
habit of receiving almost any testimonial offer "for what it
is worth," a practice which results in unduly swelling records
by incorporation of much that is clearly worth nothing, and
toward the practice of receiving only material, relevant evidence of reliable probative value. 30
5· Utilization of Written Evidence
In many types of administrative proceedings, the utilization of written evidence as a substitute for oral examination
of witnesses, is effective to expedite the consideration of cases,
without injury to the justice of the result. In certain types of
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
for example, a so-called "shortened procedure" is made
available, under which, with the consent of the affected
parties, a case may be decided upon stipulations, depositions,
and briefs.31 Over a period of time, this procedure has been
chosen by the parties in approximately one third of the cases
wherein it is applicable. Because of the circumstance that in
many cases before the agencies there is but little argument
over the facts, which are often chiefly statistical in naturethe argument being as to the significance or proper interpretation of a technical and complex factual situation-there
is every indication that similar procedures could well be
adopted more generally. While in some types of proceed30 For typical administrative rulings excluding proffered evidence, see In the
Matter of Lindeman Power & Equipment Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 868 ( 1939), and
In re Riemer and the State of Illinois, U. S. Civil Service Commission, Docket
No. 56, July 7> 1943. For law review comment, see Vanderbilt, "The Technique of Proof Before Administrative Bodies," 24 IA. L. REV. 464 (1939).
31 Monograph No. 1 I of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. IO, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 23·
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ings, such as cases before the National Labor Relations Board
involving charges of unfair labor practices, it would be quite
out of the question to attempt to decide the cases on the basis
of ex parte affidavits, still there are many opportunities for
profitable expansion of this practice.
Without the necessity of any changes in present rules, it
is possible by informal co-operation between attorneys for
the agency and for the respondent to approximate this result.
Often, an agency assigns a case for hearing before its staff
members have become familiar with the factual data involved; and the submission by the respondent's attorney of
a carefully prepared statement covering the significant facts
of the case may become the basis for a stipulation of facts, on
which the case may be disposed of. Utilization of this informal device is obviously advantageous for the respondent
as well as for the public interests served by the agency.
6. Presumptions and Inferences; Burden of Proof
In theory at least, it is true as well in the case of administrative proceedings as in the case of proceedings in courts
that the party seeking relief has the burden of proof, even
though that party be the administrative agency; and it has
been held that administrative agencies have no general authority by regulation to shift the fundamental burden of
proof.32 But in practice it is easy for the agency, acting as
judge as well as plaintiff, to satisfy itself that it has sustained
the burden of proof which formally is imposed upon it. While
the burden of going forward with the proofs rests indeed on
the agency, in many senses the burden of ultimately convincing the tribunal that the respondent is not guilty as charged
rests upon the respondent.
This is so, largely because of the fact that the ultimate
finding by the administrative agency frequently depends on
32 Petition of Warszawski (D. C. Mich. 1936), 16 F. Supp. 43· And note
provisions of Federal Administrative Procedure Act.

190

PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES

inference. It must determine, for example, whether a gift
was made in contemplation of death, or what the intent was
which motivated an employer in discharging an employee.
Where the important question is not a matter of primary
fact but of inference, it is inevitable that an agency approaching a case (as many administrative agencies do) with a desire
to reach one result, if possible, rather than another, will often
find it easy to make an inference on facts which to a totally
disinterested judge would not preponderate in support of the
inference.
This situation gives rise to a question which has a long
history in the field of administrative law. In cases where the
evidence equally supports an inference imposing liability and
likewise a contrary inference exonerating of liability, must
the agency dismiss the case, or may it choose the inference
it desires? In the earlier days, there was a strong tendency
in the courts to rule that where the evidence equally supported either inference, the agency would not be permitted
to make the inference that would impose liability. 33
Dissatisfied with the result of such decisions (which frequently made it impossible, for example, to award workmen's
compensation to the family of a worker killed while at work,
but under circumstances which rendered it impossible to
establish clearly whether the death was due to accident or
suicide), the state legislatures and Congress as well, sought
to change the rule by adopting various "presumption" statutes. They were principally of two types: first, creating a
presumption effective on appeal in favor of the correctness
of the administrative decision; and second, a presumption in
favor of one party that would operate throughout the administrative proceedings (for example, a presumption that a
workmen's compensation claim came within the statute, that
33 See, for example, Chaudier v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 2.06 Mich.
433, 173 N. W. 198 (1919); Sparks v. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co., 195
Iowa 334, 190 N. W. 593 (192.2.). Many state courts follow this rule.
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the injury did not result from negligence or intoxication,
that death was not suicide, et cetera).
Some state courts quite ignored these presumption statutes,
construing them so as to deprive them of any substantial
operative effect.34 But it has now been established at least for
the federal agencies that such presumptions are valid; and
while their force vanishes upon the introduction of any
countervailing evidence, it is indicated that in the absence
thereof, the statutory presumption satisfies the requirement
that the finding be supported by evidence. 35
7. The Requirement of Substantial Evidence
A further limitation on the power of administrative tribunals to exercise free discretion in making inferences as
to facts not specifically established, is the provision so frequently found in the statutes (and imposed by the courts
themselves where the statute is silent) that the findings of
the administrative body are binding and conclusive only if
supported by substantial evidence. So used, the term is chiefly
significant as a criterion of the scope of judicial review. As
hereinafter discussed, the term in such connection has no fixed
meaning. The extent to which the courts will examine the
reasonableness of the inferences made by an agency, in ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence to support those
inferences, varies widely from agency to agency, if not from
court to court. The extent to which the inferences are examined is influenced by many factors, and the characterization
of the supporting evidence as substantial or otherwise, ordi34

See e.g., Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N.Y. S.

700 (1921).
35 See Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. z8o, 56 S. Ct. 190 (1935), commented on in 34 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1936); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 63 S. Ct. 1241 (1943), commented on in 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1943);
Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S. Ct. 816 (1937); Webre
Steib Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U. S. 164, 65 S. Ct.

578 ( 1945).
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narily reflects the result attained rather than the tests employed.
However, the existence of this vague requirement that a
finding may be revised, if not supported by substantial evidence, has influenced the proof-taking processes of the agencies. In making a record in a case which may be subjected
to judicial review, an administrative agency is assiduous in
its effort to make sure that substantial evidence can be pointed
to in support of its findings.
One particular aspect of the requirement of substantial
evidence is particularly significant in this connection. This is
the so-called legal residuum rule. 36 Under this rule, it is said
that a finding cannot be deemed to be supported by substantial evidence unless there is at least a residuum of legally
competent evidence to support it. This would mean, for
example, that no matter how convincing the record might
be, the courts would have the power to set aside the findings
of fact on the sole ground that nowhere in the record was
there a residuum of technically competent proof which supported the finding.
The artificiality of this legal residuum rule seems clear.
The administrative officers reach their decision upon a consideration of all the evidence received, be it hearsay or otherwise. Their decision is influenced by the preponderance of the
testimony, not by the residuum thereof. The fact that there is
some residuum of proof pointing in one direction or another
has nothing to do with the making of the administrative
finding. As observed by Wigmore, "it is obviously fallacious
to assume that one or more pieces of 'legal' evidence are
36 The legal residuum rule is sometimes spoken of as a rule separate from
and in fact opposed to the substantial evidence rule. Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942) 189. It is true that many
courts which apply the substantial evidence requirement have repudiated the
legal residuum rule, but it would seem that the two rules are but a broader and
narrower aspect of the same general requirement.
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'per se' a sufficient guarantee of truth." 31 The only beneficial
effect which the rule has had lies in the influence that has
been exerted upon administrative tribunals to follow generally the basic principles of evidence so far as it is practical
to do so.
Despite the artificiality of the rule, it has been of some
indirect value in this way, and has at least done no substantial
amount of harm. For better or worse, the rule is still in
effect in apparently a majority of the state courts.38
The extent to which the legal residuum rule will be followed in the federal courts is not so clear. The different
circuits are not in complete agreement, and the Supreme
Court has not spoken with finality.
Some of the circuit courts of appeal insist that there must
be a residuum at least of legally competent proof to support the finding of an administrative agency. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit declared on one occasion that a statutory provision that rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity will not control an administrative agency means that
it is not error for the Board to "hear incompetent evidence,
but does not mean that a finding of fact may rest solely on
such evidence." 39 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has declared
that the relaxation of the strict rules of evidence in the case
of proceedings before administrative agencies "was done for
the sole purpose of expediting administrative procedure, and
not to limit in any manner the well-known rules relating to
311 Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. (1940) 41.
38 Many cases are cited in 1 Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. (1940) 83 et
seq.; Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., :u8 N.Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507
(1916); Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 170 Cal. 793, 151
Pac. 421 (1915); Jensen v. Wheeler & England, 51 Idaho 91, I P. (2d) 62.4
(1931); Selz-Schwab & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 326 Ill. no, 156 N. E.
763 ( 1927); Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 148 N. W. 247 ( 1914);
Smith v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 284 Pa. 35, 130 Atl. 265
(1925).
39 National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas Co. (C.C.A. sth 1938),
98 F. (2d) 870.
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the weight or the applicability, or the materiality of the
evidence." 40
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has declared that where
improper, immaterial, or hearsay testimony "is the only
foundation for the findings . . . [then it cannot be said
that] they are supported by such substantial evidence as the
law requires." 41 The position of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia is not so clear, but in at least one
case it has applied a similar rule. 42
In other circuits, however, it has been specifically ruled
that the evidence in support of a finding may be "substantial," so as to render that finding unassailable, even though
there is no residuum of technically competent proof. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has spoken clearly, declaring
that while mere rumor would doubtless not be sufficient to
support a finding, yet "hearsay may do so, at least if more
is not conveniently available and if, in the end, the finding
is supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible
persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs." 43
40 National Labor Relations Board v. Illinois Tool Works (C.C.A. 7th
1941), 119 F. (zd) 356, 363, 364; the court added:
"We think Congress presupposed that the trier of facts would weigh and
apply the evidence as before and use only that which was competent and
material, and disregard that which was not. The effect of the statute is
to shorten trial procedure by permitting the trier, if he chooses, to admit
all evidence of doubtful materiality and thus eliminate delays caused by
arguments. The statute does not attempt to define competent and material
evidence. That is still left to the determination of the trier. The statute
merely gives him a longer time in which to make his decision, and at the
same time shortens the trial. There is nothing new in this formula, for
courts have used it from time immemorial in cases not triable by juries.
They could always, in their findings, guard against errors in the admission
of evidence, and when they did, the reviewing court would regard such
errors as harmless. What was heretofore permitted by the courts has likewise been authorized by this statute in cases of this character."
41 National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co.
(C.C.A. 9th 1941), 118 F. (zd) 98o.
42 Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App.
D. C. 1938), 96 F. (zd) 564-a decision on which Wigmore commented, "No
wonder the administrative agencies chafe under such unpractical control."
I Wigmore on EVIDENCE, 3d ed. ( 1940) 34·
43 National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc. (C.C.A. zd
1938), 94 F. (zd) 862, 864; see also Art Metals Const. Co. v. National Labor
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Similarly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that since an administrative agency is not bound by technical
rules of evidence, and may admit evidence, such as hearsay,
which would be inadmissible in a court, it need not single
out this evidence for special treatment but may make it the
basis for findings, if the evidence is such as would normally
be relied on by reasonable people. 44
Again, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has declared that "it is only convincing, not lawyers' evidence
which is required." 45
Many other cases could be cited from these and other
circuits, but the resulting picture would be the same. There
is no consistent trend, and remarks found in one opinion of
a given court are sometimes seemingly at odds with remarks
found in other decisions by the same court.
The test toward which the federal courts are apparently
moving is to say that a finding may be deemed to be supported by substantial evidence, even though there is no
residuum of legally competent proof, so long as the evidence
on which the Board relied was the best that was conveniently
available and was of a kind on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in serious affairs; but to say that technically incompetent proof, such as hearsay, is not sufficient
to constitute substantial evidence in a case where it is substiRelations Board (C.C.A. 2d 194o), 110 F. (2d) 148, 149-150, where the
court said:
"We cannot see any basis to challenge the competency of this evidence, or
its sufficiency to support the finding, even though common law evidence
alone were competent, which is not the case."
In an earlier decision, John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
(C.C.A. 2d 1924), 299 Fed. 468, the court held it proper for an agency to
consider legally incompetent evidence so long as it was evidence of a kind that
would affect fairminded men in the conduct of important affairs.
44 National Labor Relations Board v. Service Wood Heel Co., Inc. (C.C.A.
ISt 1941), 124 F. (2d) 470.
45 International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 35 v.
National Labor Relations Board (App. D. C. 1939), 110 F. (zd) 2.9, 35, aff'd
3ll u.s. 71.. 61 s. Ct. 83 (1940).
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tuted for direct evidence that is conveniently available-and
particularly where there is a denial of the hearsay. 46
The Supreme Court declared in Consolidated Edison Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board: 41 "Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."
This may properly be taken as suggesting that hearsay which
rises above the level of rumor and is corroborated by circumstantial indication of its reliability, may constitute substantial
evidence. In Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of
Wage and Hour Division of Department of Labor/8 the
court found that statistical studies by a government department, which would not be legally competent, were sufficient
to constitute substantial support for the agency's findings.
The opinion strongly indicates that evidence which would
not be competent in a court of law may be substantial evidence
to support a finding of an administrative board. However,
the court did not squarely face the question, since it appeared
that the documents in question were received in evidence
without objection, and that accordingly, even in a court of
law, such evidence could have been considered and accorded
its natural probative effect, as if it were admissible.
Ordinarily, it cannot be said that evidence is substantial
unless at least a substantial portion of the evidence relied
upon is technically competent. The administrative agencies
have refused to make findings on the basis of charts made
by witnesses who were not examined, on the basis of letters,
et cetera. 49 But in rare cases, such incompetent testimony may
be the best that is available, and if it is persuasive, many
46 Martel Mills Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 4th 1940),
114 F. (2d) 624.
47 305 U.S. 197, 230, 59 S. Ct. 2o6 (1938).
4 8 3 12 U. S. 12 6, 61 S. Ct. 524 ( 1941). This case has been the subject of
extensive law review comment, e. g., 27 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1941); 35 ILL. L.
REv. 84o (1941); 29 GEo. L. J. 882 (1941); ro GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 219
( 1941).
49 See In the Matter of W. H. B. Broadcasting Co., 3 F. C. C. 592 (1936);
In re Queensboro Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 86o (1937).
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courts can be expected to rule that there is substantial evidence to support the finding, even though there is no residuum of leg~lly competent proof.
In many cases, the requirement that there be substantial
evidence in order to render the findings unassailable, is said
to be approximately the same test as that applied by appellate
courts in determining whether or not a jury verdict must be
set aside-the test then being, generally, whether the finding
is so contrary to the evidence that no reasonable group acting
reasonably could have reached the conclusion assailed.50 The
suggestion cannot be taken technically because in a jury trial,
if there is not at least a residuum of legal evidence to support
the verdict, a directed verdict must be entered by the court.
The rule, rather, should be construed broadly to mean that
such substantial evidence as confers finality upon the administrative decision on the facts exists when the evidence is such
that a reasonable man acting reasonably might have reached
the decision which is assailed.
The rule is then not much different from saying, as the
courts sometimes do, that substantial evidence exists if there
is a rational basis for the decision. The general spirit of this
requirement is illustrated by the provisions of Section 7 of
50 E. B. Stason, "'Substantial Evidence' in Administrative Law," 89 U.
PA. L. REv. 1026 (1941). Among the numerous cases in which "substantial
evidence" is equated to the directed verdict rule in jury trial are the following:
National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306
U.S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. sth 1940), 112 F. (2d) S4H
National Labor Relations Board v. Goshen Rubber & Manufacturing Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th 1940), IIO F. (2d) 432; National Labor Relations Board v.
Sterling Electric Motors, Inc. (C.C.A. 9th 1940), 109 F. (2d) 194; National
Labor Relations Board v. Asheville Hosiery Co. (C.C.A. 4th 1939), 108 F.
(2d) 288; National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas Co. {C.C.A. sth
1938), 98 F. (2d) 406; National Labor Relations Board v. Wallace Mfg. Co.
{C.C.A. 4th 1938), 95 F. (2d) 818; Appalachian Electric Power Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 4th 1938), 93 F. (zd) 985. That
the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act somewhat enlarge
the powers of the courts to hold evidence not "substantial" is indicated by
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B. (Feb. z6, 1951, No. 40, Oct. 1950
term). The precise extent of the enlargement has not been precisely defined. See
citations inn. zs, Ch. 16, at p. 313, infra.
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the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 that decision must be based on the whole record and "in accordance
with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." See
the cases cited below.51
Thus the substantial evidence rule is a strong inducement
to administrative agencies to insist upon a general adherence
to the basic principles of evidence; but it is doubtful that this
requirement will continue to be available as a basis for setting aside an administrative determination on the sole ground
that it is not supported in part, at least, by proof which ts
technically "competent" under common-law standards.
51 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 12.5, 59 S. Ct. 754
(1939); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 54
S. Ct. 692 ( 1934); Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission (C.C.A.
gth 1940), 112 F. (2d) 371; Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C. 1939), 107 F. (2d) 212.
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Official Notice
I.

In General

NE of the principal reasons for entrusting to administrative tribunals the determination of specialized
classes of justiciable controversies is the belief that
through their extensive experience in a particular field they
gain information, knowledge, and wisdom which enable them
to decide cases of a highly technical or specialized nature
more wisely than could a court of general jurisdiction. Limitations on their power to utilize the breadth of knowledge
gained through intensive experience in their particular fields,
therefore, can be imposed only at the cost of reducing proportionately one of the prime benefits sought through the
creation of such tribunals. But some limitations are nonetheless necessary, in the interests of assuring fair and just determinations, for the simple reason that without them there
would be no means of correcting an administrative determination which was erroneous because the agency's experience
had convinced it of certain conclusions which could be shown
to an impartial tribunal to be without foundation. To the
extent that an agency is permitted to notice officially the
existence of alleged facts, its conclusions with respect thereto
(whether or not supported by any evidence) become final
and unassailable. Determinations may thus be based not on
the evidence produced at the hearing, but on conclusions
reached dehors the record. The hearing can accordingly be
reduced to a mere talisman. But such reduction, of course,
cannot be permitted in cases where hearings are required.
And so the courts have been compelled to work out methods
whereby the special experience and knowledge of adminis-
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trative tribunals can be fully utilized under conditions which
will safeguard the right of the parties to contest the accuracy
and correctness of the conclusions which the tribunal's experience has taught it to believe.
This is the general problem of "official notice." So stated,
it involves a variety of related but separable inquiries, which
may be reduced to clearer focus by narrowing the general
definition to exclude the related subsidiary questions.
2.

Use of Expert Knowledge in Drawing Inferences

In the process of decision, as distinguished from the process
of proof, agency officials are at liberty to give the fullest play
to their expert knowledge and experience in evaluating the
evidence that is in the record and drawing conclusions therefrom. Such utilization is not only permissible, but is desirable.1 This, of course, is quite a different thing than the
utilization of special experience and asserted knowledge as
a substitute for evidence and as a basis for making factual
determinations as to matters not proved by evidence in the
record.
The difference is one of degree rather than of kind, to
be sure. If a certain conclusion has become firmly fixed in
the administrator's mind, he will find it easy to discredit
evidence tending to support a contrary conclusion and will,
on the other hand, be easily persuaded to make inferences
consonant with his prepossessed ideas, and this on the basis
of evidence which to another would not seem to justify any
such inference. But so long as the factual conclusion must
be supportable by evidence in the record, and cannot be
premised upon the asserted independent knowledge of the
agency, the tendency of the agencies to rely heavily on their
special experience (and the predilections induced thereby) in
1 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(1942) 209, 210; Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 71·
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drawing inferences from the evidence, does not present any
insurmountable problems. The court may set the conclusion
aside unless it appears that the inference so drawn can reasonably be premised upon the record evidence. By and large,
this is a sufficient protection against the danger that asserted
expertness may become a euphemistic label concealing actual
arbitrary decision. Any further safeguards would interfere
with the fullest utilization of the admitted expertness which
.
.
agencies acquire.
Closely related to the problems posed by the tendency
of agencies to rely on their special information and experience
in evaluating and drawing inferences from the evidence before them, is the question arising out of an agency's refusal
(induced by its special experience) to accept as true the
uncontradicted evidence of witnesses testifying in support of
a given conclusion.
Where the burden is on the party appearing before the
agency to convince it of a certain conclusion, there is no
reason why an agency should not have at least as much
power as that of a common-law jury to refuse to accept testimony which its experience shows to be incredible. The need
of such a power is particularly great in the case of administrative agencies, because so often the testimony offered is
opinion evidence-the ideas of experts as to the value of
property, the cause of a hernia, the safety of a mechanical
device, and the like. Hearings before administrative agencies
frequently involve a situation where a board of experts is
called upon to pass judgment upon the opinions of other
experts representing the parties. Quite properly, the agency
is usually held to have the power to refuse to accept the
opinions of the experts who testify.
A typical case is that where, in a claim for workmen's
compensation, the issue is whether a hernia is traumatic.
Claimant's doctors give their opinion that it was. There is
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no direct contradictory evidence, but the Board is convinced
that the physicians' opinion is so at odds with the physical
facts of the case as to be incredible. The Board may disbelieve the expert witness.2
Similarly, where an agency is called upon to fix a valuation
on property, it may rely on its own knowledge as to values
in refusing to accept an expert's estimate, even though because of the ex parte nature of many valuation proceedings
there is no directly contrary evidence before the agency. 3 In
this case again, the problem involved is different than that
of an agency's officially noticing facts as to which there is
no evidence; for in many instances there is no requirement
in assessment proceedings that the agency's determination be
supported by substantial evidence. In cases where this requirement does exist, it is of course held that the agency
may not arbitrarily substitute a different value than that
indicated by the testimony. 4
3· Notice of "Litigation" Facts
The principle of official notice is based on the premise that
administrative tribunals should be permitted to utilize their
special information and knowledge built up over many years
of intensive study of a specialized field, and not be required
to treat each case as an isolated phenomenon in the consideration of which their accumulated knowledge must be excluded.
This premise does not apply to a case where an agency may
be inclined to rely on ex parte reports of investigators as to
particular factual details peculiar to a given case. Information
2 McCarthy v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, I 94 Wis. I 9 8, 2 I 5
N. W. 824 (I927). See Pillsbury, "Review of Decisions of Administrative Tribunals-Industrial Accident Commission," I9 CAL. L. REV. 282 (I9JI).
3 Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 2d
I932), 55 F. (2d) 893; Gloyd v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A.
8th I933), 63 F. (2d) 649.
4 Boggs & Buhl, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 3d
I929), 34 F. (zd) 859; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (C.C.A. 2d I9JI), 53 F. (zd) 381.
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gathered privately by an agency with reference solely to a
particular case at hand, does not bear the hallmark of expert
knowledge. It is rather to be compared, from the standpoint
of reliability, with the report of a private detective agency.
There is no reason to permit an agency to rely on such reports
as a basis for decision. Rather, there is every reason to insist
that such reports should be subjected to the searching light
of cross-examination. Such information should be adduced
only by the ordinary process of proof, and should be considered only it it is in the record and if there has been
adequate opportunity to examine the ability and credibility
of the investigator.
It is only when the information in question has been
developed over a period of years in the usual course of the
business of the agency, and has emerged from a coterie of
facts established indisputably in numerous cases, that there
is a basis for permitting an agency to utilize its knowledge in
noticing facts,. even though not all the sources thereof are
reproduced in full detail in the record. It is only where truly
expert knowledge is involved that the doctrine of official
notice applies. Asserted testimonial knowledge based on private investigations as to the particular facts in litigation in
an individual case is not expert knowledge. The doctrine of
official notice does not permit an agency to rely on it.
Here again, just as in the case of the distinction between
utilization of expert knowledge as a substitute for evidence
and the utilization thereof as a basis for evaluating evidence,
the difference is only a matter of degree. A report by an
expert accountant employed by an agency, for example, may
inextricably intertwine matters representing the accumulated
expert knowledge of the agency with other matters representing an opinion as to the "litigation" facts of a particular
case. It is the responsibility of the agency to refuse to give
undue weight to the latter aspects of the report, for there
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is usually no way of proving that the agency has relied unduly on the results of its ex parte investigation into the
"litigation" facts.
4· Use of Record in Another Proceeding
Not infrequently, administrative agencies incorporate into
the record of a particular proceeding, either by introduction
of bulky exhibits or by reference to the agency's files and
records, a transcript of the proceedings in another case. The
agency thus relies on what it heard and what it concluded
in another case, as a basis for its decision in the instant case.
But here again, there is really no problem of official notice
involved, for it is open to the parties to examine the files of
the cases referred to and to meet by their own proofs whatever adverse factual data such files may contain.
Reliance upon the records made in other cases, specifically
referred to, involves primarily the question as to whether
the party appearing before the agency has been unfairly
deprived of the right to cross-examine the witnesses who
testified in the other proceeding. Ordinarily, in accordance
with the principles discussed supra, opportunity to rebut the
testimony offered in the prior proceeding is deemed to be a
satisfactory substitute for the actual cross-examination of the
witnesses therein. 5
It is only where the agency relies on its records in other
proceedings as a basis for reaching a conclusion in a particular
5 Lakemore Co. v. Brown (Emergency Ct. of App. 1943), 137 F. (2d) 355·
In immigration cases, the courts have been noticeably liberal in permitting
utilization of records in other proceedings; e. g., Jung See v. Nash (C.C.A. 8th
1925), 4 F. (2d) 639; Lui Tse Chew v. Nagle (C.C.A. 9th 1926), 15 F. (2d)
636; SooHoo Yen ex rel. SooHoo Do Yim v. Tillinghast (C.C.A. 1st 1928),
24 F. (2d) 163; Yong Yung See v. United States (C.C.A. 9th 1937), 92 F.
(2d) 700. In Interstate Commerce Commission cases, less liberality is permitted,
e. g., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States (D. C. Ky. 1915), 225 Fed. 571,
aff'd 245 U.S. 463, 38 S. Ct. 141 (1918). The general problem is discussed
by J. F. Davison in 25 IA. L. REv. 555 (1940).
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case, without giving the parties adequate notice of the records
so to be relied on, and an adequate opportunity to examine
and rebut them, that a problem of official notice is involved.

5. Where Agency Is Not Exercising Judicial Function
Since the problem of official notice is concerned fundamentally with the extent to which an agency may substitute
its own knowledge or conclusions for evidence, it is clear
that the problem cannot arise in cases where there is no
requirement that the agency act on the basis of evidence.
Where an agency exercises legislative or executive functions,
it is not ordinarily required to show any basis of substantial
evidence to support its findings and conclusions (except where
a statute imposes such a requirement) and therefore in making findings it may rely as fully on its own experience as on
any other factor. It could be said that in such cases there is
no limit to what an agency may officially notice. More accurately, it should be concluded that the doctrine of official
notice is not involved where an agency exercises executive
or legislative functions.
Thus, in cases where no hearing need be given, the agency
is at liberty to determine the case without reference to the
testimony adduced at any hearing which may be held; and
the doctrine limiting the extent to which an agency may
officially notice facts is inapplicable.
Similarly, in cases where there is no judicial review of
the factual findings (as in many ad valorem tax-assessment
cases, where ordinarily the assessors are not required to
support their judgment of values by a formal record containing substantial evidence tending to establish the accuracy
of the assessment) the doctrine of official notice is really
inapplicable.6
6 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, zo4 U.S. 585, Z7 S. Ct. 3z6 (I907);
Olympia Water Works v. Gelbach, I6 Wash. 48z, 48 Pac. zs I (I 897).
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6. Official Notice Redefined
The real crux of the problem, then, after all the subsidiary
inquiries are put to one side, is simply this: To what extent
may an administrative tribunal, in the exercise of its judicial
functions, rely on conclusions developed as a result of its
intensive experience in its specialized field of activity, as a
basis for factual findings as to matters of a general nature
which are not fully established by evidence in the record
made in a particular case?
7. When Notice Freely Permitted
The rule is now clearly emerging (see, e. g., Section 7 (d)
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946) that
an administrative agency may take official notice not only of
such factual matters as courts judicially notice/ but also of
any factual matter of a general nature which its experience
has shown to be true, subject always to the proviso that the
parties must be given adequate advance notice of the facts
which the agency proposes to note, and given adequate opportunity to show the inaccuracy of the facts or the fallacy
of the conclusions which the agency proposes tentatively to
accept without proof. Such official notice, therefore, has only
prima-facie effect. The agency is permitted to announce any
reasonable presumption it proposes to make as to factual
matters of a general nature within the field of its special
knowledge, but the presumption may be substituted for evidence only so long as it is not rebutted. Often, the party
against whom the notice is asserted will seek to show not
7 This is commonly said to be restricted to matters of common knowledge
aild notoriety. But the courts have been exceedingly liberal in their interpretatiOn of what constitutes common knowledge; and have in fact been willing to
11otice a wide variety of facts which are deemed to be readily susceptible to objective ascertainment, noticing such facts as the height of the tallest man in
history; that dynamic radio completely superseded the magnetic; that pneumatic tires are more damaging to highways than hard rubber tires. See E. D.
Ransom, comment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 610 (1938).
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that the general fact of which the commission proposes to
take notice is entirely wrong, 'but only that the generality
should be somehow modified because of conditions present
in his particular case. Often, the area of disagreement concerns only the significance of the facts to be noticed, and
the deductions to be drawn from them.
So long as adequate notice is given, at the hearing or prior
thereto, of what generalities the agency proposes to notice,
and so long as the parties have adequate opportunity to meet
and rebut the inference which the agency proposes to make,
wide latitude should be given. For example, if the issuance of
a license to operate a common or contract carrier depends on
whether or not public convenience requires such service between two cities, the commission should be able to rely on
conclusions reached in a recent hearing on a similar application as to the same route, and should not be required to put
into the record again all the information it had heard a few
weeks previously. 8
But if the agency fails to advise the parties as to the assumed facts which it proposes to notice, or fails to give the
parties adequate opportunity to examine their accuracy and
rebut or explain them, there has been a denial of due process.9
Thus, there are two limitations imposed on the power of
administrative agencies to notice officially as facts certain generalities which their special experience has taught them to
believe. They are: ( 1) the facts noticed must be incorporated
into the record, or there must be citation of the source rna8 Railroad Commission v. McDonald (Tex. Civ. App. I936), 90S. W. (zd)
s8I; PennsylvaniaR. Co. v. United States (D. c. Pa. I93o), 40 F. (zd) 92.Ij
Gellhorn, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ( I94 I) 89-92..
9 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 30I U. S. 2.92.,
57 S. Ct. 7 2.4 (I 9 3 7) ; United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., z65 U.S. 2.74, 44 S. Ct. 565 (I92.4); West Ohio
Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (D. C. Ohio I92.8), 42. F.
(zd) 899· See Smith, "Practice and Procedure Before the Interstate Commerce
Commission," 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 404 (I937).
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terial on which the agency relies; and ( 2) this source material
must be made available to the parties for their examination.10
8. Relaxation of Requirements Where Risk of Error Is
Slight
Ordinarily, disregard of either of the two last-mentioned
requirements is fatal to the validity of the administrative determination, but in cases where the risk of error seems plainly
small, some relaxation of the requirements is permitted.
Thus, agencies have been permitted to notice such matters as
the average earnings of a day laborer,11 or an individual's
earning capacity.12 For somewhat similar reasons, notice is
freely permitted in alienage cases. 13 Where an agency notices
a party's own prior reports, no reversible error exists, at least
in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice.14
Some state courts have suggested that public utility commissions have almost unlimited powers to notice officially
anything in their files, and rely on any report contained
therein, without notice to the parties.15 But to the extent that
such decisions appear to permit a broader scope to the exercise of official notice than do the Supreme Court cases above
cited, it would seem clear (in view of the constitutional basis
of the federal decisions in the guaranties of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment) that they cannot be
regarded as authoritative. Further, examination of many of
10 The following law review articles discnss this general problem: Gellhorn,
"Official Notice in Administrative Adjudication," 20 TEX. L. REv. 131
( 1941) ; Faris, "Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies," 4 IND. L. J. 167
( 19 2 8) ; Merrill, "Rules of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings," 14 OKLA.
BAR A. J. 1934 (194J).
11 Walsh's Case, 227 Mass. J41, II6 N. E. 496 (1917).
12 O'Reilly's Case, 265 Mass. 456, 164 N. E. 440 (1929).
13 E. g., Jung See v. Nash (C.C.A. 8th, 1925), 4 F. (2d) 639.
14 Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324
U.S. 548, 65 S. Ct. 770 (1945), commented on in 6o HARV. L. REV. 620
(1947).
15 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 156 Wis.
47, 145 N. W. 216, 974 (1914); City of Elizabeth v. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, 99 N.J. L. 496, 123 Atl. 358 (1924).
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the decisions containing such broad remarks as to the powers
of agencies to take official notice of facts not incorporated in
the record indicates that the requirements of the rule as above
stated had been satisfied, the parties having in fact been given
adequate opportunity to learn what facts a commission proposed to notice and adequate opportunity to rebut them. 16
l6 E. g., Duluth Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission, 161 Wis. 245,
152 N. W. 887 (1915); Steamboat Canal Co. v. Garson, 43 Nev. 298, 185
Pac. 801 (1919), 1119 (1920); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Stewart,
150 Ark. 586, 235 S. W. 1003 (1921). See Hanft, "Utilities Commissions as
Expert Courts," 15 N. C. L. REv. 12 (1936); Brown, "Public Service Commission Procedure-A Problem and a Suggestion," 87 U. PA. L. REV. 139
(1938).
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Posthearing Procedure
I.

The Nature of the Problem

OME separation of hearing procedure and decision procedure is characteristic of administrative agencies. The
hearings are but rarely conducted by an officer with
power to make any effective decision. Rather, the decision
is frequently made by an officer who was not present at the
hearing. The resulting effects on the actual process of case
determination can be visualized by comparing the situation
with that which would exist if, in the courts, the trial judges,
at the termination of the hearing in every lawsuit, simply
submitted a summary or memorandum as to the contentions
of the parties to an appellate court, which without hearing
the parties or reading the evidence, then proceeded to decide
all the cases assigned for trial before all the trial judges,
relying only on a short oral argument and advice from their
law clerks as to the contents of the record and of briefs filed
by counsel to determine the facts and law of each case.
While the postulated hypothetical situation represents an
extreme, yet it fairly describes a procedure which could be
followed by most federal agencies and many state agencies;
and it is indicative of the type of procedure actually followed
by a number of agencies.
A mere description of the process is suggestive of the difficulties that inhere. As pointed out by the Attorney General's
Committee/ two undesirable consequences ensue as the conduct of the hearing becomes divorced from responsibility for
decision: (I) the hearing itself tends to degenerate; and ( 2)

S

1 Sen. Doc. No.8, nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) 45·
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the decision becomes anonymous, and therefore less
respected.
Of course the procedural mechanics employed vary widely
from agency to agency, and changes occur frequently within
each agency as attempts are made to devise methods that will
meet, so far as possible, the difficulties encountered by the
agencies in their attempts to decide wisely and justly the
multitude of cases which they can study so little. But the
typical course of procedure, recognized in Section 8 (b) of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, calls for
the making of an intermediate report and recommendation
by the hearing officer, which is served on the parties, who then
submit exceptions thereto (together with supporting briefs)
to the agency, which (with copious assistance of law clerks)
proceeds to learn the high spots of the case and then renders
its decision. Oral arguments are usually utilized when requested by the parties, but they are typically too short to
enable counsel to do more than acquaint the agency with the
barest outline of the case.
The system which has evolved owes its existence to practical exigencies rather than to any theory of jurisprudence.
Faced with a necessity of deciding a staggering number of
cases annually, it has been simply a matter of necessity for the
agencies to delegate to assistants, so far as possible, the tasks
of hearing and weighing the evidence. Constitutional and
statutory proscriptions have ordinarily made it impossible for
the agencies to carry this process to its ultimate logical conclusion, by appointing responsible staff members and giving
them power to decide cases. Where an agency is given the
power to decide cases, it has been held to be the duty of the
agency itself (in the sense of the board of three or four or six
members appointed by law as members of the agency) to
make the decisions and enter the orders.
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Many administrators contend ably that this process of decision has worked well and achieved just results. But it is of
course impossible to determine whether the decisions would
have been otherwise had they been made on the basis of an
intensive knowledge of the case, such as that possessed by a
trial judge when he makes his decision; and it is likewise
impossible to determine whether the decisions as made are on
the whole as fair, just, and well considered as would be true
if conventional judicial methods were employed. While it
serves current exigencies, there can be little defense of this
method as a jurisprudential model. It has been quite generally agreed that future development should be in the direction of endowing the hearing officer with substantially the
responsibilities and powers of a trial judge, so that the initial
decision in the case is by him, and his decision becomes the
decision of the agency, unless on an appeal to the agency
heads (which would be conducted generally in the manner
characteristic of appeals from trial to appellate courts) his
decision is reversed. 2 Some agencies have been seeking sua
sponte to move in this direction, so far as existing statutory
provisions permit.
The procedure which has developed has arisen from the
necessities of the situation. The number of cases which the
agencies are required to dispose of has required delegation.
Agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board frequently dispose of 500 to
700 cases a year. The Interstate Commerce Commission may
dispose of 6,ooo or more. 3 Transcripts in individual cases
frequently run J,ooo to s,ooo pages in length and may be
accompanied by several volumes of exhibits. It is obvious that
hearing examiners must be employed to take the testimony.
2 See report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
Sen. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 45-46, 51.
3 2 B. N. A. Smith Investigating Committee Verbatim Record 36o; Exhibit
No. 18, Official Hearings, 2731.
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Normally, after a hearing has been completed, the hearing
officer submits an intermediate report. In the case of the federal agencies, Section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act of I 946 provides (where a hearing is required by statute)
that the officer hearing the evidence shall make the recommended decision or initial decision, except in cases where the
record is transferred to the agency heads for initial determination. The nature and effect of this report vary widely in
different agencies. In some cases, it is little more than a summary of the contentions of one or both of the parties. In other
cases, it embraces a fair summary of the testimony, concluded
by findings of fact, conclusions of law, and detailed recommendations as to the disposition of the case. Between these
two extremes, of course, there are encountered many intermediate forms. The preparation of the report may represent
a diligent and conscientious study of the case by the hearing
officer; or, on the other hand, it may be prepared not by the
hearing officer but by other employees of the agency-perhaps the attorney who tried the case for the agency. 4
In agencies where the intermediate reports are typically
prepared in careless fashion, they serve little other purpose
than to state the respective contentions of the parties. In such
cases, the agency heads place but little reliance on the reports.
On the other hand, where the general level of performance
by the hearing officers is on a higher plane, their reports carry greater weight with the heads of the agency, and are sometimes viewed informally as representing a sort of nisi-prius
decision of the agency. Section 8 (a) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 contemplates this result.
But whatever the status of the intermediate report (and
there is in fact no requirement that such reports be issued or
4 Cf., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK (1942) 112. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 5 (c), goes
some distance toward prohibiting this practice in the case of some of the judicial functions of the federal agencies.
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served on the parties, so long as other appropriate means are
employed to advise the parties of the agency's contentions)
it is necessary, when the case is presented to the agency for
actual decision, for the agency heads to learn enough of the
case to be able to make their own decision as to its proper
disposition. The only way in which it is possible for them to
do this is to rely heavily on the assistance of staff employees
whose job it is to digest records and briefs and then consult
informally with the agency heads, who thus get the case
more or less at second hand.
Necessary though this practice may be, and conceding that
the staff members to whom are entrusted these heavy responsibilities are on the whole fairly competent, yet it seems clear
that full public confidence in administrative procedures cannot be gained until there are eliminated the possibilities of
gross maladministration which inhere in this system. The
public knows that the staff assistants who thus recommend
decision and often write the opinion are frequently inexperienced and untrained. It knows that the positions are generally
not such as to attract large numbers of mature and competent
men. It suspects that recommendations are sometimes based
on a desire to pick and choose from the record something that
will support a desired result, rather than on a conscientious
analysis of the record. It suspects that portions of testimony
or matters of argument which are hard to meet are conveniently ignored, and suspects that it is unduly difficult for
counsel to convince an agency on oral argument of the controlling importance of such overlooked portions of the record,
when the staff employees assure the agency heads that the
record "as a whole" does not support what counsel claims,
and when the agency heads do not have time to determine
this for themselves.
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Many able administrators have pointed out the defects of
the current practice. 5 There is a plain need for improvement
of administrative procedure at this point. The cure seems to
be in the direction, which has so often been suggested and is
adopted-for the federal agencies-by Section 11 of the
Administrative Procedure Act of I 946, of making the position of hearing officer sufficiently attractive (by endowing it
with large powers of decision and the security of assured
tenure and liberal compensation) to render it possible to fill
these positions with experienced and highly competent professional men, whose initial dispositions of cases will carry
sufficient weight to command public confidence and be of such
a character that they can safely be accepted as the decision of
the agency (subject to limited rights of intra-agency appeal).
2.

The Rule That the One Who Decides Must Hear

Under most statutes creating administrative tribunals with
judicial powers, power of decision is vested in the agency. It
is the agency, and not some staff assistant or employee, who
must decide the case. The authority to make the decision cannot be delegated.
But one of the fundamental requirements of a fair trial,
previously adverted to 6 is that the one who decides must
hear. Such was the phraseology of the Supreme Court in the
first of the celebrated Morgan cases. 7 The agency, in which
alone is vested authority and responsibility to make the decision, must hear the evidence. This, of course, does not require
that the agency must listen to all the witnesses, but only that
the agency which makes the determinations "must consider
5 Various criticisms by authors with a wealth of administrative experience
are cited in Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 MICH. L.
REV. 501, 514 (1942).
6 Page 150, supra.
7 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 at 481, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936).
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and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 8 The reason
for this requirement, as the court further explained in the
case cited, lies in the fact that the weight ascribed by the law
to administrative findings-their conclusiveness when made
within the sphere of the authority conferred on the agencyrests on the assumption that the officer or body who makes
the findings has considered the evidence and upon that evidence has conscientiously reached a conclusion deemed to be
justified thereby.
Limiting the rule thus enunciated by the reason given as
its basis, this celebrated decision means little more than this:
An agency in deciding a case is required to master the record
made in the administrative proceedings to the same degree as
a trial judge is required to master the record in a case referred
to a referee for the taking of testimony, before reaching his
decision. 9 So stated, the rule of the Morgan case did not come
as a startling innovation. The principle had been previously
applied in a variety of cases. 10 But the vigorous language of
the opinion, and the attention which the case received as a
cause celebre, served to bring into sharp focus the question as
to whether administrative agencies, operating under the procedures discussed in the preceding section, were sufficiently
mastering the records in the cases they were deciding. The
opinion of course did not state (nor could there be enunciated) any precise measuring stick which could be utilized in
determining whether an agency had sufficiently performed its
duty in this respect. But the case did raise many questions as
to just what was required. Most of these questions remain
8

298 U.S. 468 at 482, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936).
This probably contemplates a greater familiarity with the details of evidence than is ordinarily required of an appellate court, which except possibly
in cases of equitable reviews de novo is not ordinarily required to make evidentiary determinations.
10 See, e. g., United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins (C. C. A. 2d 1935), 79
F. (2d) 533; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage
Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933).
9
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unanswered; and, for reasons discussed below, it is doubtful
whether the answers will ever be afforded.
A few cases, decided shortly after the first Morgan case,
intimated that the requirement was that all the members of
an agency must personally review the entire record of a case. 11
But this would impose a greater burden on members of administrative agencies than is imposed on courts composed of
several judges, and hence goes too far, for it has been suggested in many cases that there is no legal reason and no
practical justification for requiring agencies to do more than
courts do in mastering the evidence in the record of the case.12
While many of the questions raised by the decision in the
Morgan case remain unanswered, the general application of
the principle there declared can be roughly defined-and by
way of exclusion, rather than inclusion-by examining cases
where it has been held that the procedure adopted by the
agency was not improper.
Thus, it is not required that all the members of the agency
sit in each case. 13 Nor is it necessary that any member of the
agency be present at the taking of testimony; hearing examiners may be appointed. 14 A change in the personnel of an
agency during the pendency of proceedings in a particular
11 State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v. Wrabetz, 2.31 Wis. 147, z85 N. W.
504 (1939); Joyce v. Bruckman, 2.57 App. Div. 795, 15 N.Y. S. (zd) 679
( 1 939).
12 In some decisions, the duty of the administrative agency in respect to mastering the record is made analogous to the duty of an appellate court. Logically,
this is unsound, for the administrative agency makes an original determination,
rather than an appellate review; and its mastery of the record should be equated
to that of a trial judge who decides a case upon a record made before a master
or referee. But as a practical matter, this theoretical distinction will presumably exercise but little influence, because of the fact that, as noted below, the
courts generally refuse to undertake the task of determining the extent to which
the members of an agency have studied the record of a case.
13Frischer & Co. v. Elting (C.C.A. zd 19p), 6o F. (zd) 711; Frischer &
Co. v. Bakelite Corp. (C.C.P.A. 193o), 39 F. (zd) 2.47.
14 California Lumbermen's Council v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A.
9th 1940), 115 F. (zd) 178; Plapao Laboratories, Inc. v. Farley (App. D. C.
1937), 92. F. (zd) :uS; Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 2.73 U.S. 352., 47 S. Ct.
346 (192.7).
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case does not require that a fresh start be made. 15 The agency
members need not personally examine the record; they may
employ assistants to sift and analyze the evidence. 16
The second Morgan case 17 is one of the comparatively few
cases in which any affirmative showing was made as to the
extent to which the deciding authority (in that case a single
officer) had examined the record. In that case, the Secretary
of Agriculture testified that the bulky transcript of testimony, some IO,ooo pages exclusive of exhibits, was placed
on his desk and he dipped into it from time to time to
get its drift. He read the respondent's brief and a transcript
of the oral argument. He conferred with his subordinates
who had sifted and analyzed the evidence, and discussed the
proposed findings. He said that his order represented his own
"independent reactions to the findings" of the men in the
Bureau. The court said (by way of dictum) that it would
assume that the Secretary sufficiently understood the evidence, and the case was decided on the point that the respondents had not been properly advised of the nature of the claims
made by the government. It is not clear whether the court's
assumption was based on the supposition that such a study of
a record was sufficient, or whether it was based on the proposition that it was improper for the courts to probe the mental
processes of administrative officials. The significance of the
case is thus obscured. Nevertheless, it is generally indicative
of what is permitted.
In any event, due process does not require that the members of an agency hear or read a transcript of the testimony/8
15 United States ex rel. Minuto v. Reimer (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F. (2d)
166; Eastland Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C. 1937),
92 F. (2d) 467; Vogeley v. Detroit Lumber Co., 196 Mich. 516, 162 N. W.
975 (1917).
16 Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 ( 1936).
17 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938).
18 Sec. 10 of the Model State Act provides that the officials who are to render
the decision "shall personally consider the whole record or such portions thereof
as may be cited by the parties." Similarly, Section 7 (c) of the Federal Admin-
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but only that they sufficiently familiarize themselves with the
evidence to be able to render a decision based thereon. So
stating the requirement, it becomes obvious that it is exceedingly difficult to determine, in any particular case, whether
the members of the agency did in fact perform their duty of
mastering the record. Ordinarily, the only source of information on this critical point would be the testimony of the agency
members. Unless they can be compelled to testify as to the
extent to which they familiarized themselves with the record
in deciding a case, there is ordinarily no method of raising
the question.
It quite clearly appears that the courts will not permit
agency members to be summoned for cross-examination as to
this. The impropriety of such examination, suggested in the
second Morgan case, supra, was strongly emphasized in a
later opinion.19 Similarly, attempts to require members of
agencies to answer depositions raising particular questions as
to their consideration of a specific case have been almost
uniformly unsuccessful. 20
Thus (except where specific statutory requirements exist),
the broad requirement that the members of an agency in deciding a case must sufficiently master the record made therein
so as to be able to reach an independent decision based on the
evidence taken in the case, is one which for most practical
istrative Procedure Act in terms requires agencies to consider the whole record
or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party.
19 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941).
20 In National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C.C.A. 5th
1938), 98 F. (zd) 444, interrogatories were allowed; but the court relied
largely on particular factors deemed to indicate unfair administrative handling
of the case; and this decision was distinguished and limited in a later decision
of the same court, denying the issuance of interrogatories. National Labor Relations Board v. Lane Cotton Mills Co. (C.C.A. 5th 194o), 108 F. (zd) 568.
Other cases refusing to permit similar inquiries are: National Labor Relations
Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co. (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (zd) 16;
Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A.
8th 1939), 103 F. (zd) 953; National Labor Relations Board v. Botany
Worsted Mills, Inc. (C.C.A. 3d 1939), 106 F. (zd) 263; Inland Steel Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1939), 105 F. (zd) 246.
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purposes is committed to the consciences of agency members.
And this of course is in keeping with the spirit which recognizes administrative agencies as independent instrumentalities
of justice, collaborative with the courts, whose independence
and integrity must be respected. 21
3· Necessity of Intermediate Findings by Hearing Officers
In fulfilling their duty to master the essence of the record
in each individual case decided judicially, agencies have
found that ordinarily the most effective and expeditious aid
toward this end is to require the officer who hears the testimony to prepare an intermediate report which at least summarizes the claims of the parties and normally contains at
least some suggestion as to what findings the hearing officer
believes should be made by the agency (in cases where Section 8 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act applies,
the hearing officer must submit a recommendation as to what
the decision should be). Even if it serves only to narrow the
focus of argument before the agency itself, such a report is
obviously of great value.
So common has the practice become, and so dismayed is the
litigant who is deprived of the advantages of receiving such
an intermediate report, that it has been urged that failure to
provide some statement as to the findings and recommendations of the hearing officer, to guide the parties in their further presentation of the case before the agency, is in itself
tantamount to a denial of a fair trial.
As to this, the rule adopted by the courts has been that
if no alternative device is employed to apprise the parties
fairly of the claims and contentions made by the agency, then
the absence of the intermediate report may be fatal. But it is
considered as only one of several alternative devices which
may perform this function; and if the respondents are otherwise fully advised of the issues on which the agency will
2l

See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941).
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decide the case, the absence of an intermediate report is not
fatal. 22
4· The Adjudication of Cases and the Separation of Powers
It is, of course, at the stage of actual decision that there is
brought into sharp focus the question as to the effect of combining in a single agency the powers of witness, prosecutor,
judge, and executioner. This general problem is primarily a
matter involving constitutional questions as to the separation
of powers. 23 The effect of such combination characterizes the
whole administrative process, and the stage of decision is only
one point of impact.
However, one extreme consequence of the hazards inherent in complete combination of powers within an agency
appears intimately as a part of the actual process and mechanics of decision-making. It occurs where a staff member
who investigated a case ex parte, or the agency's attorney who
handled the trial of the case, is permitted to write the findings, opinion, or decision of the agency-or to collaborate to
a large degree in the writing thereof. There can be no valid
reason for such practice, and Section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 goes far toward eliminating it in
the case of the federal agencies. But here again, the reponsibility for avoiding this situation is one which must be entrusted to the agencies.
5. Requirement That Final Decision Be Supported by
Findings

It is often required by statute, and perhaps by the Constitution 24 that the determination of an administrative agency
22 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S.
333, 58 S. Ct. 904 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst (C.C.A.
9th 1939), 102 F. (2d) 658.
23 See, supra, p. 5o et seq.
24 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
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must be supported by findings. This requirement presents
greater difficulties in cases where the administrative order is
primarily legislative in character than in cases where the determination is essentially judicial in nature. In the latter type
of case, established administrative practice (recognizing the
practical necessity of a statement of findings as a matter of
sound administration, as a condition precedent to effective
judicial review, and perhaps as a constitutional requirement)
is to rest each determination on definite findings. 25
25 On the broad question as to the necessity of findings, see many cases collected in Vom Bauer, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942.) 535 et seq., Gellhorn, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ( r 942.) 770 et seq.; 146 A. L. R. 2.09.

CHAPTER

12

Administrative Ad judication
and the Role of Discretion

T

HE decisions of administrative tribunals are made by
administrators, not by judges. Viewing their function
as basically that of administering and implementing
a stated legislative purpose, administrators adopt as their
model not the judicial attitude of deciding impartially between opposed litigants, but rather the attitude of an executive who wants to get a job done. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that the agencies, while using essentially the same
materials of decision as do the courts (i.e., constitutions,
statutes, prior decisions, and testimony), do not deal with
these materials in the same way that judges do.
To the objection that an agency should construe statutes
and evaluate evidence on the basis of the same canons and
standards as are employed by courts, the administrators reply
that one of the prime purposes in the creation of an agency is,
frequently, to enable the clarification of policy in a new and
perplexing field by putting decision on a basis of ad hoc discretion. To achieve this end, it is said, agencies must depart
from the normal standards of decision that guide the courts.
Justifiable or not as this answer may be, it is at least a fair
description of the general approach of the agencies to the
jurisprudential aspects of the problem of decision-making.
While the extent of departure from judicial norms varies
considerably as between different agencies, there is a pervasive tendency, which can be noted in all administrative
agencies, to base decision of ju,dicial questions on general
considerations of policy to a far greater extent than is
true in the courts, wherein decision is ordinarily based on
223
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the provisions of a statute or a common-law doctrine. 1 This
tendency has been encouraged by the plain intimations found
in many judicial opinions that an administrative decision
based on the experience and peculiar competence of the
agency will command far more respect, and be much less
subject to judicial reversal, than a decision based on legal
grounds. 2 The implication seems to be that when an agency's
decision is based on purely judicial questions presented in
the record before it, the courts will exercise their superior
competency in reviewing such questions of law; but when,
on the other hand, decision is rested on imponderable considerations of a policy which can be known fully only to
the agency, then the courts will but seldom venture to interfere with the result of the administrative determination. It
is not surprising that the agencies, which rarely welcome
judicial review of their decisions, seize upon the opportunity
to rest every decision, so far as possible, on general grounds
of policy.
1 Cf., the observation in Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JuDICIAL
FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (I 942) 2 I 6: "The distinction between an agency acting judicially and a court is largely in the extent
to which policy is determined by decision or previously defined by statute or
common law."
2 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 3 I 8 U. S. 8o, 63
S. Ct. 454 (I943). In that case, the Commission said that under general principles of equity law, stock acquired by officers of a corporation during a period
of reorganization could not be permitted to share in the reorganization on an
equal footing with other stock of the same class. Pointing out (as conceded by
counsel for the Commission) that this decision involved a misunderstanding of
the court decisions in question, the court reversed the Commission, but pointed
out that the result might have been quite the opposite if the Commission had
seen fit to promulgate its own rule of policy as the governing factor in its
decision. The case was remanded to the Commission for further consideration.
On remand, as the Supreme Court later said, "the Commission re-examined the
problem, recast its rationale and reached the same result." The Supreme Court
on a second appeal affirmed the Commission, pointing out (332 U. S. I94, I99>
67 S. Ct. I575 (I947)):
"The latest order of the Commission definitely avoids the fatal error of
relying on judicial precedents which do not sustain it. . . . It has
drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility
reorganizations."
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But in many cases the agencies cannot escape the necessity
of passing on issues involving the interpretation of the governing statute, the evaluation of conflicting evidence, the
effect to be given prior decisions involving the same or other
parties, and other similar issues, where the question presented involves the use of the same techniques as those
employed by lawyers and judges in court cases. It is here
that the unique jurisprudential approach of the agencies
most clearly appears.
1.

Interpretation of Statutes

Two frequently noted tendencies of administrative tribunals are of far-reaching effect in coloring administrative
interpretation of statutes. The first is the natural tendency
of an agency to emphasize (if not magnify) its own stature
and importance by seeking to extend its jurisdiction and
power to the furthest possible limits. The second is the
tendency to broaden, by successive steps of administrative
implementation, the policy of the statute which the agency
is administering. Frequently, the statement of policy as contained in the legislative enactment is considered to be only
a starting point from which the agency can develop policies
and programs deemed to further the general objectives which
motivated the enactment of the law. Such development,
which frequently in recent years has assumed the guise of
"economic interpretation" sometimes pushes the policy of
the statute far afield.
(a) Enlarging jurisdiction of agency. Whether or not any
particular decision on a jurisdictional question amounts to
an enlargement of the agency's powers involves a point of
argument that cannot be conclusively settled except where
an administrative determination as to the existence of jurisdiction has been reversed upon court review. Several such
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cases could be noted. But any mention of them should not
overlook the existence of other cases where a gradual expansion of jurisdiction was accomplished, step by step, without being subjected to the test of judicial review; and where
after such expanded jurisdiction had in fact been exercised
for several years before being challenged in the courts, it
was in effect held that the lapse of time coupled with silent
legislative acquiescence had developed a power which perhaps the court could not otherwise have read into the original statute. 3 Nor should there be overlooked cases where an
expanded jurisdiction, gradually developed, has never been
tested in the courts. The citation of cases reversing administrative findings of jurisdiction does not tell the whole story.
Characteristic of this tendency of the agencies to enlarge
their jurisdiction was the determination of the Federal Trade
Commission (after it had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Congress to enlarge its jurisdiction beyond the prevention of unfair methods of competition in commerce, to include
the prevention of unfair methods of competition in transactions affecting commerce) that it had power even under
the more restrictive phraseology, to enjoin allegedly unfair
sales methods in purely intrastate sales. The theory was that
the power to prevent the use of unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce embraced a power to prevent
the use of unfair methods in intrastate sales, where the result
3 E.g., the long series of steps by which the National Labor Relations Board
obtained judicial acceptance of its claims to a constantly broadened jurisdiction;
asserting it first in cases of large corporations with integrated multi-state
activities, and gradually pushing it to the point of including retail storesalthough in the earlier days of the administration of the act, the agency refused
to assert jurisdiction over retail stores, thinking that the intimations of the
comparatively early case of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National
Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 2d 1938), 95 F. (2d) 390, 393, aiPd 305
U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938), indicated that such claims of jurisdiction
would not then have been accepted.
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was to handicap interstate competitors. But this theory was
rejected by the court.4
Similarly, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor (which under the explicit provision of the
controlling statute had no jurisdiction over employees with
respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission had
"power" to establish maximum hours of service) concluded
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had such "power"
only in cases where it had exercised it by prescribing
maximum hours, and that until such regulations were promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, such
employees were within the jurisdiction of the Wage and
Hour Division. 5 This extension of jurisdiction, similarly,
was voided by the Supreme Court.6
Another example of the same tendency can be seen in
the assertion by the Securities and Exchange Commission of
a continuing jurisdiction to conduct "stop order" proceedings
despite the fact that the registration statement, proposing
the issuance and offering of certain securities, had been withdrawn. Here again, the court found jurisdiction did not exist. 7
Examples need not be multiplied to illustrate further the
general tendency. It is a part of administrative jurisprudence
that statutory grants of power are to be broadly construed,
and every doubt resolved in favor of the existence of jurisdiction on the part of the agency. This trend is in part no
4 Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 3 IZ U. S. 349, 6 I S. Ct.
s8o (1941).
5 Interpretative Bulletin No.9, 194z Wage Hour Manual, 377, 379·
6Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, JI9 U.S. 44,63 S. Ct. 917 (1943).
In a more recent case involving substantially the same question, the court
(overruling a claim by the Wage Hour Division that it had jurisdiction over
part-time truck drivers), said in part: "This position no doubt arose from
a desire to give wide effect to the Fair Labor Standards Act." Levinson v.
Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 682, 67 S. Ct. 931 (1947).
7 Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Z98
I, s6
Ct. 654
(1936).

u. s.

s.
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doubt a reaction to the efforts of private litigants who seek
unfairly to limit and narrow an agency's jurisdiction. An
atmosphere of litigious hostility is created in which the agency
plays the part of its own advocate. And all this is a reflection
of the newness of many of the agencies. As the agencies
achieve a greater degree of maturity, and become more
thoroughly integrated into a general plan whereby the administration of the law is divided between courts and agencies, this tendency should gradually diminish. Indeed, in the
case of some of the older agencies, the trend has already
largely disappeared. 8
(b) Broadening policy of act. Here again, in discussing
administrative decisions as to the substantive requirements
of the statute which an agency administers, no positive assertion of improperly extensive interpretations can be made
except in cases where such interpretations have been set aside
by the courts, as going too far beyond the realm wherein an
agency's interpretation as to the meaning of a statute will
carry highly persuasive weight. Such examples can be found
in plenty, but they do not fully cover the field. There remains a much broader territory, the exact extent of which
can be only conjectured, where the broadening of the originally announced legislative purpose or policy (as a result of
administrative development) has been accepted by the courts,
and has led to the creation of rules of conduct which might
never have been reached had the interpretation of the statutes
been left to the less colorful imagination of the courts. Yet
it is precisely at this point that the process of free interpretation by administrative agencies has its greatest effects.
An example or two will illumine the thought. The proscription of unfair labor practices on the part of employers
8 The Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, has been reversed for
failing to accept jurisdiction in cases where the court found it existed. Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co.,
224 U.S. 474, 32 S. Ct. 556 (1912).
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as against their employees, as contained in the National Labor
Relations Act,9 might well never have been extended to
embrace the employment of such practices on the part of
an employing unit when directed against an independent
contractor, had the interpretation of the statute been left to
the courts. 10 But when administrative ingenuity discovered
that independent contractors could, for purposes of the particular statute, be treated as employees, the court accepted
this administrative development of the statute.11 A somewhat
similar situation was presented with the enactment of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of r9J8/2 requiring the payment
of at least time-and-one-half overtime compensation to employees engaged in occupations necessary to the production
of goods for commerce. The question of course arose as to
the effect of the statute in the case of a salaried employee,
whose salary (established by a contractual agreement antedating the adoption of the law) was stated to cover compensation for a certain number of hours of work per week, in
excess of the maximum which could be w~rked without payment of overtime compensation. In such a case, could the
contract legally be continued, so long as the amount due
was in excess of what the law required as a minimum wage
plus overtime? The original administrative suggestion, that
perhaps such an arrangement would satisfy the law/8 was
the same as the conclusion of a number of lower courts,
which early considered the question and so held.14 But the
original suggestion of the agency was speedily replaced by
9

49 Stat. 449, ::9 U.S.C. § ISI.
See Columbia River Packers Ass'n., Inc. v. Hinton, 3 IS U. S. 143, 6::
s. Ct. szo (I94Z).
11 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 3u U. S.
III, 64 s. Ct. 8SI (I944).
12 sz Stat. 106o, z9 U.S.C. § zoi.
13 I W. H. Ref. Man. 6o (I939); 3 Wage and Hour Reporter ::8 (I938).
14 E.g., Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. (D. C. Md. 1941), 40
F. Supp. I74; Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co. (D. C. Tex. 1940).
33 F. Supp. 90.
10
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an interpretation definitely requiring the enlargement of such
salaries/ 5 and the revised administrative interpretation ultimately gained judicial acceptance. 16
The tendency of the taxing authorities to interpret tax
statutes to the end of achieving the largest possible tax
revenue scarcely needs documentation; and the effect of the
decision in the famous Dobson case 17 tends in some degree
to give the administrative agencies free play in this particular
field.
More significant, perhaps, than the trend of the agencies
to broaden legislative policies within limits which the courts
find sustainable, is the large number of cases where courts
have found that agencies have carried interpretation to a
point of legislation, and the courts have accordingly set aside
administrative determinations as being incompatible with the
requirements of the statute which the agency was created to
administer. These cases reveal an administrative tendency to
set up and give effect to policies beyond or even at variance
with the statutes or the general law governing the action of
the administrative agency.18
Many examples could be cited. The Supreme Court has
more than once had occasion to condemn administrative determinations of the taxing officials as being invalid attempts
to "add a supplementary legislative provision" to a statute. 19
In furtherance of a policy which was quite understandable,
but unwarranted by law, the Interstate Commerce Commis15 1 W. H. Ref. Man. 197 (1939).
16 Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 S. Ct.
1216( 1942).
17 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 321 U. S. 231, 64 S. Ct.
495 (1944).
18 Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 70-73.
19 E.g., Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 113, 62 S. Ct. 989 (1942). See also Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 63 S. Ct.
5 77 ( 1943 ), where the court reversed an administrative determination that
a gift would not be accorded the statutory exemption from tax unless it was
proved that the motives for making the gift were solely altruism and generosity.
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sion declined to issue a certificate as a motor carrier to a
railroad which operated a co-ordinated rail-motor freight
service, on the grounds that such certificate should go only
to one who exercised complete direction and control of the
motor-truck operation and assumed full responsibility to
the shipper and public. But the statute did not permit denial
of a certificate on this ground of policy, and the administrative decision was accordingly reversed. 20
The same trend has been observed in the administration
of the labor laws. In one such instance, the Wage and Hour
Division of the United States Department of Labor, being
empowered by the statute to define the "area of production"
for purposes of an exemption relieving canneries located
within such areas from the necessity of paying overtime
compensation, so defined the term as to exclude larger canneries. The theory was that the boundaries of a given "area
of production" could be so drawn as to stop at the walls of
any cannery employing more than a certain number of persons. This was held invalid.21
Earlier, the Wage and Hour Division had argued that
the statutory requirement of paying one and one half of an
employee's regular rate of pay for overtime work had the
effect of invalidating any agreement to reduce an employee's
20 Thomson, Trustee v. United States, 32 I U. S. I9, 64 S. Ct. 392 ( I944).
In the I946 term, the Supreme Court twice reversed the Interstate Commerce
Commission for giving effect to policies unwarranted by the governing statute.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567, 67 S. Ct. 894
(I947); United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424, 429, 67 S. Ct.
435 (I947). In the latter case the court said:
"Thus it seems apparent that the Seatrain proceedings were reopened not
to correct a mere clerical error, but to execute the new policy announced
in the Foss case."
A dramatic instance of administrative extension of statutory policies by a state
agency, is Puhl v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, I39 Pa. Super. I 52,
II A. (zd) so8 (I939), where an application for a carrier permit had been
denied by the Commission on the grounds that a married woman could not
qualify as a bona fide owner and operator of a business venture, where she
employed her husband to assist in the business.
21 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct. u 15
(I944).
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regular rate. These interpretations likewise were not sustained.22 The National Labor Relations Board, empowered
by statute to require employers to correct unfair labor practices, reasoned that an effective corrective would be the
imposition of punitive measures against offending employers,
and in effect required the payment of fines until the Supreme
Court held that the Board's powers were only remedial and
not punitive. 23
The Federal Trade Commission has similarly sought
over a long period of years to extend the concept of "unfair
methods of competition"; 24 and it has indeed in large measure been successful. But it has frequently attempted to go
further than the courts would permit. 25
The general trend is, then, for the agency to create a
program or policy which it conceives to be in furtherance
of the general purposes or objectives of the law it administers (and which frequently is not merely in furtherance of,
but indeed goes further than the law so that there is "added
a requirement not included or authorized by the statute") .26
The general aim having been crystallized, the agency then
interprets the statute in such a way as to achieve the agencyconceived policies.
In cases where the statute has financial implications (embracing a policy, colloquially expressed, to "soak the rich"
or "aid the needy," for example) one particular avenue of
approach is that of the so-called "economic interpretation"
of the statute. This is but another manifestation of the same
22 General Mills v. Williams (C.C.A. 6th 1942), 132 F. (2d) 367; Walling
v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 62 S. Ct. 1223 (1942).
2 3 Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 7, 61
S. Ct. 7 7 ( 1940), denying the power of the Board to compel an employer to
refund to public relief agencies sums which such agencies had paid strikers.
24 38 Stat. 717, 15 U.S.C. § 41.
25 E.g., see Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct.
572 (1920); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S.
463, 43 S. Ct. 450 (1923); many Court of Appeals cases could be cited.
26 Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 179, 189, 6 5 S. Ct. 1504
(1945).
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general trend. An illustration-somewhat a caricature-is
the suggestion by the Wage and Hour Division that a
gardener tending the flowers and cutting the lawns in front
of a factory was engaged in a process necessary to the production of the goods made in the factory. Since a janitor
sweeping floors or stoking furnaces within the factory was
deemed to be so engaged, it was apparently felt that it would
be unfair to deny the gardener the economic benefits of
overtime pay enjoyed by his co-employee working within
the plant.27
In cases where an agency is empowered to issue a license,
without which engagement in a certain line of activity is
prohibited, the door to the imposition of extrastatutory requirements as conditions to the issuance of a license is invitingly opened. This is so in large part because the applicant
for the license is often willing to comply with almost any
condition, in order to get a permit to start his business. But
the practice of insisting on more than the statute requires
in these licensing situations is only a manifestation of the
broader trend.
This predilection toward interpretations which accomplish
results "in the right direction" (which to the agency is often
along a road leading somewhat farther than the statute goes)
sometimes leads agencies to play loose and fast with established legal principles which may require a different interpretation. As C. K. Allen said of the administrator, "His
business is to get things done . . . and when principles
of law are put in his way, he is apt to be impatient of them
as mere pedantic obstructions." 28 Thus, in order to assess a
greater tax, the federal revenue authorities have insisted that
a transfer of stock incident to the consolidation of banks,
which was not evidenced by any instrument of conveyance
27

4 Wage and Hour Reporter 196 (1941).

28

C. K. Allen, "Some Aspects of Administrative Law,"

OF LAW (1929)

10,

16,

J. Soc. PuB. TEACH.
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or other document, was nevertheless not accomplished wholly
by operation of law, because the consolidation agreement recited that the assets of each constituent bank would pass to
the consolidated organization.29 Disregard of opinions of the
agency's own counsel is not an unknown phenomenon, where
such disregard permits an interpretation in furtherance of
the agency's general purposes.30
Where an agency thinks that what it deems a desirable
result can be rested on "established judicial principles"thereby enabling the agency to deny that it is doing anything
more than its plain legal duty requires-it sometimes reads
into prior decisions more than the courts can find therein. 31
A somewhat unique misapplication of established legal doctrine was the argument of one of the federal agencies that
an amendment to a statute, adopted to preclude the continuance of a prior administrative interpretation, had the effect
of indicating congressional approval of the precluded interpretation, for all periods up to the effective date of the
amendatory law.32
These related tendencies-to enlarge the scope of the
statute by construction, to find unwarranted sanctions for
administrative orders, to place interpretation on an economic
rather than a legalistic basis, to pervert common-law doctrine
to suit the agency's own ends-are all manifestations of the
position of advocate-litigant which the agencies so often
occupy. It is as natural for them to argue a doubtful point
of statutory construction in their own favor as it is for counsel in private litigation to urge· his client's. argument to the
furthermost position which appears in any way tenable. Their
29 This decision was reversed in United States v. Seattle-First Nat. Bank, 32.1
U.S. 583, 64 S. Ct. 713 (1944).
30 Taft v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 II U. S. 195, 61
S. Ct. 2.44 (1940).
31 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. So, 63
s. Ct. 454 (1943).
32 Haggar Co. v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S.
389, 6oS. Ct. 337 (1940).
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interpretation of statutes is essentially not judicial, but rather
that of a party in interest.
2. Evaluation of Evidence
Since agency heads often feel a distinct professional interest
in achieving a particular result in cases decided by them, they
are apt to be "convicting judges." Tax agencies feel their
work is more successful when the decision involves the imposition of a tax liability; many labor agencies would rather
decide for unions than against them; public service commissions are happier when they can order rate reductions; unemployment compensation commissions deem it their mission
to disburse the greatest possible amount of benefit payments;
trade commissions prefer if possible to sustain the charges
of the existence of unfair trade practices. While there are
exceptions, to be sure, and while there are many instances
where it is immaterial to the agency what result may be
reached in a particular case, yet the tendency is in the opposite direction.
This attitude, and this striving for results, inevitably affect
an agency's evaluation of the evidence presented before it.
Under such circumstances, it would be extremely difficult
even for a professionally trained judge to weigh the evidence
impartially; and most agency heads do not have the benefit
of the long professional training, and the discipline of continuous professional criticism of their judgments, which assist the judge in the task of evaluating evidence.
Therefore, the activity of most agencies in the appraisal
of evidence leaves something to be desired, from the viewpoint of achieving a scrupulously impartial determination of
facts.
One of the most common tendencies is that of resting
decision on the basis of preformed ideas. Often, this takes
the form of reliance on "official notice" of matters which in
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fairness (see Chapter I o, supra) should be left to proofs.83
In other cases, it leads agencies to rest decision on what the
courts describe, in setting the findings aside, as mere conjecture and speculation.34 Sometimes, in their zeal to support
a certain finding, agencies adopt in toto testimony of a witness, failing to note that his testimony was modified on crossexamination, or improperly disregarding other credible evidence in the record which compels the conclusion that the
testimony in chief cannot be accepted in whole at face value.35
The number of cases annually in which the federal appellate courts reject factual findings of administrative agenciesdespite their insulation from attack (in all except the most
flagrant cases of error) by the doctrine that the finding must
be accepted if there is any substantial evidence to support
it-lends weight to the suggestion that this tendency has
far-reaching untoward results. There is some evidence, indeed, that hearing officers have been selected on the basis
of their willingness to champion the agency policies and their
ability to discover a means of supporting a desired finding. 36
A second tendency is the inclination to decide a case without a hearing, or without hearing both sides. Many cases
could be cited. Typical is the attempt of a price-fixing agency
to make minimum price orders, without affording a notice
or hearing to interested parties, and without making any
findings of fact. 37 Even so highly respected an agency as
33

Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 301 U. S. z9z,

57 S. Ct. 724 (1937 ).
3 4 E.g., Ohio Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 6th
1940), 115 F. (zd) 839; Doran v. Eisenberg (C.C.A. 3d 1929), 30 F. (zd)
503,
35 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Union Pacific Stages (C.C.A. 9th
1938), 99 F. (zd) 153. Cf., the admonition of§ 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, that no order is to be made except on consideration of
the whole record.
36 See the testimony set forth in National Labor Relations Board v. Cudahy
Packing Co. (D. C. Kan. 1940), 34 F. Supp. 53, 59·
37 Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App.
D. C. 1938), 96 F. (zd) 517.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission has had to be reminded
that "there is no hearing when the party does not know
what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an
opportunity to test, explain, or refute." 38 Not long ago the
Supreme Court was compelled to point out that a Conciliation Commissioner, making a reappraisal of a debtor's property pursuant to Section 75 (s) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act, 38a
erred in basing his valuation partly on evidence obtained by
his personal investigation without the knowledge or consent
of the parties. 39 An interesting example is that of a state
public utilities commission, which was empowered to annul
new tariff schedules only after a full public hearing, but
which (after adjourning a hearing in order to obtain further
evidence necessary to permit it to consider the case fully)
ordered that the tariff should stand annulled pending the
renewal of the hearing. 40
Closely related is the tendency to make determinations
upon the basis of consultations had in private or on the basis
of reports which are not disclosed. Many agencies have yet
to take to heart the admonition of Scott, L. J., in Cooper v.
Wilson 41 that "when a tribunal considers its decision behind
closed doors it has no right to invite one party in and shut
the other out."
Animated by excessive zeal, and convinced of the great
importance of their missions, many agencies see their task
38 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
93> 33 s. Ct. I85 (I9IJ).
38a I I U.S.C. § 203.
39 Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243, 64 S. Ct. I (I943). Cf., § 7 (d) of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, providing that in the case of certain
proceedings before federal agencies, the "exclusive record for decision" shall
comprise the transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with the papers and
requests filed in the proceeding.
40 In re Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.'s Protest of Rates, 44 N. M. 6o8, 107
P. (2d) I23 (I94o). Many other examples are cited in Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (I942) 68-72.
41 Cooper v. Wilson, [I9J7] 2 K. B. 309, 345·
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out of true proportion. The seeming desirability of obtaining
a particular result in an instant case, as a step toward furthering a broad general program, leads them sometimes to pay
too little attention to the stubborn facts which interfere with
the desired disposition of a particular case,.42
3. Stare Decisis
Both from the viewpoint of history and that of logic, there
is but little room to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to
determinations of administrative tribunals. Agencies are ordinarily created for the very reason that it appears unsatisfactory to attempt to dispose of disputes in a particular field by
strict application of a rule of law. They are not expected
to apply fixed or unyielding rules or policies, but to exercise
discretion and ingenuity in working out a satisfactory solution
for each new case. Further, the announcement of a decision
by an administrative tribunal does not establish a rule of law,
as does a court's judgment. Its basis is rather that of an
ad hoc determination. Therefore to the extent at least that
the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the notion that the
law is unchanging, the classical doctrine of stare decisis does
not square with the theory and practice of the agencies.
It is well es~ablished that an administrative agency may
depart from the principle of its former rulings and establish
a new r~le. 43 Not only may it change its theory of decision
and depart from what might be called the "common law"
of the agency's rulings, but it may amend or set aside its
own formally established rules, if in its discretion such action
appears fair and proper in a particular case.44
42 Doran v.
43 Shawmut

Eisenberg (C.C.A. 3d 1929), 30 F. (2d) 503.
Ass'n v. Securities and Exchange Commission (C.C.A. 1st
1945), 146 F. (2d) 791; American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U.S.
450,62 S. Ct. 1144 (1942).
44 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Kenan ( C.C.A.
sth 1937), 87 F. (2d) 651.
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But despite the unquestioned freedom enjoyed by the
agencies in this respect, many agencies, motivated in part
no doubt by practical considerations and arguments of convenience, have adopted the practice of relying heavily on
their decisions in former cases.
Thus, the research staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure found, after extensive
interviews with the staff members of the federal agencies,
that "in almost every instance the agencies' officers who were
interviewed expressed the belief that they accorded to the
precedents of their respective agencies as much weight as is
thought to be given by the highest court of a state to its
own prior decisions." 45 Many statements of such a policy are
found in agency decisions. The impulse is particularly strong
in such fields as taxation and public lands administration,
where precedents are easy to find and where the agency is
conscious of the fact that hundreds of important transactions
are consummated in reliance on rules announced in particular
cases. Similarly, in the agencies which have been longer
established, the principle of reliance on precedent plays an
important part in agency jurisprudence. This is true, for
example, of the Interstate Commerce Commission.46 The
Federal Trade Commission, too, is said to regard as an
authoritative precedent every case in which the Commission
has determined, after investigation, that a particular trade
practice was not an unfair or deceptive act. 47
Expressions of this policy are frequent in the decisions of
the agencies. Thus the Federal Power Commission has de45 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8,
nth Cong., ISt Sess. (I94I) 466. See McClintock, "The Administrative Determination of Public Land Controversies," 9 MINN. L. REV. 638 (I925).
46 See Pittman, "The Doctrine of Precedents and the Interstate Commerce
Commission," 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 543 (I937); and Pittman, "The Doctrine
of Precedents and Public Service Commissions," I I Mo. L. REV. 3 I ( I946).
41 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8,
nth Cong., ISt Sess. (I94I) 468.
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dared that "as a matter of principle" it should follow a
former decision. 48 Similarly, the United States Civil Service
Commission has declared that "to the extent that determining
factors in two cases are the same, results should be the same.
Consistency of decision should prevail in quasi-judicial as
well as in judicial fields." 49
Other agencies, however, as noted by the Attorney General's Committee, refuse to regard their adjudications as
building up any body of precedents which should be considered as guides in the decision of subsequent cases.
Further, in all the agencies, there is no feeling of compulsion to follow precedents. The agencies do not feel, as
do the courts, that the following of precedents as a means
of establishing stability in the law is an end in itself, and that
a principle once firmly established should be followed unless
overpowering reasons compel its abandonment. Rather, the
agencies are inclined to follow their precedents chiefly as a
matter of convenience, and regard all their statements of
principle and policy as subject to change or modification
upon further consideration of the matter.50 There is no
feeling that a change of policy requires an apology, or an
explanation of the overwhelming necessity of changing a
previously established rule. Thus, the doctrine of precedents
plays quite a different role in the jurisprudence of administrative tribunals than in that of the courts. 51
Another limitation upon the effective use of the doctrine
of stare decisis in administrative adjudication is found in the
practices of the agencies as to writing opinions. Many agencies
48 In the Matter of Pacific Power & Light Co., 2 F. P. C. 508 (1941).
49 In the Matter of Arrington, et al., Docket No. 120 (1944).
50 American Glue Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., et al., 191 I. C. C. 37 (1932);
In the Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943).
51 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 62-63; Davis, "Res Judicata in Administrative Law," 25 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1947); Parker, "Administrative Res
Judicata," 40 ILL. L. REV. 56 (1945).
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dispose of hundreds of cases without written opinion. Others,
even in important or leading cases, restrict their findings to
formal pronouncements couched in statutory language, without explanation of the facts in any detail and without a
statement of the reasons leading to the conclusions announced. It is accordingly difficult to discover what rules
of policy or of statutory construction are embraced in the
decision. In other cases, opinions consist largely of a minutely
detailed statement of facts, concluded by a formal order. In
such cases likewise, the absence of any rationally developed
statement of rules and policies renders it difficult to ascertain
exactly what the case stands for. It is accordingly easy for
an agency to alter or modify its policies to a considerable
extent without having the change apparent. The absence from
the decisions of precise statements of rules and policies renders it correspondingly easy for the agency to distinguish
any prior decision which may be urged upon it.
\Vhile agencies do exhibit the natural tendency to decide
similar cases consistently, and do quite frequently profess
reliance on their own precedents, yet the doctrine of stare
decisis has, as such, no application to their adjudications; and
in practice the asserted consistency of opinion is often quite
debatable, and the extent of actual reliance on precedent a
matter of argument.
4· The Doctrine of Res Judicata

(a) Effect of agency determination on subsequent determinations of same agency. The doctrine of res judicata-that
a question of fact or of legal right determined by a judgment
cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the parties
thereto or their privies-does not apply, in any strict or
technical sense, to the decisions of administrative agencies.
They are not courts, and their determinations are not judg-
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ments. 52 There are, further, obvious practical reasons why
the doctrine should not be applied to many types of administrative determinations. Agency determinations often combine
an exercise of delegated legislative power, or the exercise of
executive discretion, with the decision of quasi-judicial questions; and of course in cases where legislative or otherwise
discretionary powers are exercised, an agency should be as
free to change its mind as is a legislature.
Where, however, the determination is essentially judicial
in nature, severe individual hardships might be incurred if
agencies were free to unsettle decisions which parties had in
good faith accepted as settling their rights. To forestall such
untoward results, there has been applied in a variety of cases
a species of equitable estoppel which produces approximately
the same result as would application of the rules of res
judicata-and which has indeed been referred to, both by
courts and by the agencies themseloves, by the term res
judicata.
Cases involving grant. Perhaps the clearest case for the
proposition that an agency's determination of a question of
private right, unappealed from, should be treated as disposing finally of the question involved, is the case where
the agency's order involves a grant of some right or privilege.
Thus, it has been held that the Secretary of the Interior
has no authority to annul the action of a predecessor approving a grant of public lands.53 The same principle doubtless
applies in cases involving the grant of a patent or of a
license. 54
Ruling on nonrecurring factual situations. Similar considerations of policy also apply where an agency has made a
52Pearson v. Williams, zoz U.S. z81, z6 S. Ct. 6o8 (1906); Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., z84 U. S. 370, sz S. Ct. 183
(19p).
5 3 United States v. Minor, 114 U.S. z33, 5 S. Ct. 836 (1885); Noble v.
Union River Logging Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 S. Ct. z71 (1893).
54 See Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. 8th 1917), 243 Fed. 503,
and note in 31 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1918).
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ruling, relied on by private parties, as to their rights in a
particular situation, where the issue involved arises out of a
single nonrecurring transaction. Aptly illustrating the reaction of the courts to this type of situation is the decision in
Woodworth v. Kales. 55 In that case, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue had, on request of a stockholder, fixed the
value of stock of the Ford Motor Car Company as of a
certain date. Income taxes were paid on the basis of the
values so computed, and the income tax return was confirmed
by the Commissioner. Later, the Treasury Department fixed
a new valuation on the stock as of the date in question, and
deficiency assessments were levied on the basis of the new
valuation. It was held that there was no authority for such
action; and the court, referring to the dangerous possibilities
of official oppression inherent in the situation, ruled in effect
that by analogy to the doctrine of res judicata, the matter
must be considered closed.
In other types of tax cases, the policy of giving effect to
final administrative determinations of tax liability, by application of the principles of res judicata, has been widely recognized. Thus, the Tax Court speaks of its decisions as res
judicata/6 and it has held that the plea of res judicata is
good although intervening Supreme Court decisions show
the earlier decision to have been erroneous.57
(C.C.A. 6th 1928), 26 F. (2d) 178.
J. B. Barber, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, I T. C. 726
(1943),
57 Pryor & Lockhart Development Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
34 B. T. A. 687 ( I9J6). See comments in I Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) 247. "Res Judicata in Tax Litigation," 46 HARV. L.
REV. 692 (1933). In some tax cases it has been held that where the agency's
determination is based on a mistake of law in construing a statute, the erroneous decision may be reopened by the agency, and a tax assessed. National
Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young (App. D. C. 1943), I34 F. (2d) 524; Utah
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, I07 Utah 24, 15I P. (2d) 467 (I944).
While this may be harsh, it is not without judicial analogy. See Johnson v.
Cadillac Motor Car Co. (C.C.A. zd 1919), 261 Fed. 878, discussed in Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 159.
55

56
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Another case showing the basis on which the courts, by
application of doctrines akin to those of estoppel, follow the
rule of res judicata as to agency determinations involving
matters of private right in a nonrecurring, past transaction,
is Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 58 In that case, the Interstate Commerce Commission
had fixed reasonable rates to be charged by the railroad on
certain hauls, and the railroad put them into effect. Some
years later, the Commission (in reparations proceedings) determined that because of changing conditions the rates fixed
in 1921 had become unreasonable in 1922, and ordered that
reparations be paid. In setting aside this order, the Supreme
Court declared that "while not bound by the rule of res
judicata," the Commission "was bound to recognize the validity of the rule of conduct prescribed by it and not to repeal
its own enactment with retroactive effect." 59
This doctrine of adjudicatory estoppel applies only to
official actions of the agency. Reliance on mere oral advice
of an administrative officer does not ordinarily furnish a
basis of a later claim that the agency is estopped from taking
a position inconsistent with the informal, unofficial ruling. 60
T¥here order affects continuing course of conduct. The
Arizona Grocery Company case illustrates the distinction between cases where the courts hold an agency bound by its
prior determination, and those where an opposite result is
reached. For the court, adding to the pronouncement above
quoted, observed that the Commission "could repeal the
order as it affected future action, and substitute a new rule
of conduct as often as occasion might require." 61
58 284 U.S.
59 284 U.S.
6 0 Nichols &

37o, 52 S. Ct. 183 (1932).
370, 389, 52 S. Ct. 183 (1932).
Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C.C.A. 1st 1942), 131 F.
(2d) 651; same case (C.C.A. xst 1943), 136 F. (2d) 503; Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Torr (D. C. N.Y. 1938), 22 F. Supp. 6o2; United
States v. Globe Indemnity Co. (C.C.A. 2d 1938), 94 F. (2d) 576.
61 284 U.S. 370, 389, 52 S. Ct. 183 (1932). The distinction is developed,
with reference to Interstate Commerce Commission cases, in a comment, 34
MICH. L. REV. 672 (1936).
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In other words, where an agency's decision is based on
factors which may change during the course of time, and
pertains to a subject matter over which the agency has a
continuing jurisdiction,62 it is not bound by its prior decision,
but may reopen and modify it from time to time. 63 For
example, the dismissal of a complaint by the Federal Trade
Commission does not preclude that agency from later reopening the case and taking further proceedings therein.64
The policy factors deemed to be controlling in such cases
are illustrated by the decision in United States v. Stone &
Downer Company. 65 There, the Court of Customs Appeals
had decided adversely to the government a question as to
the classification, for customs purposes, of certain imported
commodities. In a subsequent case between the same parties,
involving the same questions and importations of similar
merchandise, the same court reached a contrary conclusion.
In rejecting the claim that by application of principles analogous to those of res judicata, the first judgment should be
held controlling, the Supreme Court declared that circumstances justified limiting the finality of the conclusion in
customs controversies to the identical importation, pointing
out that the business of importing was carried on by large
houses between which and the government there are constant. differences as to proper classifications of similar importations, and that injustice and confusion would result if one
importer could rely for years on an early decision rendered
as to him which permitted low customs duties on a commodity which had been ruled in other cases, involving competing importers, to be subject to a higher rate. It was
necessary to effective administration of the customs laws that
a decision which rested on the evidentiary facts presented
This is true in the case of most of the so-called regulatory agencies.
See, generally, I Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (194z) 16z
et seq., 244 et seq.
64 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (App. D. C,
1929) 32 F. (2d) 966.
65 274 U.S. zzs, 47 S. Ct. 616 (1927).
62
63
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in one particular case should not be binding upon the recurrence of a similar importation, when further evidentiary facts
might be available.
For similar reasons, decisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as to the status of a carrier under particular
statutory definitions may be reopened and changed, when
changing conditions show the wisdom of revising the former
decision, insofar as it affects continuing and future operations.66
Although, as above noted, an administrative decision approving a land grant is nonreversible, the opposite result is
reached where such an application had once been rejected,
and where, on rehearing, the agency decides to reverse its
former decision. In the latter type of case, the agency has
retained its control over the subject matter and exercises a
continuing jurisdiction over the lands. 67 Similarly, where a
grant of annuity rights to Indians does not represent a closed
transaction, but is rather a ruling of a continuing nature, the
grant may be revised as to the continuing rights of heirs to
share in the grant.68
In alienage cases, the doctrine of the right of the agency
to revise orders made in the exercise of a continuing jurisdiction has been carried to an extent seemingly inconsistent
with the results reached in cases holding decisions awarding
various grants to be nonrevocable-the difference being essentially accounted for, no doubt, by the considerations which
in other respects sustain a great degree of free administrative
discretion for immigration authorities.69
66 In re Chicago, N. S. & M. R. Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1942), 131 F. (2d) 458;
Sprague v. Woll (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 122 F. (2d) 128.
67 Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U.S. 353, 18 S. Ct. 354 (1898); West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. zoo, 49 S. Ct. 138 (1929).
68 Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 28 I U. S. 206, so S. Ct. 320
(1930).
69 Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 28 r, 26 S. Ct. 6o8 ( 1906); Lum Mon
Sing v. United States (C.C.A. 9th 1941), 124 F. (zd) 21, both holding that
an earlier decision admitting an immigrant could be later revoked in subsequent
independent proceedings.
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In many types of cases, of course, it is difficult to balance
the competing public interest in effective administration and
the individual's interest in being free from repeated litigation.
Thus, where the Post Office classifies a publication as being
entitled to second-class mailing privileges, and in reliance
thereon a substantial business is built up, should the agency
be permitted later to change its ruling? A reversal would
cause pecuniary hardship to the publisher, but a continuance
of the original ruling would harm his competitors who under
revised administrative interpretations of the statute have
been denied similar privileges. In one such case, the balance
of interests was found to favor the right of repudiation of
the prior decision. 70 A similar conflict in interests causes a
diversity of result in workmen's compensation cases.71
It becomes, in final analysis, another phase of the problem
of choosing between the public interest in free administrative
action and the private interest in security.72
Administrative recognition of doctrine. There is substantial
recognition by the agencies of the rule that a prior determination will not be reversed to the detriment of an individual
who fairly relied on an earlier ruling. 73
Where an agency refuses to reopen a case, or to change
its decision in rehearing proceedings, it is sometimes said that
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 24 S. Ct. 590 (1904).
Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 203 Cal. 522,
1.65 Pac. 195 (1928); F. Jarka Co. v. Monahan (D. C. Mass. 1928), 29
F. (2d) 741; 41 YALE L. J. 148 (1931).
72 National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young, et al. (App. D. C. 1943) 134
F. (2d) 524, cf., 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 268 (1941),
73 E.g., In the Matter of Baltimore Transit Co., 47 N. L. R. B. 109 (1943),
holding that where in 1937 a Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board had dismissed charges of unfair labor practices against a company
on the grounds that the company did not fall within the agency's jurisdiction,
while this decision was not res judicata to prevent the subsequent institution of
proceedings, still in the exercise of administrative discretion the provisions of
the order (in the subsequently instituted proceedings) as to reimbursement
of certain funds to employees, would be limited to the period since the filing
of the complaint by the agency in the second proceedings. The Wage and Hour
Division of the United States Department of Labor has adopted similar practices.
70
71
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principles of res judicata make it appropriate to follow the
original decision. 74
(b) Effect of administrative determination on determinations of other agencies. Except as the contrary is provided by
statute, the decision of a particular agency is not ordinarily
binding on another agency which may be called upon to pass
on the same issues, or substantially similar issues, in a matter
falling within its own competence.75
(c) Effect of administrative determination on subsequent
judicial actions. While, for reasons above noted, an administrative determination is not technically res judicata, so as to
preclude collateral attack on the determination in appropriate
judicial proceedings,76 still the courts are inclined to accept
administrative determinations of a factual or technical nature,
particularly where the collateral reversal of the decision
might produce harsh results; 77 and in some cases, prior administrative determinations are apparently regarded as res
judicata.78 Of course, where the court is reviewing the administrative determination, either by direct appeal or by
some other available statutory or common-law method, the
administrative order does not bind the rights of the parties
in court. 79
(d) E fleet of judicial determination on subsequent administrative action. On orthodox principles, a judgment in
a judicial action involving the government is binding in
subsequent proceedings between that party and the same or
7 4 In the Matter of Columbia Railway & Navigation Co., I F. P. C. 78
(1933); In re Barratt's Appeal, I4 App. D. C. 2.55 (I899).
75 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. I77, 59 S. Ct. I6o (I938);
I Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942.) 2.46,
76 Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc. (D. C. N. Y. 192.3), 2.95 Fed. 72.9.
77 Morgan v. Daniels, I 53 U. S. 120, 14 S. Ct. 772 (I 894); Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. Stineman Coal Mining Co., 242. U.S. 298, 37 S. Ct. 118 (1916);
New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Frank, 314 U.S. 36o, 62 S. Ct. 258 (I941).
78 Grey lock Mills v. White (D. C. Mass. 1932), 55 F. (2.d) 704; United
States v. Willard Tablet Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1944), 141 F. (2d) 141.
79 1 Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942.) 2.46-2.47•
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another representative of the government.80 Where, therefore, a question presented to an administrative agency is
res judicata as the result of a prior judgment of a competent
court, the judgment is binding on the agency.81 This principle
is, however, subject to the usual limitations as to identity of
issues and parties. For example, an acquittal in criminal
proceedings does not bar administrative action to recover
penalties based on the same alleged wrong, because the difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil
cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata.82
80 Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., z89 U. S. 6zo, 53 S. Ct. 706 ( 1933);
George H. Lee Co. v. United States (C.C.A. 9th 1930), 41 F. (zd) 460.
81 George H. Lee Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 8th 1940), IIJ
F. (zd) 583. Cases cited in 1 Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(194z) Z50.
82 Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
5 s s. Ct. 6Jo (1 9 3s).

PART FOUR
RULE MAKING

CHAPTER

13

Practice and Procedure in
the Making of Rules
I.

Development of Rule-Making Activities

T

HE adoption of rules by administrative agencies to
implement general provisions of statutes was a familiar
part of the governmental process in America long before the development of the comparatively recent practice
of entrusting substantial adjudicatory responsibilities to such
agencies. The first Congress authorized the President to
promulgate rules and regulations concerning trading with
the Indian tribes. 1 The duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to prescribe regulations under internal revenue laws goes
back to 1813.2
But until the twentieth century, administrative rulemaking powers were ordinarily exercised only in connection
with the conduct of the public business--customs, taxes,
postal affairs, administration of the public lands, protection
of the public health, and similar matters. It was only with
the expansion of governmental controls over the fields of
trade, business, and finance, and with the development of
the now familiar technique of drafting regulatory statutes in
purposely vague and broad terms, delegating to an agency
the power to fill in the legislative details, that the problem
of administrative legislation assumed its present importance.
Today, the power to promulgate regulations having the force
of law covers a vast range of activities which had long been
comparatively immune from governmental control. For example, power is delegated to various agencies to legislate on
1 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
2 3 Stat. 2. 6 ( 1813).
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such diverse matters as maximum interest rates, margin requirements on security trading, minimum and maximum
prices on commodities, and various elements of private employment contracts. The list could be extended indefinitely.
It is in connection with the exercise of delegated legislative
powers in fields regulating the conduct of private business
that the problems as to the procedure to be followed in the
promulgation of the rules, as to the legal effect of such rules,
and as to their legal validity, become important.
2.

Classification of Rules

Before considering the various types of rule-making activities, it is necessary to note at the outset the variable nature
of the distinction between rule making and adjudication. This
is but natural, for agencies often adopt adjudicatory techniques in making rules (e.g., a hearing before a public utility
commission to fix electric rates); or adopt rule-making techniques in adjudicating cases (e.g., some licensing procedures).
The distinction between rule making and adjudication is not
fixed; it is largely a matter of emphasis. Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, a functional distinction is
adopted, whereby "rule making" includes such matters as
price fixing, wage fixing, approval of corporate reorganizations, et cetera, and other types of cases where only a single
party is involved and adjudicatory techniques are often employed.3 But in the classical or traditional sense, rule making
is regarded as a function of laying down general regulations,
as distinguished from making orders that apply only to
named persons or specific situations. It is only in connection
with this latter type of rule making that there arise the problems discussed in the following pages.
S Sec. z. As to the distinction, under the act, between "rule making" and
"adjudication," see 95 U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1947) and 61 HARV. L. REV. 389,

6u (1948).
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Administrative rules and regulations of general application cover a wide range, from details of agency organization
to legislative enactments having the force of law. Within
these broad limits, there is a general line of division between
procedural rules and those whose effect is primarily substantive.
(a) Procedural rules. The issuance and publication of
procedural rules involve principally the development of a
working compromise between the agency's interest in unregulated fluidity of procedure, and the public's interest in
being able to ascertain in advance the mechanics which will
govern the disposition of a case. As every lawyer knows, the
rules of procedure are not infrequently determinative of the
outcome of a case.
Even so simple a matter as a statement of an agency's
organization may be important. If this is unpublished, it is
in many cases almost impossible for persons interested in a
matter pending before the agency to discover where to go
in order to be heard, or whom to see-yet frequently there
may be some particular branch within the agency which alone
will lend an attentive ear to a certain plea. Recognizing this,
Congress has required in Section 3 (a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act that each federal agency publish a description
of the agency's organization, including a statement of delegations of authority within the agency and the established
methods whereby information may be secured and requests
submitted.
The same is true as to rules of practice and procedure.
Frequently, available statements covering these points are
sketchy and incomplete, failing to reveal the whole process
of administration, or the various alternative procedures which
may in fact be utilized. Sometimes through mere inertia, and
more frequently perhaps through a desire to avoid commitment to any set course of procedure (for once a definite rule
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of procedure is established, a person appearing before the
agency may justifiably complain of departures therefrom),
many agencies have been loathe to adopt or publish detailed
procedural rules. So far as federal agencies are concerned, the
Administrative Procedure Act of I 946 serves to correct any
such tendency. Section 3 of that act requires the publication
of a description of the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures, together with forms and instructions. Promulgation of definite and explicit rules of practice
helps substantially to improve the level of agency performance and to promote public confidence in the fairness and
justice of administrative procedures. In the words of the Supreme Court, "The history of American freedom is, in no
small measure, the history of procedure." 4
(b) Legislative regulations. But the bulk of administrative rule making deals with regulations implementing the
substantive provisions of statutory law. While these take
many forms, from advisory opinions written in response to
individual inquiries, to formal enactments written in the form
and style of statutes, yet running through this heterogeneous
mass of quasi-legislative activity there is one fairly definite
dividing line. It involves the distinction between interpretative regulations and legislative regulations. The difference
is in some respects a matter of form, but it is not without its
consequences. If the statute provides a sanction for violation
of the regulation, and it is written pursuant to specific delegation of power, then the regulation is legislative. If, on the
other hand, the statute does not provide for such delegation
of legislative power, and the regulation represents only the
agency's opinion as to what the statute requires, then the
regulation is interpretative.
(c) Interpretative regulations. An interpretative regulation frequently takes the form of an opinion construing the
4 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,414, 65 S. Ct. 781 (1945).
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applicable statute. In such cases, while a great deal of weight
may be attached to the interpretation, particularly if it is of
long standing and if it represents the results of accumulated
experience and technical knowledge in a· particular field, yet
the regulation does not possess any greater authority than
that of a well-supported argument in favor of a particular
interpretation of a statute. Sometimes, however, a regulation
which in legal effect is only interpretative is written as a
positive legislative command. Perusal of a regulation may
leave a doubt as to whether it is intended to have legislative
effect or not. The answer in such cases may be ascertained by
an examination of the statute. If the statute fails to delegate
express power to make the regulation and provides no sanction for violation of the regulation, then it is merely interpretative, even though cast in the form of a positive requirement of designated action.
From this it is obvious that the general classification of
interpretative regulations could be subdivided into many
categories. At least three deserve particular mention.
(I) One is the type of regulation that requires the filing
of reports, the keeping of records, or the taking of other steps
designated to assist the agency in its task of administration.
The agencies must depend on various informal and sometimes extralegal sanctions to enforce these requirements.
While ordinarily the agency is given specific power to make
such regulations (under a general grant of authority to make
such regulations as may be necessary to carry the statute into
effect) yet the regulation is properly classifiable as administrative or interpretative. 5
( z) More obviously interpretative are such regulations as
the Interpretative Bulletins issued by the Wage and Hour
and Public Contracts Divisions of the Department of Labor,
5

See F. P. Lee, "Legislative and Interpretative Regulations," z9

GEO.

L.

J.

1 ( 1940); Davis, "Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive," 57 YALE L. J. 919 (1948).
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many of the income tax regulations, and other similar statements which in effect do no more than state the particular
statutory interpretation which will be followed by the agency
unless and until the statute is otherwise authoritatively interpreted by the courts.
(3) A third class of interpretative regulations are those
which state general discretionary policies to be followed by
the agency. For example, an agency given broad discretionary
powers in respect to the granting of licenses may formulate
a statement of the conditions which must be met in order to
obtain a license. In many cases, agencies have thus worked
out standards and policies, which in effect control the administrative decision in a wide variety of cases where the agencies
have freedom of choice. These various alternatives do not
reflect interpretations of a statute; rather, they represent
extrastatutory policies.
Judicious use of the power to make interpretative rulings
offers an opportunity to correct a woeful lack of adequate
public information concerning both the procedure of administrative tribunals and the substance of administrative policies.
Despite the flow of rules, regulations, press releases, and
interpretative bulletins-which are issued in such abundance
that a year's output of federal agencies' regulations may fill
more pages than are required for the compilation of all federal statute law-lawyers and laymen alike are ba:ffied by the
difficulty of ascertaining from any official source, when confronted with the institution of agency proceedings, just what
remedies are open to them, and what ruling the agency
may be expected to make in the case. Inability to learn by
what procedural rules the case will be heard, or by what
process of decision the final determination will be made,
breeds general dissatisfaction and leads to charges of unrestrained delegation of authority and star-chamber proceedings. The problem of public information is thus an important
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one with the agencies, and it can best be solved by the careful
preparation and publication of rules.
An agency of any size cannot very well function without
rules of procedure, and it may be supposed that every agency
has such rules, at least at a level of interoffice memoranda.
But in too frequent cases, the only rules published and made
generally available contain so little information as to the
actual procedural steps, and the various alternative procedures which may be available, that a person having a case
before the agency is at a loss as to how to proceed except upon
seeking advice of a representative of the agency, and then
because of the partisan position necessarily assumed by agencies in many matters, the person seeking information may
entertain understandable doubts as to whether the advice he
has received is entirely disinterested. It is for this reason that
the Attorney General's Committee strongly urged 6 that each
agency be required to make available, and to maintain current, statements describing both formal and informal procedures available in various types of cases, specifying among
other things the officers and types of personnel, the various
subdivisions of the agency, and the duties, functions, and general authority or jurisdiction of all divisions of the agency in
each of the several types of cases handled.
Similar problems are presented in connection with administrative interpretations of the regulatory statutes administered
by the agencies. It having become an accepted technique of
statutory draftsmanship to establish legislative standards in
broad, vague, and general terms, the office of interpretation
and construction has become commensurately more important. Without it, those subject to the statutory regulation are
at a loss to know what compliance will be deemed to require.
For example, the term "employee" may under one statute
6 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 195. Sec. 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 requires federal agencies to conform to most of these suggestions.
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be interpreted to include and under another statute to exclude, those who by common-law tests are independent contractors.7 Only by the publication of interpretative statements
can the public be advised in detail as to the requirements of
the statute.
These first two functions of the administrative rule-making power, then, amount to little more than making available
to all interested parties full information as to the methods of
procedure and the standards of statutory interpretation which
will be employed by the agency in making its decisions. The
problem is relatively simple.
But greater difficulty is encountered in connection with a
third function of administrative rules-i.e., enunciating administrative policies (as distinct from standards of legislative
interpretation). In establishing these administrative policies
(which, while perhaps in furtherance of a general legislative
purpose, go quite beyond the realm of interpretation or construction and into the field of discretionary policy making)
the agencies are ordinarily free to choose between the method
of formulating a general policy in the form of regulations,
and that of working out policy piecemeal by decisions in variant case situations.
In certain cases, the latter method serves important administrative purposes. In a new field, such as television, adjudication of a variety of cases may serve to clarify problems and
avoid errors that might result from premature publication of
a general rule. Further, the problems of policy presented to
some agencies are too complex to permit of codification by
quasi-legislation. For .example, it would obviously be quite
infeasible to provide by regulation under what circumstances
7 In Walling v. American Needlecrafts (C.C.A. 6th 1943), 139 F. (zd) 6o,
certain homeworkers were held to be employees under the Fair Labor Standards
A,~!i but similar homeworkers were held not to be employees for purposes of
Social Security taxes in Glenn v. Beard (C.C.A. 6th 1944), 141 F. (zd) 376;
and cf., National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S.
I I I , 64 s. Ct. 851 (1944).
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a new utility operation would be licensed as being justified by
the public interest, convenience, or necessity.
In some circumstances, perhaps, there are justifiable reasons for keeping confidential the criteria of decision. In cases
where the agency regulates conduct in a field where temptation is offered to stray from highest moral standards (the
regulation of liquor traffic might be mentioned) it has been
suggested that announcement of the furthermost reaches of
permissible conduct would encourage some licensees to go
right to that boundary line where the legal merges with the
illegal.
But ordinarily, after having attained experience in its field,
an agency is able to reach rather definite conclusions on most
policy matters. Sometimes, an agency's arrival at this stage
is followed by the enactment of regulations. The National
War Labor Board, for example, in the early days of its
World War II creation, at first decided applications for wage
increases on an ad hoc basis. As some experience was gained,
general regulations and statements of policies were enunciated; and as these were tested in the course of daily case
decisions, various amendments and refinements were devised,
until after some two years' experience it became fairly possible to ascertain from the agency's rules what its ruling would
be in various situations.
The difficulty arises in cases where the agency does not
choose to promulgate its fully developed internal criteria as
regulations. Then, those dealing with the agency are in the
unenviable position of being unable to ascertain the basis on
which cases will be decided. The practical difficulties of attempting to bring one's course of conduct into compliance
with an administr~tive policy which must be complied with,
but the terms of which can be only guessed, scarcely require
elaboration.8 Lack of knowledge of these criteria, further, in8 Handler, "Unfair Competition," zx lA. L. REV. 175, z59 (1936); Maslow,
"Poor Food and Drug Laws," z NAT. LAW. GUILD Q. zs (1939).
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terferes with the settlement of controversies in the preliminary, informal stage and thus often makes necessary the
conduct of formal judicial proceedings which might otherwise
be avoided. There are still broader reasons for the promulgation of such internal administrative policies. If cases are
determined on the basis of such a criterion, rather than by the
exercise of judgment in the particular case, both the parties
and reviewing court are in fairness and justice entitled to
know it.9
Aside from statutory provision, such as Section 3 of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, there is little
authority to require the promulgation into interpretative
rules of such internal criteria. 10 But the cause of good administration is substantially furthered by the exercise of this function of the administrative rule-making powers.
3· Hearings in Connection with the Adoption of Rules
While the legal requirements as to giving notice and conducting hearings precedent to the promulgation of rules 11
are rather attenuated, save for specific requirements of occasional state statutes and the general requirement imposed on
federal agencies by Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, yet the actual practice recognizes the practical need of
utilizing this device. There is general recognition that good
administration requires an agency to obtain and consider the
comments of all interested parties as to the contents of proposed rules.
It is further clear, and generally conceded, that the type
of hearing which should precede the administrative promulgation of rules is quite different in character and scope than
9

Benjamin,

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(1942) 296.
lO

But see Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C.

1937), 95 F. (2d) 91.
11 Discussed supra, Ch. 4·
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the hearings conducted by legislative committees. The administrative agency, starting where the legislature left off, is
necessarily concerned with minutiae that the legislature could
not take time to consider; and there is accordingly a need for
painstaking and detailed investigation, and assembling of
facts, going far beyond the general statements and arguments
of policy which are characteristic of legislative hearings on
pending bills. Further, the fact that the administrative agency's personnel does not comprise a democratically elected
group representing the diverse viewpoints of their constituents, but is rather an unrepresentative special interest group,
further emphasizes the necessity of hearings. It is only in
this way that the agency can obtain the breadth of view necessary to the most successful conduct of its work.
There are thus two prime objectives in the informationgathering activities that precede the adoption of rules by
administrative agencies. The first is to assure wise administrative action. The second is to make sure that those whose
interests will be directly affected by the rule are satisfied that
their interests have received fair and adequate consideration.
Granting opportunity to those primarily affected to participate in the rule-making process not only satisfies them of the
fairness of the procedure, but is effective also to enlist their
acquiescence and co-operation in carrying out the requirements of the rule as finally adopted. 12 Accordingly, the hearing procedures should be so devised as best to attain these
two objectives.
The first step in the procedure should be, ideally, publication of notice of an intent to make a rule. This serves fair
notice on those concerned, and gives them an opportunity to
adjust themselves to meet new requirements. The giving of
such notice, too, is frequently productive of suggestions which
12

Benjamin,

(1942) 297·
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may be of value to the agency in the second step of the procedure, which is investigation.
Factual investigation by the agency, preparatory to the
promulgation of a rule, is of all-embracing importance. Public hearings are not always productive of precise factual data;
yet it is the duty of the agency to make sure that it has
obtained full and accurate factual information as to all relevant factors. Only by careful investigation can this be
achieved. Such investigation, further, often serves to formulate issues for further discussion.
After the information has been assembled, it is the best
practice, wherever feasible, for the agency to publish a tentative draft of the proposed rule. This serves a fair warning
of what may be expected, and serves to facilitate the execution of the next and crucial part of the task-exposing the
proposal to the test of public criticism and comment, before
the rule is formally put into effect.
The mechanics of this final step-obtaining participation
in the actual rule-making process of those whose interests will
be directly affected-must of course vary in different types
of situations. In some cases, informal conferences may serve
this purpose better than a formal public hearing. This may
well be true where the group affected is small (as in the case
of regulations of the Federal Reserve Board) or where the
regulation involves primarily technical questions (as in the
case of rules of the Federal Communications Commission relating to broadcasting, or the accounting rules promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission) .13 The Administrative Procedure Act of I 946, Section 4, requires federal
agencies to afford interested parties an opportunity to participate in the rule-making procedure at least to the extent of
submitting written data, and further requires that there be
13 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 64-68.
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opportunity for oral participation where some other statute
requires a hearing. An interesting device, sometimes employed very effectively by agencies operating in fields where
broad arguments of social and economic policy are tempered
by more or less technical considerations-as in the field of
unemployment insurance-is that of an unofficial tripartite
advisory committee. Composed so as to give equal representation to conflicting points of view-often industry, labor,
and the public-it is the function of such a committee to
work out technically acceptable solutions to problems complicated both by administrative difficulties and by emotional
clashes between competing special interest groups. In devising rules by which it shall be determined, for example,
whether an unemployed worker is "available for work," or
whether an employee injured at his job is "totally incapacitated," such tripartite committees can frequently devise a
formula which will be reasonably satisfactory to all affected
groups and will at the same time be administratively feasible.
But even in cases where there is no unalterable need for a
public hearing, it is still advisable to supplement informal
conferences by such a hearing, in order to make sure that no
one can justifiably complain that his special interests were
overlooked. At some stage of the proceedings, therefore, a
public hearing should be held in almost every type of case.u
The scope of such hearing, and the general manner of its
conduct, is again a problem for the wise discretion of the individual agency. The practices of the federal agencies are
discussed in the report of the Attorney General's Committee.15 Where the regulation involves many broad problems,
incapable of reduction to precise issues, a general informatory
hearing is perhaps necessary (as if, for example, the question
14 Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(I942) 30I et seq.
15 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc, No. 8,
nth Cong., ISt Sess. (I 94I) I I I et seq.
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is whether a utility commission should extend its field of
regulatory activity to fleets of trucks operated by private
carriers, and if so, how many aspects of their operations
should be regulated-whether the rules should extend only
to safety requirements or whether they should cover also such
matters as maximum hours, overtime pay, minimum wages,
etcetera). In such cases, it is ordinarily imJ?ractical to do more
than to give all interested parties an opportunity to present
their arguments. On the other hand, where the affected group
is small, or where the issues involved can be formulated in
fairly definite terms, much more satisfactory results can be
obtained by utilization of adversary hearings, where witnesses
are examined and cross-examined, and opportunity is given
for the filing of formal briefs and full oral argument. A
prime example is that of public utility rate hearings, where a
quasi-legislative function is carried out by quasi-judicial procedure.
Another significant method of assuring effective public
participation in rule-making procedures is to afford interested
parties a statutory right to petition the agency for the adoption of a proposed rule, or the amendment of an existing
rule. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act of r 946
provides this as to the federal agencies.
Employment of these successive steps-first, announcement of the intent to formulate a rule; second, investigation;
third, issuance in draft form of a proposed rule; fourth, exposing the proposed rule to the test of public examination and
criticism-has been demonstrated by experience to be in most
cases the best method by which to insure wise administrative
action, even though not a matter of legal requirement, except
as specific statutory provisions may so enact. There are cases,
to be sure, where some of the steps may be omitted, as in the
adoption of purely procedural regulations, where an agency
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can sometimes proceed with safety on the basis of its own
knowledge. But departures from this model procedure should
not be sanctioned unless the desirability of the departure is
clear.
4· The Necessity of Findings
(a) In absence of specific statutory provision. Where the
power of an administrative agency to make a certain type of
order depends on the existence of particular facts, it is obviously necessary to determine that such facts exist before the
order can properly be made. Initially and primarily, it is the
duty of the agency to make its own finding and determination
as to the existence of the requisite factual situation, before it
takes any affirmative action.
As a matter of orderly procedure, it is obviously the preferable practice for the agency to make a formal determination and finding as to the existence of such facts, in support
of its order. This has been laid down as a positive requirement
in several cases wherein an administrative order or regulation
has been held invalid because of the failure of the agency to
make the necessary findings. 16
Conversely, where the controlling statute does not condition the agency's regulatory power upon the existence of certain facts, there is no necessity for the agency to make any
explanatory findings or declarations of policy in connection
with the promulgation of its orders. 11
Where the agency is authorized to make regulations of a
generally applicable character, it is somewhat uncommon for
16 Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of State of
Kansas, 260 U.S. 48, 43 S. Ct. 51 (1922); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44
S. Ct. 283 (1924); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct.
241 (1935); United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 55 S. Ct.
268 ( 1935). See annotation in 146 A. L. R. 209.
1 7 Cf., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 56 S. Ct. 159

(1935).
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the legislature to condition the exercise of the power on the
existence of particular facts. This requirement, as pointed
out in the last-cited case, is more often found where the contemplated administrative order is directed primarily against
a particular party or group. It is, therefore, sometimes said
that when an agency acts in a legislative capacity by making a
rule, regulation, or order of general application, it need not
make findings. But it would seem that the distinction is not
primarily the nature of the order; rather, it is a question as to
what the legislature has required.
The requirement that express findings be made in support
of the order, in those cases where the legislature has conditioned the agency's power to issue an order upon the existence of specified conditions, has been criticized/8 and there is
some suggestion that the doctrine requiring findings may in
time be dropped as an unnecessary safeguard against hasty
or ill-advised administrative action. 19 Tending in this direction are cases which insist that the doctrine may not be applied technically, so as to require a finding on every conceivable relevant factor, 20 and cases which hold that the
proper remedy (in cases where the agency has failed to make
the required findings) is not to set the order aside, but rather
to remand it to the administrative agency and give it an opportunity to perfect its record by making formal findings. 21
(b) Statutory requirements. Court-imposed requirements
as to the making of findings to support administrative orders
and regulations are far less rigorous than the requirement
18 61 A. B. A. REP. 720, 775 (1936).
19Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt (C.C.A. 8th 1941), 122 F.
(2d) 564.
20 Andree & Seedman, Inc., et al. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division of United States Department of Labor (App. D. C. 1941), 122 F. (2d)
634·
21 A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C.C.A. 7th 1941), no
F. (2d) 258; Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt (C.C.A. 8th 1941),
122 F. (zd) 564.
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quite often imposed by legislatures,22 providing that the rules
and regulations issued by the agency must be based on definite findings, which must in turn be supported by evidence
taken at a formal hearing. In this type of case, the findings
concern not only the existence of a general factual situation
on which the agency's power is conditioned, but must further
demonstrate in detail the reasonableness of the order or regulation. Such provisions, it seems clear, require extensive participation in the rule-making procedure by the private parties
affected (because they must have full opportunity to present
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, et cetera) and further require clear and close thinking on the part of the administrative draftsmen, thus tending to promote carefully drawn
rules. If it is necessary to have such statutory provisions to
gain these results, the practice of putting such requirements
into the statutes should be continued. But if, on the other
hand, free public participation and careful, exacting administrative draftsmanship can be achieved without these requirements, there is but little need for their continuance. Such
statutory requirements are burdensome, in requiring the application of the procedures of a judicial trial to administrative
rule making. The effectiveness of these procedures is inevitably limited by distinctive characteristics of rule-making
activities, where the issues are complex, numerous, and not
clearly defined; where the interests of the parties concerned
are so diverse as to be frequently incapable of alignment into
classes; and where the final outcome involves essentially not
a determination as to fact and law, but primarily a judgment
as to the future consequences of proposed rules.
22 For example, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, sz Stat. 1055, :1.1 U.S.C.
§ 371 (e); Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act, so Stat. :1.46, 7 U.S.C.
§ 6o8 (c); Bituminous Coal Act, so Stat. ·7S> IS U.S.C. § 8zg; Fair Labor
Standards Act, sz Stat. 1064, :1.9 U.S.C. § zo8.
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5. Drafting of Rules
While it is not unusual for administrative agencies to consult with representatives of the parties primarily affected as
to the actual drafting of the administrative rules (and this
is frequently done by submitting for comment and criticism a
tentative draft of a proposed rule), yet the actual formulation of the text of the rule is ultimately the sole responsibility
of the agency.
Because of the greater necessity for close attention to
minute detail, drafting of administrative rules and regulations presents difficulties which can often be avoided in legislative draftsmanship. There is a greater danger that some
obscure but nonetheless important contingency will not be
provided for; and to meet this danger, a practice has evolved
of providing a deferred effective date. This gives those affected a grace period in which to adjust their affairs to meet
the new requirements, and also gives an important opportunity to correct any oversights which may have occurred.
Legislation providing for the deferred effectiveness of regulations having statutory effect (with appropriate exceptions
to prevent undue delay in emergency situations) is to be
recommended.23
A somewhat more drastic provision which is occasionally
encountered requires that the administrative regulations be
laid before the legislature for its approval or disapproval.
Several variants of this policy are found. It may be simply
provided that the regulations be laid before the legislature
for its information. As to this requirement, there is little room
23 See "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8,
nth Cong., 1St Sess. (1941) II5· Sec. 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946 requires (in the case of federal agencies) that substantive rules (with
'some stated exceptions) must be published at least thirty days prior to the effective date, except "as otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found
and published with the rule."
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for objection, although there is room for considerable scepticism as to the effectiveness of such procedure in encouraging legislative examination of the administrative activity; a
more effective way of accomplishing this result would be to
require the annual submission of detailed reports as to the
agency's activities. Sometimes it is provided that the regulation shall be noticed for legislative review and possible
amendment or annulment within a specified period. While
of course the legislature always has this power, nevertheless
such provision does have a very real effect, in that it brings
the regulations before the legislative body, and facilitates the
making of an attack by interested parties on the challenged
regulation. A third type of proviso, far more stringent than
the others, decrees that the regulation shall not remain in
effect beyond a limited period unless within such period it is
approved and ratified by the legislature. Where this requirement is adopted, no more than legislative procrastination is
required to abolish a rule which might have met with overwhelming legislative approval.
While not unknown in American practice,24 the theory of
laying administrative regulations before the legislature has
been far more popular in England than in this country. The
English experience, particularly since the adoption of the
Statutory Instruments Act of 1946/4 a has demonstrated the
great practical effectiveness of this simple device.25
24

E.g., the Reorganization Act, 53 Stat. s6z, 5 U.S.C. §§ 133 c-d.
9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 36; 39 Rallis. Stat. 783.
25 Under the English practice, a Statutory Instruments Committee in the
House of Commons (or its counterpart in the House of Lords) examines administrative regulations to determine whether the special attention of Parliament should be directed thereto on the grounds (among others) that the
regulation is not open to challenge in the courts, or appears to make unusual
or unexpected use of the powers conferred, or purports to have unauthorized
retrospective effect. The accomplishments of this Committee are discussed in a
provocative article by J. A. G. Griffith, "Delegated Legislation-Some Recent
Developments," 11. MODERN LAW REV. 1.97 ( 1949).
24 a
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6. Publication of Rules
The unavailability of administrative rules and regulations
(many of which have, to a substantial degree, the force and
effect of laws), has long been a source of practical difficulty.
As early as 1920, John A. Fairlie wrote an article 26 urging
the adoption of a uniform system for publication of rules,
regulations, and orders adopted by executive agencies in the
federal government. His arguments attracted the attention
of other writers, and the subject received growing attention in
periodical literature during the ensuing fifteen years. 27 Attention was directed to the contrast between the situation in
the United States, where it was often impossible to ascertain
the provisions of a governing regulation except by discovery
of the original thereof within the offices of the issuing agency/8 and in England, where rather comprehensive requirements for advance publication of administrative rules had
been in effect since 1 89 3.29
However, neither the growing literature on the subject nor
the attention directed to the English situation led Congress
to take any action. As late as 1933, the President rejected a
suggestion by a group of government officials that a daily
publication be instituted to print administrative rules, orders,
and regulations. 30 The following year, however, official in26 "Administrative Legislation," 18 MICH. L. REV. 181 (1920).
27

See James H. Ronald, "Publication of Federal Administrative Legislation,"
7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 52 (1938) for a comprehensive survey of the studies
which have been made. An outstanding article is that of Erwin N. Griswold
"Government in Ignorance of Law-A Plea for Better Publication of Executive
Legislation," 48 HARV. L. REv. 198 ( 1934).
28 Erwin N. Griswold testified, for example, that in 1930 he found that certain Treasury Department bond regulations were available only in typed form
in the Treasury Department's Bond Division. Hearings on H. R. r 13 37, 74th
Congress, before subcommittee II of House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 21, 1936.
29 See Cecil T. Carr, DELEGATED LEGISLATION (1921), 36; The English
statute is 56 & 57 Viet., c. 66.
30
Ronald, "Publication of Federal Administrative Legislation," 7 GEo. ·
WAsH. L. REv. sz, 6s (1938).
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terest in the problem became at last aroused when it was discovered that a hapless individual had been arrested, indicted,
and held in jail for asserted violation of an administrative
regulation which had in fact (inadvertently, it appears, and
without the knowledge of the prosecuting officials) been repealed prior to his arrest. The case involved a gentleman
named Smith, who had been arrested for alleged violation of
one paragraph of the N.I.R.A. Petroleum Code. The government appealed from an adverse decision in the lower courts,
and shortly before the case was scheduled for argument in
the Supreme Court, the Justice Department discovered that
the paragraph in question had been dropped from the Code.
The Justice Department moved, successfully, to dismiss the
appeal. 31 Upon the argument of another case at the next term
of court, involving the same Code/2 the situation was referred to in the oral arguments, and Justice Brandeis extensively interrogated government counsel. Considerable newspaper publicity resulted, and in the same year the Federal
Register Act was passed.33
The Federal Register Act, providing for the publication
of presidential proclamations and such "classes of documents
as the President shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect" has resulted in making
widely available the rules and regulations issued by federal
agencies. It has not, to be sure, eliminated the difficulty of
locating the particular regulation with which one may be
concerned, but at least it is now possible to make the search
in any well-equipped library.34
United States v. Smith, 293 U.S. 633,55 S. Ct. 345 (1934).
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 ( 1935).
Act of July 26, 1935; 49 Stat. soo, 44 U.S.C. § 301.
34 A very useful article, describing the most convenient methods of utilizing
the wealth of administrative legislation printed in the Federal Register, is
Wigmore, "The Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations: How to
Use Them-If You Have Them," 29 A. B. A. J. 10 (1943). In similar vein
is Lavery, "The Federal Register-Its Present Day Meaning for the Practicing
31
32
33
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The problem of locating the applicable regulations is
facilitated by the publication of the Code of Federal Regulations, originally authorized by Section 11 of the Federal
Register Act, and published periodically since 1939. In this
publication, federal administrative regulations of current
legal effect are codified under fifty titles, each of which is
in turn divided into several parts.
Publication of the regulations of state agencies presents
additional problems because in many states the promulgation
of new regulations is comparatively infrequent, and the
volume of new rules scarcely justifies frequent periodical
publication. Provisions are found in several states for the
publication of a state code, embracing all currently effective
rules and regulations of state agencies; and in a number of
instances, various expedients are adopted to make readily
available, at quarterly or semiannual intervals, supplemental
information.85
Lawyer," 7 F. R. D. 625 (1948). Other articles discussing the details of the
act are found in 49 HARV. L. REv. 1209 (1936); 4 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 268
(1936); 31 ILL. L. REV. 357 (1936).
85 California, Government Code, §§ II371, 1138o, 11409; Connecticut,
Public Act No. 67, 1945; Indiana, Annotated Statutes, § 60-1505 (Burns Supp.
1946); Michigan, Annotated Statutes, §§ 3.560 (7)-(18); Minnesota, Annotated Statutes, §§ 15.045-71 North Dakota, Revised Code, §§ 28-32-03-31
Ohio, Gen. Code Ann.§§ 154-65; Wisconsin, Statutes, §§ 35·93> 22.7.03. See
N. L. Nathanson, "Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative
Law," 33 IA. L. REv. 252 (1948).
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Legal Effect of Rules
1.

The Problem

INCE the bulk of an administrative agency's work is
normally carried on within the framework of a more or
. less elaborate set of agency-created rules and regulations,
questions frequently arise (both within the agency itself and
in connection with judicial review of the agency;s proceedings) as to the significance and legal effect of such rules and
regulations. Such issues are raised in a variety of ways. The
question may be as to the effect of a party's refusal to comply with a rule. Or it may, conversely, concern the results
of voluntary compliance with an invalid rule. The inquiry
may be as to the validity of a rule, as to the consequences
of disregard of an admittedly valid rule, or as to the right
of an agency to change its rules.
The legal effect of such rules and regulations depends on
a variety of factors. The purpose of the rule, the authority
on which it was issued, the reasonableness of a proposed
application or nonapplication of the rule, and other similar
factors, are all taken into consideration by the courts. But
these factors are seldom isolated in judicial opinions, and
many seemingly contradictory dicta may be found. Some care
is required to determine what constitute the controlling elements of decision in any particular situation.

S

2.

Status of Substantive Regulations as Laws

Perhaps the most frequently recurring question is whether
or not a particular regulation, purporting to lay down a
substantive requirement of conduct, has the force of law. In
brief, it might be answered that the regulation has such effect
275
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if it is upheld by the courts; but this answer, of course,
merely avoids the real question: On what basis will the
courts determine whether to uphold the regulation? Is it to
be approached with the deference accorded legislation, or is
it to be treated merely as a partisan interpretation of the
legislature's mandate-an interpretation which the courts,
in the exercise of their judicial prerogatives, are free to
disregard?
While the cases appear to indicate some conflict of judicial
thinking on this problem, most of the seeming inconsistencies
of statement can be reconciled by making a distinction between the so-called legislative regulations and what may be
termed interpretative regulations.1 Thus, it is said that a
legislative regulation has the force of law, while an interpretative regulation has no such force unless and until it is
accepted by the courts as a correct interpretation of the
statute.
However, this distinction oversimplifies the problem. It
is really true of both types of regulations that they have
legal effect in determining the rights of parties, unless they
are invalidated by the courts. In the case of legislative
regulations, the likelihood that the courts will set them aside
is comparatively remote; and on the other hand, the courts
not infrequently set aside regulations which are merely interpretative. The difference is based not on any inherent
distinction between the two types of regulations, but is rather
empmc.
1 The courts do not often emphasize this distinction. It has been carefully
developed, with some variety of phraseology, by several students. E.g., F. P.
Lee, "Legislative and Interpretative Regulations," z9 GEO. L. J. I (I 940) 1
Fred T. Field, "The Legal Force and Effect of Treasury Interpretation," THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX (19Z1) 91; J.P. Comer, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES, Chs. II, V ( 19Z7) ; Alvord, "Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case," 40 CoL. L. REv. z5z (I940) 1
Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes," 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556 (1940), For a general discussion of how regulations are interpreted by the Courts, see Newman, "How
Courts Interpret Regulations," 35 CAL, L. REV. 509 ( 1947).
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A legislative rule is one promulgated pursuant to a
specific delegatory provision in the governing statute. The
statute sets the general standard (always necessary in the
case of delegation of legislative authority), authorizes the
agency to determine the actual content of the law by regulation, and provides the sanctions which will result from
nonconformance with the rule-or (what is really the same
thing) sets a general rule and authorizes the agency to
provide by appropriate regulations for exceptions to the rule.
Where the legislature has clearly delegated such authority, the only issues that can normally be raised as to the
validity of the rule concern the questions whether it is ultra
vires as exceeding the scope of the authority delegated, and
whether it is violative of the due process guarantees. These
issues are not often presented; and accordingly such regulations are normally treated on the same basis as legislative
acts.
In some cases, it is clear that the legislature has authorized an agency to promulgate legislative rules of this type.
Typical examples would be rate orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or regulations by the Department
of Labor defining certain exemptions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 2 Occasionally the statute specifically declares
that the regulations shall have the force and effect of law.3
Sometimes, the statute provides penalties that will result
from noncompliance with the regulations. 4 Or similarly, the
statute may make noncompliance with the regulations a
2 Sec. r 3 (a) provides in part that there shall be exempt from the overtime
provisions of the law "any employee employed in a bona :fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the capacity of
outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the
Administrator)." 29 U.S.C. §§ 2or, 213.
s E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 610.
4 E.g., Naval Stores Act, 7 U.S.C. § 96; Cotton Standards Act of 1923, 7
U.S.C. § 6o; Grain Standards Act of 1916, 7 U.S.C. § 85; Bituminous Coal
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 830.
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ground for revocation of permits or licenses.5 Conversely,
the statute may authorize the making of regulations which
will relax a statutory rule otherwise applicable.6 In all these
cases, it is clear that the regulations issued pursuant to such
express authority have, unless ultra vires, the same status
substantially as a statute.
But the legislative intent is not always so clear. For example, in many cases the only express delegation of power
to make regulations is the common bestowal of authority to
make "such regulations as may be necessary or proper to
carry out the provisions of this Act"-to adopt language
which is approximated in many statutes. In many instances,
regulations issued under such authority are not legislative.
Normally, regulations issued under such authority relate
merely to procedural details, having no significant substantive effect. If cast in the terms of substantive requirements,
they must as a rule stand merely as the agency's interpretation of the meaning of statutory language, and cannot
normally be accorded the status of the legislative type of
regulation above discussed. 7 In other cases, there is room
for argument whether the intent of the statute is that sanctions shall attach only to violation of the statute, or as well
to any violation of regulations issued under the statute.
In those cases where it does not clearly appear that power
to promulgate a legislative regulation has been delegated,
the courts usually treat the regulation on the same basis as
in cases where there can be no doubt but that the regulation
5 E.g., Federal Communications Act of 19341 47 U.S.C. § 151,
6 E.g.,§ 3 (b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (c).
7 The distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations

has not
been crystallized in the cases; and the courts sometimes treat as legislative regulations what appear to be merely interpretative regulations-e.g., Helvering,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilshire Oil Co., Inc., 308 U. S. 90, 6o
S. Ct. I 8 ( 1 9 39) . See tenBroek, "Interpretative Administrative Action and the
Lawmaker's Will," 20 OREGON L. REV. 206 (1941); and comment, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 100 (1942).
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is merely interpretative. It can therefore fairly be said that
unless the governing statute plainly gives legislative effect
to the regulations, they shall be treated merely as interpretative.
While the term is somewhat deprecatory in its implications, it should not be taken as an indication that an interpretative regulation is without any significant legal effect.
The vast majority of the rules and regulations issued by
administrative agencies fall into this category; and their
effectiveness is one of the greatest sources of administrative
powers.
The principle has been stated frequently that such regulations are entitled to great weight as presumptively correct
interpretations of the statute, and the tendency of the courts
is to accord them ever-increasing respect. But they are not
blindly accepted, and their persuasiveness or putative legal
effect varies in accordance with several factors. It is said that
such regulations may be considered only where the statute
is ambiguous.8 Granting the ambiguity of the statute, the
weight accorded the interpretative regulation depends in
part on circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness. If the regulation is new,9 does not represent long administrative experience/0 and has not been generally acquiesced in,11 it is
accorded but little more weight than is granted to a wellwritten brief. On the other hand, where it appears that the
agency's construction of a statute as exemplified in an interpretative rule or regulation represents expert knowledge

u. s.

s.

8 Biddle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30Z
573> s8
Ct. 379
(1938); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, z8z U.S. 740, 51 S. Ct. Z97
( 193 I); Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, z98 U. S.
441, 56 s. Ct. 767 (1936).
9Walling v. Swift & Co. (C.C.A. 7th 194z), 131 F. (zd) z49; Burnet v.
Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. I, 52. S. Ct. Z75 (1932.).
lO United States v. Pleasants, 305 U.S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 2.81 (1939); Fleming
v. A. H. Belo Corp. (C.C.A. sth 1941), 12.1 F. (zd) 207.
11 United States v. Erie R. Co., 236 U.S. 2.59, 35 S. Ct. 396 (1915).
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as to administrative needs and convenience/2 and where it
appears that the rule is of long standing and has received
the acquiescence of interested persons/3 then, so long as the
administrative interpretation is reasonable, it is given great
and often controlling weight.14
There are sometimes found affirmative legislative indications of approval of the administrative construction-and
this of course further inclines the courts to accept and enforce
the regulation. 15 In come cases, as in those last cited, such
indication of legislative approval is realistic. In many other
instances, decision is placed on the theory (which however
fallacious logically, is a well-established legal fiction) that
re-enactment of the statutory provision without change subsequent to the promulgation of the regulation indicates
legislative approval of the regulation. 16 But recognizing that
legislative re-enactment is often accomplished without the
existence of the regulation in question ever having been
brought to the attention of the legislature, the courts do
not hesitate to set aside an interpretative regulation deemed
to be inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of the
statute, despite the re-enactment of the statute without
change subsequent to the promulgation of the regulation.17
12 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 39, 6o
S. Ct. 51 (1939); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S.
77,53 S. Ct. 42 (1932).
13 United States v. Chicago, N. S. & M. R. Co., 288 U. S. t, 53 S. Ct. 245
(1933); Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 34 S. Ct. 685 (1914).
14 Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 51 S. Ct. 144
(1931); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 1 53 S. Ct. 152 (1932).
15 Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States, 290 U. S. 256, 54 S. Ct. 159
(1933); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 51 S. Ct. 510
(1931).
16 Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79,
59 S. Ct. 45 (1938); Hartley, Executor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
295 U.S. 2.16, 55 S. Ct. 756 (1935).
17 Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 39, 6o
S. Ct. 51 (1939); compare Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 6oS. Ct. 18 (1939); and Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hallock, 309 U.S. to6, 6oS. Ct. 444 ( 194o).
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The doctrine is fundamentally one of convenience and must
sometimes be disregarded-as where a complaisant legislature had thus "ratified" one interpretation on several
occasions, and then without hesitation proceeded to "ratify"
similarly a new and different interpretation, by again reenacting the statute without change after a change in the
administrative interpretation.18
In the case of interpretative regulations, then (and in this
may be included all regulations other than those wherein
the legislature has plainly delegated authority to prescribe
legislative regulations, subject to a stated standard, and the
violation of which is made subject to definite statutory
sanctions), the substantive requirements of the regulation
are considered as interpretations of the substantive requirements of the statute. So long as they represent an interpretation or construction of the statute which is acceptable to
the courts, they have the force of law. But they lose all
. force and effect, ab initio, if held to be an incorrect interpretation, and are subject to judicial scrutiny on more issues
than are true legislative regulations. Being vulnerable to
attack on more grounds than are legislative regulations,
interpretative regulations are more likely to be set aside than
are those of the former type. This, essentially, is the difference in legal effect between legislative and interpretative
regulations setting forth substantive requirements.
3· Status of Procedural Regulations
There is, of course, no question as to the power of an
administrative agency to make rules of procedure to govern
the normal conduct of the agency's tasks, subject always to
18 Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. R.
Co., 306 U.S. IIo, 59 S. Ct. 42.3 (1939).

J. Reynolds Tobacco
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the condition that such rules cannot limit, extend, or otherwise control the agency's statutory jurisdiction and powers. 19
The question as to the legal effect of such rules is not
often raised. They are designed to control the process of
adjudication within the agency; and parties to the proceedings within the agency ordinarily conform to the requirements of such rules for the obvious reason that the prospects
of obtaining a desired result within the agency are jeopardized by nonconformance with its procedural rules. The rules
are not ordinarily burdensome, but typically are loosely
drawn; and substantial conformity therewith is all that is
required.
While it is frequently said that rules of practice, pleading,
procedure, and evidence promulgated by an administrative
agency under proper legal authorization have the force and
effect of law,20 this is true in a limited degree only. Such
regulations do not ordinarily affect or attempt to control
the substantive rights of the parties; and indeed for this
very reason are not ordinarily subject to judicial review. 21
Noncompliance with such procedural regulations does not
ordinarily constitute a violation of the controlling statute.22
While a party might in some cases be denied relief by the
agency solely because of his disregard of its procedural
rules, ordinarily substantial compliance therewith is all that
is insisted upon. It would ill become administrative agencies,
created in part for the purpose of avoiding the technicalities
19 Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. Shults Bread Co. (App.
D. C. 1929), 37 F. (2d) 442; Weaver v. Blair (C.C.A. 3d 1927), I9 F. (2d)
I6.
20 See Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 25 I U. S. 342, 349, 40 S. Ct.
I 55 (I 920) ; Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C. I938), 98 F. (2d) 282.
2l Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App. D. C.
I938), 99 F. (2d) 399; Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 304 U.S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963 (I938).
22 Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. International Milling Co. (C.C.A. 8th I93o),
43 F. (2d) 93; United States v. Eaton, I44 U.S. 677, I2 S. Ct. 764 (I892).
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of court procedure, to insist on any rigid formalities in their
own practice; and it would seem that any overly strict insistence on procedural niceties which operated to deprive a
party of a full and fair hearing would not be permitted,
but could be corrected by application to the courts.
4· Criminal Penalties for Violation of Rules
The reluctance of the courts to permit the delegation of
any extensive responsibilities to administrative agencies in
the field of criminal law, has led to the imposition of stringent restrictions on the power of administrative agencies
to promulgate regulations whose violation carries criminal
sanctions.
While an agency may be empowered, in cases where a
plain need for such delegation exists, to prescribe by regulation the particular acts which will constitute violations of a
generally phrased statute that creates the crime and fixes
the penalty,23 agencies have not generally been permitted to
adopt rules creating crimes or fixing penalties.24
The reluctance of the courts to grant legal status to
administrative rules carrying criminal sanctions is exemplified
by the cases denying legal effect to traffic rules, governing
the use of public streets, when prescribed by an administrative agency rather than by a municipal governing body.211
This extreme view is not universally shared,26 and it is diffi23 Yakus v. United States, 3Z 1 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 66o ( 1944) 1 United
States v. Grimaud, z2o U.S. 506,31 S. Ct. 480 (1911)1 In re Kollock, 165
U. S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444 ( 1897); Musgrove v. Parker, 84 N. H. 550, 153 Atl.
320 (1931); Howard v. State, 154 Ark. 430, 242 S. W. 818 (1922) 1 People
v. Soule, 238 Mich. 130, 213 N. W. 195 (1927).
24 United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 12 S. Ct. 764 ( 1892) 1 United
States v. Maid (D. C. Cal. 1902), 116 Fed. 65o; People v. Grant, z4z App.
Div. 31o, 275 N.Y. S. 74 (1934).
25 E.g., City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 ( 1925) 1
Goodlove v. Logan, 217 Iowa 98, 251 N. W. 39 (1933).
26 See Smallwood v. District of Columbia (App. D. C. 1927), 17 F. (2d)
210; Hamann v. Lawrence, 354 Ill. 197, 188 N. E. 333 (1933).
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cult to explain on logical grounds the reason for denying
legal effectiveness to administrative rules carrying criminal
penalties, although similar rules carrying civil penalties may
be sustained.27 The explanation must lie in an inherent conviction on the part of the courts that it is unwise to grant
broad powers over civil liberties to agency officials who are
subject to political pressures and are immune from the direct
control of the electorate.
Disregard of an administrative regulation that carries
penal sanctions may involve consequences of civilliability.28
Similarly, a contract made in contravention of such a criminally-sanctioned administrative rule may be unenforceable
as against public policy. 29

5. Effect of Reliance on Regulations and Problems of
Retroactive Application

If a person challenges the validity of a regulationeither on the grounds that a legislative regulation is ultra
vires or that an interpretative regulation is based on an
incorrect interpretation of the statute-he is not without
remedies to obtain a judicial determination of the correctness of his position. But it is not the ordinary case where
a person affected by a regulation will choose to pursue this
course. As to the vast majority of persons affected by a
regulation, common prudence will require that he conform
to the requirements of the regulation. If he does so, and
the regulation is later held invalid, or is subsequently
changed by the administrative agency, then what is his
position?
If the regulation on which he relied is held invalid, it
would seem he is in substantially the same position as one
27
28

E.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S. E. 665 (1909).
See Clarence Morris, "The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability," 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1933).
29 See Walter Gellhorn, "Contracts and Public Policy," 35 CoL. L. REV. 679,
696 (1935).
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relying on an unconstitutional statute, or an erroneous opinion of counsel.
If the regulation is changed, his position is but little
better.
If it is a legislative regulation, it is normally competent
for the agency to amend its regulation, just as it is proper
for a legislature to amend a statute; and there is normally
nothing to prevent the amended regulation being applied in
situations where it has retroactive effects. Ordinarily, administrative discretion is exercised in favor of preventing any
harsh results from such retroactive application; and sometimes the statute makes particular provisions to this end.
Occasionally, an agency is deemed to be estopped from applying retroactively an amended regulation or legislative determination.30 But unless protection is provided in one of these
particular methods, an individual who acted in re,liance on
the regulation may be substantially prejudiced by an amendment thereto.
When the regulation is interpretative, there is again no
particular ground for denying the agency the power to
change its interpretation. The doctrine of legislative "ratification" through re-enactment without change is not pressed
to the logical extreme of concluding that such re-enactment
freezes the interpretation, which becomes thereby a part
of the law and incapable of change by the administrative
agency. Agencies have on occasion taken the position that
a new interpretative regulation, rather than the superseded
one on which the individual relied, should be applied retroactively to a closed transaction. 31
30 Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 52
S. Ct. 183 (1932).
31 C/., Lang v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 304 U. S. 264, 58 S. Ct.
88o ( 1938); Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 297 u. s. IZ9, s6 s. Ct. 397 ( 1936).
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While the courts have indicated disapproval of the retroactive application of regulations,82 there is but scant authority for denying the agency power to insist on a retroactive
application. In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.83
it was held that after an interpretative regulation had been
"ratified" by legislative re-enactment, and was otherwise
valid, a new and different interpretative regulation could
not be retroactively applied to the prejudice of an individual
who had relied on the former interpretation. Broad extension of this principle would seem desirable.
The legislatures have in some measure met the situation.
In several federal statutes, for example, protection is specifically provided for persons relying on the regulations of
an agency, even though such regulations be later superseded
or invalidated.84
6. Agen~y Disregard for or Suspension of Rules
Questions arising in connection with the disregard by
administrative agencies of their self-imposed rules 811 are no
more than another manifestation of the ever-present problem of reaching a fair and workable compromise between
the administrator's demand for extreme fluidity (permitting
expeditious disposal of the agency's business) and the respondent's demand for static regularity (permitting him to
ascertain in advance of administrative determination what his
rights are and how they can be asserted). The administrator
would be glad to have the privilege of refusing to follow a
rule whenever, in the interest of achieving a particular result,
it would be convenient to disregard it. Opposing counsel
32 Miller v. United States, 294 U. S. 435, 55 S. Ct. 440 (1935); United
States v. Davis, 132 U.S. 334, 10 S. Ct. 105 (1889).
33 306 U.S. 11o, 59 S. Ct. 423 (1939).
84 E.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23; so U.S.C. App.
§ 901; Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 908; 15 U.S.C. § 78;
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, Ch. 52; 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 251.
35 Related questions are discussed supra, Ch. 8, p. 167, in connection with
the procedural requirements of a fair trial.
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would be equally delighted with a rule that any disregard by
an agency of any of its rules, at any time and under any circumstances, would be a basis for invalidating the agency's
determination.
The problem arises chiefly in connection with procedural
rules. Rules of substance-whether legislative or interpretative-are either followed or changed. They cannot very well
be simply disregarded or overlooked. But in the case of
procedural rules, it is often expeditious for an agency simply
to ignore a certain rule in some particular case and adopt
therein a different procedure than that contemplated by the
agency's rules.
The parties may waive compliance with the rules, and if
the waiver is made voluntarily, with full knowledge of the
situation, no difficulty arises. 36 Similarly, there can be no
doubt as to the right to disregard minutiae of procedure in
a particular case where to do so is necessary to reach a just
result. 37 While not quite so clear, it seems that if it can be
shown that a particular rule was established solely for the
agency's own convenience, it may be waived by the agency.88
At the opposite extreme, it is clear that an agency will
not be permitted to adopt a special rule of procedure for
the sole purpose of affecting the outcome of a particular
case, or (with a conscious desire toward this end) willfully
to ignore a rule in some particular case.89
36Cf., Zigelhofer v. Reynolds, 5:1. L. D. 38 (19:1.7), where the Department
of the Interior gave relief to. a party who had been misled by a representative
of the Department as to its rules of practice.
37 Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. Shults Bread Co. (App.
D. C. 19:1.9), 37 F. (zd) 442.; Gillis v. Public Service Commission, 105 Pa.
Super. 389 1 161 Atl. 563 (1937.).
38 System Federation No. 6, et al. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 2. N. R.
A. B. 178 (1937); In the Matter of Emil Denemar~, Inc., 2. F. C. C. 474
(1936); cf., Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A.
6th 1940), 133 F. (zd) 38.
39 Colyer v. Skeffington (D. C. Mass. 192.0), 2.65 Fed. 17, 47, rev'd on
other points in Skeffington v. Katzeff (C.C.A. ut 19:1.2.), 2.77 Fed. u9;
People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo, IIO Misc. 5191 180 N.Y. S• .554 (192.0), aff'd
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Between these two extremes is a broad field where there
is room to debate the wisdom and fairness of a disregard
of procedural rules in a particular case, and where it is
somewhat a matter of conjecture whether such disregard
has affected private rights.
If it fairly appears that some prejudice might likely have
resulted from such disregard of established rules, or that
the departure caused great inconvenience to the parties or
took them unfairly by surprise, the .courts quite readily set
aside the administrative determination. Particularly is this
true where the rule was established to protect the interests
of the parties appearing before the agency. 40
In many cases there appears a strong tendency to set aside
administrative determinations because of a disregard of the
agency's established procedural rules, even though there is
no showing as to the likelihood that prejudice or serious
inconvenience resulted. The dictum in Bilokumsky v. Tad 41
that "one under investigation . . . · is legally entitled to
insist upon the observance of rules promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to law" has been applied quite literally. For
example, in Sibray v. United States 42 in releasing an alien
detained in connection with deportation proceedings because
of the Department's nonobservance of its procedural rule,
the court declared "It is not within our province to speculate in any particular case what effect the disregard of those
rules might or might not have." 43
194 App. Div. 9z1, 184 N.Y. S. 943 (19zo). For an interesting example of
an agency's voluntary adherence to this principle, see In the Matter of Consumers Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 444 ( 1939).
40
United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins (C.C.A. zd 1935), 79 F. (zd) 533;
Erie R. Co. v. City of Paterson, 79 N.J. L. 5n, 76 Atl. 1065 (1910); Mah
Shee v. White (C.C.A. 9th 1917), zp Fed. 868; Ex parte Radivoeff (D. C.
Mont. 19zz), :t78 Fed. zz7.
41
:t63 u.s. 149> xss, 44 s. Ct. 54 (19:t3).
42
(C.C.A. 3d 19u), z8z Fed. 795, 798.
43 And see United States ex rel. Chin Fook Wah v. Dunton (D. C. N. Y.
1923), z88 Fed. 959·
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But if it can be fairly shown that the failure to follow
the agency's rules did not affect the result of the case, the
failure may be excused. Thus, the same court which in United
States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins 44 set aside a deportation
order because, in violation of departmental rules, one examiner had heard the testimony and another had submitted
findings thereon, held in another alienage case that receipt
of a doctor's report not prepared in conformity with the
departmental rules was not fatal to the validity of the proceeding, where there was other evidence in the record which
would justify the order. 45 In other cases, a plainly immaterial disregard of procedural rules or practices has been permitted.46
The general approach of the courts to the problem, then,
is that an agency desiring to change its procedural rules
should do so in advance of the institution of proceedings in
any case where the changed rules are to be followed. Disregard of established rules is ordinarily fatal, unless the
agency can show a voluntary waiver of the rule, or can
show that the disregard was necessary in order to reach a
fair result and did not prejudice the rights of private parties, or that the rule was one adopted solely for the convenience of the agency and which the respondent had no
right to rely on, or that the disregard did not affect the
outcome of the case.
In deciding whether an agency has sustained this burden,
courts are not unmindful that too rigid an application of
the doctrine prohibiting disregard of procedural rules would
encourage the tendency of some agencies to proceed almost
44 (C.C.A.
45

2d 1935), 79 F. (2d) 533·
United States ex rel. Minuto v. Reimer (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F. (zd)

166.

46 E.g., Baitinger Elec. Co. v. Forbes,
(1939).

170

Misc. 589,

10

N.Y. S. (zd) 924
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without rules. The doctrine should not be pressed so far as
to induce agencies to adopt the protective device of promulgating procedural rules so vague in nature as to make it
impossible to show a violation of the rules. Such application
of the doctrine would defeat its purpose, which is to guarantee that standards of administrative procedure should be
equally as fair as those of court procedure.

CHAPTER

15

Validity of Rules and Regulations
I.

Logical Criteria

L

OGICALLY, the questions to be examined by the
courts, in determining the validity of a rule or regulation adopted by an administrative agency, should
depend on the type of regulation involved. In the case of
a legislative regulation (i.e., one promulgated pursuant to
a delegation of legislative power, the violation of which
involves statutory sanctions) the queries would be: first,
whether the regulation related to the subject matter on
which power to legislate had been delegated; second,
whether the regulation conformed to the standards prescribed in the delegatory statute; and third, whether the
regulation was invalid on constitutional grounds, such as due
process. The approach should be somewhat different, from a
purely logical viewpoint, when an interpretative regulation
is challenged. In such cases, the inquiry would be fundamentally a question as to whether the ruling correctly interpreted the statute, and involved with this issue would
be a question as to whether the challenged ruling amounted
to an attempt to exercise legislative powers which had not
been delegated. If this were the case, the ruling involved
would be held invalid as going beyond the sphere of interpretation and into that of legislation.
But in a field so surcharged with delicate questions of
policy, and the balancing of competing claims and divergent
governmental theories, the law cannot live on logic. The
approach must be realistically pragmatic. While the decisions
are ordinarily couched in maxims that set forth general
"tests" as to the validity of regulations, yet these formal
291
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criteria often express the result of a judgment rather than
the means by which that judgment was reached. In interpreting and evaluating the decisions, the circumstances under
which the rule was announced require as careful consideration as the rule itself. The general rules laid down in the
decisions, like the maxims of equity, are not to be overlooked
but still are not to be taken as touchstones to the decision
of any particular case.
These general rules for the most part do not specifically
recognize the distinction which logically should be made
between legislative regulations and interpretative regulations. This is in part due to the traditional reluctance of
many courts to admit that legislative functions may be delegated-any type of agency lawmaking is said, euphemistically, to be merely "administrative"-and is in part a result
of the difficulty of differentiating between legislative and
interpretative regulations. In many cases, where an agency
has been granted some legislative powers, it is often a matter
of conjecture whether a particular regulation was intended
to be an exercise of such delegated legislative authority or
merely an exercise of the agency's broad implicit power to
interpret, for purposes of its administrative activity, the statute under which it operates. However, despite the lack of
formal acknowledgment of the fundamental difference between legislative and interpretative regulations, there is a
practical recognition of this difference running through the
cases. 1 A dictum or general rule laid down by the court in
a case dealing with an interpretative regulation will often
receive but lip service in a case involving a legislative regulation. The fundamental logical difference between these two
types of rules or regulations must therefore be borne in
1 There are, however, some cases where a seemingly illogical result was
reached by treating as legislative an interpretative regulation, or vice versa. F.
P. Lee, "Legislative and Interpretative Regulations," 29 GEO. L. J. 1 (1940).
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mind in examining the general rules as laid down by the
courts.
2.

General Tests of Validity

(a) Exceeding authority conferred. It is often said that
a regulation is invalid if it exceeds the authority conferred
by statute. This truism affords but a limited source of guidance, for of course the difficult question, always, is the determination of the outermost limits of the delegated authority.
The rule has but little independent force except in cases
where a power has been delegated to make legislative rules
within a plainly limited sphere and subject to defined standards, and where the rule adopted exceeds this sphere or is
contrary to the standards.2 The rule may also be applied to
cases where there has been no delegation of legislative power,
and where a regulation issued as an administrative interpretation of the statute is found to go beyond the sphere of
interpretation and into the forbidden realm of legislative
regulation. 3 In other types of cases, this general criterion is
merely the characterization of a result arrived at by some
more specific course of reasoning.
(b) Conflict with statute. In many cases, the conclusion
that a regulation is invalid as exceeding the authority conferred on the agency by statute is premised on the fact that
there is a conflict between the challenged rule or regulation,
on the one side, and, on the other, provisions of the governing statute or the standard laid down therein as a guide to
the exercise of the agency's rule-making powers. A good
example of the application of this general principle to a
legislative regulation is Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod2 E.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 27 S. Ct. 153
(1906).
S E.g., Work, Secretary of the Interior v. United States ex rel. Mosier, 261
U.S. 352, 43 S. Ct. 389 (1923).
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ucts, Inc./ where power had been delegated to an agency to
define the "area of production" within a statutory provision
exempting from the requirement of certain overtime wage
payments individuals employed in the "area of production"
in the canning or packing of agricultural commodities. Under
the statute, the administrator was given legislative power to
define the "area of production"; and he adopted a definition
which excluded from the exemption canneries which employed more than a certain number of persons. Here, the
general standard as laid down by Congress related to the
geographical contiguity between the cannery and the growing
areas; and the administrative agency's regulation was based
on a policy completely at odds with this standard.
In cases where an interpretative regulation is thus in
conflict with the court's interpretation of the statute, the
conclusion of invalidity could be premised, in succinct terms,
on the basis that the agency's interpretation of the legal
meaning of the statute was wrong. Where this is so, the
courts frequently invalidate an erroneous agency interpretation by saying that the regulation in question is invalid as
being in conflict with the statute. Thus in Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sabine Transportation Co./
the court declared in setting aside the challenged regulations
that they "in the teeth of the unambiguous mandate of the
statute, are contradictory of its plain terms." 6
(c) Extending or modifying statute. In some cases, the
conflict between the regulation and the statute appears because the regulation seeks to extend or modify the statute.
4

pz U. S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct. u 15 ( 1944).
318 u.s. 306, 311-JIZ, 63 s. Ct. 569 (1943).
6 For similar cases, see M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. z67, 59
S. Ct. 186 (1938); Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
2.98 U. S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767 (1936); Watts v. United States (C.C.A. zd
1936), 8z F. (zd) 266; United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U. S.
21o, 40 S. Ct. 139 (192o).
l5

VALIDITY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

295

The cases above discussed 7 as typical of the trend of many
agencies to extend beyond allowable limits the policy of the
governing statute, present examples of regulations held invalid on this ground. In many instances, interpretative regulations which carry interpretation to a point of legislation,
have been thus held invalid. As the court said in Merritt v.
Welsh,8 "If experience shows that Congress acted under a
mistaken impression, that does not authorize the Treasury
Department . . . to make new laws which they imagine
Congress would have made had it been properly informed."
This principle has been applied frequently. Thus, where a
statute permitted duty-free importation of animals brought
into this country for breeding purposes, and the customs
officials undertook by regulation to limit the privilege to
cases where the animals were of superior stock, adapted to
improving the breed, this regulatory modification of the
governing statute was held invalid.9 A similar result was
reached where a statutory authorization permitting the cutting of timber on public lands for "domestic uses," was
sought to be limited by regulations so as to exclude the
cutting of timber for certain domestic purposes deemed undesirable; 10 and again where an agency attempted by a
general regulation to revoke outstanding permits without
recourse to the statutory proceedings prescribed as a condition of the revocation of permits. 11 Not infrequently, regulations under the internal revenue laws have been held invalid
as being attempts to add supplementary legislative proviCh. 12, ns. 18-32.
Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 704 (1881).
9 Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 1 S. Ct. 423 (1883).
10 United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, 25 S. Ct. 2U

7
8

(1905).
11 Campbell, Federal Prohibition Administrator v. Galeno Chemical Co., 2.81
U.S. 599, so S. Ct. 412 (1930).
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sions. 12 A regulation improperly restricting or narrowing a
statute, or an agency's jurisdiction thereunder, would similarly be invalid.18
(d) No reasonable relationship to statutory purpose. In
some cases the general policy of the regulation seems unrelated to the general policy of the statute, but neither
direct conflict with the statute nor any clear extension of the
statutory command can be shown. In such cases, at least if
convinced that the challenged regulation produces burdensome and inequitable results, the courts may set it aside as
bearing no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the
governing statute and producing a result which is out of
harmony with the statute and hence unreasonable. 14 For example, where a statute authorized a state agency to make
certain regulations to prevent a waste of oil reserves, and it
was shown that certain proration orders issued under such
authority were not effective to prevent waste but did produce
untoward effects in compelling pipe-line owners to furnish
a market to producers who had no pipe lines, the regulation
was held invalid on these broad grounds. 15 On a similar
basis, regulations which attempt too rigidly to limit the
degree of proof which will be required in various administrative proceedings, or to impose arbitrary tests where the
statutory requirement is more flexible, may be held invalid.16
Again, a regulation is said to have no reasonable relationship
12 E.g., Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 316 U.S. 107, 6z S. Ct. 989 (1942); Taft v. Helvering, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 195,61 S. Ct. 244 (1940).
13 Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 253 U. S. 117, 40 S. Ct. 466

(1920).
14 For statements of the rule, see dicta in Manhattan General Equipment Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397 (1936);
Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 51 S. Ct. 144 (1931),
15 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 57 S. Ct. 364

(1937).
16 United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 33 S. Ct. 412 (1913); Lynch,
Executrix v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U. S. 315, 44 S. Ct. 488 ( 1924); Miller
v. United States, 294 U. S. 435, 55 S. Ct. 440 (1935).
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to the statute when it attempts to include what had, by
apparent inadvertency, been omitted by the statute from the
legislative scheme. 17
(e) Unreasonable and arbitrary regulations; violation of
due process. Where excess of authority cannot be predicated
on the grounds that a regulation is in conflict with the statute,
or improperly extends or modifies the statute, or has no
reasonable relationship to the purpose of the statute (all of
these being obviously closely related grounds), then a conclusion of invalidity must ordinarily be premised on the
grounds that the challenged regulation is so unreasonable
and arbitrary as to be unconstitutional.
As it is sometimes put, the regulation is invalid if it goes
beyond what the legislature could authorize. 18 If the regulation, had it been enacted as a statute by the legislature, would
have been held unconstitutional on any of the grounds on
which statutory enactments may be attacked, then the regulation must fall. A regulation which amounts to a deprival of
property without due process/9 or is unreasonably discriminatory 20 may be set aside on this basis. Or the coUJ;t may by
judicial construction limit the scope of a regulation on the
grounds that it would be invalid unless so limited.21
3· Factors Underlying Decision
These general tests offer at best a basis for argument as to
the validity or invalidity of a challenged regulation. Does the
regulation conflict with the statute by altering its meaning; or
Iselin v. United States, 2.70 U.S. 2.45, 46 S. Ct. 2.48 (192.6).
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 2.43 U. S. 389, 37 S. Ct. 387
(1917).
19 International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. so6, 42. S. Ct. 179 (1922).
20 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 2.84 U. S. 8o, 52 S. Ct. 87
(1931).
21 Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117,46 S. Ct.
2.15 ( 192.6); M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 32.7 U. S. 614, 66 S. Ct.
705 (1946).
17
18
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does it merely interpret and clarify an ambiguous statutory
phrase? This question cannot be answered on a rhetorical
basis; it often involves subtle judgments on deep-seated
policy questions. Does the regulation "extend" the statute,
or does it merely specify an application of the general legislative purpose which was implicit in the general language
used by the legislature? This inquiry likewise is not purely
logical; the answer depends largely on a judgment as to
how broad a discretion should be vested in administrative
agencies to implement vague statutory language. Is there a
reasonable relationship between the terms of the regulation
and the general statutory purpose? Appraisals of reasonableness are never based on logic.
In all but the plainest cases, the application of these general tests is at best highly debatable. The general tests do
little more than define the actual issue which must be argued.
Decision of this issue is to a large extent dependent on the
particular factual details and social implications of each case.
But there are some basic points of view which are ordinarily
followed.
Implicit in many of the decisions cited above is a recognition of the doctrine that the scope of a particular agency's
regulatory power must be determined by the character of
the statute involved, and by the consequent practical need
for giving a large degree of freedom of action to the administrative authorities. This principle was clearly enunciated in
United States v. A ntikamnia Chemical Company. 22
The statute involved in that case required that medicinal
preparations should bear a label stating "the quantity or
proportion of . . . acetanilid, or any derivative or preparation of any such substances CQntained therein." The manufacturer of certain pills which contained acetphenetidin, a
derivative of acetanilid, marketed them with a label which
22 231 U.S. 654, 662, 666, 34 S. Ct. 222 (1914).
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stated the quantity and proportion of acetphenetidin contained. The manufacturer claimed that this constituted compliance with the statute, and that a regulation which further
required him to specify on the label that the acetphenetidin
was a derivative of acetanilid was invalid as extending the
statutory requirement. The issue therefore was whether or
not the regulation added to the law in providing that the
label must state not only the name of the derivative (which
the statute required) but also the name of the substance from
which it was derived (as to which the statute was silent). In
holding the regulation valid, the court pointed out that the
purpose of the law was to warn the public of the presence
of deleterious drugs in medicinal preparations; that a statement of the name of the derivative unaccompanied by an
explanation of the substance from which it was derived
would not accomplish this purpose, because while the public
generally had some notion of the possible deleterious effects
of acetanilid and would be warned by information that the
medicine contained a derivative of acetanilid, yet the consumer would not be so warned if the label stated merely
the name of the derivative and did not explain that it was
a derivative of acetanilid. The extent of an agency's regulatory power, said the court "must be determined by the purpose of the Act and the difficulties its execution might encounter."
This practical doctrine of expediency is, then, a fundamental factor underlying judicial determination of the
validity of administrative rules and regulations. Where the
purpose of the statute is to vest broad discretionary powers
in an agency, and where successful execution of the agency's
task of administration so requires, a broad measure of autonomy will be accorded the agency; and there will be a tendency to view its regulations as in harmony with the statute
and reasonable. Where, on the other hand, the statute does
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not disclose a purpose of any such broad grant of power to
the agency, and where no need can be readily seen for the
extensive implementation of the statute through the medium
of regulations, the courts will be more ready to discover a
conflict between the statute and the regulation, or to hold
that the regulation attempts to enlarge the statute, or is
unreasonable.
A second factor is essentially historical. During the decade
of I9JD-I940, roughly, there developed (particularly in the
federal courts, although the same trend can be seen in the
decisions of many state courts) a much more wholehearted
acceptance of administrative tribunals as respected and independent agencies of justice than had theretofore generally
existed. This recognition of agencies as an integral part of
the judicial system has led the courts to accord a more hospitable reception to challenged administrative regulations.
Regulations which might have been held invalid in an earlier
era are now likely to be upheld.
These two factors are interrelated. Recent statutes often
pertain to fields of social control wherein the need for
administrative discretion is obvious; and in such cases of
course it is customary for the statute to lay down only
broad standards, leaving significant details to be worked out
through administrative rules and regulations of the agencies.
Given this type of statute, and a judicial atmosphere of
friendliness to the theory of administrative regulation, a
challenged rule or regulation is quite likely to be held valid,
unless plainly at odds with the statute or subject to clear
constitutional infirmities.
The practical effect of these two factors can be seen by
examining variant case situations.
Where a statute creates or recognizes private rights, and
the purpose or effect of the regulation is to limit or restrict
such rights, the courts were strongly inclined, until a few
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years ago at least, to find the regulations invalid.23 This attitude is still seen in the cases, but its rigor is considerably
diminished, as may be illustrated by National Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. United States,24 where the court in holding valid
regulations which put many restrictions on the rights of radio
broadcasting companies to effect intercompany affiliations,
disposed of the claim that the regulations were arbitrary by
saying that it did not have the technical competence to pass
upon the wisdom of the regulations.25
Regulations promulgated by agencies whose task is the
conduct of public business have always received a more
kindly reception than those that control or regulate the
carrying on of private business, for in such fields as the
preservation of public health, the administration of the postal
system, and the regulation of the currency, the courts have
long been ready to concede the need for broad administrative
discretion. As the philosophy of committing broad powers
to administrative agencies in the regulation of private business is coming to gain wider acceptance, this differentiation
is becoming less noticeable.
The field of tax regulations could be made a separate
study, so great are the number of cases passing on the validity
of regulations issued under taxing statutes. For many years,
it was in this field particularly that the courts were likely
to hold regulations invalid. Any attempt to enlarge ever so
minutely the plain requirement of the statute was held invalid. Partly this represented the philosophy that ambiguities
23 E.g., Campbell, Federal Prohibition Administrator v. Galeno Chemical
Co., et al., 281 U.S. 599, 50S. Ct. 412 (1930); Goldsmith v. United States
Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 46 S. Ct. 215 (1926).
24 319 U.S. 19o, 63 S. Ct. 997 (1943).
25 With this decision may be compared the opinion in the earlier case of
Waite et al. v. Macy et al., 246 U.S. 6o6, 6o8-6o9, 38 S. Ct. 395 (1918),
where the court in invalidating regulations which would have excluded certain
types of tea from import, said, "No doubt it is true that this Court cannot
displace the judgment of the board in any matter within its jurisdiction, but it
is equally true that the board cannot enlarge the powers given to it by statute.''
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in taxing statutes should be construed in favor of the taxpayer; and partly it resulted from the fact that the courts
could see no need for relying on administrative discretion in
this field. Tax statutes involved typical legalistic problems;
and there was little in the nature of the problems involved
to lead the courts to defer to the expert knowledge of an
administrative body. But as the complexity and technicality
of tax statutes has developed to a point where the study of
them is almost a separate science, and as the style of draftsmanship of the tax statutes has changed so that the question
of taxability often depends on a matter of technical judgment
rather than on a juristic interpretation of legalistic language,
there has been a corresponding change in the attitude of
the courts.26
But despite the hospitable reception which the courts now
give challenged rules of administrative agencies, and despite
the fact that statutes are now frequently so drawn as to make
it clear that a wide measure of discretion must be allowed in
the making of implemental regulations, still a regulation
cannot stand which is plainly at odds with the legislative
purpose, or plainly involves a usurpation of power, or is
indubitably arbitrary and unreasonable.
26 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, po U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct.
(1943).
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Availability and General Functions
of Judicial Review
OR a long time, it was believed by many that the courts
should exercise a general superintending control over
the actions of administrative agencies, and that the
processes of judicial review should be relied on to correct
any errors of administration. For various reasons, this has
proved impractical, and it has become generally recognized
that the function of the courts, in reviewing administrative
determinations, must be for the most part limited to such
matters as (I) checking excessive assumptions of power by
the executive; (2) speaking the final word on important
questions of statutory interpretation; (3) requiring fair procedure in administrative action; and (4) invalidating arbitrary or capricious administrative action. While the scope and
effectiveness of judicial review vary widely in different case
situations, so as to preclude the drawing of any categorical
conclusions as to the purposes it may properly serve, yet the
general trend of court decisions (except in cases where a
statute prescribes a broad review) is in the direction of
reducing the scope of review.

F

I.

Practical Difficulties Limiting Effectiveness of Judicial
Review

There are many purely practical considerations which limit
the availability of judicial review as a general corrective for
allegedly erroneous administrative action. In the first place,
the number of administrative adjudications is so great as
to preclude the possibility of court review in more than a
small percentage of the cases decided. In the vast majority
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of cases, the administrative determination must be the final
one. Further, the expense incident to perfecting an appeal
and obtaining judicial review is such that in many cases the
parties cannot afford to take the case into court.
In certain types of cases, the delay involved in judicial
review is a determining factor. Business transactions cannot
always await the final outcome of time-consuming appellate
procedures. In the fields of trade and finance, the situation
which gave rise to the administrative order will often have
been so changed during the course of six months or a year
that the questions involved would have become moot before
the court could pass judgment on the case. Then, too, the
effect of administrative action cannot always be erased by
a subsequent judicial reversal of the agency's determination.
A stop order by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
for example, or even a threat that such an order might be
issued, effectively kills a proposed offering of securities; and
a subsequent judicial determination that the order was improperly entered would never resurrect the deal.
Perhaps most important of the practical limitations on
judicial review as a corrective device is the plain fact that
the minutiae of a case cannot ordinarily be brought to the
attention of the reviewing court. The records are so long,
the factual situations so complex and technical, and the time
available for argument so short, that it is impossible for the
reviewing court to get more than the high lights of the questions actually fought out before the administrative agency.
The details which perhaps should be controlling of the disposition of the particular case may be lost to sight. Slugging
in the clinches may escape the referee's eye. The reviewing
court often cannot obtain the intimate knowledge of the case
which is requisite to fully informed consideration and judgment. Of course, the conclusive effect given to most of the
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findings which have a factual aspect contributes to this difficulty. The reviewing court must consider the case in the light
of the broad and general factual findings made by the agency,
and these often tend to transform a case from a concrete
practical situation to an abstract legalistic problem which does
not reflect the hard realities involved.
2.

Restraints on Judicial Action

(a) Judicial self-restraint. The doctrine that courts and
agencies are to be regarded as co-ordinate instrumentalities
of justice, sharing joint responsibilities to attain the ends
sought by the legislature in passing a statute/ has had important effects in determining the availability and functions
of judicial review. 2 It is fundamentally the attitude of the
courts, rather than the provisions of statutes, which determines the actual scope of judicial review; and as both federal
and state courts have come to grant increased respect to
administrative determinations, the extent of review has been
narrowed.
This tendency has had many repercussions. It can be seen
in the increasing frequency with which courts, after holding
an original determination invalid, remand the case for further
consideration by the agency, rather than making a final decision.3 It can be seen in the tendency to treat as issues of
fact what might well be considered as issues of law. 4 It can
be seen in suggestions that in some cases judicial review
1 Cf., United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795 (1939).
2 Chamberlain, Dowling, and Hays, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942) 174; Landis, "Administrative Policies and
the Courts," 47 YALE L. J. 519 (1938); Merrill, "Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, A Functional Prospectus," 23 NEB. L. REV. 56
(1944).
s E.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 6o7, 64 S. Ct.
1215 (1944).
4 E.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S.
581, 65 S. Ct. 829 (1945); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S. Ct. 326
(1941).
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should not be granted except as required by legislative
mandate. 5
There has developed, in short, a judicial disinclination to
substitute the judgment of judges for the discretion of administrators. This has gone far to reduce the availability and
limit the functions of judicial review.
(b) Constitutional limitations. Legislative attempts to
provide extensive judicial review of administrative determinations have sometimes run afoul of the doctrine prohibiting
courts from exercising nonjudicial powers. Particularly in the
federal courts, there has been a consistent refusal to review
what are deemed "administrative" questions.
One of the leading cases, illustrative of the problem, is
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 6
where the matter involved was an administrative ruling reducing the permissible hours of service of a radio station. The
lower courts, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable statute, revised the administrative order; but when
review was sought in the Supreme Court, that court dismissed
the writ of certiorari on the grounds that the question was
purely administrative or legislative, and that thus no case
or controversy within the judiciary article of the Constitution
was presented. Somewhat similar rulings have been made as
to review of certain issues in rate-making cases 7 and trademark cases. 8
But this doctrine does not, of course, bar judicial review
of such questions as the "reasonableness" of an administrative
order or whether it is "in conformity with law." 9 The doc5 E.g., Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board,
320 U.S. 297,301, 64 S. Ct. 95 (1943).
6 281 U.S. 464, so S. Ct. 389 (1930).
7 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445
(1923).
8 Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, 47 S. Ct. 284
(1927).
9 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933); Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v.
Havemeyer, 296 U.S. so6, 56 S. Ct. 36o (1936).
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trine proscribes review only in those cases where the court is
asked to substitute its judgment for the discretion of an
administrative agency on a question which is not to be settled
by deductive legalistic reasoning.
Nor does the doctrine apply to the so-called federal legislative courts. Such bodies as the territorial courts, the Court
of Claims and the Tax Court may be vested with some administrative powers. 10 Similarly, the courts of the District
of Columbia may be required to discharge administrative
duties. 11
While appellate state courts have often refused to review
the decisions of administrative agencies where only administrative questions were involved/2 nevertheless the state courts
have been less strict in their insistence that certain types of
administrative determinations are nonreviewable. In the state
courts, judicial review of rate-fixing proceedings, determinations granting or denying licenses to operate common carriers,
and even tax assessments, has not uncommonly been permitted. The distinction between what will be reviewed, and
what not, is largely historical; where a particular state court
has long exercised its powers in a particular type of case, the
issues involved, even though not strictly legalistic, are
deemed "subject for judicial determination," 13 and the court
will continue to decide such issues, even though from a purely
logical viewpoint they might be deemed administrative in
character.
3· Constitutional Right of Review
The decreasing significance of judicial review in the field
of administrative law is nowhere better illustrated than in the
10 Williams v. United States, 2.89 U.S. 553,53 S. Ct. 751 (1933) 1 American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. (z6 U.S.) 511 (182.8).
11 O'Donoghue v. United States, 2.89 U. S. p6, 53 S. Ct. 740 ( 1933).
12 E.g., Hodges v. Public Service Commission, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E.

834 (1931).
13 Murray's Lessee et al. v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How.
( 59 u.s.) z 7 z, 2.84 (18 55 ).
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deterioration of the doctrines recognizing a constitutional
right to obtain judicial review on certain types of issues. It
has commonly been supposed that there existed an immutable
right to obtain judicial review on questions of law, questions
of jurisdictional fact, and questions of constitutional fact. The
letter of the rule perhaps still stands; but its substance has
been depleted to the extent that the rule is deprived of most
of the significance long attributed to it.
(a) Issues of law. The commonplace that final decision on
questions of law must be reserved for the courts traces back
principally to the decision in Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 14 holding invalid a state statute
providing that an administrative determination as to the reasonableness of railroad rates should be final and not subject
to judicial review. Such issue, the court said, was "eminently
a question for judicial investigation." While the court was
undoubtedly influenced by the apparent unreasonableness of
the whole statutory scheme, under which there was no requirement of hearing and no provision for safeguarding private rights/ 5 and while therefore the decision does not really
foreclose the question as to the permissibility of granting administrative agencies power to make final and nonreviewable
determinations of legal issues, nevertheless it has commonly
been supposed that the decision held exactly that.
It is undoubtedly true that the power of final decision on
judicial matters involving private right cannot constitutionally be taken away from the courts; but this does not mean
that the courts will review every such issue of law involved
in an administrative determination.
Many types of administrative determination involving issues of statutory construction or other legalistic inquiries do
14 134 U.S. 418, 458, 10 S. Ct. 46z, 702 (1890). For a more modern view
on the question as to the constitutionality of providing for administrative finality on questions of law, see comment: 26 CAL. L. REv. 683 (1938).
15 See Freund, THE PoLICE PoWER (1904) § 381.
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not determine matters of absolute private right, but involve
rather the granting or denial of some privilege. In such cases,
it seems that the legislature may grant to administrative
agencies the power to decide with finality issues of law. 16 In
this way, a variety of important legal issues may be removed
from the sphere of judicial decision.
But far more significant, so far as concerns the extent of
participation by the courts in matters committed originally to
administrative decision, is the judicial doctrine that as a matter of comity or convenience, the courts will not concern
themselves with every asserted error of law 17 on the part of
the agencies. It is not so much a matter of denial of the power
of review, but rather a reluctance to exercise it. The administrative determination will be accepted, without close scrutiny,
if it has "a reasonable basis in law." 18 The courts hesitate to
assert and exercise their power of judicial review, where the
legislature has not expressly so required or authorized, unless
the "type of problem involved and the history of the statute
in question" indicate that judicial review should be supplied.19
In short, the courts will concern themselves only with the
vital, fundamental questions of law involved in administrative determinations, and will often decline to review other
issues which, although perhaps controlling of the result in the
particular case, are not thought to have broad interest and
significance.
Another path which has led to the diminution of effective
judicial review has been by way of calling issues of fact what
might with equal logic be deemed matters of law. The classic
comment of Dickinson, pointing out that there is no fixed
16Van Horne v. Hines (App. D. C. I94I), I22 F. (2d) 207; Nolde &
Horst Co. v. Helvering (App. D. C. I94I), 122 F. (2d) 41.
17Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 32I U.S. 231, 64 S. Ct.
495 (I944).
18 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S.
III, I3I, 64 s. Ct. 85I (I944).
19 Switchmen's Union of North America v. National ·Mediation Board, 320
u.s. 297> 30I, 64 s. Ct. 95 (I943).
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distinction between matters of fact and law, but that "The
knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage," 20 has been
echoed by the Supreme Court.21 The general policy of judicial self-restraint has increasingly led the courts to characterize as issues of fact, and hence nonreviewable, issues which
with equal logic, could have been deemed issues of law, and
reviewable,22 had the courts desired to review them. Thus,
questions as to the meaning of the term "employee," or the
"appropriateness" of a formula employed in rate-fixing proceedings, are treated as presenting issues of fact. 23 Many issues of law, masquerading as matters of fact, thus escape
judicial review.
While the power of the courts to review and settle issues
of law must of course remain, yet the growing deference paid
to administrative determinations has much diminished the
extensiveness with which appellate courts probe into decisions
which could be said quite properly to involve fundamentally
issues of law .24
The provisions of Section 10 (e) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of r 946 may have some effect to enlarge the scope of review of federal agency determinations,
where the error alleged is predicated on what can fairly be
termed a question of law; but it would appear that this statute
does not deprive the courts of continuing to exercise judicial
20

John Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY

OF

LAW

(1927) 55; and see Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of
Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1944); Brown, "Fact and Law in
Judicial Review," 56 HARV. L. REv. 899 (1943); Isaacs, "The Law and the
Facts," 22 CoL. L. REV. I (1922); Stern, "Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis," 58 HARV. L. REV. 70
(1944).
21 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,670,64 S. Ct. 1240 (I944).

22 Cf., Benjamin, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE

YoRK (1942) 347-349.

OF

NEW

23 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al., 324
U. S. 581, 65 S. Ct. 829 (1945); National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 64 S. Ct. 851 (1944).
24 Cf., Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139, 65 S. Ct. 161
(1944).
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prerogatives in deciding how broad the scope of review
should be. The implications of this section are uncertain. 25
(b) Jurisdictional facts. The ruling in Crowell v. Benson 26 (which held that an employer was entitled to a judicial
trial de novo on the factual questions on which depended the
jurisdiction of the United States Employees' Compensation
Commission to make an award against him,27 and which
marked the zenith if not the birth of the doctrine that a right
to judicial review de novo exists on all questions of jurisdictional fact) has in the intervening years lost much of the
practical significance it was originally thought by many to
possess as establishing a minimum standard of judicial participation in administrative adjudication.
The case appears, indeed, to have been a departure from
the logic of many earlier cases 28 and must be taken to be
greatly limited by, if it has not in fact been disregarded in,
subsequent decisions. It can scarcely be reconciled with the
decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation,29
25 There are two schools of thought as to whether § 10 (e) authorizes or
requires the courts to broaden the scope of judicial review. The Attorney General has suggested that it merely restated the then existing law (letter dated
October 19, 1945, addressed to Senate Judiciary Committee and printed as App.
B, Sen. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)); but there is indicatiop in
the Congressional debates that a broader scope of review is intended. (Congressional Record, May 24, 1946, 5654, 5657.) That the act should be construed
to enlarge the scope of review is forcibly argued by John Dickinson, 33 A. B. A.
J. 434 ( 1947). For additional views, see Shine, "Administrative Procedure Act:
Judicial Review 'Hotchpot'?" 36 GEo. L. J. 16 (1947); Hinman, "Effect of
the Administrative Procedure Act on Judicial Review of Administrative Action," 20 RocKY MT. L. REV. 267 (194S). The courts have not yet settled the
question. Compare Snyder v. Buck (D. C. D. C. 194S), 75 F. Supp. 902; Olin
Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (D. C. Mass. 1947), 72 F.
Supp. 225; United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi (C.C.A. 3d 194S), 166 F.
(2d) 457·
26 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 2S5 (1932). Many volumes of commentary have
been written about this case. See for example, So U. PA. L. REV. 1055 ( 1932);
46 HARV. L. REv. 47S (1933); 22 CoRN. L. Q. 349, 515 (1937).
27Those jurisdictional facts being: (1) whether the accident occurred on
navigable waters; ( 2) whether an employer-employee relationship existed.
28 SoU. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932); Pound, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942)
2S.
29 o 3 U.S. 41, 5S S. Ct. 459 (1938).
3
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in which it was held that a federal district court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit raising a question as to whether the
National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction of contemplated proceedings; and its philosophy was essentially repudiated in later cases where, there being doubts as to
whether an administrative agency had jurisdiction in the
premises, the court remanded the case to that agency for
further findings on the jurisdictional question. 80
Similarly, the decisions in the state courts indicate that no
broader scope of review will be applied to determinations of
jurisdictional fact than to other factual determinations.81
Judicial redetermination of the facts on which depends the
jurisdiction of the administrative agency can no longer be
regarded as an absolute legal right.
(c) Constitutional facts. Closely related to the jurisdictional fact doctrine is the principle that where the existence
of a private right asserted under the Constitution depends on
a finding of fact, there is a right to judicial review de novo of
that issue of fact. This doctrine appeared to have been reaffirmed, by a divided court, as late as 1936.82 But its vitality
has since largely disappeared, and the more recent decisions
suggest judicial acceptance of the argument that there is no
logical basis for distinguishing between ordinary facts and
constitutional facts. 88 Even in cases where confiscation is asserted, and this of course is the typical case for the application
of the rule requiring full judicial review of questions of constitutional fact, the courts have not in more recent years
so See, for example, City of Yonkers et al. v. United States et al., 320 U. S.
685, 64 S. Ct. 327 ( 1944); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 324 U.S. 515, 65 S. Ct. 749 (1945).
81 E.g., Dimino v. Independent Warehouses, Inc., 284 N.Y. 481, 31 N. E.
(2d) 911 (1940); Miles v. Colegrove, 258 App. Div. 1014, 16 N.Y. S. (2d)
988 (1940), aff'd 284 N.Y. 6o9, 29 N. E. (2d) 929 (1940).
82 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720
(1936); cj., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287,
40 S. Ct. 527 (1920). For law review comment on the doctrines of these cases,
see: 4 ILL. L. Q. 44 (1921); 43 HARV. L. REv. 1249 (1930); 40 HARV. L.
REv. 1033 (1927); 27 W.VA. L. Q. 207 (1921); 36 GEo. L. J. 337 (1948).
38 Cj., Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 124.
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always consented to review the facts involved. Here again,
increased deference for the judgment of administrative agencies has been reflected in the decisions of the courts. Thus,
where it was claimed by an oil producer that a state order
limiting its production was confiscatory, the Supreme Court
observed that the inquiry was one for determination by an
administrative agency possessing expertness in the particular
subject, and that it was not for the court to pass upon the propriety of the order, even though it might appear to the court
that a different order would be wiser. 34
There can be no disagreement with the somewhat conservative expression of opinion by several members of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure who
observed that "in the future, fact issues involving due process,
equal protection, and doubtless also other constitutional guaranties will in all probability no longer be subject to court
review as a matter of constitutional right." 35
While of course the power of the courts to review questions of law, questions of jurisdictional fact, and questions of
constitutional fact, cannot well be doubted, yet the courts no
longer feel bound to review every issue which can be so
described. Rather, the courts are inclined to limit review to
those cases and those issues which are deemed to be particularly important or which are thought to be more suitable for
judicial determination than for determination by an administrative agency. Conversely, where it is thought that the problem is more suitable for administrative handling, no searching
review will be supplied even on these fundamental questions.
Increasing deference for administrative determinations decreases the scope of judicial
., participation in administrative
law.
34 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S.
573, 6oS. Ct. 1021 (1940); 311 U.S. 614, 61 S. Ct. 66 (1940); 3II U.S.
57o, 61 S. Ct. 343 (1941),
35 "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies," Sen. Doc. No. 8,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1941) 210.

CHAPTER

17

Utilization and Exhaustion of Administrative
Processes as Conditions Precedent
to Review
ISINCLINATION on the part of the courts to
intervene in fields where judicial or legislative powers
have been vested in administrative agencies is evidenced by the development of the doctrines requiring litigants to address their complaints initially to administrative
tribunals, rather than to the courts, and further requiring
them to exhaust all possibilities for obtaining relief through
administrative channels before appealing to the courts.
In this connection, there have developed several interrelated doctrines, including (I) the rule of prior resort, sometimes called the principle of primary jurisdiction; ( 2) the
requirement of exhausting all available administrative remedies before appealing to the courts; and (3) the principle of
estoppel for failure to utilize administrative remedies/ While
all of these related principles may be bound up in a single
case, and are not always treated separately in judicial opinions, yet such separation is convenient for purposes of analysis and discussion.

D

I.

The Doctrine of Prior Resort

During the last two decades there has developed in the
federal courts a strong inclination to refuse jurisdiction of a
case wherein the issues are such that they could have been
presented in the first instance to an administrative body. Similar principles are followed in many state courts, but with
1 For a comprehensive general discussion, see E. B. Stason's article on
"Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action," 25
MINN. L. REV. s6o (1941).
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considerable variation from state to state, with occasional
repudiation of the doctrine. 2
The rule is frequently said to have been established in the
Abilene Cotton Oil case.3 There, suit had been brought in
the Texas state courts to recover reparations for allegedly
excessive rates charged by the railroad. It was defended on
the ground that no prior application had been made to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for relief. The court held
that this defense was valid-that the Interstate Commerce
Act by implication (despite the act's declaration that none of
its provisions should be deemed to abridge existing commonlaw remedies) barred resort to the courts until the Interstate
Commerce Commission had been permitted to pass upon the
reasonableness of the challenged rate.
The reasons for the rule are well stated in United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. 4 In that case,
plaintiff sought in the federal district court to enjoin an alleged restraint of trade, charging that the defendants had
offered lower rates to shippers who agreed to ship none of
their goods on plaintiff's vessels. A motion to dismiss was
granted because the plaintiff had failed to resort first to the
United States Shipping Board, the court suggesting that the
inquiry as to whether the challenged combination ~~s illegal
would depend on many technical factors which might be
better understood by the Commission than by the courts, and
2 E.g., Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Co., 59 R.I. z9,
193 Atl. 879 (1937). In Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Driscoll, 343
Pa. 109, 21 A. (zd) 9u (194•), the court in effect refused to apply the
doctrine where to do so would involve assertedly irreparable injury. The federal courts appear to give little consideration to this argument. Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938); Aircraft
& Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 7 sz, 773, 67 S. Ct. 1493
( 1947). Some of the state courts appear to apply the principle to newer agencies, but to adhere to established practices which in the case of some of the older
agencies-e.g., local taxing boards-permitted more extensive judicial intervention.
3 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., zo4 U. S. 4z6, z7 S. Ct.
350 (1907).
4 284 u.s. 474> 5Z s. Ct. Z47 (•9JZ).

JUDICIAL REVIEW

pointing out that only by requiring the initial presentation of
all such questions to the administrative agency could uniformity of ruling be attained.
There are, in other words, two reasons for the rule: first,
to take full advantage of administrative expertness; and second, to attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws.
The rule is apparently one of general applicability. It has
a long history in the railroad and shipping cases of the type
wherein it was first promulgated,5 and has been extended into
many other fields, including some not characterized by the
technical complexities which underlay the development of
the rule in the Interstate Commerce Commission cases where
it originated. Among the fields of administrative activity to
which the doctrine has been extended are those of trade regulation,6 labor disputes/ and tax collection.8
Likewise, the rule has come to be applied not only toquestions of a technical factual content but as well to issues of
much broader character. It has been applied to issues of jurisdictional fact (which not long ago were thought to be exclusively for the courts) ,9 issues as to the unreasonableness of
5 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S.
481, 30 S. Ct. 164 (r9ro); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Brothers Coal Mining Co., 238 U.S. 456, 35 S. Ct. 896 (1915); Director General of Railroads
et al. v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498, 41 S. Ct. 151 (1921); Alabama & V. Ry.
Co. v. Jackson & Eastern Ry. Co., 271 U.S. 244, 46 S. Ct. 535 (1926) [all
of these cases, in fact, preceding the so-called birth of the rule in the Abilene
case ( r 92 7), and being perhaps progenitors of the rule rather than instances
of its application]; Midland Valley R. Co. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482, 48 S. Ct.
342 (1928); Board of Railroad Commissioners of North Dakota v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 281 U.S. 412, 50S. Ct. 391 (1930).
6 Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 29 r U. S. 67, 54 S. Ct.
315 (1934); Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291
U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (1934).
7 Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Schauf!ler, 303 U. S. 54,
58 S. Ct. 466 (1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41,
58 S. Ct. 459 (r938).
8 Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337,57 S. Ct. 8r6 (1937); United
States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U.S. 269, 51 S. Ct. 376 (r93r).
9 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459
(1938).
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administrative regulations/ 0 and some issues of law.11 It has
been held that an administrative officer could not be enjoined
from enforcing an allegedly invalid administrative regulation without application first being made to the officer for
modification of the objectionable rule.12
While there have been assertions that the doctrine has no
application to "pure" questions of law 13 (such as might be
raised by an issue as to the legality of the statute under which
an agency operates) 14 there is but infrequently an opportunity to raise such a question. As distinctions between law and
fact become constantly more blurred, and the enforcement of
asserted legal rights comes to be conditioned largely upon
administrative discretion, there are but few issues which the
courts are likely henceforward to characterize as purely legal.
Where the legal question is bound up with an administrative
question, the rule of prior resort applies. 15
The rule of prior resort will, it appears, be applied whereever the court believes (considering opportunities of utilizing
technical competence and obtaining uniformity of rule) that
the legislature intended the issues to be left to the administrative agency for initial determination.16 In an era of increasing
respect for administrative adjudication, it can be expected
that there will be but few cases where the courts will conclude
there was no such legislative intention. Only where it can be
convincingly shown that an alleged administrative remedy
10Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317,65 S. Ct. II51 (1945).
11 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., Ltd., 234 U. S. 138,
34 S. Ct. 885 (1914); Aron v. Federal Trade Commission (D. C. Pa. 1943),
so F. Supp. 289.
12p, F. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570,54 S. Ct. 277 (1934).
13 Great Northern Ry. Co. et al. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285,
42 S. Ct. 477 (1922); and see discussion in United States Navigation Co., Inc.
v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 284 U.S. 474, 52 S. Ct. 247 (1932).
14 See 35 CoL. L. REv. 230, 234 (1935).
15 Cf., Vom Baur, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1942) p. 199, § 219.
16 See opinion of Brandeis, J., in Great Northern Ry. Co.,et al. v. Merchants'
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 2.85, 42. S. Ct. 477 (192.2).
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would be plainly inadequate 17 will the courts excuse the requirement of prior resort to administrative remedies.
2.

The Requirement of Exhausting Administrative Remedies

(a) Historical basis of rule. Not only must a question
cognizable by an administrative agency be first presented to
it, rather than to the courts, but there is a further requirement
that the case must run the full gamut of administrative proceedings, before an application for judicial relief may be considered. This is the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. It means, in effect, that the administrative
agency is entitled to the first and last word. It must be given
an opportunity to speak first (this is the doctrine of prior
resort), and it cannot be deprived of the power to pass upon
the case until it has spoken its last word with reference
thereto.
While this requirement of exhausting administrative remedies has a somewhat different historical background than the
rule of prior resort, yet the two doctrines have developed
into complementary parts of a general principle which ordinarily serves to preclude judicial consideration of a question
while there remains any possibility of further administrative
action.
The reasons for the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies are basically the same as those which long
ago led to the adoption of the familiar tenet of appellate practice that appeals may be taken only from a final judgment. If
appeals to the courts were to be permitted while a matter was
still pending before an administrative agency, the result
would be productive of much confusion and delay. Piecemeal
litigation would be permitted. Many unnecessary and even
vexatious appeals would be taken. The work of the courts
would be needlessly increased. Further, the taking of such
17 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226 ( 1944).
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interlocutory appeals would interfere with the most effective
conduct of the work of the administrative agencies themselves.
Frequently, the rule has been applied in cases where equitable relief in the nature of an injunction is sought against an
administrative agency/8 and in such cases the result is often
premised on the maxim that equitable relief will not be
granted where some other adequate remedy is available. But
the reason for the rule goes further. It is applicable to proceedings at law as well as suits in equity. 19
The rule is said to be of special force where resort is had
to the federal courts to restrain the action of state o:ffi.cers,20
and in such cases it is sometimes suggested that a fundamental
18 Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Board of Public Works of West
Virginia, 172 U.S. 32, 19 S. Ct. 90 (1898); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 ( 1908); Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286
U.S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617 (1932).
19 First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners of County
of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385 (1924); Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 337,57 S. Ct. 816 (1937).
20 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 52 S. Ct. 217 (1932); Central
Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 290 U. S.
2 64, 54 S. Ct. 154 ( 19 3 3). Sometimes, proceedings in the state courts to review
and revise orders of state agencies are themselves administrative in character.
In such cases, a review of the order of the state agency in the federal courts
may not normally be had until the state courts have been appealed to [Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908); Porter v.
Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617 (1932); 287 U.S. 346, 53
S. Ct. 132 (1932) (rehearing)], save possibly in cases where confiscation is
presently in process and no relief to stay the confiscation may be had in the state
courts [Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 43 S. Ct. 353
( 1923) ], or where other unusual circumstances are present [City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., Executor v. Schnader, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 291 U. S.
24, 54 S. Ct. 259 (1934)]. The problem of seeking relief in the federal courts
from orders of state administrative agencies is further complicated by the
provisions of the Johnson Act, 50 Stat. 738, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1), limiting the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts to grant injunctive relief in various
types of cases where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the
state courts. Still further complications arise from the tendency of the federal
courts to extend the philosophy of the Johnson Act to cases where it does not
in terms apply [as in the case of an application for a declaratory judgmentGreat Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 63 S. Ct. 1070
( 1943)], and the general disinclination of the federal courts to pass upon
cases involving action of state administrative agencies, where questions of state
law are fundamentally involved. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643 (1941).
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basis of the rule is the principle that comity between different
departments of government requires that the federal courts
should stay their hand until the state administrative processes
have been completed. But the doctrine applies with just as
great rigor where the appeal is from an agency of the federal
government to the federal courts. Comity is not alone the
basis for the rule.
Again, it is sometimes said that the doctrine is related to
the familiar principle that official acts will be presumed to be
correct and lawful-that if an error is committed in the initial
steps of administrative activity it will be corrected by the
higher administrative authorities. 21
But the real basis for the rule is that it constitutes a doctrine
of self-limitation which the courts have evolved in marking
out the boundary line between the powers of the courts and
those of administrative agencies. While it is sometimes suggested that the rule is fundamentally one of discretion, and
may be relaxed in the sound judgment of the trial court,22
yet such relaxation may be expected only in those cases, discussed below, where it is said that the rule does not apply. In
general, it is to be considered a mandatory requirement-a
rule of judicial administration, and not merely one governing
the exercise of discretion. 23
(b) Instances of application of rule. Administrative appeals. It is very commonly held, in a wide variety of situations, that if the original administrative determination may be
appealed to an appellate administrative agency (or to a lower
court exercising administrative functions) such administrative
21 Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438, 45 S. Ct. 153
(1925).
22 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 58 S. Ct. 199 ( 1937).
23 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 3 o 3 U. S. 41, 5 1, 58 S. Ct. 4 59
(1938); Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 753, 67
S. Ct. 1493 (1947). See Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48
YALE L. J. 981 (1939), suggesting that the application of the doctrine should

not be deemed discretionary.
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remedies must be exhausted. Perhaps the most common instance of this application of the rule is in connection with state
tax administration.24 The rule has been frequently applied
under similar circumstances in connection with decisions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.25 It has been applied as to
various state agencies. 26 In cases where further administrative
appeals are provided for, the rule requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies appears clearly to be of general application, and one which may be invoked regardless of the
nature or particular function of the agency involved, except
as it may be modified by particular statutory enactment (cf.,
Section I o (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946).
Administrative consideration continuing. It is even clearer
that where the consideration of the case by the agency is still
continuing, and no decision has as yet been reached, the courts
will not normally interfere.27
Where it is claimed tribunal has no jurisdiction. The claim
that the agency is exceeding its jurisdiction in a pending case
is not ordinarily, in the federal courts at least, enough to afford a basis to transfer the proceedings into the courts, prior
to the completion of the administrative proceedings.28 In the
state courts, however, there is some tendency to hold that
where the jurisdiction of the agency is challenged, resort may
be had directly to the courts for a decision on this question. 29
24 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners
of County of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385 ( 1924).
25 E.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 54 S. Ct. 471
( 1934).
26 E.g., Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 S. Ct. 7
(1934).
2T New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U.S. 261, 13 S. Ct. 303 (1893); Oregon v.
Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 6o, 26 S. Ct. 568 (19o6).
28 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459
(1938); Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U, S. 160 1 47
S. Ct. 553 (1927); but cf., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land (App. D. C. 1945),
151 F. (2d) 292.
29 This is particularly true in tax cases. See, e.g., Koch v. City of Detroit,
236 Mich. 338, 210 N. W. 239 (1926).
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Where unconstitutional administrative action is asserted.
There are some suggestions that where it can be shown that
the prescribed administrative remedy fails to comply with the
requirements of procedural due process, the rule does not apply,30 but the cases are not clear enough to indicate that any
substantial relaxation of the rule is to be expected on this
basis. In the more common case, where the administrative
action is claimed to be unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts of the case, it is usually held that the administrative remedy must be pursued to the end,31 and this holding
seems to be fully in accord with requirements of orderly procedure and with the general principles on which the rule is
founded.
Where underlying statute is assailed. Where it is claimed
that the statute under which the agency is acting is itself unconstitutional, it may be that the question can be raised directly in the courts without first exhausting administrative proceedings.32 But this has not been clearly established.33
(c) When is administrative remedy exhausted? Administrative proceedings frequently assume the character of a
seamless web, which goes on and on and then starts over; and
consequently questions sometimes arise, in connection with
the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies, as to
when this requirement has been satisfied.
Motions for rehearing. One of the most perplexing questions is whether the party seeking to appeal the administrative decision must file a motion for a rehearing of his case
30 Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 54 S. Ct. 7I2 (I934); Munn v.
Des Moines Nat. Bank (C.C.A. 8th I927), I8 F. (2d) 269; Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. v. Ogden Levee Dist. (C.C.A. 8th I926), IS F. (2d) 637.
31 First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners of County
of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385 (I924).
32 Buder v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis (C.C.A. 8th I927 ), I6 F. (2d) 990.
33 See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission of State of New York,
z66 U. S. 265, 45 S. Ct. So ( I924); and Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 YALE L. ]. 98 I ( I939).
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before the highest administrative body, before taking the case
into the courts.
A comparatively early decision 34 indicated that application
for rehearing was not a condition precedent to judicial relief
when the pertinent statute merely conferred the privilege of
filing such a motion, but did not make it mandatory, and the
granting of the motion was entirely within the discretion of
the agency. A number of subsequent decisions followed this
holding, and it was commonly supposed that if the agency
had already passed on the specific contentions which would be
advanced in the motion for a rehearing, it was unnecessary to
take this formal step. But later decisions cast doubt on the
rule so stated. 35 It is now said by the Supreme Court that
while there is "no fixed rule" requiring the filing of such a
motion, yet it is to be considered a condition precedent to the
right to seek judicial review where such device would offer
"a new opportunity to obtain critical administrative review of
the question." 36 The controlling inquiry in each case thus becomes whether or not a motion for rehearing would result in
the agency's giving to the question involved its further considered attention. If such would be the case, the motion
should be filed. Whether such would be the case depends, of
course, on many factors which cannot be foretold in advance.
The only safe rule of practice, consequently, is to file such a
motion where provision therefor is made (unless the controlling statute makes it unnecessary, as appears to be the case
34 Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 2.62. U. S. 43, 43 S. Ct. 466
(192.3).
35 Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission
(App. D. C. 1938), 98 F. (:~.d) 2.82.; Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963 (1938); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Slattery, 302. U.S. 3oo, 58 S. Ct. 199 (1937); Peoria Braumeister Co.
v. Yellowley (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 12.3 F. (:~.d) 637.
36 Levers v. Anderson, 32.6 U. S. 2.19, 2.2.4, 66 S. Ct. 72. ( 1945 ), where the
Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that on the particular facts
involved, the application was merely a "normal, formal type of motion" and
not a condition to judicial review.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
in certain situations under Section 10 (c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of I 946).
Indications of adverse decision. Normally, a justifiable belief that the agency will decide the case adversely to the litigant does not excuse going through with the administrative
proceedings to their bitter end before seeking judicial review.
Newspaper stories, declarations of counsel, or general statements by the agency as to its contemplated action are not
normally enough to show that the final result of the administrative action is so well known as to make resort to the administrative process merely a waste of time. 37 But in rare cases,
where it can be shown that the final decision has in fact been
reached, and that nothing remains but the preparation and
entry of the formal order, it may be held that resort to the
courts is not premature, even though the administrative formalities have not been completed.38
Unreasonable delay. If delay on the part of an agency in
deciding a case is so long and unreasonable, and so productive
of hardship as to evidence a complete disregard of a party's
substantial rights, it may be considered that all effective possibilities of obtaining administrative relief have been exhausted, and an appeal to the courts permitted.39
3· Estoppel by Reason of Failing to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies
Ordinarily, when a petition seeking judicial redress of alleged administrative error is denied on the grounds that the
petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedy, it
only means that the party must go back to the administrative
agency and proceed to exhaust the remedies there available to
37

Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 49 S. Ct. 282

(1929).
38 City Bank Farmers Trust Co., Executor v. Schnader, Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, 291 U.S. 24, 54 S. Ct. 259 ( 1934).
39 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 2 70 U. S. 58 7, 46 S. Ct. 408 ( 192 6).
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him. It occasionally happens, however, that after such an attempt to take the case into the courts has been rebuffed, the
petitioner finds that it is too late to seek further administrative consideration of the case. The administrative remedies
which he failed to exhaust in the first instance are no longer
available. The unfortunate petitioner in such cases must go
without relief. He is deprived of the chance to have a hearing
on his claim, before either the administrative agency or the
courts.
This is the so-called doctrine of estoppel for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. It amounts to no more than
applying the usual doctrine in cases where the results may be
disastrous.
The principle is dramatically illustrated by the decision in
National Labor Relations Board v. Fairchild Engine and
Airplane Corporation/0 where the respondent undertook to
prove certain facts by a witness who testified to them from
hearsay. The trial examiner ruled that in view of the circumstances of the case the hearsay would not be received. At the
conclusion of the day's hearings, late in the afternoon, respondent offered to produce on the following day a witness
who could testify to the facts in question from personal
knowledge. The trial examiner refused to continue the hearing to permit this to be done; and the record was closed
without this evidence; and the Board made a finding against
respondent. On proceedings brought to enforce the order of
the Board, the Court held that while this action of the trial
examiner was arbitrary and unreasonable, still no relief could
be afforded, because of the failure of the respondent to apply
for leave to introduce additional testimony. 41 Accordingly, an
40 (C.C.A. 4th 1944), 145 F. (zd) 214.
41 Since such application could have been made directly to the court, it might
be said that there was involved something more than a failure to exhaust an
administrative remedy; but the case really falls within the same principle.
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order was entered enforcing the Board's order. It was too late
for respondent to obtain any relief from arbitrary administrative action.
The doctrine of estoppel is savagely harsh. There is some
doubt to what extent it applies outside of cases where strong
reasons of public convenience require that a final and unassailable determination be speedily reached. Typical of this
category, of course, are tax cases, where the constant pressing
need for the prompt collection of the public revenues is so
dominant a factor in judicial thinking. It is in tax cases that
the doctrine has most frequently been applied. A leading case
is First National Bank v. Board of Commissioners of Weld
County/ 2 where the taxpayer's complaint was that its property had been assessed far above market value, while property
of other taxpayers had been assessed not in excess of market
value. In this type of case, of course, an assessment is ordinarily deemed void. But in the reported case, the taxpayer
had neglected to appeal to the state tax commission or the
state board of equalization; and a demurrer to its action to
recover the excess taxes paid was upheld on the grounds that
it had failed to exhaust administrative remedies which were
available. After the defeat in the lawsuit, it was too late for
the taxpayer to go back to the administrative authorities to
obtain relief.
Even in tax cases, there are decisions which refuse to apply
the doctrine where resort to the administrative remedy would
be plainly futile or inadequate,48 or where the tax statute was
void. 44
42 264 U.S.
43 Montana

450,44 S. Ct. 385 (1924).
Nat. Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County of Montana, 276
U.S. 499,48 S. Ct. 331 (1928); Munn v. Des Moines Nat. Bank (C.C.A. 8th
1927), 18 F. (2d) 269.
44 Buder v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis (C.C.A. 8th 192.7), 16 F. (zd) 990.
See E. B. Stason, "Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort
to Administrative Remedies," 28 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1930).
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But despite the association of the estoppel rule with tax
cases, and the fact that even in that field the doctrine is not
unswervingly applied where the resulting inequities would
shock the judicial conscience, it cannot be assumed that the
doctrine is limited to the tax field. It has been applied in other
situations and is seemingly of general application. 45
45 See Johnson v. United States (C.C.A. 8th 1942.), 12.6 F. (2.d) 2.42.; and
Leebern v. United States (C.C.A. sth 1941), 12.4 F. (2d) sos.
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The Scope of Judicial Review
A. FAcToRs AFFECTING ScoPE oF REVIEW

T

HE factors determining the scope and extent of
judicial review of administrative decisions are essentially temporal in nature, varying with the attitude of
the particular court, the subject of the administrative activity,
the reputation of the particular tribunal involved, the method
by which review is obtained, and other elements which vary
widely from case to case. Any specific conclusions as to what
questions will be considered by the reviewing court must be
reached on the basis of a detailed study of cases involving a
particular agency.
But this does not mean that the forest must be examined
tree by tree. Out of the confusing welter of decisions there
appear certain broad trends--certain indications of the factors
which influence courts in their determination of the extent to
which they will review decisions of administrative agencies.
Analysis of these factors affords some guide-only tentative,
but still of practical value-in determining the scope of review likely to be afforded in a situation involving a new
agency or a new issue, as to which there has been no direct
pronouncement defining the scope of review.
In viewing the decisions for purposes of such horizontal
classification, the question is not so much the precise extent
to which the courts will review the correctness and validity
of factual inferences or statutory interpretations made by the
Interstate Commerce Commission or by the Federal Trade
Commission or some other agency; but rather the inquiry is
why the courts examine more searchingly the rulings made
by one agency than those made by another. If the reason can
330
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be discovered, some basis will be afforded for predicting the
extent to which the courts will review rulings to be made by
new tribunals whose decisions will be subjected to judicial
scrutiny in future years.
I.

Methods of Review

The extent of review is often controlled by limitations
inherent in the procedural method by which the question is
presented to the reviewing court. 1
(a) Statutory methods of review. Where the statute setting up the agency makes specific provision for judicial review
of the agency's determinations, the statutory method is ordinarily exclusive, and courts will but seldom permit the employment of any other procedural device (such as a writ of
mandamus, or petition for certiorari) as a means of bringing
the administrative determination into court for purposes of
review. 2
While the statutes seldom prescribe the scope of review
(except in terminology so vague as to leave the determination
of the actual extent of review to the courts) yet the fact that
the statutory method is exclusive often operates indirectly to
limit the scope of review. The statutory method may be inappropriate for the raising of certain q~estions that could be
raised if other procedural devices were available.
So far as the statute does set out some indication of the
permissible scope of review, it is controlling, subject only to
constitutional requirements which preclude vesting in the
1 The general problem is thoroughly discussed by E. B. Stason, "Methods
of Judicial Relief from Administrative Tribunals," 24 A. B. A. J. 274
(1938); and McAllister, "Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders," z8 CAL. L. REV. 129 (1940).
2 Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375,
58 S. Ct. 963 (1938); United Employees Ass'n v. National Labor Relations
Board (C.C.A. 3d 1938), 96 F. (zd) 875; Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Alexander, 306 U.S. 615, 59 S. Ct. 489 (1939), aff'g (D. C. D. C. 1938), 24
F. Supp. 88o; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Andrews (C.C.A. zd
1937), 88 F. (2d) 441.
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courts revisory powers so broad as to amount to a delegation
of administrative duties, 3 and which preclude depriving the
courts of the power to review constitutional questions and
essential questions of statutory construction.4
(b) Common-law methods of review. In appropriate
cases-usually, where no specific statutory method is provided 5-relief may be had by virtue of the common-law
writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition; or by their
statutory counterparts. Where such method of review is employed, the extent of relief is governed primarily by the
limitations inherent in these procedural devices.
Certiorari. Certiorari is not ordinarily available in the
federal courts as a device to review administrative orders.6
In the state courts, it is probably the most commonly employed device to review orders of state tribunals; and while
the questions which may be raised on certiorari proceedings
vary widely in different states, depending on the effect of
statutory modifications of the common-law scope of the writ,
yet in general the extent of review available on certiorari
proceedings is somewhat circumscribed. It is of course effective to raise questions as to the jurisdiction of the agency;
and the general tendency in the state courts is to hold that
when the writ is directed to an administrative agency, the
court is enabled to pass upon (a) questions of law appearing
on the face of the record, and (b) claims that the adminis3 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50
S. Ct. 389 (1930); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751
(1933); Courter v. Simpson Construction Co., 264 Ill. 488, 106 N. E. 350
(1914).
4 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932); cf., Otis Elevator
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19 (1922).
5 Or where the statutory method of review does not cover the particular
situation involved. Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 59
S. Ct. 160 (1938); Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission,
3o6 u.s. 5 6, 5 9 s. Ct. 409 (1939).
6 Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. r6z, 33 S. Ct. 639 ( 1913); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 S. Ct. 789 ( 1904).
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trative order 1s plainly irregular or illegal. 7 Questions as to
the weight of the evidence, of course, cannot be reviewed
on certiorari proceedings.
The availability of judicial relief by way of a writ of
certiorari is also limited by the doctrine that certiorari will
lie only where the decision of the agency is judicial in
character, rather than legislative or purely administrative.
On the question as to when the agency's determination is to
be described as judicial, there is of course a contrariety of
opinion. Thus, denial of a certificate of convenience and
necessity to a public utility has been described as judicial; 8
while the revocation of such a certificate has been described
as nonjudiciaP The conclusion in each case is apparently
affected by (a) the court's judgment as to the desirability
of reviewing a particular type of determination; and (b) by
the availability of other methods of review-the courts being
inclined to permit the use of the writ where no other method
of review would be open. Many of the state court decisions
(but not all of them) can be reconciled on the basis that
where the agency is required to grant a hearing and there
consider a claim of legal right, the proceeding will be deemed
reviewable by certiorari; and conversely the writ is not
usually available where the agency is not required to grant
a hearing.
lld.andamus. In the comparatively few cases where mandamus is available to review agency determinations, the area
of review is closely circumscribed by the nature of the writ.
It is available as a means of compelling an officer or agency
7Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444 (r872); Jackson v. People,
9 Mich. rrr ( r86o); comment, "Review of Acts of Non-Judicial Bodies by
Certiorari," 19 lA. L. REV. 6o9 (1934).
8 People ex rel. Steward v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 160 N. Y.
zo2, 54 N. E. 697 (1899).
9 People ex rel. Keating v. Bingham, 138 App. Div. 736, IZJ N.Y. S. 506
(191o); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public-Service Commission,
r8r Ga. 75, r8r S. E. 834 (1935).
·
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to perform a purely ministerial act where refusal to perform
it violates a clearly established legal right, and it can be
utilized to compel an agency to assume jurisdiction over a
case which it is the duty of the agency to decide; 10 but it
can seldom if ever be employed as a means of raising any
other question of law. It does not reach questions of fact
decided by the administrative agency.
Its only substantial function, then, is to compel an agency
to perform its clear legal duty; and if any doubt is raised
as to the existence of a strict and undoubted legal right in
the petitioner to the claimed relief, the writ may be denied. 11
Thus, mandamus is unavailable where the act which petitioner seeks to compel the agency to perform is one involving
some measure of discretion. A modicum of discretionary
power is sufficient to render nugatory mandamus proceedings.
Thus, where the requested administrative action involves the
construction of a statute, the action of the agency is said by
the federal courts, at least, to involve a measure of discretion,
making mandamus unavailable. 12 Many of the state courts,
however, will review some issues of statutory construction
on mandamus.
Where the agency performs a judicial function, the courts
will not, on mandamus proceedings, direct the agency as to
what decision to make on a legal question involved in the
administrative proceeding .13
Even where a strict legal right on the part of the petitioner
can be shown, relief may be denied on the basis that mandamus is an equitable remedy, which should not be granted
10 Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474, 32 S. Ct. 556 (1912).
11 United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U. S. 540, 57
S. Ct. 855 (I 9 3 7). See Sherwood, "Mandamus to Review State Administrative
Action," 45 MICH. L. REV. 123 (1946), for a general discussion of the
availability of mandamus to review administrative proceedings.
12 United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343, 41 S. Ct. 131 (1920);
Thomas v. Vinson (App. D. C. 1946), 153 F. (zd) 636.
13 People ex rel. McCabe v. Matthies, 179 N. Y. 242, 72 N. E. 103 ( 1904).
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unless the inconvenience to the government is more than
counterbalanced by a resulting substantial benefit to the petitioner.14 On similar grounds, relief by mandamus is ordinarily
denied where it can be shown that some other assertedly
adequate remedy is available.15
In the federal courts, the usefulness of this writ is further
impaired by the circumstance that (save for the courts of
the District of Columbia, which have inherited some of the
common-law powers of the Maryland courts) 16 the district
courts have no general original power to issue writs of mandamus, but may grant the writ only in aid of already acquired
jurisdiction/7 or as empowered by statute in specific cases.
The writ is rarely available to review determinations of federal agencies, for the state courts may not issue the writ
against federal officers. 18
Prohibition. The writ of prohibition, where available, raises
only the single question as to whether the agency, in connection with the performance of a judicial function, is unlawfully
assuming a power it cannot legally exercise, because beyond
its statutory jurisdiction. It will not issue to prevent the
performance of executive or ministerial functions/ 9 in the
absence of specific statutory provisions, such as are found in
a few states. It is unavailable in the federal courts.20
14 United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352, 53 S. Ct. 614
( 1933); Matter of Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N. Y. 358, 182
N. E. 16 (1932).
15 United States ex rel. Frey v. Robertson (App. D. C. 1933), 63 F. (2d)
457; United States ex rel. Carroll Electric Co. v. McCarl (App. D. C. 1925),
8 F. (2d) 910.
16 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 524 (1838). See Miller,
"Control of the Interstate Commerce Commission by Mandamus," 4 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. ll8 (1935).
17 Bath County v. Amy, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 244 (1871); Labette County
Commissioners v. United States, 112 U.S. 217, 5 S. Ct. 108 (1884).
18M'Clung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 598 (1821).
19Lodge v. Fletcher, 184 Mass. 238, 68 N. E. 204 (1903); Butler v.
Selectmen of Wakefield, 269 Mass. 585, 169 N. E. 498 (1930) 1 and cases
cited in annotation, 115 A. L. R. 3; 159 A. L. R. 627.
2o 34 CoL. L. REv. 899, 905 (1934).
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(c) Collateral attack. The extremely limited scope of review which may be obtained by means of the common-law
writs, and their unavailability in many types of situations,
has rendered it necessary to employ various methods of collateral attack as a means of reviewing administrative determinations, in cases where no statutory method of review is
provided or where the method of review provided by statute
is inadequate. The usual methods of collateral attack employed are (1) bills for injunction; (2) damage actions
against administrative officers; (3) actions for restitution;
and (4) actions for declaratory judgments. 21
Bills for injunction. Not infrequently, statutory provisions
authorize the filing of a bill for injunction to review particular agency determinations, and in such cases, the scope of
review is determined on the same basis as in other instances
where review is by statutory method. So far as the statute
specifies the extent of review which is to be had, the statute
is controlling. To the extent that the statute is silent as to
the intended breadth of review, the question is one for the
courts, to be determined in accordance with the general principles discussed infra.
Only where there is no such statutory provision does an
application for injunctive relief assume the true character
of a collateral attack. In such instances, it must usually be
shown, in order to sustain the bill, that the agency action
complained of is void rather than merely erroneous/2 that
21 While perhaps not strictly a method of collateral attack, petitions for
declaratory judgment have recently become available as an effective method
for raising questions as to the jurisdiction of an agency and as to the validity
of agency rules. See cases collected in note: Stason, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, zd ed. (I947) 599-6oq and I49 A. L. R. 349· For law review comment, see Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law,"
I I N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. I 3 9 ( I 9 3 3) ; Ellingwood, "Declaratory Judgments in
Public Law," 29 ILL. L. REV. I, I74 (I934); Martin, "The Declaratory
Judgment Act in Public Law Controversies," 7 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 5I4
(r939); Davison, "Administrative Legislation," 34 ILL, L. REv. 65I (I940),
22 Stone v. Heath, I79 Mass. 385, 6o N. E. 975 (I90I).
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irreparable injury would be suffered,23 and that there is no
adequate remedy at law. 24
A bill for an injunction may be utilized, typically, to
review an assertion that a statute is unconstitutional, or that
enforcement of a particular order will result in a deprival of
due process. It is employed frequently in tax cases. However,
application of general doctrines of equity as to the availability
and functions of injunctive remedies circumscribes the utility
of this device as a means of obtaining a general review of the
fairness, justice, or legal correctness of the determinations of
administrative agencies.
Damage actions against administrative officers. Historically, the basic common-law remedy for the protection of an
individual against illegal official action was a private action
for damages. In such a case, if the plaintiff could show that
the action of the officer was a private wrong (not justifiable
under the statute), he was entitled to recover damages. The
issue thus presented was whether or not an officer was legally
entitled to do what he did do in the particular case-whether
the law authorized his conduct under the circumstances. Obviously, the scope of review in such an action was necessarily
limited. Because of these obvious inadequacies of this common-law remedy, indeed, it became largely displaced by the
familiar bill for an injunction. However, the remedy is still
available, and is occasionally used. 25
The older cases allowed recovery quite freely, not only
for action under an unconstitutional statute, but also in cases
where, because of a mistaken determination of fact, the officer
took some action not authorized by the statute. Thus, where
an officer was authorized to destroy diseased cattle, and (on
finding cattle to be diseased) destroyed them, but a jury later
California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 59 S. Ct. 166 (1938).
24 Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 52 S. Ct. 267 ( 1932).
25 Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S.
118,59 s. Ct. 366 (1939).
23
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found that the cattle had not in fact been diseased, it was said
that the officer had killed cattle which were not diseased, and
had hence committed a wrong which could not be justified
under the statute, and was therefore liable in damages. 26 But
the results of this doctrine were unsatisfactory. The danger
of an administrative official subjecting himself to substantial
personal liability-if a jury, trying the factual question de
novo (and often on less complete evidence than that on which
the officer acted) should determine the factual question differently than the officer had-was an obvious deterrent to
yigilant administrative enforcement. Further, the theory of
according greater weight to the jury's fact finding than to
the factual determination of the administrative officer was
completely at odds with fundamental tenets of the doctrine
of administrative expertise. Consequently, as a means of
avoiding the harsh results of the rule, some courts developed
a theory that where the administrative function is judicial in
character (or quasi-judicial, as it has been commonly called),
the administrative officer is exempt from liability so long as
he acts within his jurisdiction and in good faith. 27 Sometimes
it is said that the immunity is available only where no property right is invaded, but the courts have gone far, in order
to protect an officer, in finding this requirement satisfied. 28
Actions for restitution. Closely related to the damage
action is a private suit seeking restitution of moneys collected
by an administrative officer or agency, which are alleged to
have been improperly collected. The typical case is the suit
to recover taxes paid under protest.
26
27

Lowe v. Conroy, r2o Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (r9o4).
See note, 34 MICH. L. REV. II3 (1935); Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. So
(r883); Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa 244, ro8 N. W. 311 (r9o6);
Williams v. Rivenburg, 145 App. Div. 93, 129 N.Y. S. 473 (r9rr).
28 For example, it was held in Wasserman v. City of Kenosha, 2 r 7 Wis. 223,
2 58 N. W. 857 (I 9 35), that revocation of a building permit did not invade
any property right, and that therefore an officer who revoked the permit was
not liable for damages.
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At common law, there was doubt whether such an action
could be maintained unless the actions of the administrative
officer were void, rather than merely erroneous.29 In most of
the states, and under various federal statutes, these actions
are now controlled by specific statutory provision, and the
question as to the scope of review is primarily a question as
to what the statute provides.
2.

"Facts" v. "Law" as a Criterion of Review

The classical dichotomy (asserting that the courts should
judicially review questions of law passed on by administrative
agencies, but should not review their determinations of fact,
beyond ascertaining whether the determinations are supported by substantial evidence) is of little use as a working
tool. One cannot predict the scope of review which will be
accorded by ascertaining whether the question involved is
one of law or of fact.
The basic reason for this, as pointed out in the classic
statement of Dickinson/0 is that there is no fixed distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law, but "The
knife of policy alone affects an artificial cleavage." What
would be considered in many connections as a question of
law-e. g., a question as to whether, on stated facts, the
relationship between two parties is that of employer and
employee or independent contractor,31 or a question of reasonableness 32-may be treated as a question of fact to eliminate
judicial review, where considerations of policy dictate such
results. On the other hand, determinations which are labeled
findings of fact, may be treated as involving questions of law,
29 United States Trust Co. of New York v. Mayor, etc., of City of New
York, 144 N.Y. 488, 39 N. E. 383 (1895).
30 Dickinson, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW
(1927) 55·
31 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 3:u U. S.
111, 64 S. Ct. 851 ( 1944).
3 2 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 325 U. S. 365,
6s s. Ct. 1232 (1945).
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and subject to review. 33 The distinction, as the Supreme Court
has said, "is often not an illuminating test and is never selfexecuting." 34 Judges may often disagree as to whether a
question is one of fact or of law; and the disagreement reflects merely different judgments as to the proper extent of
review. 35
Even if it can be agreed that a certain issue is one of fact
or of law, the question as to the actual scope of review is
still unanswered. As to whether a factual determination is
supported by substantial evidence, judges of a court often
disagree, the disagreement representing different philosophies
as to the proper scope of review. And where the question is
one of law, there still remains the question as to whether the
court should ascertain merely whether the decision has "a
reasonable basis in the law" or whether the court should
determine the law question independently. Judgment on all
these points reflects no logical distinctions but represents rather a delicate balancing of many imponderable policy factors.
As it is well stated by Justice Brandeis: 36 ". • • in deciding
when, and to what extent, finality may be given to an administrative finding of fact involving the taking of property, the
court has refused to be governed by a rigid rule. It has
33 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 1 64 S. Ct. 1240 (1944) 1
where the court pointed out that the determination of the so-called ultimate
facts "implies the application of standards of law," and declared that in such
cases "the conclusion that may appropriately be drawn from the whole mass of
evidence is not always the ascertainment of the kind of 'fact' that precludes
consideration by this Court." Cf., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. :u6,
236, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1945), where the court said, "State courts cannot avoid
review by this Court of their disposition of a constitutional claim by casting
it in the form of an unreviewable finding of fact."
34 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 64 S. Ct. 1240 (1944).
1
35 E.g., majority and dissenting opinions in Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 1
62 S. Ct. 326 (1941).
36 Concurring opinion, St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U. S. 38, 81, 56 S. Ct. 720 ( 1936). How such considerations may affect the
scope of review is pointed out in McDermott, "To What Extent Should the
Decisions of Administrative Bodies be Reviewable by the Courts?" 25 A. B.
A.]. 453 (1939).
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weighed the relative values of constitutional rights, the essentials of powers conferred, and the need of protecting both. It
has noted the distinction between informal, summary administrative action . . . and formal, deliberate, quasi-judicial
decisions. . . . It has considered the nature of the facts in
issue, the character of the relevant evidence, the need in the
business of government for prompt final decision. . . . It
has enquired into the character of the administrative tribunal
provided and the incidents of its procedure."
Whether the question be one of fact or law, the scope of
review does not depend on any logical or mechanical classification of the issue under one category or the other. Rather,
the extent to which the court will review the agency's determination depends on more vital factors. These factors reflect
the court's judgment as to the appropriate spheres of administrative and judicial activity. The judgment on this ultimate
question is based not on logic but on experience and philosophy.
3· Conduct of Public Business v. Regulation of Private
Business
The distinction between the regulation of private business
and the conduct of public business furnishes a criterion capable of fairly definite and objective application as a basis on
which to predict the scope of judicial review that will be
afforded.
Where the purpose of the administrative tribunal is to
discharge a function which is essential to the perpetuation
of government itself, far different considerations apply than
where the tribunal's purpose is to regulate the conduct of
private business enterprise.
In administrative determinations which are incidental to
the conduct of the public business, there are many cases where
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the sovereign's free will is unfettered-where decisions do
not determine legal rights, but merely establish the extent
of a privilege which the government is free to grant or deny,
as in public lands and veteran's pension cases, or the granting
of licenses to establish businesses of the sort which the government may regulate to the point of extinction, like saloons
and public dance halls.37 In other instances, legal rights are
to a larger degree involved, but the need for a prompt determination of the dispute is more impelling than the need for
a detailed reconsideration of each case. Thus, in immigration
matters, the courts have been willing to sacrifice some doubts
as to the correctness and justice of individual determinations
because of the practical necessity for the speedy disposition of
such cases. 38 In tax cases and customs cases, the courts, recognizing the overwhelming public interest in the prompt collection of the public revenues in order to permit the uninterrupted operation of governmental processes, accord a large
degree of finality to administrative decisions. 39
On the other hand, where the incidence of the administrative function falls primarily on the conduct of private
business, the administration's demands for autonomy are less
persuasive. The courts have clearly recognized a need for
more extensive review where administrative determinations
directly affect the operation of business enterprise. 40 In this
37 United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 2.3
S. Ct. 698 (1903); United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 S.
Ct. 12 (1888); Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. p, 19 S. Ct. 317 (1899);
State of Kansas v. Sherow, 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866 ( 1912); State ex rel.
Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S. E. 686 (1889); McMillan v. Sims, 132 Wash. 265, 231 Pac. 943 (1925).
38 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 2.53 U. S. 454, 40 S. Ct. 566 (1920); Van
Vleck, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932) Ch. V.
39 Passavant v. United States, 148 U. S. 214, I 3 S. Ct. 5 72 ( 1893) ; Stason,
"Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to Administrative
Remedies," 2.8 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1930).
40 West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U. S.
662, 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S.
134, 53 S. Ct. 52. (1932); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 180 U.S.
19, so s. Ct. I (1929).
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field, overly drastic restrictions of judicial review might serve
ultimately to impair rather than foster the effectiveness of
governmental processes; a reasonably broad review helps to
maintain public confidence in the fairness of the administrative activity.
There are some agencies which neither carry on the necessary business of government nor regulate the actual operation
of private business, but are rather charged with the duty of
enforcing a general rule of conduct prescribed by statute.
Thus, the National Labor Relations Board does not actually
regulate industry (as the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates the investment banking business and some corporate reorganizations) but merely insists that industry in
the conduct of business shall not transgress certain standards
of behavior prescribed by Congress. Where such is the nature
of the agency's task, it impinges less substantially on the
conduct of private affairs. It does not regulate, but merely
polices. In such cases, the trend is in the direction of a narrowing scope of review.
4· Legislative v. Judicial Powers
Another guide which is of some assistance in predicting
the scope of review which will be allowed in particular cases
is based on the distinction between those administrative functions which are basically of a legislative character and those
which are essentially judicial in nature. Administrative agencies act in three fields: (a) those which are traditionally
deemed executive or administrative; (b) those in which the
agency makes rules analogous to legislative enactments; and
(c) those in which the determinative functions resemble so
closely the processes of the constitutional courts that frankness compels the application of the adjective "judicial."
So far as the action is purely executive or ministerial,
judicial review may be limited to a determination that the
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agency has kept within its statutory powers and has followed
statutory procedure. 41 The field of executive action is traditionally one for comparatively unbridled administrative
discretion.
Where, however, the agency fulfills a function that is
traditionally legislative, less freedom from control is permitted. A standard must be set up by which the agency's acts
are to be measured. The courts must determine whether a
proper standard has been set up, and whether the agency has
complied with that standard. 42 The judicial approach is somewhat similar to that employed when a statute is attacked on
constitutional grounds-highest respect is shown for the legislative or administrative determination, but the courts must
intervene when the bounds imposed by the enabling enactments are overreached.
When the agency exercises judicial powers, it passes on
questions intimately associated with personal rights of liberty
and property, presented in a form readily susceptible to
judicial consideration. Judicial review is likely to be granted
at least to the extent of passing on vital issues of statutory
construction, scrutinizing claims that the agency has violated
those ordinary decencies of judicial procedure that constitute
the requirements of procedural due process; 43 determining
whether it has decided cases on the basis of matters not before
the agency or on preformed opinions; 44 and deciding whether
its findings are supported by substantial evidence.
41 Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N. E. (2d) 281 (1938); Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, so S. Ct. 389 (1930).
42 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S.
Ct. 837 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241
(1935); State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,
220 N. W. 929 (1928).
4 3 Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission (App.
D. C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 517; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913).
44 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 55 S. Ct.
462 (1935); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (App. D. C. 1938), 96 F. (2d) 564.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

345

5. Discretionary Powers
If an administrative agency is in fact endowed with truly
discretionary powers, judicial review of its discretionary acts
may properly be denied. 45 An act of free discretion, referable
to no fixed standard except governmental desire, is not appropriate for judicial review. 46
But instances are uncommon where an agency exercises
pure and untrammeled discretionary powers. Rarely is an
agency of the government granted discretionary powers as
broad as those of its principal. Usually, the delegated discretion is limited to interstitial legislative powers-to the determination, within stated limits, of the proper means of executing a stated legislative purpose. In such cases, review is
appropriate to determine whether the agency's discretion was
controlled by improper considerations-whether its discretion
was abused. 47
Control of discretion is not typically a judicial function,
nor is there promise of any assured gain to be derived from
superimposing the discretion of the judge upon that of the
administrator. Rather, the problem of controlling the scope
of administrative discretion is fundamentally political; it is
for the legislature, primarily, to determine the breadth of
discretionary power to be vested in a branch of the government which is comparatively free of popular control. The
most that the courts can do is to ascertain that the administrative action has not exceeded the limits of the delegated
discretion.
45 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 48 S. Ct.
587 (1928); City of Chicago v. Kirkland (C.C.A. 7th 1935), 79 F. (2d)
963. See Treves, "Administrative Discretion and Judicial Control," 10 Mon.
L. REV. 276 (1947).
46 People ex rel. Keating v. Bingham, 138 App. Div. 736, 123 N.Y. S. 506
(1910). Provisions allowing review in such cases may be unconstitutional.
Norwalk Street Railway Company's Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 37 Atl. 1o8o
(1897).
47 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 32 S. Ct.
22 (1911); City of Monticello v. Bates, 169 Ky. 258, 183 S. W. 555 (1916).
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Hence, when an agency asserts that its decision is nonreviewable, because reached in the exercise of its discretionary
power, the first task of the reviewing court is to determine
to what extent the agency's powers are discretionary. 48 The
court must then ascertain whether the agency has exceeded
these limits. If it has stayed within the area of delegated
discretion, there is no further question presented.
6. Character of Administrative Procedure
Because of the duty of the courts to review assertions that
the course of proceedings adopted by an agency constituted
a deprival of procedural due process, the scope and extent
of review is affected indirectly by the character of the agency's
procedure. The more summary the administrative procedure,
the more searching must judicial review be in order to permit
the court to determine whether perfunctory adherence to
customary forms masks arbitrary or capricious action. Similarly, where investigatory, prosecuting, and adjudicatory
powers are combined in a single agency-and particularly
where they are not rigidly divided between separate departments of that agency-searching inquiry may be required to
determine whether there has been any infringement of the
guaranties of fair procedure. 49
Conversely, where the determination is based on evidentiary findings, made after a formal hearing at which there
was afforded ample opportunity to present testimony and
meet the arguments of the adverse party-where the procedure is essentially that of a legislative court-the inclination
of the courts is to probe less deeply. In other words, the
48 Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 24 S. Ct. 595 (1904); Yudelson v. Andrews (C.C.A. 3d 1928), 25 F. (2d) So; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
Brady (C.C.A. 4th 1932), 61 F. (2d) 242.
49 It has been suggested that § 10 (3) (5) of the Administrative Procedure
Act authorizes the determination de novo by the reviewing court of the facts
pertinent to any relevant question of law, in cases where the agency's determination was not based on a statute-required hearing. See Congressional
Debate, "The Congressional Record," May 24, 1946, 5654, 5657.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

347

character of the administrative procedure affects the scope of
judicial review to the extent that suspicions of arbitrary or
careless administration prompt the courts to examine carefully the fairness of the procedures adopted.
Aside from this, the character of the administrative procedure may affect the scope of judicial review in another way.
If the procedure is such as to beget lack of confidence in the
probable correctness of the administrative determination,
there is an inclination to allow a fuller review. Thus, it has
been suggested that the doctrine according great weight to
administrative findings of fact "has and should have" little
bearing on certain findings of the Patent Office because of the
ex parte nature of the particular proceedings, allowing interested parties but a limited opportunity to be heard. 50
7. Experience of Agency
Both in legislative and judicial spheres of administrative
activity, the experience of the particular agency is a factor
which plays some part in judicial determination as to the
proper extent of review. The greater experience an agency
may possess, the greater confidence will be indulged by the
courts in its decisions. The high quality of performance
demonstrated by the Interstate Commerce Commission had
won for its determinations the respect of the courts even
before the Federal Trade Commission, for example, was
organized. 51 The latter body was, for a time, viewed somewhat with mistrust by the courts.52 In earlier days, for ex50 Opinion of Frank, J., concurring in Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corporation (C.C.A. 2d 1942), 130 F. (2d) 290, 294·
5l E.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U. S.
441, 27 S. Ct. 700 (1907); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185 (1913).
52 It is said that some ten years after the creation of the Federal Trade
Commission, one appellate judge confessed that when reviewing a determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was always his inclination to
affirm; and that when reviewing a determination of the Federal Trade Commission, he entertained some predisposition toward reversal. 24 A. B. A. J.
z8s (1938).
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ample, the courts were inclined to insist that its factual
inferences would be accepted only if they were "reasonable"
or "legitimate" or "necessary," and there was considerable
readiness to find the inferences unreasonable; 53 and similarly,
it was declared that what constituted unfair competition was a
question for the courts rather than for the agency. 54 But in
more recent years, as the courts have come to repose more
confidence in the Commission, its inferences have been more
readily accepted without review/ 5 and the courts give far
greater weight to the Commission's determination as to the
propriety or impropriety of a given trade practice.
The successful experience of an administrative agency is
the best criterion of its true expertness; and the pleas that
the expert knowledge of an administrative body should not
be jettisoned, carry far greater weight where the asserted
expertness has been demonstrated. 56
8. Miscellaneous Factors Affecting Likelihood of Fair Trial
The continued insistence of the courts on the maintenance
of standards of fair play in administrative procedure has led
reviewing judges to probe somewhat more deeply in cases
where factors are present which may make it difficult for the
53 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 6sr, 51 S. Ct.
587 (1931); Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n,
2.73 U.S. sz, 6r, 47 S. Ct. 255 (192.7).
54 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 2.53 U. S. 42.1, 40 S. Ct. 572.
(r92o); Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Pub. Co., z6o U. S. 568, 43
S. Ct. 210 (1923).
55 Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 65
S. Ct. 971 (1945); Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,
29I U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (I934).
56 Cf., the discussion in Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 6s
S. Ct. I 6 I (I 944), as to the reasons for giving weight to an interpretative
opinion of the Wage and Hour Division; and the reasons given in Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 32 I u. s. 144, I 56, 64 s. Ct. 474 ( 1944), for
refusing to follow the construction given a statute by the Office of Price
Administration.
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agency to observe high standards of fairness. 57 Political pressure is present in varying degrees in different tribunals. Its
significance, where present, is reflected by the frank statement of President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative
Management:
"
the independent comm1sswn is obliged to
carry on judicial functions under conditions which
threaten the impartial performance of the judicial
work. . . . Pressures and influences properly enough
directed toward officers responsible for formulating and
administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights." 58
Where the danger of improper political motivation is apparent, it is to be expected that judicial review will be somewhat
more searching.
·opportunities for reaching an unbiased decision are in
some fields rendered difficult by the highly subjective character of the inquiry. As has been wisely said, "The more
indefinite the standard, the greater is obviously the temptation to use the law as a weapon." 59 A familiar example of
the difficulty of applying vague standards is found in the
fields of economic legislation, operating in terms of fraud,
discrimination, monopoly, unreasonable charges, and similar
concepts. In fields where technical competence plays a large
part, and where a reasonably objective test is to be applied,
administrative conclusiveness is more readily conceded than
in fields where more judgment and less cold fact are in57 "Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert and imp<!,rtial, others
subservient." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 52, 56
S. Ct. 720 (1936).
5 8 Sen. Doc. No.8, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 68.
59 Freund, GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) 31.
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volved, and where distinctions between findings of fact and
conclusions of law are almost obliterated.

B.

ScoPE oF REVIEW ON APPEALs FROM DETERMINATIONS
OF SPECIFIC AGENCIES

Decisions laying down rules as to the extent of review
on appeals from the determinations of various particular
agencies illustrate the application of the general factors above
discussed.
I.

Workmen's Compensation Cases

The field of workmen's compensation presents a middle
ground, so far as concerns the scope of judicial review of
administrative determinations. Factors which in other types
of cases prompt the courts to examine with care the agency's
factual inferences are here lacking; but there are also absent
the factors which in some cases are effective to eliminate
review of issues involving questions that could be described
as issues of law.
Workmen's compensation commissions are engaged essentially in administering a social insurance program, the costs
of which are widely spread. The administrative activity does
not bear so directly or so oppressively on private affairs as
in cases where, for example, an agency undertakes to regulate
the trade practices of some particular industry. In some respects, the task of the compensation commissions is coming
to be viewed as the discharge of one of the normal functions
of government-like carrying mail or policing highway traffic. To the extent that the function is thus coming to be
considered as the conduct of the public business, there is a
growing tendency in the courts to restrict the scope of judicial
review. On the other hand, the compensation awards remain
a direct burden on the individual employer or his insurance
carrier, and a broader scope of review is granted than in cases
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where a purely public program is being carried out which
does not directly impinge on private rights of person or
property. 60
(a) Factors tending toward broad review. There are present in this field a number of factors which militate toward a
substantial degree of judicial review. Thus, in the first place,
the compensation commissions exercise a function which is
typically judicial-determining contested issues of fact and
law by hearing evidence and interpreting a governing statute.
The tendency to grant broader review where the agency exercises judicial functions is thus operative in cases of this type.
Secondly, the compensation commissions typically have but
a small measure of discretion-when the facts are found, the
decision must be based on the provisions of the controlling
statute. There is thus but little occasion to restrict review on
the principle that judicial respect and deference must be
accorded the judgment of the agency in matters involving
discretion. Thirdly, the law questions presented have a nontechnical background; courts feel themselves on familiar
grounds in considering such questions as the meaning of
"dependent," the significance of the phrase "arising out of
and in the course of employment," the definition of "engaged
in trade or business," and the like. Consequently, courts are
more ready to impose their own judgments than in fields
where the controlling statutes and regulations are cast in the
terminology of a complex, technical field.
(b) Factors tending toward narrow review. On the other
hand, there are also present factors which disincline the courts
to probe extensively into the intrinsic correctness of the administrative determination. For one thing, the courts exhibit
60

C/., the suggestion in Crowell v. Benson,

2.85

U. S. :u,

so,

52. S. Ct.

2.85

( 19 32), indicating that a narrower scope of review would have been afforded,

had the matter related solely to the conduct of public business. For a general
survey of the scope of review in workmen's compensation cases, see Horovitz,
"Modern Trends in Workmen's Compensation," 2.1 IND. L. J. 473 (1946).
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some tendency toward viewing it as socially desirable to
sustain the grant of compensation unless the decision is
plainly erroneous. The fact that the amount involved in the
individual case is not large likely contributes somewhat toward acceptance of this philosophy. There is little in the
character of the administrative procedure to create concern
or alarm. Judicial-type hearing procedures are usually employed, and there is seldom any serious question presented
as to the granting of a fair trial. Even where this point is
urged, the courts hear it with considerable scepticism.61 There
is usually but little if any political motivation in the functioning of compensation commissions, nor are such agencies often
exposed to questionable pressures. These factors likewise
incline the courts to accept the administrative determinations
as presumptively fair and just. Finally, the long experience
and demonstrated expertness of compensation commissions
operate to create judicial respect for the administrative determination.
(c) Fact and law. In reconciling these opposed tendencies,
the courts have been inclined to accept without critical examination determinations which are purely factual or based on
inferences as to the facts, but at the same time to describe
as issues of law and grant full review to issues of statutory ·
interpretation and application which in other types of cases
might be deemed nonreviewable issues of fact. Thus, the
question as to whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor is ordinarily deemed a reviewable
question of law in compensation cases; whereas in unfair labor
practice cases it may be deemed a question of fact. 62
61

E.g., County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, zoz Cal.

437, z61 Pac. 295 (1927); King v. Alabam's Freight Co., 40 Ariz. 363, 12.
P. (zd) 294 (1932), holding that the mere fact that the testimony given

before a referee had not been transcribed when the award was made did not
indicate that the Commission did not consider the testimony, since there was
no proof that the Commission did not have the stenographer read the untranscribed testimony.
6 2 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S.
111, 64 S. Ct. 851 (1944).
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Decision on all ordinary questions of litigation facts is
reserved almost exclusively for the commissions. It is frequently said, for example, that the court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustain the findings,
and all presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the
validity of orders granting compensation.63 Doubts as to
whether the award is supported by evidence should be resolved in favor of the injured employee.64 Even if the findings of the commission are inconsistent, it is enough if some
of the findings sustain the award. 65
Likewise, the agency's inferences from established primary
facts are ordinarily accorded the same conclusiveness as is
granted the agency's findings as to the primary facts. 66
It was in this field, to be sure, that the doctrine as to
judicial review de novo of "jurisdictional facts" was established in Crowell v. Benson 67 but the validity of this doctrine,
and its vitality even in the federal courts is open to serious
doubt; and several state courts, both before and after this
decision, have considered jurisdictional facts on the same basis
as other factual questions. 68
Because of the comparatively long time that workmen's
compensation commissions have been functioning, there may
63 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. House, 217 Ala. 422, ll6 So. 167
(1928); Crutcher v. Curtiss-Robertson Airplane Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 169, 52
S. W. (2d) 1019 (1932); Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Industrial Commission, 173 Wis. 128, 179 N. W. 590 (I92I).
64 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoage (App. D. C. 1933), 65 F. (2d) 822.
65 Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, I77 Cal. 378,
I 70 Pac. 822 ( I9I 8).
66Goldsworthy v. Industrial Commission, 2I2 Wis. 544, 250 N. W. 427
(1933); Noto v. Hemp & Co., 231 Mo. App. 982, 83 S. W. (2d) I36
( 19 3 5) ; Ginsberg v. Burroughs Adding Machine Co., 204 Mich. I 30, I 70
N. W. I5 (I9I8).
67 285 U.S. 22, 34, 52 S. Ct. 285 (I932).
68 Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, I70 Cal. I8o, 149 Pac. 35 (1915);
County of San Bernardino v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 217 Cal.
618, 20 P. (2d) 673 (1933); O'Hara's Case, 248 Mass. 31, 142. N. E. 844
(1924); Matter of Dimino v. Independent Warehouses, Inc., 284 N.Y. 481,
31 N. E. (zd) 911 (194o); Matter of Miles v. Colegrove, 258 App. Div.
IOI4, 16 N.Y. S. (2d) 988 (1940), aff'd 284 N.Y. 609, 29 N. E. (2d) 929
( 1940).
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be found in this field a series of decisions regarding judicial
review, which extend over a period of years and illustrate the
changing trend of the courts. Thus, many early cases insisted
that where the facts were such as to support equally an inference justifying an award or an inference denying it, it was
the duty of the agency to make the inference which denied
the award. 69 Early attempts of the legislatures to change this
result by enacting "presumption statutes" to aid the compensation claimants were in some instances blandly disregarded
by the courts. 70 But by the time of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Del Vecchio v. Bowers/1 sustaining the validity of,
and giving substantial effect to such presumption statutes,
there had developed a tendency (which under the Supreme
Court's decision became a binding requirement) to grant a
much larger degree of freedom to the compensation commissions to make such inferences as they choose.
2.

Taxation

(a) Determinations involve conduct of public business.
The overwhelming necessity of the prompt collection of
the public revenues is a brooding omnipresence in the judicial
consciousness, when courts are reviewing administrative determinations in tax matters. The exercise of the power of
taxation (which has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as an "imperious necessity of all government, not to be restricted by mere legal fictions") 72 through administrative
agencies, is the outstanding example of the principle that
where an agency is conducting the public business, the courts
will review the administrative determinations less rigorously
than where an agency is regulating private business.
69 Chaudier v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 206 Mich. 433, I 73 N. W. 198
(1919); Sparks v. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co., 195 Iowa 334, 190 N. W.
593 (1922). Several state courts still follow this rule.
70 Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N. Y. S. 700
(1921).
71 296 U.S. 28o, 56 S. Ct. 190 (1935).
72 Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503, so S. Ct. 356 (1930).
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In few fields is the scope of judicial review more narrow
than in that of taxation. The slowness of the courts to interfere in cases involving collection of governmental revenue
is illustrated by the vigorous application in tax cases of the
principles requiring complete exhaustion of all possible administrative procedures, before the courts will even take
jurisdiction over the controversy. In tax cases (though perhaps not in all other types of cases), this principle of prior
resort is applied, even though the alleged error is one that
would render the administrative determination void. 73
(b) Treatment of factual questions and inferences. None
of the important factual questions determined by agencies
administering tax laws can be effectively reviewed in the
courts. In cases involving ad valorem taxes, the underlying
factual issue is usually that of the true value of the property;
but this question of valuation is ordinarily deemed nonjudicial, the courts refusing to review the question unless it
can be established that the assessors committed fraud or
adopted fundamentally wrong methods of valuation. 74 Partly
for the reason that assessments are often fixed on bases other
than the taking of testimony, some courts even refuse to
consider whether or not there was any evidence at all to
support the administrative conclusion as to value. 75
In many excise tax cases, decision turns primarily on an
inference to be made from somewhat ambiguous circumstances; and in such cases the principle is met that it is the
73 Stason, "Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to
Administrative Remedies," 28 MICH. L. REV. 637 (1930); among recent
general discussions of the scope of review in tax cases, see Dwan, "Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions: Treasury Practice," 46 CoL. L. REV. 58 I
( 1946); Gordon, "Reviewability of Tax Court Decisions," 2 TAx L. REV. 171
(1947); Heidenreich, "Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of the United
States Tax Court," 29 MINN. L. REV. 186 (1945).
74 See Luce, "Assessment of Real Property for Taxation," 35 MICH. L. REV.
1217, 1239 (1937); cases collected in Cooley on TAXATION, 4th ed. (192.4),
§§ 1612, 1645·
75 Board of Commissioners of County of Finney v. Bullard, 77 Kan. 349,
94 Pac. 129 (r9o8).
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function of the tax authorities, and not of the courts, to draw
inferences from the facts and to choose between conflicting
inferences. 76
Where decision rests fundamentally on a factual question,
the suggestion is made that there is no warrant for the
expenditure of any great amount of judicial energy in discovering the truth; 77 and references are constantly found,
both in state and federal decisions, to the greater expertness
of the administrative officials in determining the difficult
factual problems involved in taxation matters.
(c) Treatment of questions of law. Even where the controlling issue is clearly a question of law, the attitude of
judicial abstinence is adhered to. In the famous Dobson case 78
the Supreme Court criticized the lower federal courts for
interfering too readily with the determinations of the administrative authorities in the taxation field, and indicated that
even though the question involved was one of law, the decision was not to be reversed so long as the administrative
decision on the law question was reasonable. 79 Similarly, it
has been suggested that the court's function, on review of a
tax case, is limited to corrections of "obvious errors"; 80 that
the courts should reverse only for a "clear cut mistake of
law"; 81 and that the administrative decision should be ac76Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 3I6 U. S. I64, 62 S. Ct. 984
(I 942) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scottish American Inv. Co.,
Ltd., 323 U.S. I1 9, 65 S. Ct. I69 (I944).
77 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scottish American Inv. Co., Ltd.,
323 u.s. II9, 65 s. Ct. I69 (I944).
78 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 496-498,
64 S. Ct. 239 (1943).
79 For an analysis of this decision, see Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The
Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (I944). Congressional
disapproval of some phases of the decision is indicated in the I 948 Revenue
Act (I.R.C. I I4I (a)).
80 Slee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. zd I93o), 42 F. (zd)
I84.
81 Smith's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 3d I944),
I40 F. (zd) 759·
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cepted so long as it has "reasonable basis in the law." 82 About
the most that can be said is that the administrative decision
on law questions is not controlling, if clearly erroneous.83
The courts have, to be sure, reserved to themselves the
right to speak with finality on issues of law, but unless the
question is one of broad general interest the courts are likely
to accept, without critical re-examination, the conclusion of
the agency. The point will not necessarily be considered de
novo merely because it involves an issue of law.
The state courts, partly because many of them have not
reached the wholehearted acceptance of the doctrine (which
is characteristic of the federal courts) that administrative
agencies should be recognized as co-ordinate agencies of
government, and partly because tax cases coming before them
do not involve so many subtle technicalities as do many of
the cases arising under the federal tax laws, are on the whole
inclined to review tax cases somewhat more intensively than
do the federal courts. But even in the state courts, the old
aphorism to the effect that doubts as to the collectability of
a disputed tax should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer,
has been quite effectively displaced by the attitude that the
demand of the administrative agency for the payment of the
tax should be respected unless the agency can be shown to
be wrong.
(d) Role of discretion and expert judgment. Another
reasS)n for the strict limitations imposed by the courts on
the/extent of judicial review in the tax field lies in the circ;:umstance that the decisions of the tax agencies are not
strictly judicial. In large measure their functions are execu82

Smith v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (App. D. C.

1944), 141 F.(zd) 529·
83

Cf., Hormel v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

ssz, ss6,

61

s. Ct.

312

U. S.

719 (1941), where a footnote to the opinion says that the

Board's rulings on questions of law are "not as conclusive as its :findings of
fact."
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tive and ministerial, and this is often asserted as a basis for
restricting the scope of review. 84 As one court put it, practical
business experience and common sense are the best guides in
administering tax laws. 85 Many of the questions involved are
not deemed to be peculiarly within the special competence
of the judges. Thus is effect given to the general principle
that where a substantial measure of executive autonomy is
involved in the operations of an agency, the scope of review
will be restricted.
The principle that less review will be permitted where
discretion is involved, is likewise reflected in cases passing
on the proper scope of judicial review in the tax field. It is
frequently pointed out that the courts should not interfere
unless there has been a clearly arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of discretion by the taxing officials.86 In many cases,
the administrative officials are vested with a large measure
of real discretion-a classical example being that where the
tax collector was permitted to decide which of alternative
bases was to be used to measure the tax. 87 In other cases,
what is really involved is not so much discretion as the exercise of judgment. Thus, the determination of value is said
to be a matter of discretion.88
84 Daffin v. Scotch Lumber Co., 226 Ala. 33, I45 So. 452 ( I933); Mannings Bank v. Armstrong, 204 Iowa 512, 21I N. W. 485 (1926); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, I79 Atl. 357 (I935).
85[n re Harleigh Realty Company's Case, 299 Pa. 385, I49 Atl. 653
(I930).
86 E.g., Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 293 U. S. 102, 55 S. Ct. 55
(I934); Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 45 S. Ct.
55 (I924); Kinderman v. Harding, 345 Ill. 237, I78 N. E. 7I (I93I); City
of Birmingham v. Oakland County Supervisors, 276 Mich. I, 268 N. W. 409
(1936); Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, I34 Me. 28, I8o Atl. 803
(I935).
87 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 2 77 U. S. 55 I, 4 8 S. Ct.
5 8 7 (1 9 28).
88 E.g., Meridian Highway Bridge Co. v. Cedar County, I 17 Neb. 214, no
N. W. 241 (I928); Colorado Tax Commission v. Midland Terminal Ry. Co.,
93 Colo. Io8, 24 P. (2d) 745 ( 1933).
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There can also be plainly seen, in tax cases, the operation
of the principle that where an agency through long experience has gained true expertness in its field, the extent of
review will be narrow. The Supreme Court has more than
once had occasion to refer to the tax administrators' "practical
knowledge of the intricate details incident to tax problems." 89
Again, conceding candidly that the subject is "so complex as
to be the despair of judges," the court has bluntly suggested
that the administrative agency "is relatively better staffed
for its task than is the judiciary." 90 Likewise in matters of
state taxation, the state courts recognize and defer to the
long experience of the administrative authorities. The practical knowledge of assessors as to property values, and their
experienced judgment in choosing the proper method for
assessment of utility, mining, or industrial properties, are
effective deterrents to broad judicial review.
(e) Confidence in fairness of administrative procedure.
The procedures adopted by the taxing authorities are ordinarily fair, and there is but seldom occasion for the courts
to examine critically the course of the administrative proceedings, in order to determine whether due process has been
denied. The Tax Court, in the field of federal taxation, has
long been recognized as furnishing a model of proper administrative procedure. As the Supreme Court had occasion to
summarize, this agency "is independent, and its neutrality
is not clouded by prosecuting duties. Its procedures assure
fair hearings. Its deliberations are evidenced by careful opinions. All guides to judgment available to judges are habitually consulted and respected. It has established a tradition
of freedom: from bias and pressures. . . . Individual cases
89 Burnet v. S. & L. Building Corp., 2 8 8 U. S. 40 6, 415, 53 S. Ct. 42 8
(1933).
90 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 498, 64 S.
Ct. 239 (1943).
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are disposed of wholly on records publicly made, in adversary
proceedings, and the court has no responsibility for previous
handling. Tested by every theoretical and practical reason
for administrative finality, no administrative decisions are
entitled to higher credit in the courts." 91 Similarly, the state
courts have frequently recognized the general fairness of the
procedures employed by the tax collectors, and have been
content sometimes to rest decision on the presumption that
the officers performed their duties properly.92
In summary, nearly all the factors above discussed as
tending to affect the scope of judicial review, operate to
restrict the scope of review in tax cases. The field involves
the conduct of public business, a matter in which the courts
are always reluctant to interfere. The administrative agencies
exercise functions which are largely executive or ministerial,
rather than purely judicial. They are vested with an important measure of discretion. Their procedures are fair. The
agencies through long experience have developed true expertness. The questions involved are not such as to fall
peculiarly within the particular competence of the courts.
3· Federal Trade Commission
Nearly all of the considerations which have prompted the
courts narrowly to circumscribe the scope of review in tax
cases may be seen in inverse operation in Federal Trade
Commission cases, where the scope of review has traditionally
been very broad. The various factors which affect judicial
determination of the proper scope of review-the public or
private sphere of the agency's activities, the character of its
91 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U. S. 489, 498-499,
64 S. Ct. 239 (1943).
92 Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P.
(2d) 585 (1931); Daly v. Fisk, 104 Conn. 579, 134 Atl. 169 (192.6);
People ex rel. Carr v. Immanuel Herald Publishing House, 323 Ill. 574, 154
N. E. 439 (1926); Kelly v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 2.03 Wis. 639, 2.34
N. W. 701 (1931).
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functions (whether legislative or judicial), the extent of its
discretionary powers, the experience of the agency, and the
character of its procedure-have influenced the courts to
probe searchingly in Federal Trade Commission cases, just
as they have influenced the courts to limit the scope of
review in tax cases.
For this reason, an examination of the cases wherein the
courts have determined the proper scope of review of Federal
Trade Commission orders is interesting as a means of further
illustrating the operation of the deep imponderables which
play so large a part in determining the scope of review of
administrative orders. Further, an examination of the cases
involving judicial review of Federal Trade Commission
orders has an independent value because it illustrates how
completely the attitude of the courts toward the determinations of a particular agency may change over a period of a
decade. In the case of this particular agency, the change in
judicial attitude may be ascribed in part to the recent broad
trend of respect for administrative adjudication and the gradual adaptation of judicial doctrine to this new phenomenon,93
but it is in part at least due to the fact that as the agency has
gained experience and improved its administrative techniques,
it has been granted greater deference than was formerly
accorded. 94
(a) Regulation of private business. One of the primary
factors accounting for the attitude which the courts have dis93 Countryman, "The Federal Trade Commission and the Courts," 17 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 83 at 96 (1942); Davison, "The Place of Federal Trade Commission in Administrative Law," 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 280 (1940); Daniels,
"Judicial Review of Fact Findings of Federal Trade Commission," 14 WASH.
L. REV. 37 (1939).
9 4 E.g., while in earlier cases the courts freely amended the form of the
Commission's orders, in 1944 we find the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
declaring, in response to a claim that an order was so broad that it might
operate in futuro to prohibit lawful conduct, "Of course the influence o£
changed business conditions must be taken into account in reaching a decision;
but there is no reason to believe that the Federal Trade Commission will fail
in its duty in this respect." American Chain & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission (C.C.A. 4th 1944), 139 F. (2d) 622.
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played in reviewing Federal Trade Commission decisions is
the fact that the Commission is not conducting public business,
like tax collection, but is rather engaged in as far-reaching
regulation of private business as has been undertaken by any
governmental agency. Restrictions as to the price at which
a manufacturer may sell, the discounts he may give, the
forms of advertising a seller may employ, and the like, all
reach to the very heart of private business operations; and
all involve matters which had been traditionally subject to
few controls. In such fields, the courts are reluctant to grant
administrative agencies a free rein. This can be illustrated,
of course, by earlier cases which imposed severe restrictions
even on the right of the Commission to obtain information.95
It can be seen in the courts' repeated characterization as questions of law issues which might be deemed questions of
fact-e. g., the question as to what methods of competition
are unfair, and the question as to whether a proceeding involves the public interest. It can be seen in the readiness of
the courts to substitute their notions as to proper remedy for
those of the Commission. While the general attitude of distrust toward any agency seeking to intermeddle in private
affairs was of course far stronger a decade ago than it is
now, nevertheless the impulse to watch with care administrative regulation of purely private business still remains. It
has been recognized by the Supreme Court, in an opinion
pointing out that decisions as to the scope of the Interstate
Commerce Commission's jurisdiction could not be relied
upon as establishing like powers for the Federal Trade Commission, for the reason-inter alia-that there is so wide a
difference in the nature of the enterprises which these two
agencies affect. 96 In regulating railroads, the Interstate Com95 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 44
1
S. Ct. 336 ( 1924); Federal Trade Commission v. Baltimore Grain Co. (D. C.
Md. 1922), 284 Fed. 886, aff'd 267 U.S. 586, 45 S. Ct. 461 (1924).
96 Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 3 u U. S. 349, 353,
61 S. Ct. 58o (1941).
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merce Commission is exercising a function which has been
recognized as a responsibility of government. It has come
to be thought of as a part of the public business. But regulating the sales methods of a vendor of penny candy bars is
a different matter.
(b) Adequacy of administrative procedure. A second
factor which in the past made for comparatively broad review of decisions of the Federal Trade Commission was a
lack of confidence on the part of the courts in the fairness
of the agency's procedures. In former years, there was perhaps some basis for such suspicion. The courts were not unaware, for example, that proceedings against a respondent
were frequently inspired by the complaint of a competitor,
who wished to utilize the agency as an ally in a private
competitive struggle. The practice under which the agency's
staff assistants prepared the Commission's findings also gave
rise to doubts. Further, the form of the findings in many
cases did not inspire confidence-witness the conclusion
reached in 1924 by one writer that in a number of cases
( 1) the Commission's findings failed "to give an adequate
account of respondent's defense, or even to mention the evidence given in respondent's behalf" and ( 2) that the "frequently obvious attempt to frame findings with a view to
the legal result desired, rather than as a mirror of events
and circumstances" 97 contributed in a substantial degree to
the scant respect paid by the courts to the Commission's
findings. Such cavalier treatment of the testimony was alluded to in court opinions.98 While the Commission has gone
far toward eliminating much of the basis for criticism on
such grounds, the courts still find occasion to point out defects. In one case, for example, the Commission was taken
Henderson, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (192.4) 140, 162.-63.
L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission of America (C.C.A. 6th
1923), 289 Fed. 985; Curtis Pub. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A.
3d 192.1), 2.70 Fed. 881, aff'd sub nom. Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 26o U.S. 568, 43 S. Ct. 2.10 (192.3).
97
98
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to task for its opposition to a request by respondent that the
trial examiner's report be certified as part of the record, and
the court pointed out that the variance between the findings
of the Commission and those of the trial examiner detracted
from the claim that the findings of the Commission were
supported by substantial evidence. 99 The apparent reluctance
of the Commission in some cases to submit to judicial review
has been the subject ~f judicial comment.100
Despite the fact that such criticisms continue to appear
occasionally, nevertheless the courts (accepting the philosophy of the new administrative freedom) are in recent years
more ready to grant enforcement of the Commission's orders.
In one case, for example, the court criticized the refusal on
the part of the Commission to furnish respondent with a bill
of particulars, remarking that the Commission should in fairness have done so; but the court still held that it could not
be established that the refusal of the bill of particulars was
prejudicial and accordingly determined that the order should
be enforced. 101
(c) Experience and expertness of agency. In the earlier
days of the Commission's history, there was considerable
skepticism as to the true expertness of the Commissioners.
This was referred to in both leading discussions of the work
of the Commission prior to 1935.102 This attitude was unquestionably an important factor in many court decisions.
In the course of time, this attitude has to a large extent
at least disappeared, and the Commission is recognized as
a body of experts, duly informed by experience, whose judg99 Kidder Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th 1941), II7 F.
(2d) 892·
100 American Drug Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 8th 1945),
149 F. (2d) 6o8.
101 E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th 1944),
142 F. (2d) 511.
102 McFarland, JuDICIAL CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION
AND THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE COMMISSION (1933) 176-177; and Henderson, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) 328,
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ment is to be respected. But the courts still are more willing
to displace their judgment for that of the agency in the case
of this Commission than in the case of many other administrative tribunals, and for the reason that the formulae and
concepts with which the Federal Trade Commission works
fall within the particular competence of the courts. The
judges have apparently felt 103 that only the courts are fully
qualified to work with such formulae. Questions relating to
unfair trade practices and unreasonable restraints of competition. do not possess the baffling technicalities of the rate
problems handled by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
nor the newness and strangeness of the labor relations problems handled by the National Labor Relations Board. They
are questions as to which the courts feel themselves on
familiar ground. Consequently, there has never developed
quite the respect for administrative expertise that other agencies have enjoyed.
(d) Role of discretion. In complaint proceedings, there is
usually a rather narrow issue involved: Has the respondent
violated a particular section of the statute? In determining
this question, there is comparatively little room for the
exercise of discretion. Rather, it is a matter of determining
whether specified charges have been proved, and this is
determined as a result of comparatively formal, court-like
proceedings. This lack of opportunity for wide exercise of
administrative discretion has served to broaden the permissible scope of judicial review.
In one phase of the procedure, however, there is a large
amount of discretion involved. This is the matter of determining what remedy shall be adopted, in cases where a
violation of the law has been established. Shall a respondent,
for example, be completely enjoined from using a particular
103 As suggested by Thurman N. Arnold, THE BoTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS
(1940) 99·
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trade name which infringes on the rights of another and is
deceiving to the public, or shall he simply be required to
add an explanatory statement, to wipe out the likelihood of
deception? Here, increasing respect is being shown for the
determinations of the Commission, although several of the
circuit courts of appeal have exhibited considerable reluctance
toward yielding their former prerogative of freely revising
the form of the Commission's orders/ 04 and there still remains a noticeable readiness to find that the Commission has
abused its discretion in this regard. 105
(e) Lack of legislative power. The functions of the Federal Trade Commission have been regarded primarily as
judicial, rather than legislative. This again has served to
permit a broad scope of review. The tendency of the courts
to treat nearly all of the ultimate issues before the Commission as questions of law rather than of fact has of course
served to accentuate this trend.
(f) Treatment of questions of law and fact. As a result
of the fact that (because of the operation of the various
factors above described) the courts have been inclined to
104 E.g., see the concurring opinion in Parke, Austin & Lipscomb v. Federal
Trade Commission (C.C.A. zd 1944), 142. F. (zd) 437, 442, pointing out
that "Until recently this court would have regarded itself as competent to
modify an order which imposed a restraint broader than the necessities of the
case required"; and see Herzfeld v. Federal Trade Commission ( C.C.A. 2d
1944), 140 F. (zd) 207, 2.09, where it was said: "Such tribunals possess
competence in their special fields which forbids us to disturb the measure of
relief which they think necessary. . . . Congress having now created an
organ endued with the skill which comes of long experience and penetrating
study, its conclusions inevitably supersede those of the courts, which are not
similarly endowed."
105 In Federal Trade Commission v. A. P. W. Paper Co., Inc., 328 U. S.
193, 66 S. Ct. 932 (r946), it was held that the Commission lacked the power
to prohibit a manufacturer's use of the words "Red Cross" and the Greek Red
Cross emblem in the sale of its product. In Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 327 U.S. 6o8, 66 S. Ct. 758 (1946), the court, while recognizing that the Commission had broad latitude to exercise its own judgment in
shaping its order, reversed an order which prohibited the use of a trade name
because the record did not show that the Commission had considered whether
some change short of complete excision would have satisfied the ends of the
act.
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probe deeply when reviewing determinations of the Federal
Trade Commission, issues which might well have been described as issues of fact (and hence closed to review) have
been described as reviewable issues of law. Thus, the determination of the Federal Trade Commission as to the fairness
of a trade practice is deemed a question of law for the courts;
whereas the determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the fairness of a preferential rate is deemed a
question of fact. The difference is not logical, but empiric. It
is accounted for by some difference in the attitude with which
the courts view determinations of the Federal Trade Commission and those of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
This tendency to treat many of the issues decided by the
Federal Trade Commission as issues of law has of course
broadened the scope of review.
But even the Commission's decisions on the facts have
not, until the last decade, been accorded the respect paid
the factual determinations of other agencies. Thus, one student of the Commission has concluded that up to 1930 the
courts had, in reviewing Commission orders, determined the
sufficiency of the pleadings, determined what should constitute proofs, and what conclusions should be drawn from the
evidence; and that in fact in only two instances during the
decade from 1919 to 1929 did the Supreme Court express
or approve a real deference to the Commission's findings. 106
Another student observed somewhat earlier that not a single
case could be found in which it could be said that the findings of the Commission had in any way affected the decisions
of the courts. 107
During this earlier period, the courts had no difficulty in
determining that the findings of the Commission were not
supported by substantial evidence, and hence could be dis106 McFarland, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1933) p, 96.
107 Henderson, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION (1924) 336.
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regarded. But two decisions of the Supreme Court in 1934 108
insisted that a more generous treatment must be accorded
the findings of the Commission. Since that time, the courts
have been cautious in disturbing the findings of the Commission on pure issues of litigation facts, but even in such
instances, refusal to accept the findings of the Commission
is sometimes encountered. 109
Where the conclusion of the Commission rests on inference, rather than an issue of primary fact, the courts have
been more ready to review the reasonableness of the inference
than has been true in cases involving other agencies. In Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Association,110 it was said that the inferences reasonably drawn
from the facts were for the Commission, thus implying the
existence of a somewhat broad power in the courts to determine the reasonableness of the inference. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Raladam Co., 111 the phrase used was "necessary inference." This led several of the courts of appeal to
conclude that where the finding rested on inference, the court
was free to disregard the Commission's conclusion, if it could
be deemed in any way unreasonable or not a necessary
inference. 112 Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that
108 Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 54 S.
Ct. 315 (1934), and Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,
291 U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (1934).
1 09 In Gelb v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 2d 1944), 144 F. (2d)
s8o, for example, a finding based on the opinion of a single expert, overlooking opposed testimony which was in part uncontradicted, was set aside as being
without substantial support in the evidence.
110 Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S.
p, 6 3, 4 7 s. Ct. 2 55 ( I 9 2 7) .
111 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 651, 51 S.
Ct. 587 (I9JI).
112 See, e.g., Dearborn Supply Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 7th
1944), 146 F. (2d) s, where the facts had been stipulated, but an order
based on inferences not included in the stipulated facts was held to be without
support in the evidence; and see Raladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission
(C.C.A. 6th 1941), 123 F. (2d) 34, rev'd in Federal Trade Commission v.
Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 62 S. Ct. 966 (1942).
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a greater respect must be paid the Commission's inferences,
remarking in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission 113 that the "weight to be attributed to the facts
proved or stipulated, and the inferences to be drawn from
them [italics added], are for the Commission to determine,
not the courts." But even in that case, the court took pains
to point out that "We cannot say that the Commission's
inference here is not supported by the stipulated facts," thus
indicating that there still remains some readiness to inquire
whether the facts do support the inference.
Thus, it must be concluded that even on issues of fact,
the findings of the Commission received for many years but
scant deference from the courts. While the trend is clearly
in the opposite direction, there still remains considerable
reluctance on the part of some of the courts of appeal, at
least, to accord the Commission's findings on the facts a full
measure of respect, particularly in cases where the finding
rests on inference.
On many of the issues decided by the Commission, full
review is permitted because of the readiness of the courts to
treat as issues of law what might be characterized as issues
of fact. Thus, questions as to whether the public interest is
involved in a proceeding, whether a trade practice is unfair,
whether a practice fosters monopoly, or amounts to an interference with competition, have been deemed matters of law
for the courts.
Here again, the present trend is toward a narrower scope
of review. While still recognizing the early established doctrine 114 that what is an unfair method of competition is a
question for the courts, the decisions are coming to emphasize
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 32-4 U. S.
s. Ct. 9 61 (1 945).
114 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 572
113

7 26, 739 , 65
(1920).
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the great weight to be given to the findings and experienced
judgment of the Commission in determining this question.115
Similarly, the rule reserving to the courts the determination
as to whether public interest is involved,116 is coming to be
tempered by the readiness of the courts to accept the finding
of the Commission that the requisite public interest is present.117
4· Interstate Commerce CommisSion
(a) Judicial recognition of agency's expertness. Recognition that the Interstate Commerce Commission exercises
true expertness in passing on complex and technical problems
led the courts, at a comparatively early period, to adopt a
self-denying attitude in reviewing the determinations of this
agency. There is probably no agency which enjoys in greater
degree the confidence of the courts, and for this reason, the
scope of review available in the courts is very narrow. 118
Long ago, the Supreme Court characterized this agency as
a "tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience." 119
The respect thus indicated for the ability and fairness of the
Commission has not lessened through the years. More re115 Hastings Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th I946),
I53 F. (2d) 253.
116Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. I9, so S. Ct. I (I929).
117 E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A. 6th I944),
I42 F. (2d) SII; Parke, Austin & Lipscomb v. Federal Trade Commission
(C.C.A. 2d I944), I42 F. (2d) 437·
118 It was not always thus. Before the turn of the century, courts determined
the case de novo when the Commission applied for enforcement of its order,
and the courts without hesitation substituted their judgment for that of the
Commission on matters of fact, law, and policy. See I Sharfman, THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE CoMMISSION ( I93 I) 23 et seq. The passage of the Hepburn
Act of I9o6 (34 Stat. 584) had much to do with the change of attitude. For
an excellent detailed history of changing judicial attitudes toward the decisions
of the Commission, see 2 Sharfman, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
(I93I) 384-452; and McFarland, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ( I933);
Tollefson, "Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission," 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 503 (I937).
119 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U. S. 441,
454, 27 S. Ct. 7oo (I9o7).
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cently the court pointed out that "We certainly have neither
technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon
the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission." 120 Similarly, the court has reversed lower courts for redetermining
"administrative" questions passed on by the Commission.121
The great respect of the courts for the demonstrated
expertness and fairness of the Commission could be illustrated in many ways. It was no accident which led the courts
to formulate with reference to this agency's decisions the
primary jurisdiction doctrine (since applied to other agencies) which requires that initial resort be had to the agency
for a determination of an otherwise justiciable question which
could be presented to the agency. 122 It is commonplace that
for many years the Interstate Commerce Commission fared
better in the courts than did other agencies. Nor is this fact
merely of historical significance. A general disposition to
accord the Interstate Commerce Commission's determinations
greater weight than that of newer and less experienced
agencies can be seen in many recent cases.123
This respect for the ability and impartiality of the Commission, coupled with the fact that it works in a field so
technical and complex as to be the despair of the uninitiated,
are probably the two predominant factors which have induced
the courts to limit very narrowly the available scope of
rev1ew.
(b) Legislative nature of determinations. Many years
ago, the Supreme Court declared the rate-making functions
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to be legislative,
120 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 3 I4 U. S. 534, 548,
62 S. Ct. 366 (I942); and see Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S.
649, 6 7
Ct. 9 3 I (I 94 7).
.
121 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. I77> 59 S. Ct. 160 (1938).
122 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct.
350 (1907).
123 Interstate Commerce Commission v. City of Jersey City, 3:u U. S. 503,
64 S. Ct. II29 (I944); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64
S. Ct. 474 (1944); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 3u, 64 S. Ct. 587 (1944).
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rather than judicial/24 and the Court has more recently
taken occasion to observe that the rate-making process is
essentially empiric. 125 Many of the other functions of the
Commission fall within the same category, in that the agency
is changing existing conditions by making a new rule to be
applied thereafter rather than investigating, declaring, and
enforcing liabilities as they stand on past facts, under laws
already existing. Thus, in making regulations as to the assignment of railroad cars between competing prospective users,
or deciding whether to compel the fixing of joint or through
rates, or defining the scope of operations to be permitted
under "grandfather clauses" (permitting long established
carriers in a given field to continue certain operations without
qualifying for a license under a subsequently adopted law),
or deciding whether "need is found . . . to establish for
private carriers . . . maximum hours of service of employees," 126 the Commission is functioning rather in the field
of delegated legislation than that of delegated adjudication.
The possible scope of judicial review is always more
narrow, where the administrative determination is legislative.
Further, where an agency's activities are predominantly in
the legislative field, and where a legislative element creeps
into activities which also bear some indicia of judicial proceedings, there is a tendency to deny review of matters which
might otherwise be deemed to be reviewable by the courts
as involving questions of law.
These factors account in large part for the very restricted
scope of review which is available in the courts when orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission are challenged. The
courts often conclude that the inquiry involved is essentially
124

Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210,226-227,29 S. Ct.

67 (1908).
125 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 62 S. Ct.
366 (1942).
126
Sec. 204 (a) (3) Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 546, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 304.
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legislative, or (as it is euphemistically called) "administrative," and hence the function is said to be "reserved for the
Commission,". and one in which the court is accordingly not
at liberty to consider the soundness of the agency's reasoning
or the wisdom of its determinations. 127
(c) Conduct of public business. The functions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission have not been viewed as
involving the regulation of private business. Control of
common carriers and other like utilities has been viewed as
something much more closely related to the conduct of public
business. While the actual operation of railroads has been
made a function of government only in emergency periods,
yet this industry has long been deemed to be one "affected
with a public interest," and hence subject to a much greater
degree of governmental control than those industries which
until recently at least were deemed to be more or less purely
the private affairs of the individual entrepreneurs. As the
Supreme Court recently put it, ". . . the owners of . . .
railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his
farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily
to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially
a public function, it is subject to state regulation." 128
Since the regulation of railroads and other carriers by the
Interstate Commerce Commission has thus been regarded as
a matter closely akin to the conduct of the public business,
the general principles which operate to restrict the scope of
judicial review in cases where administrative agencies are
merely conducting the public business, are applicable on
review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders. The
determinations of this Commission are thus viewed in a different light than those of such agencies as the Federal Trade
Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission,
127 Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 47 S. Ct. 727 ( 1927); Noble v.
United States, 319 U.S. 88,63 S. Ct. 950 (1943).
128 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. sox, so6, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946).
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whose activities in large measure involve the regulation of
what has been called purely private business. The tendency
to restrict judicial review, where the matter involved is the
conduct of the public business, has been another factor influencing the very narrow scope of review of decisions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
(d) Discretion. As is always true where an agency exercises substantial legislative powers, the determinations of the
Interstate Commerce Commission involve a large measure of
discretion. And always, where the role of discretion looms
larger, the scope of review becomes smaller. The courts have
not infrequently had occasion to allude to the importance of
giving free rein to the Commission's discretion. Thus, where
the question was as to the propriety of prescribed accounting
methods, the court observed that it was "without power to
usurp its [the Commission's] discretion and substitute our
own." 129 Again, where it was claimed that the controlling
statute in effect required the Commission to adopt a different
hearing procedure than had been employed, the court declared that it was not "at liberty to prescribe general attitudes
the Commission must adopt towards the exercise of discretion
left to it rather than the courts." 13° Further, the court has
recognized that because of the discretionary nature of the
Commission's determinations, it is at liberty to make successive decisions which appear inconsistent. The court has thus
pointed out that "Considerations that reasonably guide to
decision in one case may rightly be deemed to have little
or no bearing in other cases." 131
1 29 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, z87 U.S. 134, 141, 53 S. Ct. sz
(1932).
13° Interstate Commerce Commission v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U. S.
671,691,63 S. Ct. 1296 (1943).
131 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States, z98 U. S. 349, 359, 56 S. Ct. 797
(1936).
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Thus, the important part that discretion plays in the
Commission's determinations has been another factor which
militates for restricted judicial review.
(e) Character of procedure. Proceedings before the Commission are marked by a degree of regularity (if not formality) strongly reminiscent of judicial proceedings. The
Commission's rules are not unlike rules of court. It has its
own roster of practitioners (specially admitted to practice
before the Commission) who are mostly specialists in the
field. Its practices as to the holding of hearings and as to
the technique of decision making are well established. All
of its standards of procedure have long been hailed as models
for other agencies to follow. There has been little if any
suggestion of bias or partiality on the part of the members
of the Commission or its staff. The agency is comparatively
isolated from political pressure. That its officers have special
competence and ability, in a field where there is a real need
for technical competence, is never challenged.
All of these factors further serve to disincline the courts
to probe deeply into the fairness and reasonableness of the
Commission's decisions.
(f) Questions of fact and law. Since all of the criteria on
which the scope of review normally depends (absent statutory regulation) recommend, in the case of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, that only a narrow review should
be permitted, it is not surprising that in addition to being
ready to find "substantial support" in the evidence for
any challenged findings of fact, the courts show a readiness to describe as issues of fact matters which might otherwise be deemed questions of law. Thus, such questions
as-( I ) whether a rate is unreasonable or discriminatory; 132
132 Western Paper Makers' Chemical Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268, 46
S. Ct. soo (1926).
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( 2) whether a preference is undue and unreasonable; 133
(3) whether a difference in rates constitutes an "unjust discrimination"; 134 ( 4) whether the statutory term "transportation" includes yardage service; 135 and (5) whether the
statutory term "deficit" should be construed one way or
another 136-have all been deemed to be questions of fact, on
which the determination of the Commission is conclusive,
unless it can be plainly shown that the determination was
entirely without support in the record.
Why the reasonableness or fairness of a trade practice is
a question of law, as to which the determination of the
Federal Trade Commission is only advisory, whereas the
question as to the reasonableness or fairness of a rate differential is a question of fact, as to which the determination of
the Interstate Commerce Commission is conclusive, is a
question which presents logical difficulties but which can be
easily answered in the light of practical experience. And the
life of the law, as the profession has been reminded by one
of its masters, has been experience, not logic.
The courts have not insisted that there must be any showing of the reasonableness of the inferences of fact reached
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Rather, the court
has recognized that the Commission may be presumed to be
able to draw inferences that are not obvious to others. 137
Even where it cannot be disputed that the issues involved
present questions of law, within the proper competence of
the courts, there has been great respect paid to the wisdom
of the Commission. In at least one case, for example, the
133 United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 235 U. S. 314, 35 S. Ct. r 13
(1914).

134 L. T. Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 967

(1943).

135Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216,62 S. Ct. 948 (1942).
136 Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 290 U. S. 127, 54 S. Ct. ro8
(1933); noted in 33 MICH. L. REV. 120 (1934).
137 O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U.S. 294, 36 S. Ct. 313 (1916).

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

377

Supreme Court asked the Commission for advice as to the
meaning and application of its order. 138 And not long ago
the court observed that "Only where the error is patent may
we say that the Commission transgressed." 139 Fundamental
questions of statutory interpretation and the like are of course
reserved to the courts, particularly where the question affects
the jurisdiction or powers of the Commission. Except in such
cases, the courts are disinclined to make an independent
determination of what might be termed questions of law unless the case be one where it appears that the question is
not "technical," and where the inquiry "would, in all respects, be like that commonly made by courts when called
upon to construe and apply any other document." 140
In all respects, therefore, the complex and technical nature
of the problems handled by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and likewise the demonstrated competence of the
Commission in its special field, have been the keystone in the
determination by the courts as to the scope of judicial review
of its determinations. Any inquiry closely related to factual
considerations is likely to be deemed a nonreviewable question of fact, and only those issues which are largely divorced
of technical character are deemed reviewable questions of law.
5· National Labor Relations Board
The National Labor Relations Board operates largely in
a field unknown to the common law. In determining, for
example, what unit is appropriate for collective bargaining
138 Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thomson, 3 I 8 U. S. 67 5> 6 3 S. Ct. 8 34
(1943).
139 United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 482, 62
S. Ct. 722 (1942).
140 W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 299 U. S.
393,398,57 S. Ct. 265 (1937); and see Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 216 U.S. 538, 30 S. Ct. 417 (r9ro), where the court
declared that the mere preference of customers for a particular route could
not, as a matter of law, be taken as a basis for a determination that any other
route was unreasonable and unsatisfactory.
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purposes (considering such issues as whether the several
plants of a single company should bargain jointly or separately, whether skilled tradesmen should be represented by
the same union as unskilled factory help, and the like), and
similarly in determining what remedies are appropriate to
eradicate the effectiveness of a prior unfair labor practice,
the Board is dealing with problems quite unfamiliar to the
courts. The National Labor Relations Act 141 created whole
congeries of rights and remedies for labor unions which had
been previously without substantial judicial recognition. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the courts should show but
little inclination to substitute their judgment for that of the
Board on such matters. The courts have no established legal
standards by which to judge the propriety of the Board's
action, in many types of cases.
On the other hand, in carrying out the varied tasks
imposed upon it by the statute, the Board has had to face
many questions involving statutory interpretation and certain
basic constitutional questions, on which the courts feel themselves to be on familiar grounds. As to these issues, the courts
have evinced a willingness to grant full review.
Thus, judicial review of determinations of the National
Labor Relations Board stands on somewhat different footing
than in the case of either the Federal Trade Commission or
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The tendencies and
basic principles which influence the courts in determining
the scope of review remain much the same, but their application leads to somewhat different results. The courts are,
on the whole, probably less willing to reverse the National
Labor Relations Board than the Federal Trade Commission;
on the other hand, the National Labor Relations Board has
141 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 15 I et seq. Note that the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 141, has limited the
Board's power in many respects, and has narrowed its discretion in determining
what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
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not enjoyed the immunity from extensive judicial supervision
that has long been accorded the Interstate Commerce Comm1ss1on.
(a) Regard for expertness of agency. Very frequently,
proceedings before the Board involve difficult questions as
to an employer's motive. Whether a certain course of action
does or does not constitute an unfair labor practice often
depends upon an employer's intent. Thus, granting an increase in pay is ordinarily proper. But if an increase is granted
during a union's organizational campaign, it may appear to
have been calculated to discourage organization, and thus to
constitute an unfair labor practice. Such would be the case,
for example, if the announcement of the pay increase were
linked with a public reminder that it is not necessary to join
a union in order to get a pay raise at that plant.142 In its
evaluations of the tangled web of contradictory evidence so
often encountered in hearings on charges of unfair labor
practice, the Board is credited with an expert ability to discover the truth. Similarly, when the question concerns the
remedy which in the particular case will be most efficient to
carry out the underlying purpose of encouraging collective
bargaining, deference is paid to administrative experience.
Further, the National Labor Relations Act is construed as
having been intended to leave a great deal to the .judgment
of the Board. Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that
"The Act . . . entrusts to an expert agency the maintenance and promotion of industrial peace . . . factors
outside our domain of experience may come into play." 143
Similarly, in upholding an order requiring restitution of
dues checked off to a company dominated union, as against
the argument that the order in question violated common-law
142 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. W. A. Jones Foundry & Machine Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1941), 123 F. (2d) 552.
143 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177,
194-195, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941).
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principles of estoppel, the court declared that the Board was
not compelled to observe conventional legal principles in
fashioning its order, and observed: "Whether and to what
extent such matters should be considered is a complex problem for the Board to decide in the light of its administrative
experience and knowledge." 144
The court has likewise said, in sustaining the validity of
a Board ruling prohibiting the enforcement of a company
rule which forbade any solicitation on company premises, that
one of the purposes of the Congress in creating the Board
". . . is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under
the particular statute made by experienced officials with an
adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject." 145
Again, in sustaining as a finding of fact the determination
by the Board that newspaper distributors who by commonlaw tests might have been deemed independent contractors
should be treated as employees for purposes of the act, the
court pointed out: "Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives it [the Board] familiarity with the
circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships
in various industries . . . and with the adaptability of
collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of . . .
disputes. . . . The experience thus acquired must be
brought frequently to bear. . . . determining whether
unfair labor practices have been committed, 'belongs to the
usual administrative routine' of the Board." 146
But judicial respect for the Board's informed knowledge
does not go so far as in the case of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. On such questions as to whether employees discharged for engaging in illegal activities retain the benefits
144 Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 319
U.S. 533, 543, 63 S. Ct. I2I4 (I943).
145 Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S.
793, 8oo, 65 S. Ct. 982 (I945).
146 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S.
III at I3o, 64 S. Ct. 85r (I944).
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of the statute, 147 or whether the Board's order may be permitted to go further than the immediate necessities of the
case require,148 or whether stipulated facts may be deemed
to be an unfair labor practice/49 the courts do not show a
slavish acceptance of the conclusions of the Board, but rather
determine the questions for themselves.
(b) The role of discretion; legislative and judicial
powers. In refusing to review the Board's decision as to the
appropriateness of a particular bargaining unit or the propriety of a particular remedy, the courts not infrequently
refer to the fact that as to such matters, the Board exercises
a broad measure of discretion. Thus, where one labor organization claimed that the Board's choice of a bargaining unit
discriminated unfairly against its members, the court observed that the matter was one which "involves an exercise
of discretion on the part of the Board." 150 Again, where the
question involved the propriety of an order requiring that
wages be paid retroactively to men who had never been
hired, the court said, "Because the relation of remedy to
policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence,
courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy." 151
But inasmuch as the functions of the National Labor
Relations Board are primarily judicial in nature and involve
but little legislative prerogative, the degree of discretion
147 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490 ( 1939).
148 National Labor Relations Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 61
S. Ct. 693 (1941).
149 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S.
678, 64 s. Ct. 830 (1944).
150 International Association of Machinists; Tool and Die Makers Lodge
No. 35 etc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 72, 82, 61 S. Ct. 83

(1940).
151

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177,

194, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941),
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enjoyed is more limited than that possessed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in exercising its broad legislative
powers. Thus, in one case, the court, after conceding that
the authorization of the Board to determine the remedy is
broad, yet insisted that this discretion "has its limits," and
held that nothing in the act conferred upon the Board discretionary power to order reinstatement of seamen who had
struck in violation of the federal mutiny statute.152 In a somewhat similar case, the court declared that "whatever discretion may be deemed to be committed to the Board, its limits
were transcended" by an order requiring the reinstatement
of former employees who had engaged in a sit-down strike. 153
The extent to which the Board's powers are discretionary
varies with the type of proceeding. In selecting the unit which
shall be used for collective bargaining, it exercises a large
measure of discretion, and review is accordingly narrowed.
But in deciding whether an unfair labor practice has been
committed, or whether in order to effectuate the policy of
promoting the bargaining power of unions it may condone
illegal activities, the Board's activity is judicial, rather than
discretionary, and a broader scope of review is permitted.
(c) Public interest involved. In carrying out its duties,
the National Labor Relations Board cannot quite be said
to be engaged in the conduct of the public business, in the
sense that such observation can be made of the tax collector
or the customs inspector or the immigration officer. But, on
the other hand, neither can the National Labor Relations
Board be viewed as an agency which regulates private business
in the sense that the Federal Trade Commission restricts
merchandising practices or the Securities and Exchange Commission controls the activities of brokers and investment
152

Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 I 6 U. S.

31, 62 S. Ct. 886 (1942).
153 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 24o, 258, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939).
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bankers. Its functions are much more closely related to the
conduct of the public business than to the regulation of private business, for the Board does not exercise any superintending control over the methods which the entrepreneur
shall employ in running his business. It only insists that in
running it, he must not discourage union activities among his
employees. It does not undertake to fix hours, or wages, or
prices, or trade practices, or employment conditions. Neither
does it require disclosure of confidential information. Its
function is merely that of a policeman, enforcing a more or
less well defined rule of conduct. As the Supreme Court has
put it, the function of the Board is to facilitate the "Attainment of a great national policy," which, it is judicially
recognized, is to be sought "through expert administration
in collaboration with limited judicial review." 154
In other words, the courts take the attitude that it has
become a part of the public business of the country to police
labor relations to the extent, at least, of effectively discouraging unfair labor practices. There is thus a tendency
to trim the scope of judicial review to the restricted scope
customarily available where the administrative agency is
merely conducting the public business.
(d) Fairness of administrative procedure. The National
Labor Relations Board does not enjoy, as does the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the benefits of a general or unanimous judicial conviction that its attitude is unbi~sed and its
procedures carefully designed to assure fair treatment to
the parties respondent. The Supreme Court from time to
time has had occasion implicitly to criticize some of the
attitudes and procedures of the Board. Thus, it has been
necessary for the court to remind the Board that it does not
154 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177,
188, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941).
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have power to impose penalties.155 Again, the Board has been
cautioned that it does not have warrant to issue a general
injunction against any violation of the statute, where the
evidence disclosed only a limited violation and there was no
basis shown for anticipating further attempts to violate the
law.156
The Board has been found guilty of exhibiting an excess
of zeal, with the pointed observation that "the Board has
not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor
Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore
other and equally important Congressional objectives. . . .
and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body
that it undertake this accommodation [of one statutory
scheme to another] without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task." 157
The opinions of the Board have not been regarded as
models of clarity. In one case, the Supreme Court complained, in remanding a case for further consideration by the
Board, that "From the record of the present case we cannot
really tell why the Board has ordered reinstatement of the
strikers. . . . The administrative process will best be
vindicated by clarity in its exercise." 158
In another case, while the majority of the court sustained
the Board in its refusal to admit or consider certain evidence
which two of the parties to a Board proceeding wished to
introduce, a minority protested bitterly against the unfair155 Republic
6I
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Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 I
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156 National Labor Relations Board v. Express Pub. Co., 3 I2 U. S. 426, 6I
S. Ct. 693 ( I94I).
157 Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3I6 U. S.
3I, 47, 62 S. Ct. 886 (I942).
158 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 I3 U. S. I77>
I96-I97> 6I s. Ct. 845 (I94I).
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ness of this refusal to consider matters which might have been
of importance. 159
In another case, refusal to receive evidence was criticized
by the court as unreasonable and arbitrary.160
In the earlier days of the Board's history, protests were
frequently made against the practice which it was alleged
the Board then followed, whereby decisions were sometimes
actually made by "review attorneys" who had not heard the
testimony. Similarly, it was claimed the Board entered orders
without having familiarized itself with the contents of the
record on which the order was based. These complaints were
frequently considered by the courts of appeal/ 61 and they
were sufficiently numerous to raise considerable doubt as to
the fairness of the Board's earlier procedures. Similarly,
attacks were frequently made, and sometimes with success/62
upon the unfair conduct of trial examiners, and their demonstrated bias and prejudice.
The doubts thus engendered had some influence (for a
time, at least) in persuading the courts to probe more searchingly when reviewing orders of the National Labor Relations Board than when considering orders of such agencies
as the Interstate Commerce Commission. As with developing
1 59 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 x3 U. S.
146, 6x S. Ct. 908 (1941).
16 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
161 National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C.C.A. sth
1938), 98 F. (2d) 444; Botany Worsted Mills v. National Labor Relations
Board (C.C.A. 3d 1939), xo6 F. (2d) 263; Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 2d 1938), 95 F. (2d) 390;
Cupples Company Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A.
8th 1939), 103 F. (2d) 953; Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 305 U.S. 364, 59 S. Ct. 301 (1939); National Labor Relations Board
v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co. (C.C.A. 9th 1938), 98 F. (2d) 16.
162 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (Union of
Ward Employees) (C.C.A. 8th 1939), 103 F. (2d) 147; National Labor
Relations Board v. Phelps (C.C.A. sth 1943), 136 F. (zd) 562; Inland Steel
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1940), 109 F. (zd) 9·
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years the Board gained a maturity of judgment, and corrected many of the conditions which led to this criticism of
its fairness, there has of course been a corresponding lessening of this earlier inclination to extend the scope of review.
(e) Review of questions of fact. While the Supreme Court
on occasion 163 and the courts of appeal not infrequently 164
found that there was no vestige of substantial evidence to
support the findings of the Board and accordingly refused
to accept its factual findings, and while the courts have
had not infrequent occasion to reiterate, in reviewing findings of the Board, that mere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence/65 yet any
examination of the decisions makes it equally clear that very
little evidence is required to meet the test of "substantiality"
which prior to the recent amendment of the statute rendered
the Board's factual findings conclusive. 166 Further, in those
cases where it was believed that administrative experience
163 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501 (1939).
164 E.g., Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board ( C.C.A.
8th I94o), III F. (2d) 783; National Labor Relations Board v. Goshen Rubber & Manufacturing Co. (C.C.A. 7th I94o), IIO F. (2d) 432; National
Labor Relations Board v. International Shoe Co. (C.C.A. 8th I94o), II6 F.
(2d) 31; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A.
sth I94o), 1I2 F. (2d) 545; Martel Mills Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board (C.C.A. 4th I94o), I14 F. (2d) 624.
165 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
I97, 59 S. Ct. 206 (I938); Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board (C.C.A. 4th I938), 93 F. (2d) 985; Interlake Iron Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7th 1942), I3I F. (2d) 129.·
166 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 3I9 U. S. so, 63 S. Ct. 905 (1943); Washington, Virginia
& Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 30I U. S. 142, 57
S. Ct. 648 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311
U. S. 5 84, 61 S. Ct. 3 58 (I 94 I). Note that the Labor Management Relations
Act, I947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 141, broadens the courts' power
to review issues of fact. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456 ( 1951). See Iserman, "The Labor
Management Act: New Law as to Evidence and the Scope of Review," 33
A. B. A. J. 760 (1947); George, "Evidence in NLRB. Cases in the Supreme
Court," 30 CoRN. L. Q. 350 ( 1945).
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attributed trustworthiness to a determination which could be
treated as either a question of law or fact, the courts have
treated as questions of fact issues which would probably be
considered reviewable as questions of law, were it not for
the trust reposed in administrative expertise. Thus, the question as to whether or not, on undisputed facts, a relationship
was one of employer-employee or of independent contractorship was treated as a question of fact; 167 and similarly the
question as to whether the activities of a fraternal insurance
association substantially affect commerce, so as to come within
the Board's jurisdiction, has been treated (despite the doctrine thought to permit independent review of questions of
jurisdictional fact) as a question for the Board to decide. 168
The various factors above discussed which have persuaded
the courts to review somewhat broadly those determinations
by the Board which have a legalistic background have occasionally prompted the courts to examine critically inferences
made by the Board from established primary facts. Thus,
where it was thought a particular order might have been
entered without giving due consideration to the employer's
constitutional rights of free speech, the Supreme Court
pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Board's finding
of coercion was based solely on an announcement made by
the company's president (in which case constitutional limitations would have vitiated the order) or whether it was based
on a whole congerie of circumstances; and the court held
that the findings of the Board were so ambiguous and doubtful that its inference could not be sustained. The court remanded the case to the Board for further consideration.169
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322. U. S.
s. Ct. 8p (1944).
168 Polish National Alliance of United States of America v. National Labor
Relations Board, 322 U.S. 643,64 S. Ct. II96 (1944).
169 National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314
U.S. 469, 62 S. Ct. 344 (1941).
167

III, 64

JUDICIAL REVIEW
On the other hand, cases are much more frequent where
the court's respect for the Board's particular experience in
the complexities of labor relations has led it to sustain without inquiry the inference made by the Board from proved
facts. The court has held, for example, that the Board need
not show that there is evidence to support its inference that
a rule against solicitation of any sort on company premises
is an unfair labor practice.170 Not infrequently, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that Congress entrusted to the Board,
and not to the courts, the drawing of inferences from inconclusive factual showings. The court has recognized that in
unfair practice cases, the lack of positive evidence is natural; 171 and it has more than once reversed courts of appeal
for substituting their judgment for that of the Board as to
the inference to be drawn from disputed facts. 172
(f) Questions of law. In those fields where it is felt
that administrative competence and experience should be a
controlling factor in decision, the courts have been satisfied
if the Board's conclusion has a "reasonable basis in the law."
Even if the law question might have been otherwise determined by the court, the administrative decision will not be
upset unless it is patently wrong. In this connection, the
courts have stressed the points (I) that where the question
is one which arises initially in agency proceedings, it acquires
a somewhat factual tinge even though it might otherwise be
deemed purely a law question; and (2.) that application of
statutory language to given facts, as distinguished from pure
interpretation of the statutory language, is rather for the
170 Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S.
79 3, 65 s. Ct. 982 (1 9 45).
171 National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc.,
315 U.S. 685, 62 S. Ct. 846 (1942).
172 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 31 I U. S. 584,
597, 61 S. Ct. 358 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada
Consolidated Copper Corp., p6 U.S. 105, 62 S. Ct. 96o (1942); National
Labor Relations Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 6o S. Ct.
6II (1940).
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Board than for the court. Thus, the court has said, "Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when
arising for the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for
the courts to resolve. . . . But where the question is one
of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding which the agency administering the statute must determine initially, the reviewing court's function is limited." 173
Again, the court has pointed out that ordinarily determination of what constitutes an unfair labor practice is for the
Board as part of its task of "applying" the act's general
prohibitory language in the light of infinite combinations of
events which might be charged as violative of the act. 174
Still again, the question as to whether or not it is appropriate
for the Board to order an employer to bargain with a union
representing only a minority of his employees, where the
union's majority status was lost because of the employer's
unfair labor practices, was treated as a question for the
Board.175 While this could be viewed as presenting only a
law question, yet it is obvious that such questions of interpretation are peculiarly susceptible to considerations of informed
administrative judgment.
But the courts find somewhat more frequently in the case
of the National Labor Relations Board than in the case of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, perhaps, that the
question involved is not controlled by considerations of specialized knowledge, and that accordingly the question falls
within the peculiar competence of the courts and should be
fully reviewed and redetermined as presenting questions of
law. Thus, where the question was whether the term "employee" could be extended to include former employees dis173 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., pz U. S.
rii, r3o-rp, 64 S. Ct. 851 (r944).
174 Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S.
793,65 s. Ct. 98z (1945).
175 National Labor Relations Board v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U. S. 5 u, 6z
s. Ct. 397 (194Z).
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charged for unlawful conduct, the court had no hesitancy in
reviewing and reversing the Board's conclusion.176 And while
as above noted, the determination as to whether or not an
unfair labor practice has been committed is ordinarily considered a question for the Board, yet where that question is
presented on clearly established facts, it is treated as a question of law. 177
The division of justiciable questions between unreviewable
issues of fact and fully reviewable issues of law is, in other
words, somewhat different in the case of this agency than in
the case of either the Interstate Commerce Commission or
the Federal Trade Commission. The differences can be
accounted for largely by differences in the types of issues
involved, and in the varying applicability of the general
principles which influence the courts toward either broad or
narrow revtew.
176 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 2.4o, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939).
177 E.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 32 x
U.S. 678, 64 S. Ct. 83o (1944).
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Administrative Procedure Act 1
AN AcT to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE
Sec. I. This Act may be cited as the "Administrative
Procedure Act."
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 2. As used in this Act( a) Agency.-"Agency" means each authority (whether
or not within or subject to review by another agency) of the
Government of the United States other than Congress, the
courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories,
1 Act of June II, 1946, c. 324, 6o Stat. :1.37, 5 U.S.C. § Ioox.
The following amendments, which have excluded from the operation of the
Act particular administrative agencies or particular administrative functions,
were enacted prior to January x, r 9 51 :

Act of August 8, 1946, c. 870, Title III, § 30:>., 6o Stat. 918 (relating to
various functions of the Federal Housing Expeditor) ;
Act of August xo, 1946, c. 951, Title VI,§ 6or, 6o Stat. 993 (likewise relating
to certain functions of the Federal Housing Expeditor);
Act of March 31, 1947, c. 30, § 6 (a), 6r Stat. 37 (relating to the administra·
tion of Sugar Controls) ;
Act of June 30, 1947, c. 163, Title II, § :>.~o, 61 Stat. zox (relating to the
Housing and Rent Act of 1947);
Act of March 30, 1948, c. 161, Title III,§ 301, 6:>. Stat. 99 (relating to the
Housing and Rent Control Act of 1947, as amended in 1948);
Act of February :>.6, 1949, c. II, 63 Stat. 7 (relating to the Export Control
Act);
Act of September 8, 1950, c. 932, Public Laws 774 (relating to functions
exercised under the Defense Production Act of 1950);
Act of September 27, 1950, c. 1052, Public Law 843 (relating to proceedings
for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens).
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or the District of Columbia. Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to repeal delegations of authority as provided by
law. Except as to the requirements of section 3, there shall
be excluded from the operation of this Act (I) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives
of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by
them, ( 2) courts martial and military commissions, (3) military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war
or in occupied territory, or (4) functions which by law expire
on the termination of present hostilities, within any fixed
period thereafter, or before July I, I947, and the functions
conferred by the following statutes: Selective Training and
Service Act of I 940; Contract Settlement Act of I 944;
Surplus Property Act of I 944·
(b) Person and Party.-"Person" includes individuals,
partnerships, corporations, associations, or public or private
organizations of any character other than agencies. "Party"
includes any person or agency named or admitted as a party,
or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted
as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein
shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any
person or agency as a party for limited purposes.
(c) Rule and Rule Making.-"Rule" means the whole
or any part of any agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency and
includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances
therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices
bearing upon any of the foregoing. "Rule making" means
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agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal
of a rule.
(d) Order and Adjudication.-"Order" means the whole
or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency
in any matter other than rule making but including licensing.
"Adjudication" means agency process for the formulation of
an order.
(e) License and Licensing.-"License" includes the
whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or
other form of permission. "Licensing" includes agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation amendment,
modification, or conditioning of a license.
(f) Sanction and Relief.-"Sanction" includes the whole
or part of any agency (I) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person;
(2) withholding of relief; (3) imposition of any form of
penalty or fine; (4) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property; ( 5) assessment of damages, reimbursement,
restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; ( 6) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or ( 7) taking of
other compulsory or restrictive action. "Relief" includes
the whole or part of any agency (I) grant of money, assistance, license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or
remedy; ( 2) recognition of any claim, right, immunity,
privilege, exemption, or exception; or (3) taking of any
other action upon the application or petition of, and beneficial
to, any person.
(g) Agency Proceeding and Action.-"Agency proceeding" means any agency process as defined in subsections (c),
(d), and (e) of this section. "Agency action" includes the
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whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.
PuBLIC INFORMATION

Sec. 3. Except to the extent that there is involved (I) any
function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public
interest or ( 2) any matter relating solely to the internal
management of an agency( a) Rules.-Every agency shall separately state and
currently publish in the Federal Register (I) descriptions
of its central and field organization including delegations
by the agency of final authority and the established places
at which, and methods whereby, the public may secure information or make submittals or requests; (2) statements of
the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal or informal procedures available as well
as forms and instructions as to the scope and contents of all
papers, reports, or examinations; and (3) substantive rules
adopted as authorized by law and statements of general
policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the
agency for the guidance of the public, but not rules addressed
to and served upon named persons in accordance with law.
No person shall in any manner be required to resort to
organization or procedure not so published.
(b) Opinions and Orders.-Every agency shall publish
or, in accordance with published rule, make available to public
inspection all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of
cases (except those required for good cause to be held confidential and not cited as precedents) and all rules.
(c) Public Records.-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly
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concerned except information held confidential for good
cause found.
RuLE MAKING

Sec. 4· Except to the extent that there is involved (I) any
military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United
States or ( 2) any matter relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts( a) Notice .-General notice of proposed rule making
shall be published in the Federal Register (unless all persons
subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law)
and shall include (I) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of public rule making proceedings; ( 2) reference to
the authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3)
either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. Except where
notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection shall
not apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, or in
any situation in which the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.
(b) Procedures.-After notice required by this section,
the agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to
present the same orally in any manner; and, after consideration of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general statement
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of their basis and purpose. Where rules are required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, the requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall
apply in place of the provisions of this subsection.
(c) Effective Dates.-The required publication or service of any substantive rule (other than one granting or
recognizing exemption or relieving restriction or interpretative rules and statements of policy) shall be made not less
than thirty days prior to the effective date thereof except
as otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found
and published with the rule.
(d) Petitions.-Every agency shall accord any interested
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.
ADJUDICATION

Sec. 5· In every case of adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved
( 1) any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and
the facts de novo in any court; ( 2) the selection or tenure
of an officer or employee of the United States other than
examiners appointed pursuant to section 11 ; (3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or
elections; (4) the conduct of military, naval, or foreign
affairs functions; (5) cases in which an agency is acting as
an agent for a court; and ( 6) the certification of employee
representatives( a) N otice.-Persons entitled to notice of an agency
hearing shall be timely informed of (I) the time, place, and
nature thereof; (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction
under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters
of fact and law asserted. In instances in which private persons
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are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding shall
give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law;
and in other instances agencies may by rule require responsive
pleading. In fixing the times and places for hearings, due
regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the
parties or their representatives.
(b) Procedure.-The agency shall afford all interested
parties opportunity for ( 1) the submission and consideration
of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of
adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding, and
the public interest permit, and ( 2) to the extent that the
parties are unable so to determine any controversy by consent, hearing, and decision upon notice and in conformity
with sections 7 and 8.
(c) Separation of Functions.-The ,Same officers who
preside at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 7
shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 8 except where such officers become unavailable to the agency. Save to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, no such
officer shall consult any person or party on any fact in issue
unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; nor shall such officer be responsible to or subject to
the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for any agency. No officer, employee, or agent
engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for any agency in any case shall, in that or a
factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section
8 except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This
subsection shall not apply in determining applications for
initial licenses or to proceedings involving the validity or
application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities
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or carriers; nor shall it be applicable in any manner to the
agency or any member or members of the body comprising
the agency.
(d) Declaratory Orders.-The agency is authorized in
its sound discretion, with like effect as in the case of other
orders, to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy
or remove uncertainty.
ANCILLARY MATTERS

Sec. 6. Except as otherwise provided in this Act( a) Appearance.-Any person compelled to appear in
person before any agency or representative thereof shall be
accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other
qualified representative. Every party shall be accorded the
right to appear in person or by or with counsel or other duly
qualified representative in any agency proceeding. So far as
the orderly conduct of public business permits, any interested person may appear before any agency or its responsible
officers or employees for the presentation, adjustment, or
determination of any issue, request or controversy in any proceeding (interlocutory, summary, or otherwise) or in connection with any agency function. Every agency shall proceed
with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented
to it except that due regard shall be had for the convenience
and necessity of the parties or their representatives. Nothing
herein shall be construed either to grant or to deny to any
person who is not a lawyer the right to appear for or represent others before any agency or in any agency proceeding.
(b) Investigations .-No process, requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand shall be
issued, made, or enforced in any manner or for any purpose
except as authorized by law. Every person compelled to sub-
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mit data or evidence shall be entitled to retain or, on payment
of lawfully prescribed costs, procure a copy or transcript
thereof, except that in a nonpublic investigatory proceeding
the witness may for good cause be limited to inspection of
the official transcript of his testimony.
(c) Subpenas.-Agency subpenas authorized by law shall
be issued to any party upon request and, as may be required
by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing of
general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
sought. Upon contest the court shall sustain any such subpena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is
found to be in accordance with law and, in any proceeding
for enforcement, shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the witness or the production of the evidence or data
within a reasonable time under penalty of punishment for
contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply.
(d) Denials.-Prompt notice shall be given of the denial
in whole or in part of any written application, petition, or
other request of any interested person made in connection
with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior
denial or where the denial is self-explanatory, such notice
shall be accompanied by a simple statement of procedural or
other grounds.
HEARINGS

Sec. 7. In hearings which section 4 or 5 requires to be
conducted pursuant to this section( a) Presiding Officers.-There shall preside at the taking of evidence ( r) the agency, ( 2) one or more members
of the body which comprises the agency, or (3) one or
more examiners appointed as provided in this Act; but
nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct
of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or
before boards or other officers specially provided for by or

400

APPENDIX

designated pursuant to statute. The functions of all presiding
officers and of officers participating in decisions in conformity
with section 8 shall be conducted in an impartial manner.
Any such officer may at any time withdraw if he deems himself disqualified; and, upon the filing in good faith of a
timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of any such officer, the agency shall determine the matter
as a part of the record and decision in the case.
(b) Hearing Powers.-Officers presiding at hearings shall
have authority, subject to the published rules of the agency
and within its powers, to (I) administer oaths and affirmations, ( 2) issue subpenas authorized by law, (3) rule upon
offers of proof and receive relevant evidence, (4) take or
cause depositions to be taken whenever the ends of justice
would be served thereby, (5) regulate the course of the
hearing, ( 6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent of the parties, ( 7) dispose
of procedural requests or similar matters, ( 8) make decisions
or recommend decisions in conformity with section 8, and
( 9) take any other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this Act.
(c) Evidence.-Except as statutes otherwise provide, the
proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof.
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every
agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence and
no sanctions shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except
upon consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Every party shall have the right to present his case
or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as
may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
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In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits
or applications for initial licenses any agency may, where the
interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt
procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence
in written form.
(d) Record.-The transcript of testimony and exhibits,
together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding,
shall constitute the exclusive record for decision in accordance
with section 8 and, upon payment of lawfully prescribed costs,
shall be made available to the parties. Where any agency
decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing
in the evidence in the record, any party shall on timely
request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary.
DECISIONS

Sec. 8. In cases in which a hearing is required to be conducted in conformity with section 7(a) Action by Subordinates.-In cases in which the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the
officer who presided (or, in cases not subject to subsection (c)
of section 5, any other officer or officers qualified to preside
at hearings pursuant to section 7) shall initially decide the
case or the agency shall require (in specific cases or by
general rule) the entire record to be certified to it for initial
decision. Whenever such officers make the initial decision and
in the absence of either an appeal to the agency or review
upon motion of the agency within time provided by rule,
such decision shall without further proceedings then become
the decision of the agency. On appeal from or review of the
initial decisions of such officers the agency shall, except as it
may limit the issues upon notice or by rule, have all the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision.
Whenever the agency makes the initial decision without
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having presided at the reception of the evidence, such officers
shall first recommend a decision except that in rule making
or determining applications for initial licenses (I) in lieu
thereof the agency may issue a tentative decision or any of
its responsible officers may recommend a decision or ( 2.) any
such procedure may be omitted in any case in which the
agency finds upon the record that due and timely execution of
its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires.
(b) Submittals and Decisions.-Prior to each recommended, initial, or tentative decision, or decision upon agency
review of the decision of subordinate officers the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit for the consideration of the officers participating in such decisions (I)
proposed findings and conclusions, or ( 2.) exceptions to the
decisions or recommended decisions of subordinate officers
or to tentative agency decisions, and (3) supporting reasons
for such exceptions or proposed findings or conclusions. The
record shall show the ruling upon each such finding, conclusion, or exception presented. All decisions (including
initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall become
a part of the record and include a statement of (I) findings
and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon
all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on
the record; and ( 2.) the appropriate rule, order, sanction,
relief, or denial thereof.
SANCTIONS AND PowERS

Sec. 9· In the exercise of any power or authority( a) In General.-No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order be issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.
(b) Licenses.-ln any case in which application is made
for a license required by law the agency, with due regard to
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the rights or privileges of all the interested parties or adversely affected persons and with reasonable dispatch, shall
set and complete any proceedings required to be conducted
pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of this Act or other proceedings
required by law and shall make its decision. Except in cases
of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or
safety requires otherwise, no withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment of any license shall be lawful unless, prior
to the institution of agency proceedings therefor, facts or
conduct which may warrant such action shall have been
called to the attention of the licensee by the agency in writing
and the licensee shall have been accorded opportunity to
demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements. In any case in which the licensee has, in accordance
with agency rules, made timely and sufficient application for
a renewal or a new license, no license with reference to any
activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such application shall have been finally determined by the agency.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Sec. ro. Except so far as (I) statutes preclude judicial
review or ( 2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion( a) Right of Review.-Any person suffering legal wrong
·because of any agency action or adversely affected o~ aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant
statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
(b) Form and Venue of Action.-The form of proceeding
for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified
by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory
judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction
or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction.
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Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the
extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for
such review is provided by law.
(c) Reviewable Acts.-Every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to
judicial review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable shall be subject to review upon the review of the final agency action.
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency
action otherwise final shall be final for the purposes of this
subsection whether or not there has been presented or determined any application for a declaratory order, for any form
of reconsideration, or (unless the agency otherwise requires
by rule and provides that the action meanwhile shall be inoperative) for an appeal to superior agency authority.
(d) Interim Relief.-Pending judicial review any agency
is authorized, where it finds that justice so requires, to postpone the effective date of any action taken by it. Upon such
conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary
to prevent irreparable injury, every reviewing court (including every court to which a case may be taken on appeal from
or upon application for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing court) is authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate
process to postpone the effective date of any agency action
or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
(e) Scope of Review.-So far as necessary to decision
and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency
action unlawfully withhel<:f or unreasonably delayed; and
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(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be (I) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ( 2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of
procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections
7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or ( 6) unwarranted by the
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo
by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions
thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
ExAMINERs
Sec. 11. Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the
extent not inconsistent with this Act, there shall be appointed
by and for each agency as many qualified and competent
examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to
section 7 and 8, who shall be assigned to cases in rotation
so far as practicable and shall perform no duties inconsistent
with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by
the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) after opportunity for hearing and upon the record
thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by
the Commission independently of agency recommendations
or ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of
1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs
( 2) and ( 3) of subsection (b) of section 7 of said Act, as
amended, and the provisions of section 9 of said Act, as
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amended, shall not be applicable. Agencies occasionally or
temporarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners
selected by the Commission from and with the consent of
other agencies. For the purposes of this section, the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require reports by
agencies, issue reports, including an annual report to the
Congress, promulgate rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed necessary, recommend legislation,
subpena witnesses or records, and pay witness fees as established for the United States courts.
CoNSTRUCTION AND EFFECT

Sec. I2. Nothing in this Act shall be held to diminish the
constitutional rights of any person or to limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law. Except as otherwise required by law, all requirements or privileges relating to evidence or procedure
shall apply equally to agencies and persons. If any provision
of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, the
remainder of this Act or other applications of such provision
shall not be affected. Every agency is granted all authority
necessary to comply with the requirements of this Act through
the issuance of rules or otherwise. No subsequent legislation
shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this
Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly. This Act shall take effect three months after its
approval except that sections 7 and 8 shall take effect six
months after such approval, the requirement of the selection
of examiners pursuant to section 11 shall not become effective
until one year after such approval, and no procedural requirement shall be mandatory as to any agency proceeding
initiated prior to the effective date of such requirement.
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Accounting systems, power of
agencies to prescribe, 14.2.
Administrative adjudications,
technique of decision making,
2 I I.

Administrative agencies
characteristics
biased interpretation of evidence, 235·
broadening policy of statute, 225.
effect of discovery powers,
125·
eliminating hearings, 236.
enlarging agency jurisdiction, 225.
interest in result, 20.
keeping criteria of decision
secret, 261.
reliance on discretion, 2 I,
224.
reliance on private consultations, 237.
reluctance to furnish bills
of particulars, I o8.
reluctance to give notice
and hearing, 55·
functions
conducting social experiments, 16.
continuity of supervision,

history
general, 7·
United States, 1 o.
Administrative functions
courts will not exercise, 33·
not judicially reviewable, 33,

308.
Administrative law, definitions,

4·

Administrative officers, personal
liability, 337.
Administrative rules. See Rule
making; Rules.
Alien proceedings
judicial review, 342.
notice and hearing, 63.
Bias and prejudice
interest in result typical of administrative agencies, 20.
personal or pecuniary interest,

157·

personal prejudice, 158.
type of partiality that disqualifies, 157·
Bills of particulars, I03, Io8.
Burden of proof, in administrative proceedings, I 89.

Certiorari, judicial review by
certiorari, 332.
Collateral attack, on administrative orders, 336.
19.
Constitutional fact questions,
execution of preventive legscope of review, 3 I 4·
islation, I4.
Crimes, violation of rules as
uniform application of policrimes, 283.
cies, 19.
Cross-examination, right to, 171.
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Declaratory judgments, use in
administrative proceedings,
336.
Delegation of powers
crimes, delegation of power
to define, 42, 2S3.
limits
cases where constitutional
limits are nonexistent,

45·

stricter where judicial power delegated, 44·
subdelegation
practical problems, 49·
validity, 4S.
tests of validity
discretion in executing law
as against power to make
law, 37·
effect of broad judicial review, 44·
effect of provision for notice
and hearing, 43·
need for expertness, 43·
power to determine facts as
against power to make
policy, 3S.
precluding delegation of
administrative duties to
courts, 33·
preserving essential independence of governmental departments, 31.
preventing delegation of
uncontrolled discretionary powers, 34·
relationship of standard to
establish legal concepts,
41.
subordinate rules within
prescribed limits, 3S.
sufficiency of statutory
standard, 36.
tradition, effect of, 41.

Discovery. See Examination of
books and records; Inspection
of premises; Physical inspections; Reports; Subpoenas.
Discretionary powers
general
effect on judicial review,
345·
tendency to rely on discretion, 21.
limits
cases where unlimited discretionary powers may
be delegated, 45·
effect of separation of powers doctrine, 34·
Due process. See also Procedural
due process.
notice and hearing, s6.
Eminent domain, necessity of
notice and hearing, 64.
Estoppel for failure to exhaust
administrative remedy, principle analyzed, 326.
Evidence. See also Official
notice.
burden of proof
on agency, 1S9.
shifting to respondent, I S9.
common-law rules
not binding, I So, 1S2.
tendency to follow, I So.
exclusion of proper evidence,
ISs.
exclusionary rules
following equity rules, IS I.
immaterial evidence, I 81.
irrelevant evidence, IS I.
power to exclude evidence,
I S1.
general tendency to follow
;:ommon-law rules, 1So.

INDEX
Evidence (continued)
hearsay
deprival of cross-examination, I84.
inferences
contradictory inferences
equally balanced, I 90.
legal residuum rule, I92·
practice of agencies, I 86.
presumptions
agency power to make,
189.
presumption statutes, I 90.
privilege
rules followed, I 84.
receipt of incompetent eVIdence
ordinarily permissible, I 82.
sometimes reversible error,
I84.
substantial evidence rule. See
also Judicial review.
necessity of residuum of
legal evidence, I 92.
rational basis for decision,
I97·
tests of substantiality, I95·
use of record in another proceeding, 204.
written evidence, I 88.
Examination of books and records. See also Subpoenas.
consent of respondent required, I 2 7.
statutes, effect of, I 2 7.
Exhausting administrative
remedies
application of doctrine, 322.
estoppel for failing to exhaust
remedies, 326.
historical basis for rule, 320.
indications of adverse decision,
326.
jurisdiction of agency, 323.

motion for rehearing, 324.
reasons for rule, 3 I 8.
unconstitutionality of agency
action, 324.
when are remedies exhausted
indications of adverse decision, 326.
motions for rehearing, 324.
unreasonable delay, 326.
Fact questions, distinguished
from questions of law, 339·
Fair trial
agency rules, 167.
cross-examination of witnesses, I 7 1.
departure from agency rules,
167, 286.
findings, necessity of, 22 I.
following agency rules, I67.
general requirements, 149·
hearing officer, I76.
impartiality of tribunal
general requirement, I 54·
interest in result immaterial,
154·
personal or pecuniary interest, I57·
personal prejudice, I58.
where all officers prejudiced, 161.
information as to nature of
charge, I05.
interference with presentation
of evidence, I59·
necessity of intermediate report, 220.
private hearings, I64.
representation by counsel,
165.
right to examine opposing evidence, 170.

INDEX
Fair trial (continued)
right to inttoduce evidence,

I7.4·
right to meet agency's case,

I69.
rule that he who decides must
hear case
difficulties of enforcing
rule, 2I9.
extent of mastery of record
required, 2 I 7.
general, 2 I 5.
interrogatories to agency
members, 2 I 9·
methods of determining
whether agency has followed rule, 2 I 9·
need not read record, 2 I 8.
time of hearing, I63.
timeliness of hearing, I 74·
Federal Administrative Procedure Act
bias and prejudice, 158.
cross-examination, I72.
examination of books and records, I27.
hearing officers, I 77, 2 I 5.
judicial review
issues of law, 3I2.
notice and hearing, 83.
official notice, 206.
petitions for adoption of rules,

266.
pleading, I03.
prehearing conferences, I 24.
public participation in rule
making, 264.
publication of rules, 262.
recommended decision by
hearing officer, 2 II.
representation by counsel,

I66.
rule making, 254, 256.
subpoenas, I 4 5.

substantial evidence rule, I 9 7.
time of hearing, I63.
Federal Communications Commission, rule of evidence, I 86.
Federal Register Act, publication of rules, 2 7 3.
Federal Trade Commission
consent orders, I 2 1.
judicial review, scope of, 360.
rule of evidence, I 8 7.
Findings
in connection with rule making, 267.
requirement that findings support decision, 2 2 1.
Hearing. See Fair trial; Notice
and hearing.
Hearing officers
powers, I 76.
qualifications, I 7 7.
responsibilities, I 7 7.
In junctions, method of judicial
review, 336.
Inspection of premises, power to
inspect, I42.
Intermediate reports
agency may eliminate, 220.
general procedure, 2 I 3·
Interrogatories, to members of
agency, limits on, 2I9.
Interstate Commerce CommisSion

judicial review, scope of, 370.
rules of evidence, I 86.
Judge-prosecutor combination
permitted under Constitution,

so.

practical results, 5 I, 22 I.
Judicial functions
limits on quasi-judicial powers,

32.

INDEX
Judicial functions (continued)
necessity of notice and hearing, 57·
scope of review, 343·
Judicial notice. See Official notice.
Judicial power, definition, 28.
Judicial review
administrative procedure
affecting scope of review,

346.
collateral attack, 336.
constitutional facts
reviewability, 3I4.
constitutional limitations. See
Judicial review, limits on.
discretionary functions
scope of review, generally,

345·
estoppel preventing review.
See Estoppel.
exhausting administrative
remedy. See Exhausting
administrative remedies.
fact questions
artificiality of distinction between fact and law, 339·
reviewability of, 339·
fair trial
claim of denial reviewable,

149·
Federal Trade Commission
cases
scope of review, 360.
functions
generally, 305.
injunctions, 336.
Interstate Commerce CommissiOn cases
scope of review, 370.
issues of law
distinguished from questions
of fact, 339·
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generally reviewable, 3 I o.
what are, 3 I 2.
when not reviewable, 311.
jurisdictional facts
history of doctrine, 3 I 3·
not always reviewable, 3I4.
legislative functions
scope of review, generally,
343·
limits on
administrative determination not reviewable, 33,

308.
delay as limiting factor,

306.
generally, 305.
judicial self-restraint, 307.
methods of review
actions for restitution, 338.
certiorari, 332.
collateral attack, 336.
damage action against officers, 337.
effect on scope of review,
331.
injunctions, 336.
mandamus, 333·
prohibition, 335·
statutory methods, 33I.
National Labor Relations
Board cases
scope of review, 377·
prior resort to administrative
remedy. See Prior resort.
questions reviewed. See Scope
of review.
rule-making functions
scope of review, generally,

293, 343·
scope of review
discretionary powers, 345·
experience of agency a factor, 347.

INDEX
Judicial review (continued)
"fact" v. "law" as criterion
of review, 339, 352,
356, 366, 375> 386.
factors affecting
character of administrative procedure, 346,
359> 363, 375, 383.
discretionary powers,
345, 358, 365, 374>
381.
experience of agency,
347, 364, 370, 379·
generally, 330.
legislative v. judicial
functions, 343, 366,
371, 381.
likelihood of fair trial,
348.
public v. private business,
341, 354, 361, 373>
382.
Federal Trade Commission
cases, 360.
Interstate Commerce Commission cases, 370.
judicial functions, 34 3·
legislative functions, 343·
National Labor Relations
Board cases, 377.
rule-making functions, 293,
343·
tax cases, 354·
workmen's compensation
cases, 350.
substitute for notice and hearing, 85.
tax cases, 354·
workmen's compensation,
350.
Jurisdictional facts
scope of review, 313.

Jurisprudence of administrative
agencies
broadening policy of statute,
228.
enlarging agency jurisdiction,
225.
evaluation of evidence, 235·
generally, 223.
reliance on discretion, 224.
reliance on private consultations, 237·
res judicata, 24 I.
stare decisis, 238.
statutory interpretation, 225.
Legislation
drafting
problem of limiting agency
discretion, 46.
preventive
role of administrative agencies, 14.
Legislative functions
limits on delegation of, 28.
necessity of notice and hearing, 57·
scope of judicial review, 343·
Legislative power, definition, 28.
Liabilities, of officers for erroneous decisions, 3 3 7.
Licenses
granting
notice and hearing, 76.
revocation
notice and hearing, 78.
Mandamus
as method of judicial review,
333·
Monopolies and unfair competition
judicial review of decisions
concerning, 360.

INDEX
National Labor Relations Board
consent orders, I 22.
judicial review, scope of, 3 77.
Notice and hearing
form of notice, 94·
necessity of giving
alien proceedings, 63
history of doctrine, 55.
licensing proceedings, 76.
not dependent on legislative
or judicial nature of
function, 57, 67, 7I, 72.
public safety cases, 74·
rate cases, 7 I.
removal of public officers,
64.
rule making, 67.
tax cases, 59·
tests
availability of judicial review as excusing, 6o,
85.
balancing public and
private interests, 64,
75, 82, 88.
discretionary powers,
basis for omitting notice, 59, 78, 88.
hearing v. objective tests,
59, n, 89.
legislative v. judicial
functions, 57, 67, 7I,
72.
number of persons involved, 59, 62, 64,
70, 72.
substantiality of property
interests involved, 59,
64, 66, 75, So.
tendency to require
where few involved,
59, 64, 89.
tradition in particular field,
8I, 87.

ss,

service of notice, 90.
statutory requirements
effect of failure of statute
to require notice, 84.
general, 83·
substitutes for
gener;l effect, 57.
judicial review as substitute,
6o, 85.
sufficiency
tax cases, 6o.
waiver, 87.
who entitled to notice, 91.
Official notice
defined, 206.
freely permitted in certain
cases, 208.
general problem, I 99·
litigation facts not noticed,
202.
making inferences distinguished, 200.
modern rule, 206.
refusal to believe testimony
distinguished, 20I.
use of record in another proceeding, 204.
where agency exercises legislative function, 205.
Opportunity to be heard. See Notice and hearing.
Orders, necessity of findings,

221.
Physical inspections, limits on use
of, I42.
Pleading
amendments, I I o.
answers, I I 2.
bills of particulars, I08.
general rules, I02.
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Pleading (continued)
statutory provisions, I03.
variances, I I o.
Post-office orders, notice and
hearing, 6 5.
Practice before agencies
general role of counsel, 23.
Presumptions, effect on burden
of proof, I 89.
Pre-trial hearings. See Procedure.
Primary jurisdiction doctrine.
See Prior resort doctrine.
Prior resort doctrine
application of rule, 3 I 8.
history of rule, 3 I 7.
limitation on judicial review,
3I6.
reasons for rule, 3 I 8.
Procedural due process, information as to nature of charge,
I05.
Procedural rules, 2 8 I.
Procedure
character of administrative
procedure affecting scope of
review, 346.
prehearing procedure
disposal of cases by consent,
I2I.

narrowing of issues, I I9.
need for regulation, I I 6.
purposes, I I4.
utility to respondent, 115.
rehearing
where original order not
based on hearing, I 24.
Prohibition, use of to review administrative proceedings, 335·
Public officers
removal
notice and hearing, 64.

Public safety cases, notice and
hearing, 74·
Quasi-judicial power, distinction
from judicial power fictitious,
29, 36.
Quasi-legislative power, distinction from legislative power fictitious, 29, 35·
Questions of constitutional fact,
scope of review, 3 I 4.
Questions of fact, difficulty of
defining, 339·
Questions of jurisdiction, scope of
review, 3I3.
Questions of law, distinguished
from questions of fact, 339·
Rate cases, notice and hearing,

7!.
Re-enactment without change,
effect on rules, 280.
Regulations. See Rules and Rule
making.
Reports, power of agencies to require reports, I 4 I.
Res judicata
administrative recognition of
doctrine, 24 7.
cases involving grant, 242.
generally, 24 I.
nonrecurring factual situations, 242.
orders affecting continuing
course of conduct, 244·
Rule making
deferred effective date, 270.
defined, 254·
drafting of rules, 2 7o.
findings
necessity of, 267.
statutory requirements,

268.

INDEX
Rule making (continued)
legislative rules
hearing on proposed rules
defined, 256, 276.
constitutional necessity, 67.
procedural rules, 281.
general practice, 262.
publication, 259, 272.
"re-enactment without
nature of hearing, 265.
history of rule-making powers,
change" doctrine, 280.
reliance on rules, effect of,
253·
interpretative rules
284.
retroactive application, 2 85.
defined, 2 56.
investigation re proposed rule,
suspension of, 286.
tests of validity
264.
legislative rules
arbitrary rules, 297.
character of statute indefined, 256, 276.
volved, 299·
legislative survey of rules,
conduct of public business,
27 I.
301.
notice of hearing
conflict with statute, 293·
constitutional necessity, 67.
due process violated, 297.
petitions for adoption of rules,
exceeding authority con266.
ferred, 2 9 3.
public participation, 264.
extending
statute, 294·
publication of proposed rules,
legalistic
view,
291.
264.
modifying statute, 294·
publication of rules, 259, 272.
need for administrative dissubmission of rules to legislacretion, 298.
ture, 27 I.
restriction
of private rights,
Rules
300.
criminal penalties for violation
tax cases, 301.
of rules, 283.
unreasonableness, 297.
deferred effective date, 2 70.
unrelated to statutory purdisregard of, by agency, 286.
pose, 296.
effect as "laws"
generally, 2 7 5.
Separation of powers. See also
interpretative rules, 279·
Delegation of powers.
legislative rules, 2 77.
combination of legislative, juprocedural regulations,
dicial, and executive func281.
tions, 50.
statutory provisions, 2 77.
Standards
interpretative rules
necessity, in delegating legisladefined, 256.
tive power, 36.
judicial review of rules. See
relationship to established legal
Judicial review.
concepts, 4 1.
Stare decisis
legal effect, generally, 275·
legality. See Tests of validity.
attitude of agencies, 238.
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Statutes
interpretation
agency rules of statutory
construction, 2 25.
economic interpretation,
232·
invalid where statute extended, 230.
Subpoenas
documents in possession of
third party, I 38.
enforcement
application to court, I 30.
contempt proceedings, I29.
privileged matters, I 32.
remedy against improper demand, I40.
right of respondent to subpoena
generally, I43·
power of agency to limit,

I45·
subpoena to agency representatives, I 4 7.
statutes
control issuance of subpoenas, 128.

tests of validity
balancing private and public
interests, I 36.
description of documents,
I31.
form of demand, I36.
invasion of privacy, I 33·
jurisdiction of agency, I 32.
nature of proceeding, effect
of, I34·
relevancy, I 3 I.
Substantial evidence rule. See
Evidence.
Suit for damages, liability of administrative officers, 33 7.
Taxation
notice and hearing in tax
cases, 59·
scope of judicial review in tax
cases, 354·
Witnesses. See Evidence.
Workmen's compensation cases,
judicial review, 350.

